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According to one estimate, about 40 percent of the driving population will be over the age of 60 
by the year 2020 in the UK and currently, several hundred thousand drivers with dementia hold 
driving licenses. The number of motor vehicle crashes per unit distance of automobile travel is 
“U”-shaped, with risk increasing slightly between the ages of 55 and 60, but risk increasing with 
each successive five-year interval. Some individuals who have mild dementia possess sufficient 
driving skills to be designated as fit drivers. The most challenging assessment and decision for the 
physician/licensing  authority  as  regards  fitness  to  drive  lies  in  drivers  who  are  questionably 
demented or are in a state of very mild dementia.  
In the absence of a reliable standard protocol, some clinicians make judgment based on self-
reporting, which has risks associated with it as lack of insight and judgment are potential common 
traits  of  the  population  experiencing  cognitive  decline.  Seldom  is  recourse  made  by  health 
professionals to on-road assessment as a first alternative as it requires a fee and such testing 
centers  are  not  readily  available  everywhere.  This  research  addresses  this  issue  of  the 
identification of cognitive tests that can be used to assess an individual’s ability to drive and 
especially  of  those  individuals  that  are  questionably  demented  and  are  the  most  difficult  to 
identify. A younger and an older group consisting of 56 drivers in total were administered nine 
different cognitive tests and two drives (Drive-I and Drive-II) on the STISIM driving simulator. 
The cognitive test ufov3 (involving the identification of a central target and simultaneously the 
radial  localization  of  a  peripheral target  embedded  in  distracter  triangles),  which  is the  third 
subtest of the UFOV (Useful Field of View) test showed the highest discriminating ability in 
separating  “poor-drivers”  from  “not-poor-drivers”,  with  92.86  %  of  the  drivers  correctly 
classified. The next best discriminating ability in decreasing order of strength was that of dichotic 
listening test, trail making test, rey-copy test and paper folding test. Also, age was found to be an 
excellent  discriminator  of  “poor-drivers”  and  “not-poor-drivers”  with  91.07  %  of  the  drivers 
correctly classified. A composite cognitive measure consisting of the sum of all nine cognitive 
tests  was  not  a  better  predictor  than  the  ufov3  test  alone;  overall  it  was  still  an  excellent 
discriminator,  classifying  89.29  %  of  drivers  correctly.  The  commonly  recommended  Clock 
Drawing test and the Trail Making test did not emerge as significant predictors of driving ability. 
A general driving skills linear model for prediction purposes was derived that explained 59 % of 
the variation in a general driving performance index with the ufov3 test, the dichotic listening test 
and the rey-recall test as significant predictors. Recommendations are made as to how this test 
should be used to screen potentially at risk drivers.                                   
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
The proportion of licensed older drivers is increasing in the general population and a 
substantial proportion within this population group are experiencing a cognitive decline 
in functions that are critical to the driving task. Extended longevity has resulted in an 
increase in the number of people who at some stage acquire a degenerative brain disease. 
These  individuals  desire  to  continue  driving  as  long  as  it  is  possible.  Similarly,  the 
survival rate of people recovering from an acquired brain injury has increased due to 
advances in medical technology and most of them wish to return to driving once they 
have surpassed the acute stage in their trauma. Considering the group performance of 
older drivers we see that there is a general gradual deterioration in driving performance 
with concomitant gradual increase in crash risk. However the individual performances of 
this group of drivers do not follow the same trend by virtue of inherent variability in the 
performance of this group. For example, there may be an older driver who shows signs of 
decline in his early 50s and by the time when he reaches the age of 60, he may be totally 
unable to safely function as a driver. On the other hand, another driver may continue to 
possess sound functional skills that may enable him to continue with the driving task 
without any apparent difficulty until a much later age. Although, older drivers show high 
accident statistics on a per-mile basis, most older drivers can drive safely. It is possible 
that  the  higher  accident  statistics  of  older  drivers  are  on  account  of  the  cognitively 
impaired proportion of this population group because such cognitively impaired drivers 
(having  some  degree  of  cognitive  impairment)  have  not  been  screened  and  are  still 
driving. Older healthy subjects perform the driving task at a level that is comparable with 
healthy young adults. Therefore we may ask whether elderly drives contribute equally to 
the increased risk of accidents or is it that some proportion of this population group are at 
increased risk. 
The difference between the direct effects of normal ageing and that of abnormal ageing 
(dementing disease especially in the early stage) relevant to driving skills, is less than 2 
 
clear-cut. It is possible that subjects exhibiting subtle cognitive changes may in fact have 
transgressed into the early stage of Dementia. Some individuals who have mild dementia 
possess sufficient driving skills to be designated as fit drivers; however, a stage /time will 
come when their cognitive impairment will increase and will ultimately render them unfit 
drivers.  The  most  challenging  assessment  and  decision  for  the  physician  /  licensing 
authority as regards fitness to drive lies in drivers who are questionably demented or are 
in  a  state  of  very  mild  dementia.  The  prerequisite  for  driving  cessation  should  be 
impaired  competence  for  driving  rather  than  a  diagnosis  of  dementia  since  there  is 
evidence that not all drivers in the early stages of dementia are incompetent drivers; the 
driving  abilities  of  mildly  demented/mildly  cognitive  impaired  drivers  have  to  be 
assessed, because no global ruling can be passed relevant to their condition. 
There  are  certain  medical  conditions  that  have  a  tendency  to  bring  about  cognitive 
impairment  to  the  extent  that  safe  operation  of  motor  vehicles  is  not  possible  and 
increasingly, such medical conditions have started to afflict people  at  relatively early 
ages. Even a small but significant number of younger people suffer from dementia who 
are likely to drive a motor car. 
Vehicle testing is carried out in most European countries to ascertain performance of the      
vehicle  as  it  ages  but  no  recourse  is  made  to  testing  elderly  drivers;  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  more  emphasis  is  placed  on  self-declaration  of  illness  (to the  DVLA)  i.e., 
license holders are required under the law to inform the DVLA of any health condition 
that  may  influence  their  ability  to  drive.  Subsequently,  it  is  the  responsibility  of  the 
DVLA Medical Branch to make judgement regarding a person’s fitness to drive. After 
the DVLA is notified, individuals are required to fill and complete medical information 
forms. Medical advisors from the DVLA review and scrutinize these forms and a number 
of strategies are decided to carry out medical review. These may include: (a) requesting 
additional  information  from  the  GP/Consultant,  (b)  referral  for  specialist  clinical 
assessment, or (c) acquiring an independent medical opinion. Some times as the DVLA 
deems necessary, it may require individuals to re-take the standard driving test or may 
refer  him  or  her  to  a  specialist  driving  assessment  centre.  Sometimes  the  family 
doctor/GP on his own initiative may contact the Medical Advisory Branch of the DVLA. 
However,  this  strategy  only  works  if  the  family  doctor  is  fully  aware  of  all  the 3 
 
disabilities/medical conditions and his client’s driving habits. The situation is even more 
critical in cases where drivers suffer from dementia (dementia patients may lack insight 
into their illness), which is difficult to diagnose in its early stages and so many family 
doctors may be unaware of the condition. With regard to the issue of neuropsychological 
tests, there is little consensus on which tests can be used to predict driving safety and also 
which cognitive functions / domains  are more relevant to driving that will assist more 
reliably  in  decision  making  regarding  a  persons  fitness  to  drive.  Hence  there  is  no 
standard testing protocol (that is reliable) for assessing a person’s fitness to drive after the 
onset  of  neurological  or  other  illness.  Therefore,  different  neuropsychological  tests 
tapping  different  cognitive  domains  are  in  use.  Hence,  in  the  absence  of  a  standard 
reliable  protocol,  the  decisions  regarding  fitness  to  drive,  that  are  based  on  the 
neuropsychological tests are doubtful and exude a low level of confidence on part of the 
clinicians/professionals. Due to the lack of a reliable standard protocol, some clinicians 
make their judgements based on self-report, which has risks associated with it as lack of 
insight and judgment are potential common traits of this population group. In this context, 
Christie et al (2001b) while carrying out a survey of clinical psychologists with regard to 
neuropsychological  settings  in  the  UK  in  assessing  fitness  to  drive  after  head  injury, 
observed:  “Overall,  clinicians’  decisions  about  a  client’s  fitness  to  drive  seem  to  be 
based on an eclectic approach with considerable reliance on “clinical impression.””  
Also, the authors observed that a general comment by most respondents was that the 
criterion for opinion on fitness to drive have not been clarified by the DVLA except in 
cases  of  major  mental  afflictions/epilepsy.  Seldom  is  recourse  made  by  health 
professionals to driving assessment as a first alternative as it requires a fee and such 
centres  are  not  readily  available  every  where.  Thus  there  exists  a  need  for  more 
information on assessment of fitness to drive with regard to neuropsychological tests, 
since medical information alone is not sufficient to assist in decision making of fitness to 
drive.  This  will  also  alleviate  the  need  for  the  requirement  of  an  on-road 
evaluation/assessment or can be a supplementary tool in addition to on-road assessment 
and will instill more confidence in decision making on part of the clinician.   
Analysts disagree as to  which tests are best predictors of driving and  at which stage 
driving should cease. There is no single neuropsychological test that can reliably and 4 
 
economically  separate  safe  older  drivers  from  those  that  are  distinctly  unsafe  by 
identifying all deficits that are crucial to driving. Even the on-road driving tests may not 
identify important driving deficits in older drivers. Also, we see that there is in general, 
an absence of  a theory  driven choice of neuropsychological tests. There are plentiful 
neuropsychological  tests  that  are  not  sensitive  and  specific  enough  to  tap  the 
neuropsychological constructs /cognitive domains relevant to driving. A comprehensive 
test battery should be able to tap multiple measures of each cognitive domain or construct 
so that the construct is more fully assessed relevant to the task at hand and also that 
structural or behavioural characteristic peculiar to an individual or group are avoided. The 
“test all” cognitive skills approach adopted with regard to neuropsychological tests does 
not bear relevance/resemblance to the actual driving task while assessing fitness to drive. 
We see that more emphasis has been placed on attributes that apparently seem important 
to  the  driving  task  like  reaction  time  and  general  intelligence  tests,  while  as  little 
conceptual understanding has been developed of the cognitive skills that are required of 
driving. Higher-order cognitive skills are more important relevant to the driving task. 
Studies regarding neuropsychological testing of drivers sometimes have, and sometimes 
have  not,  showed  significant  correlations  with  performance  results  from  a  driving 
simulator/on-road test. These studies although had certain findings/conclusion relevant to 
a group but these could not be extended at the individual level and so could not be used to 
predict the outcome of a driving test for a particular individual. The lack of consistency 
and  sufficient  correlation  between  neuropsychological  tests  and  driving  skill  can  be 
attributed to the methodological disparity and maladoption of a logical test.    
Although, the probability that the performance of older drivers deteriorates increases as 
their age increases, there is considerable variability in their performance profiles. Hence, 
we can not single out a specific chronological age at which a driver should be denied a 
driver’s license. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
 
1.  To  identify  a  series  of  effective  neuropsychological  tests  which  tap  cognitive 
domains/constructs that have significance for the driving task. 5 
 
2.  To determine the relationship between different driving performance parameters 
measured on the simulator and neuropsychological tests.    
3.  To develop a methodology to categorize driver conditions as passed/failed or their 
categorization (based on driving skill). 
4.  To  model  the  relationship  between  categorization  of  drivers  and 
neuropsychological tests. 
5.  To recommend a process whereby potential at risk drivers could be screened for 
further detailed evaluation. 
 
1.3 Methodology (Overview) 
 
In  evaluating  experienced  older  drivers,  it  was  necessary  to  identify  decline  in  their 
driving competence. This could be best achieved by comparing their driving performance 
with  that  of  normal  experienced  drivers  (control  group),  which  would  enable  the 
identification of driving errors that were only present in the group that experiences the 
decline. Therefore a comparative approach was used. 
Participants  were  recruited  through  advertisement  leaflets  that  were  distributed  in  the 
Southampton area including a number of bowling clubs. In carrying out this research, a 
group  of  older  drivers  and  a  control  group  consisting  of  young  age  drivers  (normal 
experienced drivers) were given a battery of neuropsychological tests (cognitive tests) 
and then were made to drive two drives (Drive-I and Drive-II) on the STISIM driving 
simulator. The age requirement for the younger subjects was from 26-40 years, because 
statistically  this  is  the  safest  age  group  and  their  performance  is  less  likely  to  be 
confounded by the effects of age. Also this younger-group-age constraint ensured that 
participants would have at least 5 years of driving experience. The old age group drivers 
were above the age of 60 years. All drivers were to hold a valid UK driver’s license with 
at  least  5  years  of  driving  experience.  Subjects  between  the  ages  of  41  to  59  were 
excluded to minimize cross-sectional overlap in functionality. All drivers were to have 
adequate  visual,  hearing,  communication  and  physical  capabilities  to  complete  the 
simulator driving tests/assessment.  6 
 
A schematic diagram of the methodology adopted in carrying out this research is shown 
in Figure 1.1. The participants were first given a short (3 to 4 minutes) run on the practice 
drive (the beginning portion had S-curves, which can expose drivers prone to simulation 
sickness) to ensure that the driver was not prone to simulation sickness syndrome. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Schematic diagram showing the methodology of research 
 
Nausea,  disorientation  and  ocular  problems  such as  eyestrain,  blurred  vision  and  eye 
fatigue have been reported as some of the indicators of simulation sickness in fixed-base 
Southampton 
Area 
Younger Group 
(age: 26-40 years) 
Older Group 
(age: > 60 years) 
 
1. Battery of Cognitive Tests 
2. Drive-I & Drive-II on STISIM Simulator 
1. STISIM Data Analyzed 
2. Driving Performance 
Parameters Calculated  
Cognitive Tests Scored 
1.  Categorization  of  drivers  based  on  driving 
performance 
2.  Relationships  formed  between  cognitive  tests 
and Driving performance parameters 7 
 
simulators (Mourant & Thattacherry, 2000). If a participant experienced the syndrome, 
the practice drive was immediately terminated and the participant was deemed unfit to 
take the simulation drive. If a participant did not feel any discomfort in the practice drive, 
then the rest of the protocol followed.  
Firstly, participants filled out a brief questionnaire (except part IV which related to post-
simulation  issues),  then  they  were  given  the  following  neuropsychological  tests  in 
random order: (1) Ufov Test (2) Dichotic Test (3) Trail-Making Test (4) Rey-Osterrieth 
Test (5) Paper Folding Test (6) Clock Drawing Test. This was followed by a practice 
drive for the Main Drive (Drive-I) and then the Main Drive. This procedure was repeated 
for the DA and Car-Following Drive (Drive-II). Finally part IV of the questionnaire was 
filled out. Numerous driving performance parameters were calculated from the STISIM 
generated data for further detailed analysis. Statistical techniques were used to extract 
useful information from the data and were subsequently used to categorize drivers based 
on  driving  performance  using  normal-mixture-model  cluster  analysis.  The 
neuropsychological  tests  were  scored  and  then  multiple  linear  regression  and  logistic 
regression techniques used to form relationships between the neuropsychological tests 
and the measures of driving performance.    
 
   8 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The objectives for this chapter were to carry out a detailed literature review relevant to 
the effects of ageing on driving related performance and covered a broad and diverse  
range  of  issues  that  were  relevant  to  the  topic.  In  depth  reviews  were  carried  out 
incorporating  the  headings:  (1)  Accident  Characteristics  (2)  Perception,  Cognitive  & 
Other  Factors  (3)  Driving  &  Alzheimer’s  Disease/  other  Diseases  /  other  factors  (4) 
Neuropsychological testing & Driving (5) Old Age & Mild Dementia and Driving (6) 
Driving Simulator & On-road tests.  
According  to  a  United  Nations  report,  the  median  age  of  the  world’s  population  is 
increasing mainly because of a decline in fertility and a 20-year increase in the average 
life span during the second half of the 20th century (United Nations, 2002 cited in JAMA, 
2003). These factors, combined with elevated fertility in many countries during the two 
decades after World War II (i.e., giving rise to the ‘Baby Boom’ generation), will result 
in an  increase in the  numbers of  persons aged greater than (or equal to) 65 years during 
2010 to 2030. Also, world wide, the average life span is expected to increase another 10 
years by 2050. The largest increases in absolute numbers of older persons will occur in 
developing  countries.  During  2000  to  2030,  the  number  of  persons  in  developing 
countries  aged  greater  than  (or  equal  to)  65  years  is  projected  to  almost  triple,  from 
approximately 249 million in 2000 to an estimated 690 million in 2030 (U.S. Census 
Bureau  cited  in  JAMA,  2003),  and  the  developing  countries’  share  of  the  world’s 
population  aged  greater  than  (or  equal  to)  65  years  is  projected  to  increase  from  59 
percent to 71 percent (Kinsella, 2001).  
It is reckoned that in the United Kingdom, twenty percent of the population is over 60, 
and  by  the  year  2031,  it  would  have  increased  to  30  percent  (OPCS,  1992).  As  the 
proportion of elderly people is increasing in society, they are undergoing a change in their 
lifestyle and expectations. In future, older drivers will be driving greater distances and 
making  more  trips  than  today’s  older  drivers  (OECD,  2001).  Importantly,  more  are 9 
 
currently drivers and expect to continue to drive into their old age. Also, the difference 
between  the  numbers  of  men  and  women  drivers  amongst  the  older  generations  is 
gradually  reducing;  according  to  a  Department  of  Transport  review  (  Department  of 
Transport, 2001), amongst 80-89 year olds in 1993, 44% of men and 11% of women held 
a current driving license. The DVLC (Driver Vehicle Licensing Centre) estimates that 
these figures are to rise to 65% and 35%respectively over the next 15 years. Currently, 
drivers over the age of 70 in the UK are over two million, which are expected to  rise to 
four and a half million by 2015 (Noble, 2000 cited in Department of Transport, 2001). 
Over the last 30 years, the biggest increase in active license holders has been among older 
women. For example, there was a 200 % increase in male drivers over 65 and a 600 % 
increase in female drivers over 65 between 1965 and 1985 as compared with 29% and 
290 % increases in drivers (male and female) aged 17-59. In 1985, 57 % of men over 65 
years of age and 14% of women over 65 held a valid driving license. By 1990, 55% of 
men and 20% of women over 75 years held valid driving licenses (Oxley, 1991 cited in 
Department  of  Transport,  2001).  Thus,  the  difference  in  numbers  of  older  men  and 
women drivers is diminishing rapidly. 
Similarly, in the United States, older adults represent the fastest growing segment of the 
population. This change, which sometimes demographers refer to as the “squaring of the 
pyramid,” is altering the population structure from one in which many young people are 
at the base and few old people are at the top of the pyramid to one that resembles a 
rectangle and has an even distribution at all age groups (TRB Special Report 218, 1988 
a). According to U.S Census estimates, the number of persons aged 65 and older will 
grow by 20 million, or 60 percent , over the next quarter century. Numbers of senior age 
drivers  will  grow  at  an  even  faster  rate,  as  more  elderly  females  and  minorities  are 
licensed and as those already having licenses maintain them longer. In the United States 
one in every seven licensed drivers is aged 65 or older; and by 2030, this number will 
approach one in five (Stutts et. al., 1998). 
As  the  population  ages,  it  is  expected  that  the  elderly  will  drive  their  personal 
automobiles more frequently and for longer distances, and will continue to do so until an 
older age than the elderly have done in the past. This includes not only the older driver 
(65 and older), but also the very old driver (those drivers 80 years of age and older). As 10 
 
the proportion of older drivers in the population increases, the burden of motor vehicle 
collisions  in  older  people  is  also  likely  to  expand.  This  demographic  shift  will  have 
significant implications for safety of older drivers and the public, as it is well known that 
the number of motor vehicle crashes per unit of distance driven is “U”-shaped (see Figure 
2.1),  with  crash  risk  increasing  slightly  between  the  ages  of  55  and  60,  but  greater 
increases in risk with each successive five-year interval (Insurance Institute for Highway 
Safety, 1992). 
  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Driver fatalities and injuries by age, related to population, number of driver 
licenses, and mileage driven (Hakamies-Blomqvist, 2004). 
 
Similarly, the risk of involvement in crashes resulting in a fatality is also “U”-shaped 
relative to driver  age  (Insurance  Institute for Highway Safety, 1992).  According to  a 
Transportation Research Board report (TRB Special Report 218, 1988 b), the proportion 
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of  traffic  fatalities  of  the  elderly  is  approximately  equal  to  their  proportion  in  the 
population. 
An elderly person’s risk of being killed or suffering a serious injury as a result of any 
road accident is between two and five times greater than that of a younger person because 
of their increased physical frailty; because as people age, their bone densities begin to 
decrease and also their immune system becomes weak and therefore, it becomes much 
more  difficult  for  an  older  person  to  withstand  the  impact  and  injury  from  a  motor-
vehicle collision.  When statistics based on all severities are examined, there is no age-
related increase in total number of accidents for those over the age of 60 (DOT, 1997). 
No statistics claim that older people have anything like the number of  accidents that 
young drivers have. For example, in 1996, 4253 drivers aged under 24 were killed or 
seriously injured on British roads, but only 1927 people aged over 60 were killed or 
seriously injured, and the rate per 100,000 population for all severities of accidents for 
the 60-69 age group was 117, whereas for the 20-29 age group, it was 507. However,  
statistics using population as an exposure metric show little increase with age, but when 
the same statistics are worked out by using miles driven as the exposure unit, the situation 
drastically changes as is evident from the “U”-shaped concept demonstrated earlier.  
Accident  statistics  show  a  steep  rise  in  per  mile  automobile  accident  risk  beginning 
around age 65, with the fatality rate per million miles of travel being 17 times that of the 
25-65  age  group  for  those  over  the  age  of  65  (NHTSA,  1997  cited  in  McKnight  & 
McKnight, 1999). As a further refinement of the break-up, the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA, 1994 cited in Rizzo et al., 2001), reckons that drivers 
aged 65 to 69 years are twice as likely to be involved in fatal multi-vehicle crashes as 
drivers aged 40 to 49 years, and drivers aged 85 years and older are 11 times as likely as 
drivers aged 40 to 49 years to be involved in such crashes. Drivers over the age of 65 
years have the second highest fatality rate per mile travelled (the highest rate is held by 
drivers aged 15-24) even though they travel fewer miles per year than younger drivers. 
The fatality rate of drivers aged 80  years and older actually surpasses that of drivers 
younger than 24 years old. This increase is obvious as a function of greater likelihood of 
accident  involvement  and  greater  vulnerability  to  injury  and  death  per  involvement 
(Mackay, 1988). Evans (1991) has estimated that the fatality risk of older drivers grows 12 
 
for ages greater than 20 at an approximately uniform rate of about 2 percent per year. 
Department of transport (UK Department of Transport, 2001 cited in  Hakamies et al., 
2005) has stipulated that the increasing participation of elderly drivers in the future  will 
lead to an increased number of serious accidents. 
 
2.2 Accident Characteristics 
 
The crashes involving older drivers more often occur in complex situations, where the 
driving  task  is  not  self-paced  and  there  is  a  particular  risk  of  cognitive  overload. 
Compared with  younger drivers, they are more likely to be involved in multi-vehicle 
collisions (as opposed to single-vehicle) in intersections and primarily are as a result of 
not  obeying  traffic  rulers  or  traffic  control  devices  and  failure  to  yield  right  of  way 
(Lundberg et al. , 1998; Caird & Hancock, 2002). In a typical intersection crash, the older 
driver  is  making  a  left-Turn  (Right-turn  in  Britain)  maneuver,  when  he  is  hit  by  an 
oncoming vehicle on the main road that has the right of way. As reported by Staplin & 
Lyles ( 1991), older drivers were more likely to turn left (Right in Britain) and collide 
with other drivers, but there was a less chance to be going straight and collide with left-
turning (right-turning in Britain) vehicles. The high share of angle collisions, wherein the 
older drivers are hit from the side by an oncoming vehicle explains in part the serious 
outcomes of their accidents (Hakamies-Blomqvist, 2004).  Past the age of 75, the risk of 
intersection collisions increases substantially for older drivers in almost all intersection 
maneuvers (Staplin & Lyles, 1991; Preusser et al., 1998). About 50 percent of all driver 
fatalities over the age of 80 are at junctions / intersection compared to only 23 percent for 
drivers under the age of 50 (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2000 cited in Caird, 
2005). Also, older Drivers also have been found to be the legally responsible ones in their 
crashes (Dulisse, 1997; Cooper, 1990). In Britain, seventeen to nineteen years olds had 
the highest accident rates, although older drivers (65 and older) had approximately twice 
the  number  of  accidents  involving  failure  to  obey  intersection  control  and  far  higher 
numbers involving turning across traffic ( Moore, et al., 1982 cited in Staplin & Lyles, 
1991). 13 
 
It has been observed that multi-vehicle and side impact crashes account for the majority 
of crashes sustained by older drivers and as compared to younger drivers, their propensity 
of  involvement in side impact crashes is two fold (Adkins et al., 1999). Older drivers are 
also  overrepresented  while  making  maneuvers  such  as  merging  into  traffic,  changing 
lanes and backing up (Evans, 1991; Stamatiadis et al., 1991; Preusser et al., 1998; Staplin 
& Lyles, 1991). It was observed in a study by Mourant (Mourant, 1979 cited in Viano et 
al., 1990) that the accidents of older drivers involving alcohol, skidding or loss of control 
were appreciably lower than the average accident rates. McGwin and Brown (1999) while 
analyzing police crash data in the state of Alabama found out that alcohol involvement 
was much less of a factor in older driver crashes as compared to the crashes of younger 
drivers which involved a single vehicle, one or more driving errors and higher speeds. 
They  also  noted  that  the  most  common  violation  leading  to  crashes  among  crash-
responsible  older  drivers  was  failure  to  yield.  Other  factors  such  as  unseen 
objects/person/vehicle, failure to heed signs/signals, improper lane change and improper 
turns were also among the contributory circumstances as compared to those of middle-
aged and young crash-responsible drivers. Crashes in adverse weather (e.g. rain, sleet, 
snow) were less common among older than either middle-aged or younger drivers. Also, 
older drivers  were less  likely to be involved in crashes caused due to  driver fatigue, 
travelling at high speed, during the  evening and early morning, on curved roads and 
involving a single vehicle. Failure to heed signs and grant right of way at intersections 
have also been cited by Kline et al. (1992) as critical actions manifested by older drivers.  
In a study of the crash database from Kentucky from 1995 to 1999, Chandraratna  & 
Stamatiadis (2003) using logistic regression also found out that relevant to limited-access 
highways,  older  drivers  had  higher  crash  involvement  in  high-speed  lane  changes. 
According to a Federal Highway Administration report, older drivers have an excess of 
turning and entering crashes at stop sign-controlled intersections (Knoblauch et al., 1995 
cited in Preusser et al., 1998). For older drivers, careless or inaccurate lane changes, 
careless backing and driving the wrong way on one-way streets has also been reported 
(Mcknight, 1988; Yaksich, 1985  cited in Guerrier et al., 1999). 
As reported by McKnight & Urquijo (1993), in a study conducted by the National Public 
Services Research Institute, specific behaviours were highlighted for the identification of 14 
 
deficient drivers, based on a 1000 sample of referral forms used by police in five states. 
The primary behaviours that brought drivers to the attention of police officers were: 
•  Driving the wrong way down a one-way street or on the wrong side of a two-way 
street. 
•  Failing to yield or stop. 
•  Leaving the roadway 
•  Turning across oncoming traffic. 
•  Slow speed  
•  Rear-ender 
•  Backing up 
•  Crossing lane markings 
•  Failing to yield to pedestrians or cyclists  
•  Miscellaneous/missed 
These different accidents, violations and observations are summarized in Table 2.1. For 
example, driving the wrong way down a one-way street or on the wrong side of a two-
way street contributed to many violations but few accidents. 
 
Table 2.1 Frequency of Behaviours contributing to Accidents, Violations, and 
Observations of Officers (McKnight & Urquijo, 1993). 
Behaviour  Accident  Violation  Observation  Total 
Wrong way  29  149  13  191 
No yield / stop  74  114  3  191 
Off road  176  8  1  185 
Turning across traffic  46  43  0  89 
Slow speed  0  56  9  65 
Rear-ender  49  0  1  50 
Backing  32  1  1  34 
Crossing lane marking  5  25  0  30 
No yield to pedestrians or cyclist  16  5  3  24 
Miscellaneous/missed  58  43  39  140 15 
 
 
2.2.1 Accident Details 
 
The  complexity  of  dynamic  traffic  interactions  and  traffic  control  information  at 
intersections is indeed a problem for older drivers to reckon with. In typical intersection 
collisions, older drivers apparently fail to see the opposing vehicle in time or do not see at 
all  and  therefore,  are  unable  to  exercise  an  evasive  maneuver  (Hakamies-Blomqvist, 
2004). Since intersections have high traffic and the visual situation is cluttered, therefore, 
there is a tendency on part of the older drivers to fail to detect critical roadway events 
because of the high information load. McKnight & McKnight (1999) reported that older 
drivers  face  considerable  problems  such  as  difficulty  comprehending  instructions, 
judgement of gaps, selection of appropriate speed and visual search, especially in traffic 
intensive situations. 
 According to De Raedt & Ponjaert-Kristofferson  (2001), visual scanning, attention in 
the environs of the visual field, communication with other participants of the roadway  
system and violation of road sign are linked to the inefficient operations of elderly drivers 
at intersections. In an experiment to measure driver comprehension of Left-Turn signal 
and sign configuration, Drakopoulos and Lyles ( 1997) found out that comprehension of 
traffic signals deteriorates with driver age in correct answer rate and serious error rate. 
Consequently, older drivers who misunderstand as to the action they have to take may 
give up their right-of-way or violate another driver’s right-of-way on a greater number of 
occasions as compared to younger drivers.  
Misjudgment of the distance or speed of an oncoming vehicle or misjudgment of gaps is 
the main factor contributing to older drivers’ higher involvement in intersection accidents 
(Stamatiadis  et  al.,  1991).  To  execute  a  successful  turning  act  at  an  intersection,  an 
appropriate gap in the traffic stream must be located, vehicle shifted into the gap and 
accelerated so as to achieve the ambient speed of the traffic flow. A gap may be accepted 
or rejected, as perceived safe or unsafe by the driver; hence gap acceptance behaviour 
may  be  described  as  probabilistic  in  nature.  The  minimum  time  value  is  called  the 
“critical” gap. There are several factors that govern the selection of an acceptable gap: 
vehicular  flow,  vehicle  acceleration  characteristics,  rolling  vs.  complete  stops  and  16 
 
waiting time (e.g. long queue). Staplin & Lyles (1991) reported that older drivers have 
problems judging acceptable gaps and time-to-collision (drivers make an estimate of the 
time it takes moving at a constant speed to reach specified points in their path) and are 
further aggravated by older driver’s generally slower response times. Hills and Johnson 
(1980)  reported  that  younger  drivers  allowed  a  constant  time  gap  and  accordingly 
increased the distance at higher versus lower speed, whereas, older drivers maintained a 
constant distance gap. They also found out that relative to younger drivers, older drivers 
underestimate  approaching  vehicle  speeds,  thus  overestimating  arrival  time  of  the 
oncoming vehicle which can have tragic consequences.  Scialfa et al. (1991) showed that 
older drivers had a propensity for overestimating oncoming vehicle speed at lower speeds 
and underestimation at higher speeds, relative to younger drivers.  
Staplin (1995) while making simulator and field measurements of driver age differences 
in left-turn gap judgements, reported that older drivers relied on perceived distance alone 
while making gap acceptance judgements during left turns (right turn in Britain). Older 
drivers’ gap judgements did not change significantly for vehicles travelling at 48 km/hr 
and 96 km/hr, thus resulting in disproportionate risk for older driver when there is an 
isolated speeder in the opposing traffic stream. However, the young drivers allowed a 
constant time gap, thus catering for greater distance at higher speed versus lower speed. 
However, as pointed out by Hakamies-Blomqvist (1993) there could be an involvement 
of faulty estimation of the time needed for the driver’s own actions / maneuver, keeping 
in view the long experience that older driver has had as a “normal” driver. In other words, 
the older drivers fails to take into account sufficiently their age-related slowing down, 
since  these  changes  are slow  and  gradual  and  are  therefore  overseen  which  result  in 
failure to change time estimates of their own actions in such forced-paced tasks. While 
investigating (multidisciplinary investigation) about fatal accidents of older drivers aged 
65 or more in Finland in 1984 to 1989, Hakamise-Blomqvist (1993) observed: 
“............. the accidents of older drivers were very sudden and would not have been prevented 
by  giving  the  older  drivers  a  few  hundred  milliseconds  more  time,  i.e.  the  amount 
corresponding roughly to the age-bound differences in psychomotor reaction times (Welford 
1980; Summala and Koivisto 1990). Simple or even complex psychomotor reaction times do 
not  reflect  the  augmented  need  of  time  at  intersections  correctly,  and  thus  are  not  a 17 
 
satisfactory basis for road design decisions, because they take into account only the slowing 
down of reactive action, not the slowing down of self-initiated complex behaviour.”      
Older  drivers  also  have  shown  tendency  to  fail  to  anticipate  the  movement  of  other 
vehicles in the intersection, thus leading to errors and conflicts (Treat et al., 1979 cited in 
Caird & Hancock, 2002). The significant differential between the speeds of older and 
younger  drivers  has  been  implicated  by  McGwin  &  Brown  (1999)  as  a  cause  of 
dangerous  accidents.  Latency  in  response  speed,  erratic  behavior  /  maneuvers  and 
hesitancy  of  older  drivers  can  create  ambiguous  scenarios  for  other  drivers  at 
intersections, which can prove catastrophic (Fozard et al., 1994; Hakamies-Blomqvist, 
1994).  Using  in-car  observations,  a  study  performed  by  the  Federal  Highway 
Administration (Byington et al., 2001 cited in Chandraratna & Stamatiadis, 2003) noted 
the poor positioning adopted by older drivers while making left-turns, often failing to 
signal prior to making turns. While studying the crash database from Kentucky  from 
1995 to 1999, Chandraratna & Stamatiadis (2003) noted that high-speed lane changing 
was a problematic maneuver for older drivers and they often failed to detect vehicles in 
blind spots. A closer analysis of such maneuvers revealed that majority of such crashes 
were of the side-swipe type (as compared to rear end crashes).  Involvement in angle 
crashes  was  non  existent  while  they  were  changing  lanes;  this  shows  that  their  lane 
changing behaviour was non-aggressive as compared to younger drivers. Further, while 
analyzing the database, they found out that since a one-way road intersection possesses 
fewer conflict points, elderly drivers had lower likelihood for being involved in left-turn  
(right turn in Britain) crashes on one-way roads versus two-way roads.       
In order to identify driver errors implicated in left-turn (right turn in Britain) accidents, 
Chovan et al. (Chovan et al., 1994 cited in Caird & Hancock, 2002) made an in-depth 
analysis of left-turns and came up with the following factors (exactly reproduced below): 
•  Inadequate slowing before entering the intersection. 
•  Failure to sense or comprehend traffic signals or signs. 
•  Failure to anticipate the actions or intentions of older drivers and pedestrians. 
•  Failure to detect an oncoming or crossing vehicle. 
•  Failure to accurately judge the gap or velocity of an oncoming vehicle. 18 
 
•  The physical masking of oncoming or crossing vehicles by other vehicles already 
in the intersection. 
•  Obscured line of vision by vehicles in front of the driver. 
•  Failure to coordinate travel within the intersection in accordance with the timing 
of the lights. 
•  Weather-related problems and road conditions. 
•  Roadway geometry limiting sight distances. 
•  Driver impairment due to loss of capacity, illness, drugs, fatigue, or alcohol. 
•  Improper signaling. 
•  Driver distraction by internal or external factors. 
•  Poor maneuver execution (i.e., too fast or slow, wrong trajectory) 
•  Driver impatience or hurry. 
 
2.2.2 Accident (Additional Observations) 
 
The  speed  of  traffic  and  the  rapidity  with  which  dynamic  changes  take  place  at 
intersections can not be controlled through actions of the older drivers who fail in these 
situations.    Accidents  of  older  drivers  are  primarily  linked  to  problems  with  visual 
scanning, attention in the periphery of the visual field, interaction with other road users, 
insights regarding traffic situation and violation of traffic control devices (De Raedt & 
Ponjaert-Kristoffersen,  2001).    Hakamise-Blomqvist  (1993),  while  investigating  fatal 
accidents of older drivers aged 65 or more in Finland in 1984 to 1989 found out that 
accidents happened in a sudden manner from the drivers perspective; 44 percent of the 
elderly drivers had not anticipated danger prior to the accident compared with 26 percent 
of the younger drivers, primarily due to attention and perception errors. 
As pointed out by Caird & Hancock (2002), a number of driver error categories have 
been designated as playing a role in the accident causation of older drivers. These include 
failures of perception, attention, cognition and action. Failures of attention translates to 
not seeing the other vehicle at all or seeing it too late such that it is too late to do anything 
about it (Rumar, 1990). Also, it has been found that the time required to search for a 
target or visual search performance worsens with age (Scialfa et al., 1999 cited in Caird 19 
 
&  Hancock,  2002)  and  obviously,  this  could  have  implications  for  intersections  as 
performance in such situations is always under time pressure. 
Although,  accurate  perception  of  distance  to  critical  intersection  features  (e.g.  Static 
features like islands, pedestals and other raised features etc) is necessary for the sound 
use of these facilities, transportation analysts give more credence to motion perception. 
Objects  in  our  environs  such  as  pedestrians  and  vehicles,  are  consistently  changing 
position in time and space. Motion perception is the ability to perceive these changes 
relevant  to  the  task  at  hand.  In  motion  perception,  dynamic  stimuli  (other  moving 
vehicles) are the focus of attraction (Staplin et al., 1998). An estimate of the time taken to 
reach specific points in driver’s path  when moving at constant speed, is termed  time to 
collision (TTC) estimate. Time to collision estimates are hypothesized to be based on 
either  an  optic  flow  process  or  on  a  cognitive  process  (Staplin,  1995).  In  optic  flow 
process,  the  driver’s  analysis  of  the  relative  expansion  rate  of  an  image    (e.g.  an 
oncoming vehicle) over time provides the necessary cue to estimate TTC; in this process, 
the  driver  relies  on  two dimensional  information  and  the  angular  separation  cue  (the 
image gets larger with the passage of time) provide the necessary means to estimate TTC. 
The cognitive process utilizes speed and distance information to estimate TTC and is 
essentially makes use of three dimensional information. As reported by Staplin et al. 
(1998), several  studies (Schiff & Detwiler, 1979; Cavallo, et al., 1986) favour the optic 
flow modality which supports the concept of two-dimensional angular separation cues 
(relevant to background information) to estimate TTC. The optic flow theory has also 
been  favoured  by  Lee  (1976).    As  reported  by  Staplin  (1995),  a  decline  (possibly 
exponential) relevant to younger subjects has been noted in older subjects regarding the 
ability to detect angular movement. In fact, older drivers may require twice the rate of 
movement to get a idea that an object’s motion-in-depth  is approaching, given a brief 
(2.0 seconds)  duration of exposure to the scene (Staplin et al., 1998). 
When  making  a  left  turn  (right  turn  in  Britain),  motion  in  depth  is  in  fact  more 
challenging to the visual system, because expansion rate of the image of the vehicle on 
the head-on approach is utilized and not movement across the retina (in case the other 
vehicle was approaching at a right angle). The human perceptual system is more tailored 
to motion across the visual field versus motion in depth, which is always difficult to 20 
 
reckon with (Liebowitz, 1986 cited in Caird & Hancock, 2002). Schiff and Oldak (1990), 
have observed that estimation of arrival time is more accurate when vehicles approach at 
right angle to the driver. Also, detection of vehicles could be made more difficult by the 
low contrast between vehicles and the environmental background, however, both contrast 
sensitivity and acuity play an important role in road sign recognition (Owsley, 2004). 
 
2.3 Perception, Cognitive & Other Factors 
 
In  order  to  operate  a  motor  vehicle  safely,  multiple  objects  and  events  need  to  be 
continuously monitored so as to be pre-attentive as to where critical hazards may lie. 
Allocation of attention between onboard instruments and the roadway environment and 
coding of information from the perceptual (central and peripheral vision) and other senses 
has to be performed. The knowledge of road rules, awareness of spatial routes, vehicle 
positions  and  operations  and  sound  decision-making  and  execution  are  most  crucial. 
Prompt countermeasures need to be taken on feedback of safety errors and at the same 
time,  achievement  of  travel  goals,  vehicle  operation/integrity,  signs  of  fatigue  or 
incapacity need to be reviewed/monitored and appropriate strategies adopted ( Rizzo, et 
al.,  2001).  These  function  have  been  known  to  decline  with  ageing  and  neurologic 
disease, and can pose significant risk to safe driving operations.  
Coordination and functioning of several cognitive processes is necessary for safe and 
efficient driving, these include perception, attention, memory (declarative, procedural and 
working) and executive functions (decision making and implementation). When these 
processes are impaired, as a result of neurologic or psychiatric diseases, the risk of driver 
error and motor vehicle crashes increases ( Rizzo & Dingus, 1996). Psychomotor abilities  
and general mobility are also important for the safe operation and control of a motor 
vehicle (Marottoli et al.,1994). Impaired decision making is a crucial factor in driver error 
that leads to vehicle crashes (Van Zomeren et al., 1987). Impairments in memory and in 
decision making can coexist independent of each other in the same individual. However, 
decision making will be affected if memory is impaired because memory enables the 
recall of all stored situational contingencies to deal with a specific traffic scenario, which 
will serve as input to the decision making process (Skaar et al. 2003 cited in Rizzo, 21 
 
2004). Cognitively impaired drivers are less likely to realize their errors and thus are 
liable to make driving errors. Cognitive abilities / decrements are a determinant of driving 
behaviour and safety errors, which consequently predict accidents (Rizzo, 2004). In a 
study by Shinar (Shinar, 1978 cited by Parasuraman & Nestor, 1991), it was estimated 
that 25 to 50 percent of motor vehicle crashes result due to driver inattention. According 
to cognitive psychologists, there are at least three types of attention: selective, divided, 
and  sustained  attention  (Parasuraman  &  Nestor,  1993)  (see  glossary).  These  three 
varieties of attention are not independent and separate entities and it has been shown that 
they  are  under  the  control  of  different  but  enmeshed  “networks  of  cortical  and 
subcortical” structures in the brain.           
Rizzo et al. (2004), while elaborating on attention state: 
“Executive functions control our focus of attention (3). Focused attention is thought to permit 
consolidation of information temporarily stored in visual working memory. Without focused 
attention, we can be unaware of marked changes in an object or a scene as in “change 
blindness” (4-7), and traces of retinal images in visual working memory fade without being 
consciously perceived or remembered (“inattentional amnesia”). The very act of perceiving 
one item in a rapid series of images briefly inhibits ability to perceive another image, the 
“attentional blink” (8-10). These perceptual errors depend on interactions between attention 
and working memory and may increase with visual and cognitive decline associated with 
ageing, fatigue, medications, and neurological disease.”   
The ability to engage in independent, purposeful, self-directed and self-serving behaviour 
can be described by Executive functioning. Executive functioning enables a person to 
focus  and  avoid  distraction,  do  multitasking,  have  mental  adaptability,  plan  and 
appreciate  the  future  consequences  of  actions,  self-monitor  for  errors  and  adjust 
behaviour  accordingly  and  have  abstract  reasoning  abilities  (Hopewell,  2002).  Being 
unaware  of  ones  impaired  cognitive  defects  is  termed  as  Anosognosia.  Anosognosia 
stems from deficits in executive function and it can adversely affect the functional effect 
of impairments in other cognitive domains (Anderson & Tranel, 1989 cited in Rizzo et 
al., 2001). Humans are single channel processors and therefore can not simultaneously 
properly attend to more than one item at a time; however, they have the capability to 
switch attention from one task to the other in the driving environment. As pointed out by 
Owsley  et  al.(Owsley  et  al.,  1991  cited  in  Rizzo,  el  al.,  2004),  older  drivers  may 22 
 
experience  a  decrement  in  executive  control  and  thus  the  ability  to  switch  attention 
between tasks that are crucial to driving such as road terrain tracking, keeping track of the 
spatial  change  of  vehicle  locations,  reading  maps,  signs,  traffic  lights  and  in-vehicle 
instruments,  checking  mirrors  and  switching  attention  between  different  sensory 
modalities. Kray and Lindenberger (Kray and Lindenberger, 2000 cited in Bieliauskas, 
2005) stress that age negatively affects the ability to maintain and coordinate alternating 
tasks  in  working  memory.  McDowd  &  Filion  (McDowd  &  Filion,  1992  cited  in 
Bieliauskas, 2005)  suggest that inhibiting attention to irrelevant stimuli is one of the 
primary difficulty that increases with age. 
Automatic tasks in driving for experienced drivers consist of gear changing, lane keeping 
and steering etc., these are routine control tasks and are regarded as automatic compared 
with  monitoring/scanning  and  decision  making  in  dynamic  traffic  situations,  which 
require higher order processing and the use of Working memory. Working memory is 
“….the ability to process information while maintaining intermediate products, goals, and 
associated strategies of processing online” (Naftali, 2000). The importance of working 
memory in driving cannot be overemphasized because, for example, while making a left 
turn (Right turn in Britain), based on the dynamic changing situation of oncoming traffic 
and driver’s own vehicle capabilities (e.g. acceleration), information has to be processed 
/operated on, stored, retrieved and decision made (Guerrier et al., 1999). De Raedt & 
Ponjaert-Kristoffersen  (2001)  also  confirmed  that  visuo-spatial  function  with  working 
memory play an important role in left-turn (right turn in Britain) performance, primarily 
because  the  judgement  of  speed  and  distance  of  oncoming  vehicles  is  involved.  The 
situation is further exacerbated because multiple oncoming and crossing vehicles require 
that  drivers  coordinate  their  turn  movements  into  gaps  that  are  multiply  constrained 
because of the directional split of traffic and that some times more than one lane is in 
each direction. Scialfa et al. (1994) in a study of age differences in the useful field of 
view concluded that decrements in search performance as a result of age are  attributable 
to age related changes in eye movements, working memory  and useful field of view 
(UFOV) (Scialfa et al., 1994 cited in Guerrier et al., 1999).  
With regard to driving, a simple information processing model for understanding driver 
error is shown in Figure 2.2 below: 23 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Information Processing Model for Understanding driver Behaviour. (Rizzo, 
2004). 
 
The crashes of older drivers occur in complex situations where the traffic environment is 
not self paced and the risk of cognitive overload is high; therefore, it seems logical that 
age-associated  cognitive  overload  is  a  primary  logical  factor  in  such  crash  causation 
(Hakamies-Blomqvist,  1996).  Specifically,  cognitive  functions  that  support  adequate 
visual processing and the coordination and integration of perception and motor skills are 
highly  essential  to  the  safe  and  efficient  operation  of  motor  vehicles  in  their 
environments. Many of the skills necessary for operation of a motor vehicle safely may 
be  compromised  with  age  or  as  a  result  of  various  medical  conditions  that  often 
accompany ageing. 
The cognitive functions deemed crucial to the driving task include attention, memory, 
scanning/visual spatial skills, information processing, rapid decision making and problem 
solving (Colsher and Wallace, 1993; Shinar, 1993 cited in Stutts et al., 1998). As pointed 
out by Owsley et al. (1998a), the fulfilment of the requirement of minimum visual acuity 
as per license requirements does not guarantee that an older driver will be safe on the 
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road,  because  there  are  many  other  pertinent  factors  besides  visual  acuity  that  have 
significant ramifications for the safe control of motor vehicles (Owsley, et al., 1998a); 
such  as  visual  field  loss,  contrast  sensitivity  deficits,  visual  attention  impairment, 
cognitive impairment, cardiovascular disease, diabetes and medication usage. The use of 
certain  medications  such  as  sedatives,  hypnotics,  antihypertensives,  antihistamines, 
anticonvulsants, antilipemics, hypoglycemic agents, pain medications and antidepressants 
has been known to be associated with accidents (Ray et al., 1993 cited in Rizzo, 2004). 
The  detrimental  effects  of  certain  medications  on  driving  is  attributed  in  part  to 
neurotransmitter  systems  involved  in  facilitating  decision  making  and  in  working 
memory (Rizzo, 2004). Lundberg et al. (1997) and Ball et al.(1998) support the idea that 
in the crashes of older drivers, visual and cognitive decrements are the most important 
causal factors. Rizzo (2004) states that cerebral visual impairments in drivers makes them 
liable to “look but not see”, despite the fact that information load is low. This resembles 
the situation where neurologically normal operators perform under conditions of extreme 
fatigue (such as for example air traffic controllers during prolonged intensive monitoring 
of radar screens).  
Since driving is a highly visual task, therefore, apparently, it has been assumed that the 
primary cause of the driving difficulty of the elderly is the presence of visual problems 
/eye  diseases.  Accordingly,  most  driving  license  issuing  agencies  have  put  a  lot  of 
emphasis on the assessment of visual acuity. However, as reported by Ball et al. (2006), 
although, several large scale sample studies have attempted but have failed to show a link 
between  visual  deficits  (including  several  indices  of  visual  function)  and  crash 
involvement,  thus  showing  that  visual  function  alone  is  a  poor  predictor  of  driving 
performance.  Conventional  measures  of  visual  field  assess  visual-sensory  sensitivity, 
whereas a test called the Useful field of view (UFOV) is linked to higher order processing 
skills, such as rapid visual-processing speed, selective and divided attention. In a study by 
Ball et al. (1993), to identify visual factors associated with increased vehicle crashes in 
elderly drivers, useful field of view test had high sensitivity (89 percent) and specificity 
(81 percent) in predicting the crash history of elderly drivers. It was observed that older 
drivers with significant deficits in useful field of view were six times more likely to be 
involved  in  accidents  during  the  past  5  years.  Significant  correlation  was  obtained 25 
 
between crashes and eye health status, visual sensory function and chronological age, but 
these  parameters  were  poor  at  distinguishing  crash-involved  drivers  from  crash-free 
drivers. In fact, According to the author, these tests (sensory tests, such as visual acuity 
and peripheral field sensitivity) do not reflect the visual complexity of the driving task, 
and are more relevant to clinical diagnoses and assessment of ocular disease/vision loss. 
The driving environment is quite complex, where vehicle control has to be negotiated in a 
cluttered environment through the simultaneous use of both central and peripheral vision  
to  process  both  primary (high  priority)  and  secondary  (low  priority)  visual  tasks  and 
where the prediction of important events in time and space is unpredictable. Therefore, 
simple visual sensory tests fail to capture the visual demands of driving. In the Ball et al. 
(1993) study, the subjects whose visual acuity was better than 20/20, 43 percent had a 
useful field of view (UFOV) reduction of greater than 40 percent (the threshold amount) 
and  41  percent  of  the  subjects  who  had  a  useful  field  of  view  (UFOV)  reduction  of 
greater than 40 percent (the threshold amount), showed an average loss of visual field 
sensitivity of less than 2.5 dB. Visual sensory and cognitive deficits can occur in older 
people together or separately. In another study (Ball et al., 1990 cited in Ball et al., 1993), 
it  has  also  been  shown  that  UFOV  shrinkage  can  occur  even  in  older  subjects  with 
excellent visual field sensitivity.      
Owsley, et al.(1998a) carried out a prospective cohort study of 294 drivers with three 
years of follow up from 1990-1993 to identify whether measures of visual processing 
ability, including the Useful Field of View test, are related with crash involvement in 
older drivers. In their study, visual attention and visual processing speed was assessed 
using the Useful Field of View test. The Useful Field of View test is defined as (Owsley, 
et al., 1998a):  
“……….. the visual field  area over which one can use rapidly presented visual information. 
Unlike conventional measures of visual field area, which assess visual sensory sensitivity, the 
useful filed of view test additionally relies on higher-order processing skills such as selective 
and divided attention and rapid processing speed. The test consists of a radial localization 
task in which a subject must identify the radial direction of a target (a silhouette of car) 
presented up to 30 degrees in the periphery, while simultaneously discriminating 2 targets 
presented in central vision ( a silhouette of a car versus a truck). By varying the eccentricity 26 
 
of the peripheral target ( at 10 degrees, 20 degrees, or 30 degrees), the visual field area over 
which  a  subject  can  acquire  information  rapidly  can  be  estimated.  In  some  trials,  the 
peripheral target is embedded in distracting stimuli. Thus, the task has both divided attention 
components (i.e., the subject must perform a central discriminating task at fixation while 
localizing a simultaneously presented target) and a selective attention component (i.e., the 
subject indicates the radial direction of the peripheral target even thought it is embedded in 
other discriminating stimuli in the periphery). Another variable manipulated is the duration 
of the test display, which varies from 40 to 240 milliseconds. Performance is expressed as a 
function of three variables: the minimum target duration required to perform the central 
discrimination task (subset 1), the ability to divide attention between central and peripheral 
tasks  successfully  (subset  2),  and  the  ability  to  filter  out  distracting  stimuli  (subset  3). 
Performance in each of the 3 subtests is scaled from 0 to 30. In addition, performance in the 
3 subtests is non independent because speed of processing is relevant to all 3 tests, and 
attention abilities are relevant to subtests 2 and 3. Performance in the overall useful field of 
view task is a composite score expressed as percent reduction (0 percent to 90 percent) of a 
maximum 30 degree field size (maximum field size of the test apparatus screen at the viewing 
distance). Using a previously established cut point, impaired useful field of view was defined 
as a 40 percent reduction or greater.”   
The UFOV task depends on an individual’s speed of processing, divided attention and 
selective attention performance and taps abilities that are vital to driving at the attentive 
(serial) and pre-attentive (parallel) levels. Stimulus and task features that are critical for 
driving are indeed incorporated in the useful field of view test. A driver with reduced 
UFOV may perform as if he or she has tunnel vision and yet he or she may not show any 
abnormality on standard vision perimetry tests, which place more emphasis on maximal 
estimates  of  sensory  function  vis-à-vis  attention  effects  (Rizzo,  2004).  Owsley,  et  al. 
(1998a) found out that older drivers with a reduction of useful field of view of 40 percent 
or greater were more than twice as likely to have experienced an accident. Reduction in 
useful field of view is quite prevalent in the older population. In fact, in a population 
based study, approximately one third of the older subjects had a 40 percent or greater 
reduction in useful field of view (Rubin et al., 1997 cited in Owsley, et al., 1998a). In 
another study, an overall correct classification rate of 85.4 percent (crashes versus no-
crashes) was found  when UFOV was used as predictor variable in a logistic regression 27 
 
model (Goode et al., 1998 cited in De Raedt & Ponjaert-Kristoffersen, 2001). Sekuler et 
al. (2000) describes the deterioration in the useful field of view as a decrease in efficiency 
of  extracting  information  from  a  cluttered  scene.  They  also  found  out  that  the 
deterioration of UFOV starts early in life (by 20 years or younger).  
In another study of older drivers performed in University of Alabama at Birmingham, 
Owsley et al. (1991) found that deficits in information processing ability as measured by 
the  useful  field  of  view  test  and  deficits  in  cognitive  abilities  were  related  to  crash 
involvement. By incorporating their parameters in a model they were able to explain 20 
percent of variance in crash involvement. Further, it was reckoned that older drivers with 
poor  scores  on  the  UFOV  or  exhibiting  poor  cognitive  status  had  3-4  times  more 
accidents (of any type) and 15 times more intersection crashes than subjects without those 
problems. 
Chandraratna & Stamatiadis (2003) studying the problematic driving maneuvers of older 
drivers analyzed the crash database of Kentucky from 1995 to 1999 and found out that 
their high speed lane change crashes consisted 82 percent of the sideswipe type and 10 
percent  rear-end  type.  They  further  inferred  that  the  side-swipe  crashes  reflected 
problems with peripheral vision and inattention and that the rear-end type depicted failure 
to correctly judge distance to the leading vehicle.     
McKnight  and  McKnight  (1999)  contend  that  age  dependant  loss  in  abilities  are 
interrelated such that association between any one ability and driving could be impacted 
by other abilities/variables. For example, the relationship between accidents and visual 
/perceptual deficiencies could be in part or completely due to cognitive deficiency in the 
same person. The effect of age on cognitive abilities is more pronounced than the effect 
of age on perceptual motor tasks. With age, peripheral factors influence reaction speed to 
a lesser extent than higher-order neurocognitive functions (Salthouse, 1985 cited in De 
Raedt & Ponjaert-Kristoffersen, 2001). For example Bieliauskas et al.(Bieliauskas et al., 
1998  cited  in  Bieliauskas,  2005)  compared  the  reaction  time  performance  (to  predict 
driving safety) of non-demented elderly drivers and drivers with dementia and found no 
significant difference. In old age, automatic routines remain relatively well preserved but 
older people find it very difficult to inhibit automatic processes in suddenly changing 
(and unexpected) situations (Rogers  and Fisk, 1991). As pointed out by De Raedt & 28 
 
Ponjaert-Kristoffersen (2001), such situations may be encountered in rear-end accidents 
when  the  leading  vehicle  suddenly  stops;    the  ability  to  switch  from  automatic  to 
controlled processes plays a critical role in such situations.  
The range of head and neck movements are important in order to check for vehicles, 
pedestrians and other obstacles at intersections and in the general roadway environment. 
When drivers approach intersections, distal and proximal visual information from many 
different directions is received through visual scanning using eye and head movement. 
The eyes actually make a series of little jumps while scanning the environment. The 
quick  movements  of  the  eyeballs  from  one  spot  to  the  next  are  called  saccadic  eye 
movements (pronounced “suh-cod-dik”) ( Matlin, 2005). Saccadic eye movement bring 
the centre of the retina, known as the fovea, into position over object (e.g. vehicle or 
pedestrian), because the fovea has better visual acuity than other regions of the retina. 
Fixations, which allow the visual system to acquire information, occur during the period 
between saccadic movements. In order to accurately perceive information, the services of 
central vision have to be mobilized. Central vision occurs within a cone of vision in the 
vicinity of 3 degrees (where visual acuity is highest). Up to 10 degrees ( 10 degree cone), 
vision is fairly clear, beyond 10 degrees lies the region of peripheral vision, which may 
extend up to 160 degrees (160 degree cone) (Papacostas & Prevedouros, 2005). When 
peripheral cues enter the visual field, attentional processes determine which information 
is  relevant  for  further  detailed  inspection  using  central  vision.  Central  vision  also 
facilitates the estimation of speed and distance judgement for gap selection. Isler et al. 
(1997),  while  making  a study  of  age  related  effects  of  restricted  head  movements  of 
drivers  found  that  compared  to  subjects  aged  under  thirty,  the  oldest  subjects 
demonstrated  an  average  decrease  of  about  one-third  of  head  movement  in  the  right 
lateral  plane,  owing  to  physical  neck  conditions  (e.g.,  arthritis,  lower  muscle  tone, 
neurological disorders). When head movement is severely limited, virtually very little 
information is available from the head field, since upper torso movements are restricted 
by  the  car  seat  /belt.  Hence  the  drivers  would  encounter  blind  angles  in  the  traffic 
environment, from which relevant traffic information cannot be extracted. The use of 
larger eye movements (Saccades) to compensate for head movement restriction dose not 
work well as saccades have an amplitude of 15 degrees or less and if frequent larger eye 29 
 
movements are made, it puts considerable strain on the saccadic system (Bahill et al., 
1975 cited in Isler et al., 1997). Also, drivers using corrected lenses may find that turning 
the eye beyond the limit of the lens may not prove useful. Carter et al. (Carter et al., 1983 
cited in Isler et al.,1997) found out that longer saccadic latencies were exhibited by older 
people.  
Many indictors of Physical health are based on the concept of functioning, like as to what 
extent, is the individual able to function normally and to carry out typical daily activities. 
Physical difficulties with instrumental activities of daily living may give indications that 
a person may be having problems with driving. Sims et al.(Sims et al, 1998 & Sims et al, 
2000 cited in Owsley, 2004) reported that older drivers facing difficulty with performing 
such  activities  such  as  walking  a  mile,  opening  a  jar,  doing  garden  chores  or  light 
domestic work were involved in a crash or traffic violations. 
Attention failures (especially at intersections) may result from visual search difficulties 
(McDowd  &  Shaw,  2000)  improper  division  of  attention  (Ponds  et  al.,  1988)  and/or 
inappropriate selective attention (Ball & Owsley, 1991; Parasuraman & Nestor, 1991). 
An important attention failure on part of the driver may constitute as a result of inability 
to effectively detect/monitor changes in a busy intersection where the changes are rapid 
and the environment is dynamic. In this context, Change blindness plays a significant 
role. Change blindness refers to the inability to detect changes in an object or a scene 
(Simons & Levin, 1997 cited in Matlin, 2005), especially when people fail to notice a 
change in some part of a stimulus. According to O’Regan et al. (1999) change blindness 
results,  when  prominent  changes  are  not  noticed  under  natural  viewing  conditions 
because they occur at the same time when a brief visual interruption occurs such as an 
eye movement, a blink, a flicker or a camera cut in a film sequence. In fact, O’Regan et 
al.  (1999)  found  that  the  phenomenon  of  change  blindness  can  occur  even  when  the 
change is not obscured or covered by the disruption. Dangerous events occurring in the 
driving scene can go unnoticed if they coincide with even very small apparently harmless 
disturbances. The variety of perceptual representations rapidly change from one glance to 
the next, as we drive along a busy street. If we precisely tracked each and every detail 
along the way, our visual system would be quickly overwhelmed by the trivial changes. 
Instead, our visual system is geared to forming accurate “integrated gist” or “general 30 
 
interpretation” of a scene (Matlin, 2005). As pointed out by Caird  et al. (Simons & 
Levin, 1997; O’Regan et al., 1999 cited in Caird et al., 2005), recent research does not 
favour the long-held perspective that detailed and coherent picture-like representations of 
the world are stored by people from one view to the next. Instead, stable representation of 
a single object or its spatial location, is achieved through focused visual attention, which 
provides the necessary spatiotemporal coherence; therefore, as long as focused attention 
is  provided  to  an  object  of  interest  or  the  region,  visual  representations  may  exist. 
Changes occurring in parts of a scene where attention is not focused will go unnoticed by 
viewers, primarily because there is no detailed representations of that part at that very 
moment.  Intersections  that  have  high  flows  and  visual  clutter  will  have  a  higher 
probability  of  missed  changes  (e.g.  the  appearance  of  a  vehicle  or a  pedestrian  from 
behind  an  initially  occluding  object)  because  drivers  will  fail  to construct  a  coherent 
representation  of  the  traffic  scene  (i.e.  complete  and  accurate  representation  of  each 
aspect of a visual scene), through focused attention. Caird et al. (2005), while using a 
modified flicker technique in order to induce change blindness so as to find the effects of 
time constraint on decision-making accuracy at intersections of young and older drivers, 
found  that  significantly  more  correct  decisions  (i.e.  when  change  was  detected)  were 
made by young and middle-aged drivers compared to young-old and old-old. Finally, 
Caird et al. (2005) concluded that in particular, elderly drivers are more prone to missing 
important items at intersections thereby generating the typical “looked but did not see” 
(Cairney & Catchpole, 1996) errors. 
Driving  performance  at  intersections  may  also  depend  on  the  important  construct  of 
perceptual style. The extraction of salient information from a complex background is 
termed as perceptual style and field-independent are those people who most demonstrate 
this ability, while as field- dependent least demonstrate this ability (Witkin et al., 1962 
cited  in  Mihal  &  Barret,  1976).  Field-dependent  people  have  more  difficulty 
differentiating  between  relevant  and  irrelevant  information  compared  to  field-
independent  subjects.    Field  dependence  has  been  shown  to  be  related  with  slower 
recognition speeds for traffic signs (Lambert and Fleury, 1994 cited in Mihal and Barret, 
1976)  and  Mihal and Barret (1976) found perceptual style to be related with crash 
involvement in a sample of 75 professional drivers from a utility company. 31 
 
Perceptual, cognitive, physical, sensory and general driving knowledge deficiencies were 
the five main deficiencies identified in older drivers by Ballard et al.(Ballard et al., 1993 
cited in Chandraratna & Stamatiadis, 2003). Specifically, cognitive functions like spatial 
orientation and perceptual speed  have been found to decline in the normal course of 
ageing (Schaie, 1996). In the realm of sight, visual acuity, visual field, light sensitivity, 
night vision, color vision and spatial resolution are prone to decrements with advancing 
age (Ballard et al., 1993 cited in Chandraratna & Stamatiadis, 2003). Janke (Janke, 1994 
cited in Preusser, et al., 1998) and Hu et al. (Hu et al., 1995 cited in Preusser, et al., 1998) 
are of the view that older drivers when confronted with divided attention tasks in visually 
cluttered  environments  where  potential  threats  are  coming  from  the  periphery  face 
considerable  difficulty  negotiating  them.  These  hallmarks  can  usually  be  found  at 
intersections. 
 
2.4 Driving & Alzheimer’s Disease / other Diseases/ other 
factors. 
 
The matter of driver screening is no simple matter. The main problem lies in age-related 
diseases  and  impairments  affecting  driving  skills  rather  than  in  effects  of  the  ageing 
process per se. Since dementing illnesses are common in old age, a certain proportion of 
older drivers are in the early stages of a dementing illness or already clinically demented. 
Dementia is “characterized by the development of multiple cognitive deficits…….. that 
are due to the direct physiological effects of a general medical condition, to the persisting 
effects  of  a  substance,  or  to  multiple  etiologies”  (American  Psychiatric  Association, 
1994). Alzheimer’s disease (one of the common types of dementia), is a progressive age-
related cognitive disorder associated with neurofibrillary tangles, extracellular plaques, 
and neuronal loss in the brain (Rizzo, 2004). Alzheimer disease may in fact be diagnosed 
in individuals as low an age as 50, but it is more prevalent in the old age group. O’Neill et 
al. (1992) report that there is a small but important number of younger people who suffer 
from dementia who drive and are more likely to carry passengers with them in a motor 
car.  It is difficult to distinguish the cognitive deficits of normal ageing from that of mild 32 
 
stages of DAT (Parasuraman & Nestor, 1991) .The most common cause of abnormal 
cognitive decline in older adults is Alzheimer’s disease (Cummings & Cole, 2002). Many 
individuals  with  early  AD  (Alzheimer’s  Disease)  drive  and  their  driving  becomes 
impaired as the dementia progresses. Rizzo et al. (2005) reports that there is considerable 
evidence that progression of the disease begins years before it is clinically diagnosed.  
In  the  very  early  stage  of  DAT  (dementia  of  the  Alzheimer’s  type),  the  cognitive 
decrements that prevail are not distinctly different from those that occur in normal older 
adults and hence the abilities that are pertinent to driving may be intact. Also, those mild 
DAT patients who in the beginning show language related problems, may have relatively 
sound driving abilities. Mild DAT patients who had had a robust cognitive constitution 
before the onslaught of the disease, may still have scores on standardized tests of memory 
and other cognitive functions that are within the bounds of normal functioning although 
compared to their premorbid (before the disease) condition, the decline would be still 
significant (Parasuraman & Nestor, 1991). In Alzheimer’s disease, impairment in recent 
memory is one of the  first cognitive impairment to surface.  Hence driving tasks that 
depend on recent memory like identification of routes etc are likely to be more affected. 
However,  memory  aspects  that  do  not  depend  on  explicit  recall,  like  procedural  and 
implicit memory (such as basic operations of driving an automobile, gear shifting etc) 
tend  to  be  maintained  in  mild  DAT  (dementia  of  the  Alzheimer  type)  (Knopman  & 
Nissen, 1987; Schacter, 1987 cited in Parasuraman & Nestor, 1991). The main issue of 
concern in driving in DAT is that the abilities that enables one to initiate driving are well 
preserved whereas as the abilities that make driving a goal directed and purposeful task 
are affected unfavourably (Parasuraman & Nestor, 1991). A number of compensatory 
strategies  are  employed  by  older  drivers  such  as  the  adoption  of  lower  speeds  and 
avoiding difficult driving conditions (e.g. driving at night, in the rain or at busy traffic 
hours etc) (Hakamies-Blomqvist, 1994). However, in patients with dementia, some of 
these strategies may not work, for example by driving slowly or paying more attention to 
the traffic scene, an impairment in the efficiency in switching selective attention can not 
be compensated (Parasuraman & Nestor, 1991). 
In one study, brain autopsies were performed on 98 older drivers who had died in motor 
vehicle crashes and it  was found that 52 subjects (53 percent) had sufficient neuritic 33 
 
plagues  to  fulfill  the  standard  neuropathological  criteria  to  establish  registry  for 
Alzheimer’s disease ( Johansson et al., 1997 cited in Rizzo et al., 2005). The matter is of 
quite concern due to the fact that none of these drivers were diagnosed as having AD and 
family members were often unaware of the problem and therefore, a fatal crash may 
sometimes be the first sign indicating AD. Since the cognitive decrement associated with 
normal ageing cannot be readily distinguished from that of very early stage dementia, and 
it is very difficult to diagnose the disease in the early stage, a considerable number of 
older drivers may continue driving because many of them will not be diagnosed as having 
the disease by physicians (Parasuraman & Nestor, 1993). Subjects with dementias are at a 
greater  risk  of  becoming  lost  while  driving  and  of  being  involved  in  automobile 
crashes.While examining dementia patients in their clinic, Lucas-Blaustein et al. (1988) 
found that 30 percent of them had been involved in accidents since the commencement of 
cognitive symptoms.  The odds of them being involved in accidents are from 2.5 to 4.7 
times that of age matched control group ( Reger et al., 2004). Retchin & Hillner (Retchin 
& Hillner, 1994 cited in Brown & Ott, 2004) report that the risk of crashes for elderly 
drivers with mild to moderate dementia is probably from 2- to 8-fold, compared to non-
demented  subjects.  Alzheimer’s  disease  (one  of  the  dementias)  affects  10  percent  of 
individuals above the age of 65 and about 50 percent older than the age of 85 (Hebert et 
al., 2003 cited in Snyder, 2005). Carr (1997) reported that after the initial diagnosis, about 
50 percent of the individuals with AD do not stop driving for at least three years. In a 
retirement  community,  Waller  (1967)  reported  that  31  percent  of  the  drivers  were 
suffering from dementia. Compared to unimpaired drivers, drivers with dementia are less 
likely  to  report  problems  with  driving  and  there  is  a  mismatch  between  their  actual 
driving  performance  and  their  perception  of  their  driving  skills  and  that  of  their 
caregivers (Staplin, et al., 1999). Also, they are less likely to limit their driving exposure 
to high risk /complex driving situation than drivers who have intact cognitive abilities, 
but have decrements in visual and physical abilities. Duration and severity of disease are 
important characteristics of dementia that have implications for driving ability. Drachman 
and collaborators (1993) after thorough examination of the issue found out that the risk of 
crashes  rose  above  acceptable  control  rates  beyond  the  third  year  of  the  disease. 
Alzheimer’s disease is a neurodegenerative disease that is irreversible and is the most 34 
 
common  cause  of  dementia  in  older  subjects  (Carr  et  al.,  2006).  The  results  of 
degenerative  diseases  (like  AD)  are  progressive  and  ultimately,  wider  areas  of  the 
cerebral cortex and other regions of the brain are affected, whereas stroke and traumatic 
brain injury results in static brain lesions (Snyder, 2005). All dementias are progressive, 
but the rate of progression is not uniform from individual to individual or disease to 
disease.  Alzheimer  disease  accounts  for  approximately  half  of  all  dementia  cases. 
Features of dementia that help diagnose the disease include impairment of memory and at 
least  one  of  the  following  cognitive  derangements:    aphasia,  apraxia,  agnosia,  or  a 
disturbance in executive functioning which lead to a significant decline from a previous 
level  of  functioning  and  result  in  impairment  in  social  or  occupational  functioning 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The rate of progression of a dementia (such as 
Alzheimer’s  disease)  is  quite  heterogeneous  in  individuals  afflicted  with  the  disease. 
Therefore, instead of putting more emphasis on duration of disease, more emphasis has 
been placed on disease severity. One such measure that is employed is CDR (Clinical 
Dementia  Rating).  Dubinsky  et  al.  (2000)  reviewed  literature  with  regard  to  driving 
ability  and  Alzheimer’s  disease  status  as  determined  by  CDR  rating.  He  used  a 
conversion model to convert previous studies (that were not coded into CDR) into CDR 
rating categories and found out that relative to age-matched controls, subjects with AD 
(Alzheimer’s disease) had a higher crash risk. In particular, those with CDR 1 dementia 
status  had  greater  crash  risk  than  those  with  CDR  rating  of  0.5.  Thus  as  apparent, 
increasing dementia severity leads to deficient driving. Similarly, in a study of Alzheimer 
patients and healthy ageing people, significant relationship was found between Clinical 
Dementia  Rating(CDR)  and  rating  on  a  road  test.  Subjects  having  a  CDR=0  (no 
dementia) were categorized as “safe” drivers (78 percent of CDR=0 subjects),  compared 
to  67  percent  of  CDR=0.5  subjects  (very  mild  dementia)  and  41  percent  of  CDR=1  
subjects (mild dementia). Only 3 percent of CDR=0 individuals were judged “unsafe” 
and 19 percent of CDR= 0.5 and 41 percent of CDR=1 individuals were judged “unsafe”. 
The remaining subjects in each CDR group were classified under the category “marginal” 
(Hunt et al., 1997b; Hunt et al., 1997c cited in Staplin et al., 1999). Rizzo et al. (2001) 
tested  older  drivers  with  mild  to  moderate  cognitive  impairment  due  to  Alzheimer’s 
disease in simulated car crashes at intersections. The results showed that 6 of the 18 35 
 
drivers with AD (33 percent) experienced crashes at the intersections compared to none 
of the 12 non-demented drivers of similar age. Hence most of the subjects with AD did 
not crash and fair control was exhibited by them. The authors suggested that some drivers 
with mild AD remain fit drivers and may remain safe on the road and therefore, they 
should be allowed to drive until such time when their cognitive impairment progresses to 
a state which is predictive of unsafe driving.  
The failure to code, store and retrieve information in memory is the prime defect which 
occurs in early AD. Processing speed and attention abilities decline in AD and ageing, 
which can have profound effect on the information extracted per glance from a scene, 
useful field of view (UFOV) (it gets shrunk), and visual search abilities (e.g finding a 
familiar  face  in  a  crowd,  operation  of  motor  vehicle)  (Rizzo  et  al.,  2000).  There  is 
considerable variation in the extent to which different cognitive domains are affected in 
the early stages of the disease; however, all show signs of gradual progressive memory 
impairment. Performance on IQ, attention, verbal fluency, judgement, visuoconstruction 
and confrontation naming has  also shown signs of decrements.  Cognitive deficits in 
Alzheimer’s  disease  and  other  dementias  have  serious  implications  for  driving,  since 
drivers  are  not  able  to  tackle  multiple  stimuli  simultaneously,  maintain  sustained 
attention, quickly respond to hazardous situations, judge distances and correctly interpret 
traffic control devices (Reger et al., 2004). Many drivers having Alzheimer’s disease do 
not recognize their deficits and even if they do, they tend to down play their significance 
(Wild & Cotrell, 2003). Dementia patients often lack insight into their own behaviour and 
therefore are not good predictor of their own driving impairment. For example, Brown et 
al. (2005) in a study regarding prediction of on-road driving performance in patients with 
early Alzheimer’s disease, examined 75 older adults and concluded that the neurologists’ 
assessments were significantly related to on-road driving scores; however, the caregivers 
assessments were more valid than the self-assessments made by the dementia patients. 
Impaired  awareness  of  one’s  compromised  cognitive  condition  can  result  in  the 
individual  not  taking  steps  to  compensate  for  impairments  and  continue  their  driving 
routine  despite  the  risk.  Van  Zomeren  et  al.(1988)  conjecture  that  self-criticism  and 
insight may be more crucial than the degree of cognitive deficits for a patient’s fitness to 
drive. As cited in Rizzo et al. (2000), James (1890) has explained attention as: 36 
 
“ taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, one out of what seem several 
simultaneously  possible  objects  or  trains  of  thought.  Focalization,  concentration,  of 
consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal 
effectively with others ………” 
In Alzheimer’s disease, orienting attention, focusing attention and sustaining attention are 
at higher risk of showing decline. Therefore, where ever these attention constructs are 
employed,  those  tasks  are  liable  to  suffer  e.g.    tasks  involving  visual  search,  object 
recognition and working memory are particularly at risk (Posner, 1980; Mirsky et al., 
1991; Perry & Hodges, 1999 cited in Rizzo et al., 2000). Rizzo et al. (2000) in a study 
conducted tests of attention and cognitive abilities on 42 individuals with mild AD and 22 
controls subjects without the disease. They found out that divided attention, selective 
attention, sustained attention and visual processing speed (as measured by UFOV test) 
were  the  domains  where  AD  patients  performed  significantly  worse  than  the  control 
group.  Differences  in  age,  education  or  basic  visual  function  did  not  explain  the 
differential performance of the two groups. Parasuraman (Parasuraman, 1998 cited in 
Bieliauskas,  2005)  reports  that  decreases  in  the  speed  of  saccades  (eye  movement), 
problems with shifts in attention and decrements in spatial scale of attention have been 
exhibited by DAT (Dementia of the Alzheimer’s type) patients.    
Fitten et al. (1995) carried out a study involving two mild dementia (mild Alzheimer’s 
disease and mild Vascular dementia) and three age and health control groups in order to 
characterize  on-the-road,  behind-the-wheel  driving  skills  and  related  laboratory 
performances/ neuropsychological tests of subjects with mild Alzheimer’s disease and 
Vascular dementia. The clinic control subjects consisted of 15 age-matched patients with 
diabetes (but without a history of stroke or dementia). Community controls consisted of 
26 healthy age-matched older subjects (>60 years) and 16 young subjects (age 20 to 35 
years). The drive scores of the mild AD group and the Mild Vascular dementia group 
were significantly different from the drive scores of the control group. The drive score 
performance of mild vascular dementia group was relatively better than that of mild AD 
group, and showed greater subject-to-subject variability than did the AD subjects. They 
explained  this  by  reporting  that  vascular  damage  to  brain  areas  that  facilitate  visual 
perception and attention occurs less frequently and consistently than neurodegeneration 37 
 
of AD. It was reported by Fitten et al. (1995) that on the road tests, DAT group drivers 
drove  more  slowly  and  committed  more  errors  (e.g.  driving  into  a  street  with  entry 
prohibited).      
In dementia, language disturbances occur commonly, but it has been noted that memory 
is always impaired. Decrements in memory (along with visuospatial impairments) may 
disorient a person and contribute to getting lost and consequently may result in the driver 
committing errors/violations, because intact short term memory enables a driver to retain 
information. Although language dose not have a direct impact on driving, it can influence 
strategic and tactical decision making (Lundberg et al., 1997). Due to the cumulative 
effects of diverse impairments, sometimes, a decline in two deficits in combination (e.g. 
cognition  and  vision)  may  be  more  detrimental  to  safe  driving  compared  to  a  single 
deficit. Also, certain medications have adverse effects on driving ability. Using the Iowa 
driving simulator, Rizzo et al. (2001) found that accidents of subjects having AD were in 
fact related to visuospatial impairments; also,  they were able to replicate on the driving 
simulator that some, but not all, subjects with dementia exhibit impairment in driving 
skill ( Rizzo et al., 2001; Rizzo et al., 1997). Cox et al. (Cox et al., 1998 cited in Brown & 
Ott,  2004)  using  an  interactive  driving  simulator  to  assess  the  driving  behaviour  of 
Alzheimer  patients  relative  to  age  matched  controls  found  that  Alzheimer  patients 
displayed a propensity for driving slowly relative to the speed limit, driving off the road, 
took more time in negotiating a left turn (right turn in Britain) and applied less brake 
pressure when attempting a stopping manoeuvre.          
Geographic disorientation, driving the wrong way on one-way streets or roundabouts and 
driving too slowly are some of the typical examples of impaired driving ability. Lundberg 
et al. (1997) state that subjects having dementia perform less well compared to elderly 
controls. However, there is considerable overlap between the scores of driving ability of 
the two groups and quite some subjects having mild to moderate dementia are bound to 
pass a standard road test. They further add that under these circumstances then, a standard 
driving  test  will  not  determine  whether  a  subject  with  mild  dementia  will  be  safe  in 
negotiating a critical / hazardous situation that may arise in traffic. Also, owing to the 
degenerative  nature  of  the  disease,  a  standard  driving  test  cannot  determine  whether 
driving  will  be  safe  in  the  future.  Hunt  has  identified  a  list  of  traffic  situations  / 38 
 
manoeuvres that demented drivers find difficult negotiating (Hunt, 1994 cited in Staplin 
et al., 1999), these are: 
•  Left Turn (right turn in Britain) at Intersections: drivers fail to yield right of way 
or inappropriately interpret the traffic control devices with regard to the execution 
of left turns. 
•  Failure to Remember Routes: Even familiar and well travelled routes are not well 
remembered and may lead to the driver getting lost. 
•  Confusion  in  Selecting  Pedals:  Under  stressful  conditions  or  in  emergency 
situations, drivers may press the gas pedal instead of the brake pedal or vice versa.  
•  Complex Driving Situations: in complex situations where the cognitive load is 
high and rapid cognitive processing /problem solving has to performed, the driver 
may stop in the middle of traffic or be unsuccessful in negotiating the traffic. 
Although,  to  an  observer,  stopping  in  traffic  in  that  particular  situation  is  not 
warranted. 
•  Failure of Interpretation: The drivers fail to correctly interpret or perform timely 
interpretation  of  verbal  commands  or  instructions/suggestions  from  a  fellow 
passenger, for the execution of an appropriate response.    
Hunt et al. (Hunt et al., 1993 cited in Brown & Ott , 2004) compared the on-road driving 
performance of subjects having questionable to mild severe AD (Alzheimer’s disease) 
with  that  of  age  matched  controls.  All  subjects  who  had  questionable  or  very  mild 
dementia and the control group (normal subjects) passed the road test, while as 40 percent 
of the mildly demented subjects were deemed incompetent in the road test. In the mildly 
demented group deemed unfit to drive, poor scores was achieved on signalling from curb, 
attending to task, overall judgement, awareness of driving impact on others and driving at 
inappropriate  speed.  Also,  general  cognitive  measure  such  as  the  CDR  (Clinical 
Dementia  Rating)  and  more  specific  tests  of  attention,  visuoperception,  language, 
memory  and  timed  performance  were  correlated  with  driving  performance.  Joint 
mobility, coordination, strength or primary visual abilities did not correlate with driving 
performance. In a similar study that involved a larger sample, Hunt et al. (Hunt et al., 
1997a cited in Brown & Ott , 2004) confirmed their previous observations that the severe 
the dementia (as judged by CDR ratings), the more impaired was the driving. In this 39 
 
study, the percentage of control subjects, very mild dementia subjects and  mild dementia 
subjects who failed the road test were 3 percent, 19 percent and 41 percent respectively.       
ADLs (Activities of daily living) also play an important role in the context of driving 
ability. In one study, activity of daily living scores were related to driving ability whereas 
neuropsychological  tests  did  not  help  identify  those  with  bad  driving  (O’Neill  et  al., 
1992). This makes intuitive sense since it is known that in many forms of dementing 
illnesses, aspects of procedural memory remain for a longer time than episodic memory. 
Like  motor  aspects  of  driving,  many  ADL  functions  come  under  the  rubric  of  over 
learned procedures employing procedural memory and therefore, impairments in ADLs 
may indicate a more severe condition. Since, a mix of both skills i.e. over learned skills 
and ability to respond to novel/unexpected situations is required for the driving task, 
performance of IADL (Instrumental activities of daily living) tasks may better reflect 
performance on the driving task than, for example ADLs (Lundberg et al., 1997). IADL 
are  more  demanding  and  complex  than  ADLs  (McDowell,  2006).  IADLs  includes 
activities  such  as  financial  management,  use  of  transportation  and  shopping  —— 
activities that are more complex and hierarchically arranged that integrate “lower level 
ingrained habits and higher level planning and supervisory functions” (Lundberg et al., 
1997).  In  this  context,  Lundberg  et  al.  (1997),  also  reports  that  typical  crashes  of 
demented drivers when analysed show lack of higher order skills more as a causal factor 
than deficiencies in basic vehicle handling. Carr et al.(Carr et al., 1990 cited in Fitten et 
al., 1995) reported in a study that some degree of cognitive impairment was prevalent in 
more than 60 percent of elderly drivers and that 25 percent of those drivers needed some 
help in bathing and dressing. However, Shua-Haim & Gross (1996) in a study of the 
driving  ability  of  41  patients  with  Alzheimer’s  disease  found  no  correlation  between 
driving performance and functional status evaluated by ADL and IADL. According to the 
authors, both ADL and IADL are general assessment tools for the elderly and are not 
specific  for  assessing  the  functional  status  of  subjects  with  Alzheimer’s  disease  or 
dementia. 
Dobbs  et  al.  (1998)  using  a  comparative  approach  to  identify  unsafe  older  drivers 
assessed 155 older drivers with clinically significant declines in mental abilities on on-
road test and compared them with the performance of a normal  elderly control group (68 40 
 
subjects)  and  a  normal  younger  control  group  (30  subjects).  They  found  out  that 
hazardous errors were the single most important indicator of membership in the clinically 
impaired  elderly  group.  More  hazardous  errors  were  committed  by  the  cognitively 
impaired older drivers than by the two control groups, which had similar performance. 
Further detailed analysis showed that  50 percent of the hazardous errors occurred during 
lane changing, merging and approaching intersection manoeuvres; 21 perfect occurred 
during left turns (right turn in Britain), 15 percent while failing to stop, 6 percent in 
making right turns (left turn in Britain) and 8 percent in stopping manoeuvres.          
There  are  certain  medical  conditions  that  have  a  tendency  to  bring  about  cognitive 
impairment to the extent that they precludes the safe operation of motor vehicles and such 
medical conditions can occur at any age (Dobbs et al., 1998).There are other diseases 
besides Alzheimer’s disease that impact driving ability e.g.,  there are  other types of 
dementia  like  Vascular  dementia,  Frontotemporal  dementia  and  Dementia  with  Lewy 
bodies. Crash risk is not indicated by the presence of a disease condition by itself, but by 
the  extent  of  functional  impairment  caused  by  the  disease  in  the  individual.  In  this 
context, the list includes acute episodes such as seizure, syncope, or stroke, or chronic 
conditions  such  as  cardiovascular  disease  (particularly  when  impaired  cognition  and 
fatigue are also present), neurological disease such as dementia, Parkinson’s disease and 
multiple sclerosis or musculoskeletal diseases such as arthritis (Gilfillan & Schwartzberg, 
2005).  
Also, in the elderly population, the prevalence of multiple clinical co morbid conditions 
and  psychosocial  stressors/factors  can  contribute  to  functional  impairment  (and  thus 
contribute to impairment in driving skills) independent from dementia or in addition to 
dementia. These multiple clinical disorders and the relevant treatments that the elderly 
under  go  can  create  complex  pathophysiology  that  may  have  a  negative  impact  on 
driving, since numerous medication can bring about mental status changes (Wang et al., 
2003 cited in Snyder, 2005).         
Stroke can afflict people at all ages; however, its occurrence is more common in old age. 
Stroke  is  a  relatively  common  medical  problem;  as  per  one  estimate,  as  of  2002, 
4,600,000 stroke victims were living in the United States (American Heart association, 
2002) and the number of drivers who have had a stroke is increasing because of the 41 
 
ageing trends and demographics in United States (JAMA, 2003 cited in Uc et al., 2005). 
In the United Kingdom, each year as many as 5200 people of driving age suffer a critical 
traumatic brain injury (TBI) (Barnes et al., 1998 cited in Radford et al., 2004) and during 
the rehabilitation process, the important question of whether the patient is fit enough to 
resume driving has to be addressed since there are many cognitive impairments, which 
remain. Many of the drivers inflicted with TBI (traumatic brain injury) fail to realize their 
responsibility  of  informing  the  licensing  authority  and  resume  driving  without 
appropriate evaluation or relevant advice (Christie et al., 2001a; Fisk et al., 1998; Pidikiti 
& Novack, 1991 cited in Radford et al., 2004). Stroke causes focal brain lesions which 
can cause problems with navigating around places i.e. topographical disorientation. The 
topographical disorientation can occur as a part of a more broader cognitive decline or it 
can occur in isolation. This can result in the patient getting lost and can result in other 
critical errors while driving. Uc et al. (2004) conducted a study of 32 participants with 
stroke and 104 neurologically healthy control subjects. The participants were given a 
route  following  task  (RFT),  which  placed  demands  on  driver  memory,  attention  and 
perception. The RFT was similar to a real-world situation where a drivers follows verbal 
directions to get to a destination of interest. It was observed that drivers afflicted with 
stroke committed more navigational and safety errors than neurologically healthy drivers. 
The authors stated that executive functions, mental rotation of imagined space/image, 
recognition of landmarks from an altered perspective / unusual angle and comparison 
with  mental  model  compiled  from  the  set  of  initial  verbal  instructions,  all    play  an 
important role in route navigation. As reported by Lundqvist  (2001), impaired attention, 
decrements in cognitive processing speed and executive dysfunction have been known to 
result from brain injury. When brain injury affects the frontal regions, it may result in 
impairment  in  inhibitory  control  and  working  memory,  because,  the  frontal  cortex 
controls attention and executive functions. In a study regarding stroke patients admitted 
to hospital, it was found that 76 percent had a perceptual deficit (Edmans & Lincoln, 
1987 cited in Nouri et al., 1987) and therefore it is important that this crucial factor may 
be taken into account before a return to driving. Nouri et al. (1987) reported that two 
studies  examined  the  effects  of  dysphasia  (impairment  of  speech  and  verbal 
comprehension, especially when associated with brain injury) on driving ability but it was 42 
 
found  that  accurate  prediction  of  driving  skills  was  not  provided  by  language 
performance alone.  
According to Christie et al. (2001a), cognitive impairments in the constructs of memory, 
concentration,  problem  solving,  decision  making  and  general  intellect  have  been 
associated  with  injuries  or  illnesses  affecting  the  brain;  increased  aggression,  which 
reflects changes in personality, may  also occur. The ability to plan, monitor and self 
regulate behaviour (which comes under the rubric of executive functioning) and skills 
such as insight may show decrements in people who have traumatic brain injury (TBI), 
because of damage to the frontal lobe of the brain. Christie et al. (2001b) point out that 
individuals who have executive function deficits usually lack complete insight into their 
impairments. As a result of impaired insight, TBI patients may feel fit to drive, when in 
fact they have poor driving skills. Christie et al. (2001a) while carrying out a study in 
assessment of fitness to drive after brain injury or illness found that correlation between 
the driving instructor’s judgement and the clinicians judgement was 0.8, while as the GP 
(General  Practitioner’s)  judgement  based  on  medical  information  had  low  correlation 
with the driving instructor’s judgement. Therefore, it is apparent that in case of brain 
injured patients medical information alone is not sufficient to enable a decision regarding 
fitness to drive. According to Wilkinson et al. (Wilkinson et al., 1989 cited in Christie et 
al., 2001b), residual deficits in memory, attention / concentration, decision making and 
behavioural control are some of the long term repercussions of severe head injury. For 
very severe cases of TBI (traumatic brain injury) patients who had undergone extensive 
rehabilitation in hospitals, Brouwer & Withaar (1997) after reviewing studies relevant to 
fitness to drive, found that a re-licensing rate of slightly over 50 percent was present; 
while as driving was resumed without any difficulties by the less severe cases. After head 
injury,  in  many  individuals,  driving  skills  may  be  relatively  intact.  In    this  context, 
McKenna (McKenna, 1998) states: 
“The cognitive blueprints for carrying out the motor sequences of movements in driving 
depend on automatic subconscious areas of the brain. This is why many people ………. 
who  have  suffered  a  head  injury………….  are  often  still  able  to  drive  safely  and 
efficiently, at least as far as controlling the car is concerned.” 43 
 
Visual sensory cues are affected in stroke (affecting various regions in the brain) which 
may lead to attentional decline. Also, the ability to recognize landmarks and traffic signs 
is affected, which provide important information relevant to a driver’s route and about 
upcoming  hazardous  situations  and  safety  regulations  (Uc  et  al.,  2005).  When  stroke 
stricken cognitively impaired drivers visually search for roadside targets, it can puts strain 
on  their  limited  cognitive  resources  and  can  bring  about  decrements/impairment  in 
driving performance. In this context, Uc et al. made a study in stroke stricken drivers, to 
assess their ability for visual search, road-side target recognition and their safety errors 
during a landmark and traffic sign identification task (LTIT). It was found that stroke 
drivers who were previously familiar with the area of town where LTIT was carried out 
committed a similar number of at-fault safety errors as the controls. Whereas unfamiliar 
(with the area of town where LTIT was carried out) stroke victims performed more safety 
errors  than  unfamiliar  controls.  However,  the  performance  of  a  subgroup  of  stroke 
stricken drivers was well on all LTIT and some made no safety errors. The authors finally 
concluded that some stroke stricken drivers have intact driving skills and may be allowed 
to continue to drive.    
The prerequisite for driving cessation should be impaired competence for driving rather 
than a diagnosis of dementia. This fact is also reinforced by the statement of Alzheimer’s 
Association Board of Directors: “A Diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease is not, on its own, a 
sufficient reason to withdraw driving privileges. The determining factor in withdrawing 
driving privileges should be an individual’s driving ability. When the individual poses a 
serious  risk  to  self  or  others,  driving  privileges  must  be  withdrawn.”    (Alzheimer’s 
Association, 2001). Brown & Ott (2004) report that organizations such as the American 
Psychiatric  Association,  the  American  Academy  of  Neurology,  the  International 
Consensus Conference on Dementia and Driving, the Canadian Consensus Conference on 
Dementia and the combined group consisting of the American Association of Geriatric 
Psychiatry,  the  Alzheimer’s  Association  and  the  American  Geriatrics  Society  all 
recommend  driving  cessation  for  individuals  with  moderate  to  advanced  dementia 
because  in  these  states,  there  is  sufficient  cognitive  impairment  to  be  detrimental  to 
driving. However, unanimity of decision with regard to patients having mild dementia 
does  not  exist.  Brown  &  Ott  (2004)  further  report  that  the  majority  of  guidelines 44 
 
acknowledge the fact that in mildly demented drivers, driving abilities must be assessed, 
because no global ruling can be applied. They further elaborate that certain organizations 
even  recommend  probing  the  driving  skills  of  drivers  who  have  a  history  of  traffic 
crashes  or  executive  /  judgement  dysfunction.  For  individuals  that  have  moderate  to 
severe dementia, there is strong consensus that they should not drive, however decisions 
regarding those having mild dementia are problematic (Johansson & Lundberg, 1997). 
Brown & Ott (2004) also report that there is evidence to support that not all persons in the 
early stages of dementia are incompetent drivers. A group of researchers was invited by 
the Swedish National Road Administration in order to formulate a consensus of the issue 
of driving and dementia. The researchers (Lundberg et al., 1997) reached consensus that 
in case of moderate to severe dementia, driving should be avoided and certain individuals 
with  mild  dementia  should  be  considered  for  specialized  assessment  with  regard  to 
driving competence. They also stipulated that a periodic follow-up is sufficient for mildly 
impaired non-demented drivers who have a stable and acceptable functional level and 
who do not exhibit any evidence of driving impairment. Carr et al.(2006) suggest that 
repeat testing at six- to 12-month durations must be conducted because driving skills are 
likely to decline. They also report that some patients with dementia do not recognize their 
driving  impairments  (due  to  lack  of  insight)  and  therefore,  resist  efforts  from  family 
members  to  prevent  them  from  driving.  The  American  Academy  of  Neurology  in  its 
consensus  statement  on  driving  and  dementia  has  recommended  that  patients  with  a 
severity  rating  of  CDR=1  or  greater  should  cease  to  drive,  because  they  have  a 
substantially increased accident rate and driving performance errors; patients having a 
severity rating of CDR=0.5, pose a significant traffic safety problem and in their case, the 
Academy recommends that the patient should be referred to a qualified examiner for 
assessment of driving performance. The recommendations further add that since dementia 
is  a  progressive  disease,  therefore,  clinicians  should  reassess  dementia  severity  and 
driving performance every 6 months (Dubinsky et al., 2006). However, one aspect is 
without doubt: owing to the progressive degenerative nature of the disease, there is a 
time, when ultimately all demented drivers become incompetent drivers.  
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2.5 Neuropsychological testing & Driving. 
 
Rizzo et al. (2005) while studying impaired response implementation of older drivers 
with  cognitive  decline  on  a  driving  simulator,  administered  a  variety  of 
neuropsychological  tests  and  concluded  that  neuropsychological  tests  predicted  driver 
performance  and  error  because  negotiating  driving  scenarios/situations  depends  on 
multiple cognitive domains, just as neuropsychological tests do. The authors assessed 
older drivers by observing their response to an emergency vehicle (such as a police car) 
parked by the road side. In such situations, drivers are required to detect and recognize an 
object in peripheral vision, recognize the situation, select an appropriate response and 
execute a safety manoeuvre in order to reduce the potential for crash with the vehicle or 
running over people situated in the vicinity of the police car. They suggested that older 
drivers  with  cognitive  decline  show  decrements  in  situation  awareness  or  executive 
control with regard to response implementation at the level of choosing one of several 
possible learned evasive motor manoeuvres/actions.   
To a large extent, driving is automatized and is mediated by mental schemata. Schemata  
is a pattern imposed on a complex reality or experience to assist in explaining it, mediate 
perception, or guide response. But when complex situations arise or an unexpected event 
occurs,  then  controlled  processing  is  required.  These  shifts  between  automatic  and 
controlled  processing  take  place  as  per  the  demand  of  the  traffic  scenario  and  the 
experience of the driver. Controlled processing comes into play when routine reactions do 
not suffice and the complexity of the situation necessitates the use of attention controller, 
the  central  executive.  Thus,  efficient  driving  is  achieved  through  directed  driving 
behaviour  and  attention  control.  Traffic  situations  usually  require  action  to  be 
implemented  within  a  short  period  of  time.  Time  pressure  can  affect  controlled 
processing, since information has to be held in working memory temporarily. Therefore, 
processing speed is dependent on working memory (Lundqvist, 2001).  
The  intrinsic  primary  function  of  neuropsychological  tests  is  to  assess  psychological 
functions at a functional level, while on-road tests evaluate an individual for driving skills 
at an activity level. Sometimes, the two approaches form divergent assessments primarily 
because in driving activity, individuals’ adaptive/compensatory measures, experience and 46 
 
attitudes and motivation also play role in maintaining safety, which are not accounted for 
in the neuropsychological tests (Summala, 1997; Matthew et al., 2000 cited in Lundqvist, 
2001). For example, despite neuropsychological impairment, drivers who are well aware 
of  their  dysfunction  and  have  a  long  experience  in  driving,  may  adapt  their  driving 
behaviour.  
Reger et al. (2004), while conducting meta-analysis of 27 primary studies to examine a 
relationship between neuropsychological functioning and driving ability for adults with 
dementia, found a significant relationship between neuropsychological functioning and 
driving  ability  as measured by  on-road tests  and non-road tests. They  found out that 
decline in cognitive functioning is accompanied by concomitant decline in driving ability. 
However, when care givers report was used as a measure of driving ability, mixed results 
were obtained when the relationship between driving ability and cognitive functioning 
was analysed. Visuospatial skills and attention were deemed the most helpful in screening 
at  risk  drivers.  Visuospatial  skills  enable  a  multitude  of  tasks  including  correct 
automobile positioning and manoeuvring on the road, judging distances and forecasting 
spatial position of vehicles or their evolution in the road environment. Selective, divided 
and sustained attention are essential for the detection of potential hazards, to negotiate 
competing stimuli at intersections and to maintain sustained vigilance on trips that are 
long (Lundberg et al, 1997). Reger et al. (2004) suggested that while assessing driving 
skills on the on-road test, variation in traffic and road conditions and subjective scoring 
increase  the  variability  of  on-road  scores,  hence  weakening  the  strength  of  the 
relationship with neuropsychological test scores.   
Assessment  of  mental  status  is  carried  out  when  fitness  to  drive  is  considered.  As 
reported by Reger et al. (2004), Fox et al.(1996) found that 94.7 percent of Aged  Care 
Assessment  Teams  used  the  Mini-Mental  Status  Examination  (MMSE)  for  assessing 
cognitive functioning, when evaluating fitness to drive. However, Reger et al. (2004) 
from their meta-analysis of 27 primary studies found out that when control and demented 
subjects  were  included,  mental  status  (as  measured  by  MMSE)  showed  a  moderate 
relationship  to  road  test  scores,  but  when  control  participants  were  excluded,  the 
significant relation ship ceased to exist. They commented that this may be due to the fact 
that only middle to late stages of some dementias (including Alzheimer’s disease), may 47 
 
reliably show signs of mental status changes and therefore, these stages would reflect 
universal changes in driving ability. Therefore, by including subjects with Alzheimer’s 
disease (who experience mental status changes) and also control, quite large correlations 
are observed. Brown & Ott (2004) also report that mixed results have been obtained 
regarding MMSE and driving impairment. Fitten et al. (Fitten et al.,1995 cited in Brown 
& Ott , 2004) report that correlation between driving scores and MMSE scores at the 
middle range of the scale may exist but less so in the higher range of MMSE (27/30 and 
higher). However, in two studies ( Fox et al., 1997; Trobe et al., 1996 cited in Brown & 
Ott , 2004), MMSE could not predict future traffic violations or future accidents, because 
the MMSE is a very brief general cognitive measure that places emphasis on orientation 
to  time  and  place,  language  (naming,  repetition,  comprehension,  reading,  writing, 
copying), attention and calculation (serial 7s, spell “world” backward) and immediate and 
delayed recall (three words) ( Strauss, et al., 2006). Snellgrove (2005) reports that the 
MMSE does not cater to the assessment of executive functions. The Swedish National 
Road Administration invited a group of researchers to frame a consensus on the issue of 
driving and dementia; relevant to the MMSE, one proposal (Lundberg et al., 1997) called 
that cut-off scores on the MMSE must be considered as being relative, and should form 
only a small part of the basis of decision making about driving and should always be 
secondary to a clinical evaluation. In the report (Lundberg et al., 1997) an MMSE score ≤ 
10  when  accompanied  by  a  diagnosis  of  dementia,  warrants  immediate  cessation  of 
driving,  because  it  indicates  a  sufficiently  low  level  of  cognitive  functioning.  Other 
paradigms relevant to other score ranges of the MMSE were also forwarded, but not all 
experts agreed on the proposals.     
Duchek et al. (1998) examined the relationship between visual attention measures and 
driving performance in healthy older adults and individuals with mild dementia of the 
Alzheimer type. Subjects were assessed on on-road driving trials and were administered 
computerized  experimental  visual  attention  tests.  They  found  out  that  measures  of 
selective  attention  (i.e.  visual  search  performance)  had  better  predictive  power  than 
psychometric  performance  tests.  They  inferred  that  many  psychometric  tests  are  not 
process-specific, but are rather reflective of general processes and hence these tests may 
tap  general  cognitive  status,  rather  than  skills  necessary  for  driving.  They  finally 48 
 
concluded that selective attention is related to driving skills in the early stages of DAT 
(Dementia of the Alzheimer type). 
In a study of 38 brain injured subjects, Korteling & Kaptein (1996), assessed participants 
on tests of perceptual speed, time estimation, tracking reaction, information processing 
and  an  on-road  test.  They  found  out  that  perceptual  speed  and  time  estimation  were 
significantly related with driving performance. 29 brain damaged patients and controls 
were put to neuropsychological tests, simulator driving and on-road testing by Lundqvist 
et al. (1997). The neuropsychological tests correctly classified 80 percent of the patients. 
Based on the outcome of their findings, they recommended using neuropsychological 
tests  that  measure  attention,  information  processing  and  executive  functions.  The 
predictive validity of clinical opinions and neuropsychological tests to the outcome of an 
on-road driving test was evaluated by Christie et al. (2001a) in 39 subjects with head 
injury or generalized brain damage. Logistic regression was used to identify 5 tests that 
were  significant  predictors  of  driving  skill.  These  tests  measured  visual  memory, 
executive abilities, spatial awareness and attention. On account of practice or due to the 
over-learned nature of the driving task, some brain damaged people have the ability to 
compensate for their deficits. A mismatch may result between neuropsychological tests 
(that  measure  psychological  functions  at  a  functional  level)  and  driving  performance, 
because besides cognitive functions, the role of experience, adaptability and motivation 
can  not  be  downplayed  in  driving  (Ranney,  1994;  Lundqvist,  2001;  Lundqvist  & 
Ronnberg, 2001 cited in Radford et al., 2004). Van Zomeren et al. (1988)  report that 
controlled  attentional    processes  are  impaired  after  head  injury,  while  as  automatic 
processes  are  not.  Nouri  et  al.  (1987),  while  investigating  the  relationship  between 
cognitive ability and driving after stroke, in which 39 pre-stroke drivers were assessed 
using a battery of cognitive tests and an on-road test, finally concluded that cognitive 
tests  which  involve  complex  reasoning  skills  appear  most  highly  related  to  driving 
performance. 
Parasuraman  et  al.  (1992)  tested  15  patients  with  mild  to  moderate  dementia  of  the 
Alzheimer type and 15 healthy, age matched controls in order to examine cue-directed 
shifts of attention for a letter-discrimination task. Valid, invalid and neutral cues were 
given (indicating probable target location) through the use of central arrows that preceded 49 
 
the display of every letter. It was found that the reaction times when valid cues were used 
did not differ between DAT (dementia of the Alzheimer type) subjects and the control 
group. However, the reaction times of DAT subjects were significantly greater than the 
control group, when invalid cues were used suggesting that in early DAT, subjects retain 
the ability to focus attention to a spatial location, but show impairments in the ability to 
switch or disengage attention. Parasuraman & Nestor (1993) report that the ability to 
switch attention is also correlated with driving performance in normal individuals. 
Studies  have  been  conducted  in  the  past  to  explore  the  relationship  between  driving 
performance  and  experimental  measures  that  gauge  the  efficiency  of  focusing  and 
switching attention. For example, Kahneman et al. (1973) conducted a study in which a 
test  of  auditory  selective  attention  (the  Dichotic  Listening  Test)  was  given  to  117 
professional bus drivers aged 22 to 32. In the dichotic listening test given to the subjects, 
a series of digits and word were presented at the same time to each ear. The drivers were 
told to concentrate attention on one specific ear (i.e. one specific channel) and to report 
the digits appearing on that specific channel. In the second part, they were told that when 
they hear a “particular” tone, they have to switch attention to the other channel (other ear) 
and report digits from that channel (on 50 percent of the second parts, the same ear is the 
relevant channel). Essentially the test was used to gauge three categories of errors in the 
realm of selective attention:  
1.  Number of errors committed in reporting the digits from the relevant ear (channel) 
(omission errors). This measure indicated the extent to which there was inability 
to focus attention on the relevant channel. 
2.  The number of digits reported from the irrelevant channel (intrusion errors). This 
measure indicated a person’s vulnerability to distraction. 
3.  Since 50 percent of the second parts involved switching to the other channel, thus 
the number of errors in (1) and (2) as explained above following the switch in 
relevant channel in the second part were coded as switching errors (switching 
errors).This measure indicated failure of the attention mechanism responsible for 
switching.  
Correlation coefficients of 0.29 and 0.31 were obtained between the number of errors 
committed in reporting the digits from the relevant channel and the number of digits 50 
 
reported from the irrelevant channel respectively with vehicle crashes over a one year 
period.  And  a  correlation  coefficient  of  0.37  was  obtained  between  the  number  of 
switching errors and crashes over a one year period. Similar findings have been replicated 
in other studies. In an even earlier study by Gopher & Kahneman (1971), the dichotic 
listening test was applied to a highly pre-selected group of cadets (of high-performance 
aircraft) in the Israel Air Force and a significant correlation of 0.36 was found with a 
three-level criterion in pilot training. For predicting different criteria of proficiency in 
flying high-performance aircraft, the test had promising validity. Also, pilots of high-
performance interceptor and attack aircraft had significantly better performance (on part 
two of the test) than pilots of transport and slower jet aircraft. They finally concluded that 
in driving / flying under normal conditions and in the second part of the dichotic listening 
test,  the  requirement  to reorient  attention  is  a  common  feature.  The  ability  to  switch 
attention as measured by the dichotic listening test is an indicator of overall performance 
since in the driving and flying tasks, the operators of the machines (car & plane) do not 
passively  wait  for  orienting  signals  but  have  to  rapidly  switch  attention  between  the 
stream of events taking place. Intuitively, one would think that how is it possible that the 
scores on the dichotic listening test (a test dependent on auditory modality) could be 
correlated with crashes, when driving is apparently a predominantly perceptual task.  To 
elaborate on this aspect, Avolio et al. (1985) conducted a study in which the auditory 
selective attention test (the dichotic listening test) and a visual selective attention test 
(developed  by  the  author  on  the  model  of  the  auditory  selective  attention  test  and 
constructed to equal as a visual counterpart of the auditory selective attention test), were 
given to seventy two drivers (aged from 28-59). The authors found out that all three 
categories of errors on the auditory selective attention test (dichotic listening test) were 
significantly  correlated  (in  the  predicted  direction)  with  individual  accident  rates. 
However, in the visual selective attention test, only omission errors and switching errors 
were significantly correlated (in the predicted direction) with individual accident rate. 
The intercorrelations among the errors of the auditory selective attention test and the 
visual selective attention test were positive and significant. Also, it was observed that the 
correlations between the switching errors of the auditory selective attention test and the 
visual selective attention test had the highest correlations (among the test battery) with 51 
 
individual  accident  rate.  Finally  the  authors  concluded  that  since  both  measures  of 
selective attention (i.e. both modality-specific measures i.e. auditory as well as visual) 
were correlated with each other and were also correlated with an external task (i.e. the 
individual accident rate), therefore both may be tapping a central cognitive construct / 
domain,  that  is  modality-free.  However,  the  most  distinct  differentiation  between  the 
successful  and  unsuccessful  cadets  was  provided  by  the  switching  error  category. 
Similarly,  in  this  study  also,  the  authors  concluded  that  since  there  were  high 
intercorrelations  between  all  three  categories  of  errors  and  the  dichotic  listening  test 
predicted  performance  in  the  “primarily  visually  loaded  piloting  task”,  therefore  the 
dichotic listening test in essence was tapping a single central cognitive function that was 
modality  free.  Parasuraman  &  Nestor  (1991)  give  a  list  of  other  studies  (along  with 
relevant data in tabular format) that show significant correlation starting from 0.3 to 0.4 
between measures of driving performance (some driving index) and at least one measure 
of selective attention. One primary fact that surfaces from these studies is that the largest 
correlations were obtained from the switching error category of selective attention. In this 
context, Kahneman et al. (1973) at the conclusion of their study suggested that to reorient 
attention from an earlier state of attention to a channel/stimulus is more difficult than to 
initially apply focused attention from an uncommitted waiting state. Posner (Posner, 1980 
cited  in  Parasuraman  &  Nestor,  1993)  has  described  these  attention  activities  as  the 
disengagement and engagement of attention, respectively. Disengagement and reorienting 
of attention are the particular attention traits that have shown signs of impairment in 
patients with mild DAT (dementia of the Alzheimer’s type), although, there is no marked 
decrement in the ability to focus attention in these individuals (Parasuraman et al., 1992). 
For the detection of unpredictable or infrequent events for extended periods of time, it is 
necessary that sustained attention or vigilance be maintained. However, it has been noted 
that when driving has been maintained for a long period of time (e.g. sitting behind the 
steering wheel for many hours), decrements of attention occur and detection speed (of 
stimuli) and accuracy tend to be affected adversely (Davies & Parasuraman, 1982; Warm, 
1984 cited in Parasuraman & Nestor, 1993). Since under conditions of extended driving, 
a person’s vigilance level tends to decrease and so it would seem logical to propose that 
crashes may result under certain driving environments. However, a robust association has 52 
 
not been found despite the fact that numerous studies have been conducted (Parasuraman 
& Nestor, 1993) to prove such an association. 
With regard to neuropsychological tests that facilitate in determining whether a dementia 
patient is safe to drive,  Lundberg et al.(1997) stipulate that numerous neuropsychological 
tests are not sensitive and specific enough to tap the behavioural and cognitive features 
/domains  that  may  affect  driving.  They  further  add  that  some  studies  have  shown 
reasonably high correlations between driving competence and neuropsychological tests, 
however, results have seldom been replicated and may not be applicable to the clinical 
setting.  Especially,  problems  in  the  generalizability  of  correlational  findings  occur 
because the correlations were derived from general population samples and are being 
applied to a target clinical population. Also, common neuropsychological tests fail to add 
extra predictive power over and above that is known on the basis of a subject’s diagnostic 
status,  because  these  tests  are  often  part  of  diagnostic  batteries.  According  to  Lezak 
(Lezak, 1983 cited in Christie et al., 2001b), impairment in high level functions such as 
“executive” functioning is particularly difficult to detect, because situational inflexibility, 
perseveration,  social  disinhibition  and  impulsivity  are  masked  by  the  motivating  and 
structured  context  of  formal  neuropsychological  testing.  The  driving  task  can  be 
considered in terms of three levels of behaviour i.e. strategic, tactical and operational, but 
there  is  no  provision  in  standard  neuropsychological  tests/probes  to  measure  such 
attributes (Michon, 1985 cited in Rizzo et al., 1997 & Van Zomeren et al., 1987).   
Gopher (1982) gave the Dichotic Listening Test to 2000 flight cadets in the Israeli Air 
Force  and  found  switching  errors  had  the  highest  correlation  with  success  in  flight 
training and the dichotic listening test did add to the predictive value of the test battery 
employed for pilot selection and concluded that since there were high intercorrelations 
between  types  of  errors  and  the  dichotic  listening  test  predicted  performance  in  the 
“primarily visually loaded piloting task”, therefore the dichotic listening test in essence 
was tapping a single central cognitive function that was modality free. Kahneman et al. 
(1973) conducted a study in which a test of auditory selective attention (the dichotic 
listening test) and a brief form of Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test (a short intelligence 
test)  was  given  to  117  professional  bus  drivers  aged  22  to  32.  Finally,  the  authors 
reported that “the validity of the selective attention test (dichotic listening test) was not 53 
 
due to differences in intelligence; the short intelligence test ………did not discriminate 
significantly between  the criterion groups,  and its correlation with the attention test 
(dichotic listening test) was low.” Also, Parasuraman & Nestor (1991) report that they 
conducted  a  study  of  older  and  younger  drivers  and  found  small  and  non-significant 
correlation  between  accident  rate  and  Wechsler  Adult  Intelligence  Scale  (intelligent 
quotient). An ideal neuropsychological test should must have high validity and reliability, 
should possess good sensitivity and specificity, be simple and speedy to implement, and 
should not be expensive and be well tolerated by subjects (Fitten, 2003). In describing the 
general  characteristics/attributes  of  neuropsychological  tests,  Ball  et  al.  (2004)  have 
highlighted that:(a) a single neuropsychological test does not reflect a pure measure of a 
single cognitive domain, (b) a single test only partially taps a specific domain, (c) more 
than  one  domain  are  tapped  by  almost  all  neuropsychological  tests,  (d)  many  of  the 
measures obtained from different neuropsychological tests are highly related because the 
cognitive constructs themselves are interrelated. 
Tallman (Tallman, 1992 cited in Reger et al., 2004)  states: “……Thus, what is (needed) 
are tests that are correlated with driving abilities within a mildly impaired group of 
individuals”  
 
2.6 Old Age & Mild Dementia and Driving 
 
With regard to health, the elderly are considered a very heterogeneous group. Even in 
older people of the same age, there exists considerable variability in different attributes. 
After middle age, health deteriorates exponentially over a period of 1 to 3 decades. Some 
older people experience a quite rapid decline in health while others will have a slow 
decline and they will be afflicted with disabilities quite late in life (Fitten, 2003). Hence, 
global decline is rarely observed (Schaie, 1996). During the course of normal ageing, 
some cognitive functions e.g. spatial orientation and perceptual speed have been found to 
decline (Schaie, 1996). Older drivers are more sensitive to noise and hence in performing 
a task, they require stronger signals to react (i.e. they have a lower signal-to-noise ratio) 
(Lundberg, 2003). Also, older adults have problems related with the spatial and temporal 
integration of items into larger units, which may reflect their deficits in working memory 54 
 
(Welford, 1985 cited in Lundberg, 2003). The onset of age-associated diseases affecting 
cognitive functions even further exacerbates the situation and thus increases the risk of 
motor  vehicle  crashes  in  elderly  drivers.  Compared  with  old  age,  in  DAT,  there  is 
considerable  loss  of  neuronal  cell  loss  and  also  there  are  far  greater  number  of 
neurofibrillary tangles (Morrison & Hof, 1997; Price et al., 1991 cited in Parasuraman et 
al., 2000).    
Fitten et al. (1995) carried out a study involving two mild dementia and three age and 
health control groups in order to characterize on-the-road, behind-the-wheel driving skills 
and  related  laboratory  performances/  neuropsychological  tests  of  subjects  with  mild 
Alzheimer’s disease and Vascular dementia. The clinic control subjects consisted of 15 
age-matched  patients  with  diabetes  (but  without  a  history  of  stroke  or  dementia). 
Community controls consisted of 26 healthy age-matched older subjects (>60 years) and 
16 young subjects (age 20 to 35 years). There was no significant difference in the drive 
scores of the three control groups and the older healthy individuals performed at a level 
that was comparable to that of the young healthy adults, in a suburban type drive. 
Although there is increased likelihood of cognitive impairment in older drivers, Withaar 
et  al.  (Withaar  et  al.,  2000  cited  in  Bieliauskas,  2005)  report  that  the  results  of 
neuropsychological tests show a wide variation (within this group) and hence translates 
into  mild  to  moderate  correlations  with  accidents.  Bieliauskas  (2005)  reports  that  the 
effects on driving of normal ageing and abnormal ageing (dementing diseases) are not 
clear-cut. The results from past studies may have been wrongly interpreted, as in those 
studies,  demented  individuals  may  have  been  included  in  the  apparently  healthy  old 
group,  because  they  did  not  show  clinical  symptoms  of  dementia  (but  in  fact  had 
undergone delicate cognitive changes). This would have erroneously shown a general 
impairment in the driving skills of the apparently healthy group and would have falsely 
given  the  impression  of  a  continuum  between  normal  ageing  and  abnormal  ageing 
(dementing diseases). 
Daigneault et al. (Daigneault et al., 2002 cited in Bieliauskas, 2005) in a study of older 
drivers of age of 65 and above suggested that measures of executive function could help 
in the identification of those older drivers that are at significant risk of accidents and it is 
these drivers who fail to exercise compensatory behaviour in their driving protocol. Since 55 
 
the  prefrontal  cortex  has  important  contribution  in  exercising  executive  control 
(Funahashi, 2001), therefore putting more emphasis on executive functioning is quite in 
harmony with the “frontal ageing hypothesis” which stipulates that in the ageing process, 
the prefrontal cortex is one of the most affected areas of the brain (Bieliauskas, 2005).  
Driving is a day to day real-world example of a divided-attention task, because in driving, 
the driver has to coordinate different activities under both low traffic and high traffic 
situations. If the activity being performed is automatic in nature or has been automatized 
through practice or experience, then the task will impose low divided-attention demand. 
However,  when  traffic  conditions  become  dense  or  when  the  driver  has  to  negotiate 
complex  manoeuvres  in  cluttered  environments  such  as  at  busy  intersections,  then 
divided  attention  demands  may  exceed  the  attention  capabilities  of  drivers.  Spare 
attention capacity can be assessed by assigning drivers a secondary task as they perform 
different  driving  manoeuvres.  McKnight  &  McKnight  (1993)  made  a  study  of  150 
subjects  using  simulated  driving  conditions  in  which  individuals  were  expected  to 
respond  to  different  traffic  situations  by  means  of  manipulation  of  simulated  vehicle 
controls. The drivers were subjected to a variety of distractions such as: placing a cellular 
phone call, carrying a cellular phone conversation, carrying on an intense cellular phone 
conversation, tuning a radio and no distraction. It was found that there were significant 
differences in nonresponse with regard to age. In the age group above 50, there was an 
increase of about one-third in nonresponses under all of the cellular phone distractions. 
Similarly, Brown et al. (Brown et al., 1969 cited in Parasuraman & Nestor, 1993) found 
that more “effortful”  activities such as judgement of distance in intersection crossing 
manoeuvres were more unfavourably affected than “automatic” activities such as gear 
changing,  when  drivers  were  assigned  a  reasoning  task  on  a  telephone  headset.  The 
literature does not report any studies that relate divided attention tasks to accident rate in 
drivers. With old age, efficiency in tasks that employ divided attention is known to show 
decrements especially when such tasks are of a complex nature; however, some studies 
do  not  corroborate  this  finding  (McDowd  &  Craik,  1988;  Salthouse,  1991  cited  in 
Parasuraman  &  Nestor,  1993).  Therefore,  it  is  likely  that  in  older  drivers,  divided 
attention tasks are able to gauge driving performance, but in younger drivers, they are not 
expected to make fruitful contributions to prediction of driving performance.  56 
 
A state known as mild cognitive impairment (MCI) has been identified as a state that is 
some  where  between  the  state  of  cognitive  changes  of  normal  ageing  and  that  of 
Alzheimer’s disease (see Figure 2.3 & 2.4). The memory loss experienced in MCI is 
greater than that one expects in normal healthy ageing but still they do not meet the 
standard  criteria  for  clinical  diagnosis  of  Alzheimer’s  disease  (Petersen  et  al.,  2001). 
However,  in  MCI  patients,  the  rate  of  progression  towards  clinically  probable 
Alzheimer’s disease is more accelerated than that of healthy individuals of the same age. 
The figure below shows the theoretical continuum for those subjects who progress from 
normal ageing to MCI and then to dementia. As can be seen in the figure, there is some 
overlap between the extremities between normal ageing and MCI and between MCI and 
between early dementia. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Theoretical Continuum from normal cognitive ageing through to MCI and to 
dementia (Petersen, 2003). 
 
As reported by Morris et al. (2001), MCI is diagnosed by the following observations: (a) 
proof of impairment in memory, (b) general cognitive and functional abilities are intact, 
and (c) diagnosis does not show dementia. Drivers afflicted with MCI also may exhibit 
reduced  driving  competence  (Snellgrove,  2005).  In  normal  cognitive  ageing,  there  is 
general decrement in the speed with which information is processed, the efficiency with 
which new information is acquired also decreases, there is cognitive inflexibility and the 
working  memory  shows signs  of  reduction  (Anstey  et  al.,  2003;  Rue,  1992;  Nilsson, 
2003; Salthouse & Meinz, 1995 cited in Snellgrove, 2005). 
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Figure 2.4 Concept of Mild Cognitive Impairment (Huang, 2003) 
 
Several scales are being used in classifying individuals along a continuum from normal 
ageing to the various stages of dementia. One such commonly used scale is the Clinical 
Dementia Rating Scale (CDR) (Morris, 1993 cited in Petersen et al., 2001).According to 
this  scale,  subjects  classified  under  rating  of  CDR  0  are  normal,  CDR  0.5  have 
questionable dementia, CDR l have mild dementia, CDR 2 have moderate dementia and 
CDR 3 have severe dementia. Some analysts even regard CDR 0.5 as representing MCI, 
while other think that CDR 0.5 represents both MCI and mild Alzheimer’s disease. A 
large percentage of subjects with MCI progress to dementia. Snellgrove (2005) reports 
that  about  15  percent  of  individuals  with  MCI  develop  dementia  within  an  year,  40 
percent over 2 years, 53 percent in 3 years and almost 100 percent within 5 years. While 
as Petersen et al. (Petersen et al., 2001 cited in Lundberg, 2003) report that the conversion 
of MCI to AD (Alzheimer’s disease) varies between 20 and 50 percent with an annual 
conversion  rate  from  10  to  15  percent.  Petersen  et  al.  (2001)  report  that  the  Mayo 
Alzheimer’s Disease Research Center in Rochester, Minnesota made a longitudinal study 
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of MCI subjects for more than 10 years and found that up to 80 percent converted to 
Alzheimer’s disease status during approximately 6 years. Morris et al. (2001) and Bennett 
et al. (2002) (cited in Lundberg, 2003) report that progression of the condition depends 
on  the  extent  of  the  impairment  at  baseline.  According  to  the  opinions  of  some 
researchers, MCI is not a separate disease, but rather it represents very early dementia 
(Fellgiebel, et al., 2004; Morris et al., 2001; Ritchie, et al., 2001 cited in Snellgrove, 
2005), because of its high conversion rate to dementia. While Bozoki et al. (Bozoki et al, 
2001 cited in  Lundberg, 2003) have found out  that MCI may sometimes be a stable 
condition and the risk of it being converted to dementia is elevated when indications of 
memory decline and impairments of other abilities are present in the same individual. 
In early AD (Alzheimer’s disease), patients are known to show impaired performance on 
memory tests, tests of delayed recall and tests framed to measure new learning (Petersen 
et al., 1994; Welsh, et al., 1991) and deficiencies of attention, executive function and 
language have also been noted, but it has been found that mild AD is better characterized 
by deficits in more than one cognitive domain (rather than by relying on memory alone) 
(Masur, et al., 1994). According to Petersen et al. (2001), neuropsychological tests alone 
cannot be used to diagnose Alzheimer’s disease and the importance of clinical judgement 
in this context cannot be overemphasized. Snellgrove, 2005 (Davis & Rockwood, 2004; 
Kawas, 2003; Petersen, 2003 cited in Snellgrove, 2005) gives a list of the clinical criteria 
for MCI, which are shown below: 
1.  Memory Complaint, preferably corroborated by an informant. 
2.  Memory  impairment  at  level  of  >  1.5  standard  deviations  of  age/education 
psychometric norms. 
3.  Clinical Dementia Rating (CDR) score of 0.5. 
4.  Intact general cognitive function.  
5.  Essentially preserved activities of daily living (ADLs). 
6.  Not demented according to diagnostic criteria. 
There  are  many  factors  that  affect  performance  on  neuropsychological  tests,  which 
include education, age, cultural background and illnesses other than Alzheimer’s disease 
(Inouye,  S.K.,  et  al.,  1993  cited  in  Petersen  et  al.,  2001).  Also,  because  of  the 
commonalities  of  neuropsychological  profiles  in  different  types  of  dementia, 59 
 
neuropsychological  tests  cannot  fully  differentiate  between  the  different  types  of 
dementia (Heyman et al., 1998; Ferman et al., 1999 cited in Petersen et al., 2001).   
Greenwood  et  al.  (1997)  in  a  study  of  individuals  with  mild  DAT  (dementia  of  the 
Alzheimer type) and older subjects found out that there was a reduction in the control of 
spatial  focus  of  attention  in  Alzheimer’s  disease  subjects  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in 
advanced age. In a task that involved cued-visual search which allowed for cueing with 
variable precision of a target letter in an array of letters, the benefits of spatial cueing for 
the old-old group were greater than that of the DAT group but were lower than that for 
the  young-old  group.  The  authors  finally  concluded  that  the  ability  to  control  spatial 
attention lies on a continuum from healthy young adults to the young-old, through the 
old-old to individuals with mild DAT. 
In another study, Parasuraman et al. (2000) used a cued visual search task to investigate 
the dynamic range over which spatial attention influences the identification of target by 
conducting  visual  search  tasks  to  42  participants  that  consisted  of  15  non-demented 
“young-old” adults (65-74 years), 15 non-demented “old-old” adults (75-85 years) and 12 
subjects having DAT (Dementia of the Alzheimer’s type) in its early stage. The precues 
were valid, non-valid or neutral. In the non-demented subjects, it was found that as the 
precision of a spatial cue (that preceded the search target) increased (i.e. size of precued 
area decreased), the speed of detection (i.e. reaction time) of a target situated amongst 
distracters also increased. The cue size effect was greatly reduced in both the old-old and 
the DAT groups when compared to that of the young-old group, however the old-old and 
the DAT groups did differ in the range over which the effects were found; in the DAT 
group, spatial attention was confined to the cues that were the most precise. The authors 
explain that the partial similarity of results between the old-old and the DAT group may 
be due to the fact that there are some individuals in the old-old group that are in a very 
early preclinical stage of DAT. Finally, they conclude that the shrinkage in the dynamic 
range of spatial attention may reflect an underlying factor of the impairment in perceptual 
and memory functioning in early DAT. 
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2.7 Driving Simulator & On-road tests 
 
Two kinds of errors are committed in the driving task: (a) low-frequency high-severity, 
and  (b)  high-frequency  low-severity.  If  driving  behaviour  in  diverse  traffic 
environments/manoeuvres  is  objectively  measured,  it  can  disclose  crucial  and  latent 
relationships  between  these  two  kinds  of  errors  which  can  help  in  the  prediction  of 
driving safety in individual drivers (Wierwille et al., 2002 cited in Rizzo et al., 2005). 
Thus in order to accurately estimate the risk of an accident (which is a low-frequency 
high-severity  error),  it  is  necessary  that  a  sufficient  number  measurable  safety  errors 
(which  are  high-frequency  low-severity  events)  be  evaluated/assessed  (Rizzo  et  al., 
2001). 
Driving skills can be assessed either on a driving simulator or an on-road test. Because 
the driving simulator provides strictly controlled conditions in a synthetic environment, 
hence it provides a good opportunity to study the effects of cognitive impairment on 
driver errors. In a driving simulator, we can manipulate the task demand to put strain on a 
specific/ particular information processing stage in driving so as to  generate a traffic 
scenario in which driver errors of one type or another are likely to be committed (Rizzo et 
al., 2001).  A driving simulator can be programmed to provide information inflows to the 
driver that can not be achieved in the real world and then evaluate the specific driver 
reactions  in  a  crash  or  hazardous  scenario——an  experimental  procedure  that  is 
dangerous  and  unethical  on  the  road.  Simulators  have  the  ability  to  replicate  road 
conditions  which  incite  drivers  to  make  decisions  in  a  safe  environment.  There  are 
several advantages of using driving simulators vis-à-vis road tests or driving records in 
assessment of fitness to drive. Driving simulators provide the only way in which we can 
exactly reproduce experimental roadway conditions so that people can be tested under 
identical  conditions  and comparisons  made.  They  also  provide  a  safe  environment  to 
work in without the risks inherent in an actual road test and provide an opportunity to 
observe serious driver errors. Also, in a driving simulator, a driver can be subjected to 
standardised challenges that stress crucial cognitive abilities of driving. One drawback of 
simulation  research  involves  simulator  adaptation  syndrome  (SAS),  which  includes 
symptoms  like  nausea  and  sweating  (Rizzo,  2004).  SAS  occurs  due  to  a  mismatch 61 
 
between visual cues of movement (which are enough) and inertial cues (which are scarce) 
and even occurs in simulators with a motion base. The severity of the impact of SAS can 
be reduced by using simulators that do not have large field of view displays or do not 
incorporate turns (especially left turns, right turns in Britain) so that peripheral visual 
field  stimulation  does  not  take  place  and  movement  cues  do  not  sweep  across  the 
peripheral field. Also, the driving behaviour of drivers may be different in simulators 
since there is no danger of injury occurring compared to real-life driving situations. In a 
driving simulator, a multidimensional real-life task is translated to a two dimensional 
simplification; the congruence between the simulated and the real life tasks will occur to 
the extent to which they  share common components (Rizzo et al., 1997). Even more 
important in this context is the level of psychological fidelity or functional equivalence of 
the  simulator.  However,  advances  in  microelectronics,  sensor,  communication  and 
control technology have provided for the more extensive automation of the evaluation of 
human-machine interactions (Rizzo et al., 1997) and resulted in machines that can more 
closely  mimic  reality.  As  reported  by  Rizzo  (2004),  driving  simulators  have  been 
successfully used in assessing performance of drivers in conditions such as sleep apnea, 
drowsiness, alcohol and other drug effects , old age, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s 
disease or traumatic brain injury. In a study of simulated car crashes at intersections in 
drivers with mild to moderate Alzheimer’s disease, Rizzo et al. (2001) tested drivers in a 
simulation  that  consisted  of  “multiple  “events”  associated  with  potential  crashes 
interspersed with uneventful highway segments.” In the study, 30 drivers drove a virtual 
road on the simulator and when they were within 3.6 seconds of an intersection, a cross 
vehicle made an illegal intrusion into the intersection. In order to avoid a collision with 
the cross vehicle, the driver of simulator had to perceive the intrusion and focus attention 
on the development and evaluate the situation. Next, an action plan had to be devised in 
order to deal with the hazardous situation by operating on the accelerator pedal, brake 
pedal or steering control. All reactions had to be performed under time pressure. Ideal 
response  required  that  drivers  release  the  accelerator,  apply  the  brakes  and  make 
necessary  steering  corrections  as  required  to  remain  within  the  traffic  lane  (i.e.  safe 
avoidance).  The  authors found that subjects having AD  (Alzheimer’s  disease) had a 
significantly increased risk of crash compared with non-demented drivers of similar age. 62 
 
After examining a plot of steering wheel position, brake and accelerator pedals, vehicle 
speed and vehicle and lane position 5 seconds prior to the collision, the authors observed 
that in cases where collision did take place, inattention and inappropriate or slow control 
of response was exhibited by drivers. In some cases, drivers managed to avoid a collision 
with the intruding vehicle (the main hazard), but due to the late reaction/response, they 
experienced  a  secondary  collision.  It  was  noted  that  while  driving  on  the  uneventful 
section of the road prior to the intersection, no driver committed a safety error. Anderson 
et al. (2005) contend that since subjects having Alzheimer’s disease or related disorders 
perform driving tasks adequately in familiar and ordinary traffic situations but cannot 
cope  with  unexpected  or  extraordinary  circumstances,  hence  it  is important  that  their 
responses to potentially dangerous situations be evaluated when assessing safety of such 
individuals. Fox et al. (Fox et al., 1998 cited in Schultheis et al., 2003) also argue that in 
order to predict driving adequately, drivers should be put through complex situations. In 
order to assess go/no-go decision-making by cognitively impaired drivers, Rizzo et al. 
(2003) (also cited in Rizzo,  2004) designed an abstract virtual environment (using soft 
ware) that consisted of a straight, flat, two lane road intersected by 100 crossroads. The 
task used a personal computer and the environment was displayed on a 21-inch video 
monitor.  Tests  were  conducted  on  16  subjects  with  neurological  impairments  and  16 
neurologically  normal  subjects.  The  individuals  drove  and  encountered  a  series  of 
intersecting roads with gates that opened and closed as drivers approached. Drivers were 
directed to drive though the intersection quickly without hitting the gates with traffic 
signals correctly predicting imminent closure of gates at 80 percent of the gates. Inputs 
from steering wheel and accelerator /brake hardware peripherals was recorded. Measures 
included completion time, number of crashes into closed gates, number of stops at open 
gates, and number of successes (i.e., stopping at closed gates and going at open gates). 
More errors were committed by neurologically impaired drivers at gates and they took 
more  time  to  complete  the  task.  Also,  in  the  study,  the  authors  observed  that 
“……cognitively impaired drivers who had crashes at the gates or took longer to get 
through the task continued to show good control of the vehicle and did not exceed the 
lane boundaries, indicating that visuomotor control can be intact in drivers with decision 
making impairments, and that measures of visuomotor control in the driving task (such as 63 
 
steering  and  lane  position  variability)  alone  are  not  sensitive  predictors  of  critical 
incidents caused by decision-making-impaired drivers.” Owing to the small field display, 
the  subjects  did  not  complain  about  simulator  adaptation  syndrome (SAS).  Simulator 
output that may provide clues to measures of performance include steering wheel position 
(in radians or degrees), normalized accelerator and brake pedal position ( i.e. scale of 
pedal depression from 0 % -100 %), lateral and longitudinal acceleration (in terms of 
gravity), distance headway (meters), time to collision (seconds) and speed (km/h). Close 
calls (or near misses) can also be analysed to provide some kind of index of driver safety 
and if a sufficient number of observations are obtained, it may even be possible through 
the assessment of measurable safety errors to reliably reckon relative crash risk, even if 
no crashes take place (Rizzo et al.,1997). In a study of impaired response implementation 
for older drivers with cognitive decline, Rizzo et al. (2005) tested 48 drivers (mean age 
73.5 years) with cognitive impairment caused by mild to moderate Alzheimer’s disease 
and 101 (mean age 69.3 years) neurologically normal drivers in a driving simulator, in 
which they encountered a police car on the shoulder of the road. The primary purpose 
was  to  investigate  situation  awareness  response  to  a  roadway  emergency  in  at-risk 
drivers. The reaction of drivers with cognitive impairment was more slow compared with 
neurologically normal drivers and they had more abrupt decelerations or failed to steer 
clear of the police car on the shoulder and the people situated near it. Even some impaired 
drivers stopped their vehicle in the middle of the road. The authors finally concluded that 
drivers with cognitive decline have a tendency to exhibit decreased situation awareness or 
poor executive control with regard to the selection and implementation of a potential 
evasive  manoeuvre.  Visual  and  neuropsychological  measures  of  perception,  attention, 
memory and executive function were able to predict the unsafe reactions of cognitively 
impaired  drivers.  Reger  et  al.  (2004),  while  conducting  meta-analysis  of  27  primary 
studies to examine a relationship between neuropsychological functioning and driving 
ability  for  adults  with  dementia,  found  a  significant  relationship  between 
neuropsychological functioning and driving ability as measured by on-road tests and non-
road tests. However, the authors remarked that the higher correlations of non-road test 
groups  with  neuropsychological  tests  may  be  attributed  to  the  tapping  of  purer  skills 
deemed relevant to driving. The authors further added that although on-road tests may 64 
 
have higher ecological validity, some of the limitations of these tests include high cost of 
testing, subjectivity in scoring, inability to regulate control variables such as traffic flow, 
roadway conditions and other driver behaviour, which have the effect of decreasing the 
strength of relationship with neuropsychological tests. While on the other hand, non-road 
tests give the evaluators the ability to standardize traffic scenarios encountered by drivers 
by manipulating certain control variables e.g. such as traffic flows etc  (variables that 
confound the results of road tests). 
Using  instrumented  vehicles  under  actual  road  conditions,  an  on-road  test  can 
quantitatively  access  driving  performance  in  the  field.  In  a  standard  road  test,  the 
quantitative performance measurements that are made in an instrumented vehicle are free 
of human bias that tends to affect inter-rater reliability. Information on proximity, lane 
keeping, merging and following behaviour of the driver can be gathered through the aid 
of radar and video systems on board an instrumented vehicle. G-forces generated as a 
result of hazardous events like abrupt braking, swerving or loss of vehicle control can be 
detected with the aid of accelerometers (Rizzo,  2004). Specific criteria can be used to 
highlight instances where a critical incident may have taken place and used to filter the 
raw data generated from an instrumented vehicle. For instance, as drivers apply brakes or 
swerve to avoid hitting an obstacle, the longitudinal and lateral accelerometers measure g 
forces which highlight critical driving scenarios in the data stream (e.g. a value of 0.4g 
can indicate abrupt deceleration). Uc et al. (2005) utilized an instrumented vehicle to 
study driver identification of landmarks and traffic signs after a stroke. Thirty two drivers 
with  stroke  and  137  neurologically  normal  older  adults  during  an  experimental  drive 
along a segment were asked to record sightings of specific landmarks and traffic signs. It 
was  found  that  drivers  having  suffered  a  stroke  distinguished  significantly  fewer 
landmarks and traffic signs and tended to make more at-fault safety errors compared with 
normal subjects. It was also noted that basic vehicular control as measured by standard 
deviation of steering wheel position (degrees), number of large (>6 degrees) changes in 
steering wheel position per minute and standard deviation of mean speed, on a straight 
segment (with no task load) was the same between the two groups.       
Although, in a driving simulator, the reward and penalty structure is different from that of 
real life but likewise, in an on-road test,  the natural pattern of driving is disrupted as the 65 
 
driver drives under the critical eye of the instructor or in someone else’s vehicle (e.g. a 
test car equipped with dual controls). In an on-road test, the driver is exposed to traffic 
scenarios that he may endeavour to avoid in real life (Rizzo et al., 1997). Brown & Ott 
(2004) point out that in the presence of instructors during on-road tests, many drivers may 
be more anxious or more careful, which may not reflect their natural driving behaviour. 
Also, during on-road testing, if the driver is about to commit a certain error, the instructor 
will intervene in order to maintain safety and so the instructor is not able to know how the 
examinee might have handled that specific error.  According to Rizzo (2004), state road 
tests were devised to find out whether novice drivers know the rules of the road and can 
apply  them  in  a  traffic  environment;  hence  they  are  not  an  ideal  tool  for  predicting 
accident involvement in experienced /skilled drivers who may have become impaired 
with time. Also, the author points out that to rely on real-life crashes as an assessment 
paradigm for driving skill is not credible as accidents are sporadic uncontrolled events 
that are difficult to objectively evaluate. In the assessment of driving performance on 
road tests, increase in variability of road test scores results from fluctuations in traffic and 
roadway conditions and subjective scoring by instructors which leads to a reduction in the 
strength of relationship with neuropsychological test scores (Rizzo et al., 2005).The high 
subjectivity  in  rating  driving  performance  primarily  results  because  not  all 
evaluators/instructors  use  a  structured  checklist  or  other  appropriate  method  of 
quantifying driving performance (Schultheis et al., 2003). Rizzo et al.(1997) suggest that 
it is reasonably expected of a licensed driver that when he is confronted with a hazardous 
situation  (such  as  a  short  stop  or  an  illegal  intersection  intrusion by  another  vehicle, 
which can be avoided/negotiated safely in most cases by most drivers), he should be able 
to recognize it and negotiate it safely. The simulator provides such an opportunity to test 
a driver. According to Rizzo et al. (2001), to predict driving performance through the 
observation of meaningful safety errors, it is necessary that the experimental driving task 
exposes the driver to a sufficient challenge. And according to the authors, this is one of 
the primary reasons why road tests which are tailored to provide driving routines that 
minimize  threat  of  injury,  are  unsuccessful  in  predicting  crashes  in  older  cognitively 
impaired drivers (although they have considerable experience) who are at a higher risk of 
being involved in real world accidents. Lundberg et al. (1997) also highlight that with 66 
 
regard to the content of a standard driving test (road test), for experienced drivers with 
suspected cognitive impairment, the test does not pose a challenge big enough to bring 
out existing deficits in driving on account of the automatized nature of the driving task. 
McKnight  &  McKnight  (1999)  in  a  study  regarding  age  related  driver  ability  and 
performance deficits, administered measures of basic abilities and driving performance to 
a  sample  of  407  drivers  over  the  age  of  62  that  comprised  of  drivers  that  had  been 
referred to licensing agencies because of involvement in unsafe driving and a group of 
volunteers that had not been involved in traffic incidents. The authors concluded that 
since in an on-road test, practical control over site and evaluator differences in hardly 
realizable, therefore the road test is not an ideal tool for the detection of decline in driving 
abilities that occur as a result of ageing. 
According to Bieliauskas (2005), the predictive power of neuropsychological tests can 
significantly improve if when assessing driving performance, the subjects (young & old) 
are made to face a challenging driving scenario (in a driving simulator) such as: (a) a wild 
animal all of a sudden runs into the road, (b) a vehicle intrudes from a side road/cross 
road/drive  way  from  the  right  (left  in  Britain),  (c)  the  vehicle  in  front  of  the  driver 
suddenly  stops.  Freund  et  al.  (2002)  did  a  study  to  evaluate  driving  performance  of 
cognitively impaired and healthy older adults in a pilot study that consisted of a small 
sample and compared on-road testing and driving simulation. In the on-road test and the 
driving  simulator,  the  performance  measures  used  were  hazardous  or  potentially 
catastrophic errors, traffic violations and rule violations. There was significant correlation 
between average scores on the on-road test and the driving simulator (Pearson correlation 
coefficient of -0.670). Besides, a strong correlation was also found between hazardous 
mistakes  (correlation  coefficient  -0.830)  and  lethal  mistakes  (correlation  coefficient  -
0.816) and failing the road test. The authors finally concluded that simulated driving and 
on-road  driving  exhibited  a  strong  mutual  correlation  for  both  cognitively  impaired 
drivers as well as healthy old adults. 
There is a possibility that drivers in a driving simulator may behave differently as there is 
no risk of injury compared to the driving situations that occur in real life, where there is a 
risk to life, limb and licensure are at stake. However, since the driving environment in a 
driving  simulator  has  ecological  validity  (i.e.  the  driving  maneuvers/hazards  closely 67 
 
emulate the conditions that occur in real life and the same cognitive processes/decision 
making  processes  are  at  work  in  negotiating  traffic  scenarios  and  the  simulated 
environment is supplemented by special audio effects that include engine and road noise) 
which  can  motivate  drivers  favourably.  This  is  manifested  by  some  recent  validation 
studies that have demonstrated successful application of  simulators (Fisher et al., 2002; 
George, 2003; Lee et al., 2002b) where deficits in performance on the simulator have 
been shown to correspond to shortfalls in on-road driving. Stress effects in simulators are 
minimum, however certain drivers using the simulator for the first time may experience 
some stress, which can be ameliorated through practice before taking the real test. 
As reported by Rizzo (2004), a controlled auditory verbal (e.g. holding a conversation, 
performing mental arithmetic or using modern in-vehicle telematics such as cell phones 
and navigation devices)  processing load (such as the Paced Auditory Serial-Addition 
Task [PASAT]) can be given to subjects (while driving) in order to scale the relevant 
impact / interactions in ageing and brain injury. However, in another study, Rizzo et al. 
(2004)  assessed  the  effect  of  PASAT  (while  driving  an  instrumented  vehicle)  on  78 
neurologically normal (mean age 71 years) and 82 subjects (mean age 75 years) who had 
impairments of selective attention but did not have diagnosable neurological disease. It 
was observed that imposing PASAT while driving resulted in reduced speed / steering 
control and greater number of at-fault safety errors were committed by the older drivers 
compared to the condition when PASAT was not imposed. But it was noted that there 
was  no  significant  difference  in  the  driving  performance  between  the  neurologically 
normal group and the attention-impaired group in both instances i.e when PASAT was 
imposed and base-line condition (PASAT not imposed). On reason for this could be that 
the PASAT is less emotionally engaging than for example talking to a friend on a phone 
as  such  an  operation  arouses  more  interest/attention  in  the  distraction  task.  Also,  the 
effects  of  distracter  tasks  (like  PASAT  /  cell  phones  etc)  on  driving  may  be  more 
pronounced if the driving conditions are more attention-demanding like driving through 
dense  traffic,  making  complex  manoeuvres  and  negotiating  intersections  etc.  In  this 
context, relevant to driving simulators, the authors (Rizzo et al.,2004) state: 68 
 
“Whether the safety tradeoffs that a distracted driver is willing to make in a driving 
simulator sufficiently resemble those that a distracted driver would execute while driving 
a real car on a real road………” 
 
2.8 Summary 
 
About 40 percent of the driving population will be over the age of 60 by the year 2020 in 
the  UK  and  currently,  several  hundred  thousand  drivers  with  dementia  hold  driving 
licenses. It is well known that the number of motor vehicle crashes per unit distance of 
automobile travel is “U”-shaped, with risk increasing slightly between the ages of 55 and 
60,  but  greater  increases  in  risk  with  each  successive  five-year  interval.  The  crashes 
involving older drivers more often occur in complex situations, where the driving task is 
not self-paced and there is a particular risk of cognitive overload. A number of driver 
error categories have been designated as playing a role in the accident causation of older 
drivers. These include failures of perception, attention, cognition and action. 
In the crashes of older drivers, visual and cognitive decrements are the most important 
causal factors. Cerebral visual impairments in drivers makes them liable to “look but not 
see”, despite the fact that information load is low. In old age, automatic routines remain 
relatively  well  preserved  but  older  people  find  it  very  difficult  to  inhibit  automatic 
processes in suddenly changing (and unexpected) situations.  
Alzheimer  disease  is  more  prevalent  in  the  old  age  group.  Decline  in  cognitive 
functioning is accompanied by concomitant decline in driving ability. For individuals that 
have moderate to severe dementia, there is strong consensus that they should not drive, 
however  decisions  regarding  those  having  mild  dementia  are  problematic.  The  most 
challenging assessment and decision for the physician / licensing authority as regards 
fitness to drive lies in drivers who are questionably demented or are in a state of very 
mild dementia. The prerequisite for driving cessation should be impaired competence for 
driving  rather  than  a  diagnosis  of  dementia/disease  condition.  Individuals  with  mild 
dementia  should  be  considered  for  specialized  assessment  with  regard  to  driving 
competence. Cognitive deficits in Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias have serious 
implications  for  driving,  since  drivers  are  not  able  to  tackle  multiple  stimuli 69 
 
simultaneously (show decrements in divided attention and selective attention abilities), 
maintain sustained attention, quickly respond to hazardous situations, judge distances, 
correctly  interpret  traffic  control  devices  and  exhibit  a  propensity  for  driving  slowly 
relative  to  the  speed  limit.  With  regard  to  neuropsychological  tests  that  facilitate  in 
determining whether a dementia patient is safe to drive, numerous neuropsychological 
tests are not sensitive and specific enough to tap the behavioural and cognitive features 
/domains that may affect driving. Also, many psychometric tests (cognitive tests) are not 
process-specific, but are rather reflective of general processes and hence these tests may 
tap general cognitive status, rather than skills necessary for driving. 
Driving skills can be assessed either on a driving simulator or an on-road test. A driving 
simulator can be programmed to provide information inflows to the driver that can not be 
achieved in the real world and then evaluate the specific driver reactions in a crash or 
hazardous scenario——an experimental procedure that is dangerous and unethical on the 
road. Driving simulators provide the only way in which experimental roadway conditions 
can be exactly reproduced so that people can be tested under identical conditions and 
comparisons made. One drawback of driving simulators is that a small proportion of 
drivers  experience  simulation  sickness  syndrome.  Nausea,  disorientation  and  ocular 
problems such as eyestrain, blurred vision and eye fatigue have been reported as some of 
the indicators of simulation sickness in fixed-base simulators. 
Subjects  having  Alzheimer’s  disease  or  related  disorders  perform  driving  tasks 
adequately in familiar and ordinary traffic situations but cannot cope with unexpected or 
extraordinary  circumstances,  hence  it  is  important  that  their  responses  to  potentially 
dangerous situations be evaluated when assessing safety of such individuals; this can only 
safely  be  evaluated  in  driving  simulators.  Although  on-road  tests  may  have  higher 
ecological validity, some of the limitations of these tests include high cost of testing, 
subjectivity  in  scoring,  inability  to  regulate  control  variables  such  as  traffic  flow, 
roadway conditions and other driver behaviour, which have the effect of decreasing the 
strength of relationship with neuropsychological tests. In a driving simulator, the reward 
and penalty structure is different from that of real life but likewise, in an on-road test,  the 
natural pattern of driving is disrupted as the driver drives under the critical eye of the 
instructor or in someone else’s vehicle (e.g. a test car equipped with dual controls). In the 70 
 
presence of instructors during on-road tests, many drivers may be more anxious or more 
careful,  which  may  not  reflect  their  natural  driving  behaviour.  Also,  during  on-road 
testing, if the driver is about to commit a certain error, the instructor will intervene in 
order to maintain safety and so the instructor is not able to know how the examinee might 
have handled that specific error. 
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3 Neuropsychological Tests 
 
3.1 General 
 
The objectives for this chapter were to identify the cognitive attributes that are relevant / 
crucial for the driving task and then based upon the identified cognitive constructs come 
up  with  a  battery  of  cognitive  tests  along  with  their  description  and  detailed 
testing/scoring procedure. The key functions required for driving are vision, cognition 
and motor functions. This study will deal primarily with cognitive functions, although, 
there is bound to be considerable overlap between functions. The driving environment is 
quite complex, where vehicle control has to be negotiated in a cluttered environment 
through  the  simultaneous  use  of  both  central  and  peripheral  vision    to  process  both 
primary (high priority) and secondary (low priority) visual tasks and where the prediction 
of  important  events  in  time  and  space  is  difficult/uncertain.  According  to  Hartman 
(Hartman, 1970 cited in Kito et al., 1989), visual information constitutes over 90 percent 
of the stimulus input in driving. Specifically, cognitive functions that support adequate 
visual processing and the coordination and integration of perception and motor skills are 
very  essential  for  safe  driving.  Multiple  cognitive  domains  are  called  upon  when  an 
individual is negotiating driving scenarios/situations. We must bear in mind that many of 
the cognitive constructs themselves are interrelated (Ball et al., 2004) and interact with 
each  other  (Anderson  et  al.,  2005).  According  to  Rizzo  (2004),  the  coordination  of 
several  ongoing  processes  including  attention,  perception,  memory  (declarative, 
procedural, and working), and executive functions (decision making and implementation) 
is required for safe driving.  
Reger  et  al.(2004)  conducted  meta-analysis  of  27  primary  studies  to  examine  the 
relationship between neuropsychological functioning and driving ability for adults with 
dementia  and  concluded  that  visuospatial  skills  and  attention  were  most  helpful  in 
screening at risk drivers. In a study by Shinar (Shinar, 1978 cited by Parasuraman & 
Nestor, 1991), it was estimated that 25 to 50 percent of motor vehicle crashes are the 
result  of  driver  inattention.    Rizzo  et  al.  (2005)  in  their  study  found  that  visual  and 72 
 
neuropsychological measures of perception, attention, memory and executive function 
were able to predict the unsafe reactions of cognitively impaired drivers. Lundqvist et al. 
(1997) put 29 brain damaged patients and controls to neuropsychological tests, simulator 
driving and on-road tests. Based on the outcome of their findings, they recommended 
using  neuropsychological  tests  that  measure  attention,  information  processing  and 
executive functions. Christie et al. (2001a)  evaluated 39 subjects with  head injury or 
generalized brain damage by giving them neuropsychological and road tests. Logistic 
regression was used to identify 5 tests that were significant predictors of driving skill. 
These tests measured visual memory, executive abilities, spatial awareness and attention. 
Van Zomeren et al. (1988) reported that controlled attentional processes are impaired 
after  head  injury,  while  automatic  processes  are  not.  Nouri  et  al.  (1987),  while 
investigating the relationship between cognitive ability and driving after stroke, in which 
39 pre-stroke drivers were assessed using a battery of cognitive and on-road tests, finally 
concluded that cognitive tests which involve complex reasoning skills appear most highly 
related to driving performance.  
Duchek et al. (1998) examined the relationship between visual attention measures and 
driving performance in healthy older adults and individuals with mild dementia of the 
Alzheimer type. Subjects were also assessed for on-road driving. They finally concluded 
that selective attention (i.e. visual search performance) is related to driving skills in the 
early  stages  of  DAT  (Dementia  of  the  Alzheimer  type).  Parasuraman  et  al.  (1992) 
evaluated subjects with mild to moderate dementia and concluded that patients in the 
early stage of DAT show impairments in the ability to switch or disengage attention, 
while as they retain the ability to focus attention to a spatial location. Parasuraman & 
Nestor (1993) reported that the ability to switch attention is also correlated with driving 
performance in normal individuals.  
During the course of normal ageing, some cognitive functions e.g. spatial orientation and 
perceptual  speed  have  been  found  to  decline  (Schaie,  1996).  Also,  older  adults  have 
problems  related  with  the  spatial  and  temporal  integration  of  items  into  larger  units, 
which may reflect their deficits in working memory (Welford, 1985 cited in Lundberg, 
2003). Working memory declines with age (Foos & Wright, 1992; Salthouse, 1992 cited 
in Ball et al., 2004). Working memory can be described as the ability to maintain or 73 
 
manipulate information while another task is performed concurrently. Visual search is an 
important element of driving and is crucial for detecting potential road hazards. Studies 
have shown that when cognitive processes including working memory are loaded, the 
efficiency  of  visual  search  is  affected  (Wood  et  al.,  2006).  The  “frontal  ageing 
hypothesis” stipulates that in the ageing process, the prefrontal cortex is one of the most 
affected  areas  of  the  brain  (Bieliauskas,  2005).  Since  the  prefrontal  cortex  has  an 
important contribution in exercising executive control (Funahashi, 2001), putting more 
emphasis  on  executive  functioning  is  in  harmony  with  this  hypothesis.  In  normal 
cognitive ageing, there is a general decrement in the speed with which information is 
processed, the efficiency with which new information is acquired also decreases, there is 
cognitive inflexibility and the working memory shows signs of reduction (Anstey et al., 
2003; Rue, 1992; Nilsson, 2003; Salthouse & Meinz, 1995 cited in Snellgrove, 2005). 
Greenwood  et  al.  (1997)  in  a  study  of  individuals  with  mild  DAT  (dementia  of  the 
Alzheimer type) and older subjects found out that there was a reduction in the control of 
spatial  focus  of  attention  in  Alzheimer’s  disease  subjects  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in 
advanced age. The authors finally concluded that the ability to control spatial attention 
lies on a continuum from healthy young adults to the young-old, through the old-old to 
individuals with mild DAT. 
Visuospatial skills give an individual the ability to determine where things lie in relation 
to each other and to himself/herself. Visuospatial skills play their role in a number of 
tasks relevant to driving that include: (a) the correct positioning of the vehicle in the 
roadway  environment  (b)  spatial  manoeuvring  on  the  roadway  (c)  the  judgement  of 
distances  to  other  objects  or  vehicles  (e)  monitoring  and  forecasting  the  spatial 
positioning  of  other  vehicles.  Divided  attention  enables  a  driver  to  simultaneously 
monitor  two  or  more  stimulus  sources.  The  driver  has  to  allocate  his  attention 
simultaneously to various sub-tasks which include steering (and maintaining a desired 
speed),  navigation,  obeying  regulations  and  warnings,  manipulating  in-vehicle 
mechanical  and  environmental  systems  (including  entertainment  systems), 
communicating, monitoring events outside and to a lesser extent inside the vehicle and 
keep a watch over the instrumentation panel. For example, the driver has to monitor the 
environment and at the same time, has to maintain lane position. In complex and cluttered 74 
 
driving environments selective attention skills come into play as the driver has to focus 
and  shift  attention  between  different  elements  /features/  developments/changes  in  the 
driving scene and then has to preferentially process particular events from within the 
scene so that an appropriate response can be formulated and executed. According to the 
British Psychological Society (2001), Executive functions “ govern ability to anticipate, 
plan  ahead,  make  decisions,  self-monitor,  and  change  a  plan  of  action,  sometimes 
instantaneously ”. Executive functions enable drivers to organize information and plan 
complex behaviour. As a result drivers who have executive dysfunction will not be able 
to develop appropriate strategies (which might involve complex tasks) and programme 
their  movements  when  they  face  a  novel  or  distracting  cue.  Executive  functions  also 
make use of working memory capacity. Executive skills are crucial to monitoring the 
roadway environment and adapting to the traffic at hand. This adaptation can be brought 
about by carrying out vehicle manoeuvres and responding in an appropriate manner to 
other vehicles or road users. One example when executive functions are brought into play 
is in the selection and implementation of an evasive manoeuvre performed by a driver 
who is travelling above a certain speed threshold. If all of a sudden a pedestrian steps 
onto  the  road,  the  driver  realizes  that  the  sight  distance  available  is  smaller  than  the 
perception reaction and stopping distance and so if he or she brakes, the vehicle would 
still collide with the pedestrian. Therefore he/she makes a decision to swerve to avoid 
hitting the pedestrian. But then he has two options: (a) swerve to the adjacent lane (b) 
swerve to the shoulder. If he/she swerves to the adjacent lane and if traffic is present in 
these locations it can result in a near miss or a secondary collision. Swerving onto the 
shoulder would be a better option if there is no other obstacle present on the shoulder. It 
is here that we find that processing speed (cognitive processing speed) also has a lot of 
bearing on the outcome of the event. The speed of information processing is also crucial 
to driving because it is a moving environment. One draw back of the simulator compared 
to real world driving is that in the real world, the pedestrian may take countermeasures to 
avoid an accident (i.e., he may step back, change direction or increase walking speed), 
whereas in the simulator, once a pedestrian steps onto the roadway, he will continue with 
his course i.e., he is not intelligent. The importance of Executive function for safe driving 
is also highlighted by Freund et al. (2005a). According to the authors, the automatized 75 
 
and procedural skills which are learned over a long period through driving experience do 
not protect the older driver from making errors in the presence of executive dysfunction.   
Six  neuropsychological  tests  have  been  identified  to  cover  key  cognitive  domains 
necessary for safe driving. These tests also assess a broad range of cognitive skills and 
are in the public domain with the exception of one test (i.e. UFOV test). Significant 
diversity with regard to administration of these tests is exhibited as they include paper 
and pencil tests, listening test and visual computer controlled test. Also, these tests are 
quite sensitive to the effects of ageing and to a range of diseases that are well known to 
impair driving performance. The chosen tests possess good reliability i.e., the measure of 
the test should be stable and consistent if it is to be used to gauge “an enduring traitlike 
characteristic such as the quantity of one’s processing resources” (Salthouse et al., 1989). 
In other words, the characteristic which is being measured by the test should remain 
stable over time. Although according to Salthouse & Kausler (Salthouse & Kausler, 1985 
cited in Salthouse et al., 1988), at least a moderate reliability (e.g., r > 0.6) is required. 
With regard to neuropsychological tests we must bear in mind that a single test does not 
reflect a pure measure of a single cognitive domain, but rather each test taps more than 
one cognitive domain. Also, each test only partially taps a specific domain. Therefore, 
keeping these key points in view, we have selected more than one test that taps the same 
domain that is very critical relevant to the driving task e.g., there is more than one test 
that taps visuospatial abilities and attention (because these are highly crucial domains 
relevant to driving). Tests that measure vocabulary and general information have not been 
included as they are more dependent on knowledge that has been acquired previously and 
do  not  gauge  current  processing  efficiency  of  individuals;  also,  there  is  a  positive 
correlation between age and opportunity to acquire knowledge (Salthouse et al., 1988). 
 
3.2 Trail Making-B Test 
 
The  trail  Making-A  and  Trail  Making-B  are  both  timed  paper-and-pencil  tests.  The 
original constructions of these tests took place in 1938 and were adopted by the US Army 
as a part of Army Individual Test Battery in 1944 (Strauss, et al., 2006). This test takes 
about 5 to 10 minutes to administer (Strauss, et al., 2006). In both tests, 25 circles are 76 
 
randomly  distributed  on a  sheet  of  white  paper that  is  8  ×11  ½  -in  in  size.  In  Trail 
Making-A, the distribution of the numbers is from 1 to 25. The measure of the test is the 
time that it takes for a subject to draw a continuous line correctly connecting the circles in 
numerical order. In Trail Making-B, either there is a number (from 1 to 13) or a letter 
(from A to L) inscribed inside each circle. The measure of the test is the time it takes for 
a subject to draw a continuous line correctly connecting the circles in numerical and 
alphabetical order alternately (i.e. from 1 to A to 2 to B, etc). Both tests require attention 
and visual scanning skills. However, on account of its simple structure, Trail Making-A 
test  assesses  simple  cognitive  processing  speed,  whereas  Trail  Making-B  mental 
flexibility and complex cognitive processing speed (Groth-Marnat, 2000). Lezak et al. 
(Shum et al., 1990 cited in Lezak et al., 2004) report that the motor component of this 
complex  visual  scanning  test  is  such  that  motor  speed  and  agility  of  the  examinee 
strongly  contributes  to  success  on  the  test.  Demands  on  visual  search,  speed  of 
processing, and divided attention (in case of Trail Making-B) are placed by these tests 
(Rizzo et al., 2000). 
Although  both  tests  require  non-verbal  monitoring,  Trail  Making-B  is  comparatively 
cognitively more demanding as it requires switching of attention between numbers and 
letters (McKenna, 1998). Ballard et al.(Ballard et al., 1993) have described Trail Making-
A as a test that measures visuospatial scanning abilities and motor sequencing skills, 
whilst Trail making-B requires some  abilities over and above those required for trail 
Making-B, especially greater visual search skills. They report that these tests are sensitive 
to age and were 81 percent effective in diagnosing brain damaged subjects. However 
Trail Making-B showed a higher correlation with driving performance (i.e. -0.42 ), which 
was significant  compared to Trail Making-A. Stolwyk et al. (Stolwyk et al., 2006) also 
failed to find a correlation between Trail making-A and most driving measures. However, 
trail Making-B correlated strongly with a wide range of driving performance measures in 
participants  with  Parkinson’s  Disease.  Although,  Trail  Making-B  has  the  same 
psychomotor requirements as  that of Trail Making-A, but it has significantly increased 
Working Memory demands, because information has to be concurrently manipulated. As 
pointed out by Crawford et al. (Crawford et al., 1992), while taking Trail Making-B test, 77 
 
due to the double task of keeping track of alphabets and numbers in the mind, a person’s 
working memory is loaded.     
Wang et al.(Wang et al., 2003) in their report on assessing and counselling older drivers 
have  also  highlighted  the  fact  that  association  between  poor  performance  on  Trail-
Making-B and poor driving performance, has been demonstrated by numerous studies. 
They  further  underline  that  this  test  specifically  assesses  working  memory,  visual 
processing,  visuospatial  skills,  selective  and  divided  attention  and  psychomotor 
coordination. The divided attention aspect of the test is due to the fact that participants 
have to keep track of numbers and alphabets while at the same time have to search for 
other  target  circles.    The  Trail  Making-B  test  has  also  shown  high  sensitivity  to  the 
progressive cognitive declines that take place during the course of Dementia (Storandt et 
al., 1984 cited in Stutts et. al., 1998). As reported by Carr et al. (Reger et al., 2004 cited 
in Carr et al., 2006), in older adults with dementia, poor driving outcomes (using driving 
simulators and road tests) has been correlated with poor performance on the Trail Making 
tests;  and  that  the  test  relies  on  memory,  visuospatial  skills,  attention  and  executive 
function. Perry & Hodges (Grady et al., 1988 cited in Perry & Hodges,1999) report one 
of the few longitudinal studies conducted on Alzheimer’s disease patients, who were also 
given  the  Trial  Making-B  test;  deficits  on  the  test  were  evident  after  impairment  in 
episodic  memory  but  before  visuospatial  and  language  dysfunction  could  take  effect. 
They report that the test also taps many aspects of executive function. 
In a study in Maryland (Ball et al., 2006), in which 1910 older drivers aged 55 to 96 were 
evaluated in Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) sites, it was found out that subjects 
taking 147 seconds or more to complete the Trail Making-B Test (90th percentile) were 
2.01 times more likely to be involved in a motor vehicle collision as the subjects who 
completed  the  test  in  less  time.  Performance  declines  on  Trail  Making-A  and  Trail 
Making-B  with  advancing  age  (Strauss  et  al.,  2006).  Trail  Making  Test-A  and  Trail 
Making-B  tests  have  exhibited  interrater  reliability  coefficients  of    0.94  and  0.90 
respectively (Fals-Stewart, 1991 cited in Strauss, et al., 2006). Test-Retest Reliability for 
Trail Making-B is adequate for the most part (Strauss et al., 2006). As reported by Strauss 
et al. (Strauss, et al., 2006), an adequate coefficient (0.79) and high coefficient (0.89) 
were obtained for Trail Making-A and Trail Making-B respectively,  by Dikmen et al. 78 
 
(Dikmen et al., 1999) after examining 384 normal / neurologically stable adults aged 15 
to 83 years; these participants were retested 11 months after the initial testing session.  
According  to  Reitan  (Reitan,  1958),  good  performance  on  the  test  requires  that  the 
subjects be alert and have concentrated attention on the task. Overall Trail Making-B test 
is a complex measure of multiple cognitive functions which also includes the use of 
greater visual search skills (visual scanning and tracking) compared to Trail Making-A. 
Efficient visual search especially in visually complex driving environments (encountered 
in cities and urban areas) for potential hazards is an indispensable element of the driving 
task.  Another  example  could  be  when  a  driver  has  to  search  the  environment  for  a 
specific target in a relatively complex surrounding where many distracters are present 
(e.g., a street sign at an intersection). Also, in Trail Making-B, the examinee deals with 
more  than  one  stimulus  (thought)  at  a  time,  shows  cognitive  flexibility  (opposite  of 
cognitive rigidity)  in shifting the course of an ongoing activity and has working memory 
demands,  therefore it is more relevant to the driving task. Cognitive rigidity can create 
severe problems for a driver if he encounters a suddenly changing situation (e.g., like 
intrusion of a cross vehicle in an intersection). To exploit the element of parsimony, we 
opted for the Trail Making-B (compared with using both Trail Making-A & -B) test. 
 
3.2.1 Trail Making-B Test Procedure and Scoring 
 
In Trail Making-B Test, 25 circles are randomly distributed on a sheet of white paper that 
is 8 ×11 ½ -in in size; either there is a number (from 1 to 13) or a letter (from A to L) 
inscribed inside each circle. The measure of the test is the time it takes for a subject to 
draw a continuous line (without lifting the pencil from the paper) correctly connecting the 
circles in numerical and alphabetical order alternately (i.e. from 1 to A to 2 to B, etc) as 
quickly as possible. Errors (sequencing errors), if committed are immediately pointed out 
by the examiner, who instructs the examinee to continue with the rest of the test from the 
last correct connection. The stopwatch does not stop during error correction. Therefore, 
errors  contribute  to  the  extent  that  additional  time  is  needed  for  corrections.  Poorer 
performance on the test is reflected in longer completion times. Strauss et al.(Strauss et 
al., 2006) report that a number of authors  include a time limit constraint of 5 minutes 79 
 
(300 seconds) in order to reduce testing time and frustration. Staplin et al. (Staplin et al., 
2003) in their study regarding the Maryland Pilot Older Driver Study used a maximum 
time limit of 6 minutes (360 seconds), at which point the test was discontinued. However, 
Strauss et al.(Strauss et al., 2006) report the calculation of time scores on prorata basis 
when the test was not completed within the time limit. In that case, the time score (in 
seconds) was derived by prorating by dividing the number of seconds allowed for the test  
by the  number of circles completed, and then  multiplying this “time per circle” by 25 to 
get the test score in seconds. The test is preceded by a sample test to ensure that the 
examinee has understood the test procedure and task. However, the sample test is not the 
same size as the actual trail Making-B Test, only 4 numbers (i.e. 1 to 4) and 4 letters (A 
to D) are included for rapid orientation. The practise session is not timed. Detailed Test 
Procedure is in Appendix A.  
 
3.3 Clock Drawing Test 
 
The clock drawing Test is a brief test that is easily administered and is frequently used in 
dementia  evaluations.  Its  introduction  was  brought  about  in  the  early  1900s  as  an 
indicator of constructional apraxia (McDowell, 2006).  In this test, verbal instructions are 
given  to  a  subject  to  draw  a  clock  (analog  clock),  put  in  all  the  numbers  and  set  a 
particular time. The test takes less than 5 minutes to administer. When a verbal command 
is given that a clock should be drawn, to comprehend the instructions, the examinee must 
possess  adequate  language  skills.  The  visuospatial  features  of  the  clock  must  have  a 
representation for him as well as a mechanism by which this representation is recalled. 
Then, in order to translate the mental representation into a motor program for drawing, 
visuoperceptual  and  visuomotor  processes  are  needed.  The  spatial  layout  of  the 
component  features  of  the  clock  is  guided  by  visual  perceptions.  The  accurate 
representation of features on both sides of the clock (i.e on the left and right side of the 
letter 12) is ensured by hemi-attentional processes. Motor output is monitored by visual 
perceptions  and  corrections  are  incorporated  through  control  processes  of  executive 
functions. The graphomotor representation of the digits/numbers is brought about by the 
linguistic system as an output (Freedman et al., 1994).  80 
 
Therefore, although Clock Drawing seems a simple task but this free hand procedure 
depends upon multiple cognitive functions organized in diverse cerebral regions (Groth-
Marnat,  G.  (2000).  According  to  Groth-Marnat  (2000),  some  of  these  functions  are 
auditory  language  skills,  memory  (storing  instructions  for  a  certain  time  setting), 
visuospatial ability, perceptual-motor facility, linguistic skills (for drawing numbers) and 
executive functions for planning and organization. Sunderland et al. (Sunderland et al., 
1989 cited in Ferrucci et al., 1996) considers it a simple test focusing on visuospatial and 
constructional abilities. McDowell (McDowell, 2006) reports that recently it has been 
shown that disturbance of visuospatial skills are an early sign of dementia. Deficits in 
visuospatial abilities and abstract thinking are revealed and characterized by distortions in 
the placement of numbers on the clock face and hands to designate specified times. Its 
importance is reinforced by the fact that when some persons who are in the initial stage of 
dementia are administered verbal tests, they show fairly good performance; but when 
tests of visuospatial and construction abilities are administered, they fail dramatically 
(Moore & Wyke, 1984 cited in Ferrucci et al., 1996).   
Strauss et al.(Strauss et al., 2006) report that for the screening of dementia, the Clock 
Drawing Test is frequently recommended. However, it should not be used as a stand 
alone test for dementia but rather as a supplement to other methods or used in conjunction 
with  other  tools  (McDowell,  2006;  Tuokko  et  al.,  2000).  If  it  is  compared  to  other 
dementia scales, most have primarily verbal content, while as the Clock Drawing Test is 
dependent  on  visuospatial,  constructional,  and  higher-order  cognitive  abilities  which 
includes executive aspects as well. Alzheimer’s Disease and functional disabilities are 
associated with impaired executive control functions, and it has been found that the Clock 
Drawing Test correlates with Executive Control functions (Royall et al., 1998 cited in 
Freund et al., 2005a) and also correlates with disease progression (Sunderland et al., 1989 
cited in Freund et al., 2005a). It has been revealed by cross-sectional studies that age has 
an effect on performance on the Clock Drawing Test and this decline in performance is 
exhibited particularly after the age of 70 years (Freedman et al., 1994; Strauss et al., 
2006). Incorrect representation of the proportion of the hands and placing the minute 
hand incorrectly are among the most common errors (Freedman et al., 1994). According 
to Strauss et al. (Strauss et al., 2006), the ability to position the hands bears importance 81 
 
for the detection of dementia. IQ, education and ethnicity have a low influence over the 
Clock Drawing Test (Shulman et al.,1993).   
The higher-order cognitive skill of executive functioning required for the clock drawing 
test  in  the  form  of  planning and  organization  is  a  critical  component  of  safe  driving 
because driving requires the integration of behaviour and instantaneous and appropriate 
response has to be made to changing situations in the traffic scene. Besides, the test is 
quick and easy to administer and is non-threatening (i.e., is well tolerated by examinees 
and  examiners).  Variations  exist  in  the  manner  in  which  the  Clock  Drawing  test  is 
administered  and  scored.  A  number  of  these  methods  are  discussed  in  the  following 
paragraphs  with  their  merits  and  demerits.  Of  the  methods  discussed,  the  Freedman 
method (Freedman et al., 1994) was selected. 
 
3.3.1 Time specification for Clock Drawing Test 
 
Shulman (Shulman, 2000) reports that various times have been used such as “3 o’clock” 
i.e. 3:00, “5 after 8” i.e. 8:05 and “45 after 2” i.e. 2:45 and “10 after 11” i.e. 11:10. 
According to Freedman et al.(Freedman et al., 1994), the most widely used time settings 
are: “10 after 11” i.e. 11:10, “20 after 8” i.e. 8:20 and “3 o’clock” i.e. 3:00. Kaplan 
(Kaplan, 1988) recommends using the “10 after 11” time setting in the instructions. This 
setting involves the placement of hands in both sides of the hemispace (i.e on the left and 
right  side  of  the  letter  12)  and  thus  facilitates  the  identification  of  hemilateral  or 
hemianopia (Strauss et al., 2006) and also has the advantage that it puts greater demands 
on the executive system, which is mediated by the frontal lobes of the brain. Patients with 
frontal lobe dysfunction are impaired in abstract thinking and as a result tend to make 
“stimulus-bound” errors wherein information is processed at a more perceptual rather 
than a semantic level (Freedman et al., 1994). When an examinee is instructed to set the 
time at “10 after 11”, a recoding process is involved wherein the “10” has to be recoded 
and  the  minute  hand  set  on  the  number  “2”.  Since  the  number  “10”  on  the  clock  is 
adjacent to the number “11”, Freedman et al.(Shallice, 1982 cited in  Freedman et al., 
1994)  highlight  that  patients  (subjects  with  frontal  lobe  impairement)  who  have  a 
tendency  to  be  “pulled”  (frontal  pull  due  to  executive  dysfunction)  to  the  perceptual 82 
 
features of the command are likely to commit the stimulus-bound error by placing one 
hand  (of  the  clock)  on  the  “10”  and  the  other  on  the  11.  Alternatively,  when  an 
instruction for a time setting of “20 after 8” is given, the examinee has to recode the “20”, 
because the clock face is devoid of the number “20” to “pull” the subject and therefore, 
other abnormal responses can occur such as the minute hand may be placed just after the 
eight or the minute hand may be set at the “2”, because it is similar to the “20” (Freedman 
et al., 1994). In the  “3 o’clock” time, the “o’clock” has to be recoded to “12” to represent 
correctly the minute hand. Since the time “10 after 11” appears to be the most sensitive to 
neurocognitive dysfunction, therefore we selected this time to be set by the examinees, 
although in the original study by Freedman et al. (1994) they used a time setting of 6:45. 
 
3.3.2 Clock Drawing Test Scoring Methods 
 
Variations  exist  in  the  manner  in  which  the  Clock  Drawing  test  is  administered  and 
scored. Examinees are generally presented with a blank piece of paper or a predrawn 
circle 4 and 5/8 inches in diameter (without the numbers and hands etc) and asked to 
draw a clock and set a particular time; these methods are called the “free-drawn” and the 
“pre-drawn” methods  respectively. The rationale behind using the “pre-drawn”  method 
is that the clock drawing performance is focused on the numbers and hand placement and 
as a result, some difficulties that are inherent in procedures in which the examinee draws 
the circle as well are circumvented. Because if a circle is poorly drawn, it confounds the 
remainder  of  the  clock  drawing  performance  (Tuokko  et  al.,  2000).  For  example,  an 
examinee may not draw a circle large enough for the numbers to be put in, or may be 
asymmetrical which may affect the arrangement of numbers. 
 According  to  Freedman  et  al.(Freedman  et  al.,  1994),  the  “free-drawn”  method 
constitutes all of the elements of the clock drawing task. They argue that evaluation of the 
contour  is  crucial  because  if  a  person  can  not draw  an  acceptable  contour,  it  can  be 
considered pathological at any age. Also, in the instructions many examiners instruct the 
examinees to “draw the face of a clock, put in all the numbers, and set the time at ……” 
Other examiners do not give instructions for time setting at the beginning but only after 
the examinee has drawn the clock face and numbers. These examiners are of the view 83 
 
that if the time setting is known in advance, it may influence how the subject proceeds 
through the drawing. For example, if the time is known in advance and is “10 after 11”, 
an examinee may proceed by drawing “11,” “12,” “1,” and “2,” in that order, instead of 
starting with “12” and sequentially drawing the numbers clockwise. As a result of such 
untypical behaviour, errors in spatial organization may result (Freedman et al., 1994).  In 
the  instructions  for  the  time  setting,  Shulman  (Shulman,  2000)  recommends  that  the 
instructor should not use the words “hand” in the instructions.  
The differing scoring systems that are in place, place differing emphasis on visuospatial, 
executive, quantitative and qualitative issues (Kaplan, 1990 cited in Shulman, 2000). All 
have  good  interrater  and  retest  reliability,  and  most  are  correlated  with  one  another 
(Strauss  et  al.,  2006).  However  the  correlation  is  not  so  high  as  to  make  them 
interchangeable  (Tuokko  et  al.,  2000).  Depending  on  the  scoring  method  and  sample 
composition, sensitivity (i.e., percent of individuals diagnosed with probable Alzheimer’s 
disease  who  score  in  the abnormal  range  of  the  test)  and  specificity  (i.e.,  percent  of 
control individuals who score in the normal range on the test) varies (Strauss et al., 2006). 
Some of these methods are discussed below:  
Mendez:  The  Mendez  scoring  system  (Mendez  et  al.,  1992)  is  also  called  the  Clock 
Drawing Interpretation Scale (CDIS) for testing on patients with dementia. The method is 
“free-drawn” and the time specified is 11:10. Better performance is reflected in higher 
scores. For scoring purposes, 20 individual items are evaluated and each item carries 1 
point each and therefore, the best score is 20. This scoring system consists of: 3 items 
relevant  to  general  characteristics  of  the  clock  (3  points),  12  items  relevant  to 
presentation and placement of number (12 points) and 5 items relevant to assessing the 
existence and placement of hands (5 points). A score of less than 18 suggests impairment. 
Sensitivity and specificity of the test varies from 88 to 94 percent and 26 to 65 percent 
respectively (Strauss et al., 2006). However, in this method, the full credit can still be 
obtained without the hands indicating correct time.  
Shulman: The Shulman method of scoring (Shulman et al., 1986; Shulman et al., 1993; 
Shulman, 2000) uses the “pre-drawn” method and the time specified is 11:10; the total 
score is 5. The highest score is given to an intact clock and the clock that is impaired 
receives the lowest score. A “perfect” clock receives 5 points and a clock that has minor 84 
 
visuospatial errors receives 4 points. If the visuospatial organization is well done but the 
time of 11:10 is inaccurately represented, then 3 points are awarded. If the visuospatial 
disorganization of numbers is moderate, such that it is impossible to accurately denote 
“10 after 11”, the clock receives 2 points. A clock is awarded 1 point if there exists a 
severe level of visuospatial disorganization. If there is inability on part of the examinee to 
make any reasonable representation of a clock, a zero score is awarded. A score of less 
than 4 suggests impairment. Sensitivity and specificity of the test varies from 81 to 93 
percent and 48 to 96 percent respectively (Strauss et al., 2006). 
Tuokko: The Tuokko method (Tuokko et al., 1992; Tuokko et al., 1995) uses a “pre-
drawn” clock and the time specified is 11:10. The test is scored by tallying the number of 
errors. In this method, scoring is achieved by using 25 different error types, which can be 
summed  on  seven  subscales:  omissions,  perseverations,  rotations,  misplacements, 
distortions, substitutions, and additions. To assess the level of impairment, total error 
score  can  be  obtained  by  adding  the  seven  subscales.  Low  scores  suggest  minimal 
impairment and a score of zero indicates error-free performance. There is no ceiling for 
the total number of errors but in one study (Tuokko et al., 2000), a maximum score of 41 
was  obtained.  A  score  of  greater  than  2  errors  suggests  impairment.  To  enhance  the 
accuracy in judging the misplacement of numbers, a transparent overlay with marked 
zones of acceptable positions of numbers in used in this method. Shulman (Shulman, 
2000)  reports  that  normal  elderly  and  Alzheimer’s  disease  patients  were  significantly 
differentiated  by  four  error  categories  (omissions,  distortions,  misplacements,  and 
additions). Sensitivity and specificity of the test varies from 91 to 92 percent and 50 to 86 
percent respectively (Strauss et al., 2006). 
Wolf-Klein: The Wolf-Klein method (Wolf-Klein et al., 1989) uses a “pre-drawn” clock. 
It uses a rating scale that varies from 1 (most impaired) to 10 (normal). The Wolf-Klein 
method uses 10 hierarchical clock patterns that were developed from a pilot study of over 
300 patients; this classification of ten categories of errors facilitate the scoring process. A 
score of less than 7 suggests impairment. Sensitivity and specificity of the test varies 
from 39 to 79 percent and 72 to 95 percent respectively (Strauss et al., 2006). 
Sunderland:  The Sunderland method (Sunderland et al., 1989) uses a “pre-drawn” clock 
and the time specified is 2:45. Six researchers/raters were asked by Sunderland et al. 85 
 
(Sunderland  et  al.,  1989)  to  categorize  150  completed  drawings  into  10  ordered 
categories  that  varied  from  the  “best”  representation  of  a  clock  to  the  “worst” 
representation  of  a  clock.  After  analyzing  these  categories,  descriptive  criteria  were 
developed for ranking clocks on a scale from 1 to 10 (higher numbers representing better 
performance). Examples of the criteria are: “5. Crowding of numbers at one end of the 
clock or reversal of numbers” and “7. Placement of hands is significantly off course”.  A 
score of less than 6 suggests impairment. Sensitivity and specificity of the test varies 
from 56 to 79 percent and 58 to 91 percent respectively (Strauss et al., 2006). 
Watson: The Watson method (Watson et al., 1993) uses a “pre-drawn” clock. In this 
method, the examinee is instructed to draw the numbers on the clock face but is not asked 
to draw the hands (examinees are not asked to indicate a time). The clock is evaluated 
only for the positioning of clock numbers. For scoring the clock, the clock face is divided 
into  four  quadrants.  The  fourth  quadrant  (i.e.  9  to  12  o’clock)  receives  the  greatest 
weight. If any error is committed in quadrant 4, a score of 4 is given; quadrants 1 to 3 
receive a score of 1, if any error appears in them. Scores in this method range from 0 
(least impaired) to a maximum of 7 (most impaired).  An examinee is considered normal 
if he scores from 0 to 3 and a score greater than or equal to 4 is considered abnormal (i.e. 
suffers from dementia). Storey et al. (Storey et al., 2001 cited in Strauss et al., 2006) 
report a sensitivity of 69 percent and a specificity of 44 percent when the method was 
used on a sample of geriatric medical outpatients. 
Freedman:  The Freedman method (Freedman et al., 1994) uses a “free-drawn” clock and 
the  time  specified  is  6:45.  The  total  score  is  15  with  higher  scores  indicating  better 
performance.  This  method  of  scoring  was  developed  by  Freedman  from  a  normative 
study of 348 individuals ranging in age from 20 to 90years. The clock drawings were 
analysed to determine the responses that were present at a high or low rate, respectively. 
From the youngest age group, a subset of descriptors was selected if they occurred or did 
not occur, in at least 90 percent of the subjects. The authors then evaluated the list of 
descriptors to ascertain which were considered characteristic of a “good” or “bad” clock. 
The  definition  of  “good”  and  “bad”  clock  was  determined  through  consensus.  While 
evaluating, the following question was asked: “Would the presence or absence of this 
item in any way contribute significantly to a “good” or “bad” clock?” for example, the 86 
 
data showed that at least 90 percent of the examinees who drew arrow heads, drew them 
on both hands of the clock (10 percent or less drew only one arrow head, either on the 
minute hand or the hour hand). The authors decided by consensus that although drawing 
one arrow head was unusual, such a clock was not considered as a significantly “bad” 
clock; therefore, this item was not considered as a critical item. Ultimately, 15 critical 
items  were  determined.  Thus,  the  scoring  system  consists  of  15  critical  items  that 
constitute  a  maximum  score  of  15  i.e.,      a  score  of    1  for  each  item  if  it  is  in  the 
affirmative (see Appendix A for detail). The 15 critical items have been divided between 
4  categories:  Contour  (2  critical  items),  Numbers  (6  critical  items),  Hands  (6  critical 
items), Center (1 critical item).   
The  different  scoring  systems  not  only  have  differing  sensitivities  with  regard  to  the 
detection of dementia but also differ in their ability to monitor progression of cognitive 
deterioration.  Powlishta,  et  al.,  (Powlishta,  et  al.,  2002)  tested  15  cognitively  normal 
subjects (CDR=0), 25 very mild dementia subjects (CDR=0.5), 21 mild dementia subjects 
(CDR=1)  and  14  moderate  (CDR=2)  to  severe  dementia(CDR=3)  subjects.  Six  clock 
drawing  methods  (Manos,  Mendez,  Sunderland,  Rouleau,  Pfizer,  AD  Cooperative 
Society) were used on all individuals. They found out that the very mild dementia group 
did  not  differ  significantly  from  the  normal  group,  with  regard  to  their  mean  clock 
drawing  abilities  regardless  of  the  clock  scoring  method  used  to  evaluate  their 
performance. Also, they failed to find a significant difference between the mild and the 
moderate to severe groups. They concluded that for the detection of very mild dementia, 
the  clock  drawing  test  did  not  appear  to  be  a  good  screening  instrument.  But,  when 
Heinik et al. (Heinik et al., 2002a) used the Shulman and the Freedman methods on 
subjects  with  mild  (CDR=1)  DAT  (Dementia  of  the  Alzheimer’s  type)  and  moderate 
(CDR=2) DAT, they reported that performance of the moderate DAT subjects on the 
Freedman method was significantly worse than mild DAT subjects, while as performance 
on the Shulman method was similar between the two groups. 
According to Esteban-Santillan et al. (Watson et al., 1993 cited in Esteban-Santillan et 
al., 1998), if an examinee is unable to accurately denote time by use of hands of the 
clock, it is a significant indication of cognitive impairment and should be considered as a 
more  serious  error  than  “primary  artistic,  visual,  or  spatial  difficulties”.  They  further 87 
 
added that their results suggest that very high positive and negative predictive values for 
early Alzheimer’s disease are provided by hand placement items, on the clock drawing 
test; therefore, when the Clock Drawing Test is used in dementia screening evaluations, 
the accurate placement and depiction of hands should be given particular attention.   
In general, the Tuokko, Mendez, and Shulman scoring procedures are quite sensitive. 
However, they have a modest specificity; specificity of the Mendez method is particularly 
poor (Strauss et al., 2006). Besides, in the Mendez method, full credit can be obtained 
without the hands indicating correct time which does not count towards a merit of the 
method  as  a  highly  diagnostic  feature  of  the  clock  drawing  strategy  is  not  evaluated 
appropriately.  Brodaty and Moore (1997) compared three scoring methods (Shulman, 
Sunderland,  and  Wolf-Klein)  in  a  memory  disorders  clinic  and  reported  that  the 
Shulman’s method performed best and even it was superior to the MMSE. In a sample of 
geriatric  outpatients,  Storey  et  al.  (Storey  et  al.,  2001  cited  in  Strauss  et  al.,  2006) 
compared  five  scoring  methods  (Shulman,  Sunderland,  Wolf-Klein,  Mendez,  and 
Watson); they found that dementia was predicted more accurately by the Shulman and 
Mendez methods than by the Sunderland, Wolf-Klein or Watson methods. Using older 
adults  with  and  without  dementia,  Tuokko  et  al.  (Tuokko  et  al.,  2000)  compared  a 
number of scoring methods and reported high intra-rater reliability for the Wolf-Klein 
and  the  Shulman  scoring  methods  and  concluded  that  the  relatively  lower  inter-rater 
reliability coefficients of these methods most likely  reflected the subjective nature of 
these methods; they also reported lower sensitivities and specificities for the Wolf-Klein 
and  Watson  scoring  methods.  Besides,  in  the  Watson  method,  the  examinees  are 
instructed to draw the numbers on the clock face but are not asked to draw the hands 
(examinees are not asked to indicate a time). Hence there is no representation of a highly 
diagnostic feature of the clock drawing strategy. The Sunderland scoring system also has 
a lower sensitivity and specificity (Strauss et al., 2006).  
Suhr et al. (Suhr et al., 1998) evaluated the quantitative and qualitative performance of 
stroke patients and normal controls on six clock drawing systems and reported the highest 
interrater reliability (0.98) for the Freedman scoring method. Heinik et al. (Heinik et al., 
2004) in a study of DAT (dementia of the Alzheimer type) and VD (Vascular dementia) 
patients reported significant correlations of 0.8 and higher between the Freedman and the 88 
 
Shulman scoring system; also, performance of the VD patients was significantly worse 
than the DAT patients on the Freedman method, but not on the Shulman method. Heinik 
et  al.  (Heinik  et  al.,  2002b)  made  a  study  to  see  if  the  clock  drawing  test  could 
differentiate  between  dementia  of  the  Alzheimer’s  type  and  vascular  dementia;  they 
reported  that  only  the  Freedman  clock  drawing  total  score  and  hands  subscore  were 
statistically different between the two groups and hypothesized that it was the presumed 
sensitivity of the Freedman method to impaired executive functioning that it was able to 
differentiate between the two groups, because in vascular dementia  impaired executive 
functioning  is  more  pronounced  compared  with  DAT    (dementia  of  the  Alzheimer’s 
type).  The  Freedman’s  hands  subscore  is  the  “most  abstractive-executive  oriented 
element” in the method. In another study, the use of the clock drawing test was studied in 
Schizophrenia  and  control  subjects  (Herrmann,  et  al.,  1999);  they  reported  that  the 
Schizophrenia  patients  had  significantly  worse  performance  on  the  Freedman  method 
compared to controls despite performance being equal on the MMSE. Also, the Freedman 
method of clock drawing is a “free-drawn” method and hence constructional abilities (i.e. 
visuoconstructional task) are required for the reproduction of the visual aspects of a clock 
without model of a clock being available to copy from. Shulman (2000) admits that the 
Freedman method because of its length and complexity appears well suited for research 
purposes.   
Freedman  (Freedman  et  al.,  1994)  highlights  that  for  the  screening  of  cognitive 
impairment, although the clock drawing test is a sensitive screening measure, however it 
is not intended as a tool for the diagnosis of any specific disorder, such as Alzheimer’s 
disease. It rather exposes the “deficits due to dysfunction in specific brain systems” that 
may result from a broad array of neurological disorders.  
 
3.4 Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test 
 
This test was developed by Rey in 1941 and was subsequently elaborated by Osterrieth in 
1944 (Strauss et al., 2006). Osterrieth in 1944 developed its 36-point scoring system for 
scoring the accuracy of its reproduction and was translated into English by E.M. Taylor 
in 1959 and is in wide use ever since (Hamby et al., 1993). The Rey-Osterrieth Complex 89 
 
figure  is  reproduced  below  (Figure  3.1)  and  comprises  of  18  standard  items  (see 
Appendix-A). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure (Lezak et al., 2004). 
 
In this test, the examinee is given a drawing of the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure and 
asked to make a copy of the figure. After the examinee has drawn the figure, the original 
and drawn figures are taken away and he is asked to reproduce the drawing from memory 
“immediately” and/or after a certain “delay”. Typical measures of performance include 
the copy score (it indicates how accurately the figure has been copied and is a measure of 
visual-constructional ability) and “immediate” and/or “delayed” recall scores (which is a 
measure of the amount of information retained over time). In most administrations, the 
examinees are not forewarned when they are being given the copy instructions that they 
will have to reproduce the figure from memory (Lezak et al., 2004). Knight et al. (Knight 90 
 
et al., 2003 cited in Strauss et al., 2006) made a survey of members of the International 
Neuropsychology Society and found out that the most frequently used interval between 
the  copy  and  “immediate”  recall  was  from  0  to  5  seconds  and  the  average  interval 
between the copy trial and the delayed trial was 27 minutes (SD=14 minutes) while as 30 
minutes was the most frequently used interval. The test originally developed by Rey in 
1941 involved the copy trial and a “delayed” recall 3 minutes later (Strauss et al., 2006). 
Lezak (Lezak et al., 2004) report that some examiners follow Osterrieth’s convention and 
use a delayed recall interval of 3 minutes. 
According to Strauss et al. (2006), the test assesses visual-spatial construction ability and 
visual memory. They further elaborate (Meyers & Meyers, 1995a; Waber & Holmes, 
1986  cited  in  Strauss  et  al.,  2006)  that  the  test  assesses  a  broad  range  of  cognitive 
processes  which  include  planning  skills,  organizational  skills,  and  problem  solving 
strategies. Perceptual, motor and episodic memory functions are also assessed. According 
to Chervinsky et al. (Chervinsky et al., 1992 cited in Strauss et al., 2006), the general 
notion is that if adequate performance is to be achieved on the test, the precise cognitive 
operations that must be exercised include visual perception, visual-spatial organization, 
motor functioning and memory (on the recall condition). Overall, correlational and factor 
analytic studies show that validity of the test as a measure of visual-constructional ability 
(copy)    and  memory  (recall)  but  not  executive  function  (Strauss  et  al.,  2006). 
Impairments  in  visual  memory  also  contributes  to  poor  decision  making  (based  on 
incorrect input) thereby increasing drivers’ risk of errors, crashes and injuries (Rizzo & 
Kellison,  2004)  .  The  performance  difference  between  the  immediate  and  3-minute 
delayed recall scores is very small; also, overall recall performance is not affected by the 
length of delay chosen (15, 30, 45, or 60 minutes), provided the delay is not greater than 
1 hour. Most forgetting takes place within the first few minutes after copying (Meyers & 
Meyers,  1995a;  Berry  &  Carpenter,  1992  cited  in  Strauss  et  al., 2006). Although,  in 
normal subjects virtually no forgetting takes place between the immediate recall and 20- 
or 30-minute delayed recalls (Tombaugh & Hubley, 1991). Also, if an examinee takes the 
immediate recall test, it will affect his performance on the delayed recall (Lezak et al., 
2004).  91 
 
Qualitative aspects of performance on the test can also be judged by noting the process or 
strategy  an  examinee  uses  while  copying  /recalling  the  figure  (Ruffolo  et  al.,  2001). 
Henceforth, some examiners record the strategy adopted by the examinee, while he is 
copying by either the colour pencil method or the flowchart method. This enables the 
examiner to capture the sequential process used while drawing. Because, the manner in 
which the figure is copied (i.e., strategy and organization) will have a significant bearing 
on recalling the figure. Both copy and recall accuracy scores tend to be correlated with 
qualitative copy scores (Strauss et al., 2006). According to Lezak et al. (2004), largely 
examinees  who  approach  the  copying  task  conceptually  i.e.  drawing  the  overall 
configuration of the design and then as a second step filling in the details, recall the figure 
much  better  than  participants  who  copy  the  details  one  by  one  even  if  it  is  done 
systematically (i.e., going from left to right or top to bottom). This difference may be due 
to the fact that when items are processed in pieces, there is a need to recall many more 
items as compared with when they are combined into conceptually meaningful units and 
hence demonstrates that the fragmented copy approach (piecemeal copy) is inefficient for 
memory storage. During the copying process, the organizational strategy (or its lack) in 
particular of subjects who have a lower mental ability often strongly predicts subsequent 
recall (Fujii et al., 2000; Dawson & Grant, 2000 cited in Lezak et al., 2004).  
 In the colour pencil method, when a section of the drawing is completed, the examiner 
hands the examinee a different coloured pencil. The order in which the coloured pencils 
are  handed  over  to  the  examinee  is  noted.  Pen-switching  is  brought  about  at 
approximately equal points in the construction of the figure and is avoided when the 
examinee is in the middle of drawing one of the standard 18 items (Hamby et al., 1993). 
Typically, three to six different coloured pens are used. In the flowchart method, on a 
separate sheet of paper, the examiner reproduces the drawing of the examinee (as he is 
copying the figure) and notes the order of lines as they are drawn by numbering and their 
direction  by  means  of  arrows  (Ruffolo  et  al.,  2001).  Ruffolo  et  al.  (2001)  made  a 
comparison  study  of  the  two  methods  and  reported  that  the  colour  pencil  method 
performed better than the flowchart method. 
Particularly,  age  above  70  years  affects  performance  on  the  copy  task,  however,  the 
changes are quite subtle. Mitrushina et al. (Mitrushina et al., 2005 cited in Strauss et al., 92 
 
2006) conducted a meta-analysis and reported that there is a decline in copy performance 
with age and also the variability increases with advancing age. The drawings of older 
adults (60+  years) usually have curved lines, rounded corners, gap, and overshoots which 
can be classified as minor inaccuracies and are attributed to mild deficiencies in visual-
spatial  functions  or  motor  problems  (Hartman  &  Potter,  1998  cited  in  Strauss  et  al., 
2006). Mean scores on the delayed recall condition also show a decline with advancing 
age along with increased standard deviations due to the greater heterogeneity of the older 
age  group.  In  older  age  groups,  the  main  mistake  committed  is  the  omission  of  the 
standard items of the drawing rather than distortion of the items (Hartman & Potter, 1998; 
Mitrushina et al., 2005 cited in Strauss et al., 2006). 
In memory tests, the test-retest reliability is less well defined compared with other tests. 
A normal decrement in recall is expected if a stimulus material (here exposure to the Rey-
Osterrieth drawing) is not repeated after the delay interval; but, if the stimulus material is 
repeated,  performance  is  expected  to  be  better  than  the  performance  at  the  initial 
presentation of the stimulus. In test-retest studies, a normal assumption is that that the 
characteristic  which  is  being  measured  remains  stable  over  time;  however,  both  the 
conditions  highlighted  previously  are  in  conflict  with  this  assumption  (Groth-Marnat, 
2000).  Ranges  for  some  scores  (e.g.,  copy)  are  restricted  as  most  normal  subjects’ 
performance is at maximum- or near-maximum level (i.e., ceiling effect is reached) and 
as a result, the magnitude of the test-retest correlation coefficients is artificially reduced. 
Keeping these considerations in mind, Meyers & Meyers (Meyers & Meyers, 1995b cited 
in  Strauss  et  al.,  2006)  evaluated  test-retest  reliability  of  normal  subjects  for  scores 
having sufficient range after a retest interval of 6 months and obtained a coefficient of 
0.76 for immediate recall and 0.89 for delayed recall.  
Strauss  et  al.  (2006)  report  adequate  to  high  interrater  and  intrarater  reliability 
(coefficients greater than 0.80) for total scores obtained with scoring according to the 
criteria of Osterrieth (1944) and E.M. Taylor (1959) (or variants of these criteria). In 
another  instance,  they  report  a  high  interrater  reliability  for total  scores  (greater  than 
0.90). Lezak et al.(2004) also report an interrater reliability coefficient of greater than 
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No significant relationship was found between Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test and 
language measures (Strauss et al., 2006). For individuals with a history of central nervous 
system health problems that are known to affect memory and executive system, the test 
has shown sensitivity. Such health problems include Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s 
disease, Huntington’s disease, Korsakoff’s disease, cocaine and poly drug abuse, seizure 
disorders, head injury, medial temporal lobe damage, Ischemic vascular dementia and 
anterior communicating artery aneurysm (Strauss et al., 2006). Lezak et al.(2004) also 
report  that  the  test  bears  sensitivity  to  mild  neuropsychological  impairments  that  are 
found in a variety of clinical populations. We must bear in mind that the majority of 
individuals who are healthy are able to draw the figure without major distortions and 
obtain high scores, on the copy condition. Therefore, categorizing a high copy score as 
“superior” does not make any sense; however, a low score on the copy condition is cause 
for  concern  and  has  significant  clinical  implications  (Mitrushina  et  al.,  2005  cited  in 
Strauss et al., 2006). Strauss et al. (2006) comment that for the interpretation of recall 
scores, the adequacy of the initial copy must be considered. If the initial copy is poor it 
might  indicate  disrupted  encoding  (e.g.,  due  to  visual-perceptual  or  organizational 
problems) and if recall is poor, it may suggest disrupted storage. 
 
3.4.1 Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test: Test Procedure & Scoring 
 
The detailed testing procedure is at Appendix-A. The measures of performance include a 
copy  score  and  3-minutes  delayed  recall  scores.  However,  in  the  copy  condition  the 
colour pencil method (as explained earlier) is used to capture the sequential process while 
drawing. The quantitative scoring of both the copy condition and the 3-minute delayed 
recall condition is done according to the 18-item, 36-point scoring system developed by 
Osterrieth in 1944 (Osterrieth, 1944) that was translated into English by E.M. Taylor in 
1959 (Taylor, 1959) (see Appendix-A for detail). Some examiners also record completion 
time. Although, several scoring systems have been devised, the method developed by 
Osterrieth continues to be the most commonly used method (called the Rey-Osterrieth 
method) (Lezak et al., 2004; Groth-Marnat, 2000). The figure comprises of 18 scorable 
items (see Appendix-A). Each item is numbered to facilitate scoring. Each item receives 94 
 
between 0.5 and 2.0 points depending upon accuracy, distortion and location. If an item is 
correct and is placed properly it receives 2 points, if it is correct and is placed poorly it 
receives 1 point. If an item is distorted (or incomplete but recognizable) and is placed 
properly it  receives 1 point, if it is distorted  (or incomplete but recognizable) and is 
placed poorly it receives 0.5 points. If an item is absent or is not recognizable, it receives 
zero  points.  Therefore,  the  maximum  score  that  can  be  achieved  is  36.  The  criteria 
proposed by Osterrieth (Osterrieth, 1944) clearly specify the items that are to be scored 
but still considerable latitude exists with regard to classifying items as “distorted” or 
“misplaced”;  therefore,  a  number  of  authors  have  proposed  more  explicit  criteria  for 
scoring the figure according to the Rey-Osterrieth method (Strauss et al., 2006). Strauss 
et al.(2006) report that the criteria developed by L.B. Taylor (reproduced in Spreen & 
Strauss,  1991)  are  stricter  than  those  of  E.M.  Taylor  (Taylor,  1959).  For  clarity  and 
consistency  in  scoring,  Groth-Marnat  (2000)  also  recommends  using  the  Taylor’s 
Guidelines  that  are  reproduced  in  Spreen  &  Strauss  (1991)  for  most  purposes  (see 
Appendix-A for Taylor’s criteria / guidelines). 
 
3.5 Dichotic Listening Test 
 
Studies  have  been  conducted  in  the  past  to  explore  the  relationship  between  driving 
performance  and  experimental  measures  that  gauge  the  efficiency  of  focusing  and 
switching attention. For example, Kahneman et al. (1973) conducted a study in which a 
test  of  auditory  selective  attention  (the  Dichotic  Listening  Test)  was  given  to  117 
professional bus drivers aged 22 to 32. In the dichotic listening test given to the subjects, 
a  series  of  digits  and  letters  were  presented  at  the  same  time  to  each  ear.  Each  test 
consisted  of  two  parts.  In  the  first  part  of  the  test,  drivers  were  told  to  concentrate 
attention on one specific ear (i.e. left or right ear, this is the relevant ear) and to report 
(speak aloud so that the examiner notes them down) only the digits appearing on that 
specific ear (specific channel). In the second part of the test, they were told that when 
they hear a “particular” tone, they have to switch attention to the other channel (other ear) 
and report digits from that channel (on 50 percent of the second parts, the same ear is the 
relevant channel). In the beginning of each part (i.e., part one and part two) there is a 95 
 
tone; if the examinees hear a “low” tone that indicates that the left ear is the “relevant” 
ear in that part, if they hear a “high” tone that signifies that the right ear is the “relevant” 
ear in that part. In both parts, subjects have to only report digits from the relevant ear. 
The rate at which the letters/digits were spoken was 2 letters/digits per second. Table 3.1 
is an example of the schematic of one such Dichotic Listening Test. 
 
Table 3.1 An example of a Dichotic Listening Test (Note: Each pair containing 
letters/digits is presented simultaneously to both ears). 
  Left Ear  Right Ear 
Part One 
Pair 1  V  Z 
Pair 2  P  6 
Pair 3  J  U 
Pair 4  1  I 
Pair 5  W  9 
Pair 6  M  X 
Pair 7  8  E 
Pair 8  T  2 
Pair 9  7  H 
Pair 10  Q  0 
Pair 11  A  3 
Pair 12  L  N 
Pair 13  C  5 
Pair 14  4  K 
Pair 15  S  R 
Pair 16  B  F 
Part Two 
Pair 1  Y  D 
Pair 2  4  2 
Pair 3  8  0 
Pair 4  7  9 96 
 
 
Essentially the test was used to gauge three categories of errors in the realm of selective 
attention:  
1.  Number of errors committed in reporting the digits from the relevant ear (relevant 
channel) (omission errors). This measure indicated the extent to which there was 
inability to focus attention on the relevant channel. 
2.  The number of digits reported from the irrelevant channel (intrusion errors). This 
measure indicated a person’s vulnerability to distraction.  
3.  Since 50 percent of the second parts involved switching to the other channel, thus 
the number of errors in (1) and (2) as explained above following the switch in 
relevant channel in the second part of the test were coded as switching errors 
(switching  errors).This  measure  indicated  failure  of  the  attention  mechanism 
responsible for switching.  
Correlation coefficients of 0.29 and 0.31 were obtained between the number of errors 
committed in reporting the digits from the relevant channel and the number of digits 
reported from the irrelevant channel respectively with vehicle crashes over a one year 
period.  And  a  correlation  coefficient  of  0.37  was  obtained  between  the  number  of 
switching errors and crashes over a one year period. Similar findings have been replicated 
in other studies. In an even earlier study by Gopher & Kahneman (1971), the dichotic 
listening test was applied to a highly pre-selected group of cadets (of high-performance 
aircraft) in the Israel Air Force and a significant correlation of 0.36 was found with a 
three-level criterion in pilot training. For predicting different criteria of proficiency in 
flying high-performance aircraft, the test had promising validity. Also, pilots of high-
performance interceptor and attack aircraft had significantly better performance (on part 
two of the test) than pilots of transport and slower jet aircraft. They finally concluded that 
in driving / flying under normal conditions and in the second part of the dichotic listening 
test,  the  requirement  to reorient  attention  is  a  common  feature.  The  ability  to  switch 
attention as measured by the dichotic listening test is an indicator of overall performance 
since in the driving and flying tasks, the operators of the machines (car & plane) do not 
passively  wait  for  orienting  signals  but  have  to  rapidly  switch  attention  between  the 
stream of events taking place. In the pilot’s case, this requires a high level of attention 97 
 
and  integration  of  information  from  several  sources.  His  task  includes  monitoring 
numerous displays inside the cockpit (relevant to ground location, vertical situation, and 
energy management etc.), response to ground communication and control of complex 
flight manoeuvres (Gopher, 1982). In the case of driving, the task is one of monitoring a 
cluttered  driving  environment  (in  urban    areas)  for  different  developments  /  events  / 
traffic  regulatory  signs  etc.  and  switching  attention  from  low  priority  events  to  high 
priority events while at the same time he may have to monitor the instrument panel for 
data  relevant  to  speed  etc.  Since  the  driving  environment  is  dynamic,  new  events/ 
scenarios  keep  on  appearing  and  the  driver  is  in  a  continuous  process  of  switching 
attention between different events / stimuli based on their changing priorities. Therefore, 
while driving, successive events call for the rapid switching of attention. Also, the driver 
has  to  avoid  interference  from  distracting  sources  of  information  and  has  to  divide 
resources properly. Intuitively, one would think that how is it possible that the scores on 
the dichotic listening test (a test dependent on auditory modality) could be correlated with 
crashes, when driving is apparently a predominantly perceptual task.  To elaborate on this 
aspect,  Avolio et al. (1985) conducted a study in which the auditory selective attention 
test (the Dichotic Listening Test) and a visual selective attention test (developed by the 
author on the model of the auditory selective attention test and constructed to equal as a 
visual counterpart of the auditory selective attention test), were given to seventy two 
drivers (aged from 28-59). The authors found out that all three categories of errors (i.e., 
omission, intrusion and switching errors) on the auditory selective attention test (Dichotic 
Listening Test) were significantly correlated (in the predicted direction) with individual 
accident rates. However, in the visual selective attention test, only omission errors and 
switching errors were significantly correlated (in the predicted direction) with individual 
accident rate. The intercorrelations among the errors of the auditory selective attention 
test  and  the  visual  selective  attention  test  were  positive  and  significant.  Also,  it  was 
observed  that  the  correlations  between  the  switching  errors  of  the  auditory  selective 
attention test and the visual selective attention test had the highest correlations (among 
the test battery) with individual accident rate. Finally the authors concluded that since 
both measures of selective attention (i.e., both modality-specific measures i.e. auditory as 
well as visual) were correlated with each other and were also correlated with an external 98 
 
task (i.e. the individual accident rate), therefore both may be tapping a central cognitive 
construct / domain, that is modality-free. Gopher (1982) gave the Dichotic Listening Test 
to 2000 flight cadets in the Israeli Air Force and found switching errors had the highest 
correlation with success in flight training and the dichotic listening test did add to the 
predictive value of the test battery employed for pilot selection and concluded that since 
there were high intercorrelations between types of errors and the dichotic listening test 
predicted  performance  in  the  “primarily  visually  loaded  piloting  task”  ,  therefore  the 
dichotic listening test in essence was tapping a single central cognitive function that was 
modality  free.  Parasuraman  &  Nestor  (1991)  give  a  list  of  other  studies  (along  with 
relevant data in tabular format) that show significant correlation starting from 0.3 to 0.4 
between measures of driving performance (using accident rate or closed-course driving 
performance index) and at least one measure of selective attention. One primary fact that 
surfaces  from  these  studies  is  that  the  largest  correlations  were  obtained  from  the 
switching error category of selective attention. In this context, Kahneman et al. (1973) at 
the conclusion of their study suggested that to reorient attention from an earlier state of 
attention to a channel/stimulus is more difficult than to initially apply focused attention 
from an uncommitted waiting state. 
According to Lachman et al. (1979), it is in the brain that attention is accomplished and 
not in the senses (e.g., vision, hearing etc.) as studies using visual stimuli and auditory 
stimuli gives the same results; however, it is much easier to use the auditory stimuli, 
whereby different messages are presented to the two ears. Both messages are transmitted 
to  the  brain  and  selectivity  can  be  accomplished  centrally  in  the  brain  (as  to  which 
message to inhibit). Therefore, we opted to develop an auditory task (i.e. the Dichotic 
Listening Test) rather than a visual task keeping in view equipment costs and simplicity 
of testing procedure as the Dichotic Listening Test can be administered without the use of 
a computer.   
Perry and Hodges (Perry & Hodges, 1999 cited in Duchek & Balota, 2005) suggest that 
prior  to  any  deficit  in  language  or  visuospatial  abilities  in  DAT  (Dementia  of  the 
Alzheimer’s Type), attention is the first non-memory aspect of cognition that exhibits 
decline. Elaborating  further, Baddeley et al.(2001) point out that in the early stage of 
DAT, sustained and focused attention tend to be relatively preserved; however, across 99 
 
several tasks, deficits in selective attention have been reported (Duchek & Balota, 2005). 
Also,  according  to  Parasuraman  &  Nestor  (1991)  accident  risk  is  critically  related  to 
selective attention and the ability to shift selective attention. Particularly, a decline in the 
efficiency of visual selective attention is seen in the early stages of DAT and hence may 
contribute to impaired driving performance (Parasuraman & Nestor 1991). Parasuraman 
& Nestor (1993) also report that the ability to switch attention is also correlated with 
driving performance in normal individuals. 
 
3.5.1 Dichotic Listening Test: Design 
 
In  the  Dichotic  Listening  Test  (Gopher  &  Kahneman,  1971;  Kahneman  et  al.,  1973; 
Gopher, 1982; Avolio et al.,1985; McKenna et al., 1986)  there were 48 Dichotic tests. 
Each test consisted of two parts. In part one, there were 16 pairs of digits/letters presented 
simultaneously to the two ears. The pairs were presented at a rate of 2 pairs per second. 
The digits ranged from 0 to 9 and the alphabet from A to Z. In part two, there were three 
pairs of digits that were preceded by 0,1, or 2 additional pairs of letters. The presentation 
rate in part two was the same as that in part one i.e., 2 pairs per second. In the beginning 
of each part (i.e., part one and part two) there was a tone; when the examinees heard a 
“low” tone that indicated that the left ear was the “relevant” ear in that part, if they heard 
a “high” tone that signified that the right ear was the “relevant” ear in that part. In both 
parts, subjects had to only report aloud the digits from the relevant ear. A low tone was 
designated by sounding a tone having a frequency of 250 hertz and a high tone by a 
frequency of 2500 hertz. The typical layout of a test is as follows: First there is a silence 
of 5 seconds then there is an announcement of test no. (e.g., Test No.1) on both ears. The 
examinee has to repeat aloud the test no. Then there is a silence of 2.5 seconds followed 
by a either a high tone or a low tone of 0.5 second duration, for part one of the test. The 
tone is presented monaurally to the relevant ear (i.e., if it is a low tone, it is presented to 
the left ear and if it is a high tone, it is presented to the right ear). After a silence of 1.5 
seconds, the simultaneous presentation of 16 pairs of digits/letters begins at a rate of  2 
pairs per second. After part one, there is a silence of 1.5 seconds and is followed by a 
either a high tone or a low tone of 0.5 second duration, for part two of the test. The tone is 100 
 
always presented monaurally to the ear that is relevant in part one of the test. Then after a 
silence of 1.5 seconds, there is a simultaneous presentation of three pairs of digits that are 
preceded  by  0,1,  or  2  additional  pairs  of  letters.  There  are  some  additional  features 
(constraints) of the test that have been outlined below: 
1.  On 50 percent of the tests, the tone (cue) in part one is opposite to that of part two.  
2.  In part one, there is no pair that has only digits i.e. a pair has a digit and a letter 
such as letter-digit or digit-letter. 
3.  In part one, the relevant ear (channel) had either two or four digits, whereas the 
irrelevant  channel  always  had  six  digits.  In  part  two  of  each  test,  there  were 
always three digits on the relevant ear and three on the irrelevant ear. 
4.  In part one the relevant digits are different from the irrelevant digits and also in 
part two, the relevant digits are different from the irrelevant digits. Furthermore, 
taking parts one and two together, all relevant digits in a test are different and so 
are also all irrelevant digits. 
5.  In the 16 pairs in part one, the digits are randomly placed between position 2 and 
14 and at least one letter is between successive digits. 
24 test were fabricated by factorially crossing 2 (instruction tones for part one i.e., either 
left ear relevant or right ear relevant) × 2 (instruction tones for part two i.e., either left ear 
relevant or right ear relevant) × 2 (number of relevant digits in part one i.e., either 2 or 4) 
× 3 (number of letter pairs preceding the digit pairs at the start of part two i.e., either 0, 1 
or 2).  Therefore 2 × 2 × 2 × 3 = 24 tests were fabricated. In fabricating the tests, the 
digits  for  the  relevant  and  irrelevant  parts  were  chosen  randomly  through  a  random 
number  generation  program  and  then  the  order  of  digits  within  a  test  was  also 
randomized.  The  configuration  of  the  numbers  was  chosen  so  as  to  fulfil  all  the 
aforementioned constraints. Finally, the order of the factorial design was also randomized 
to obtain a test sequence which included 24 tests. Instead of a 250 hertz low tone, a 150 
hertz low tone was used to make the discrimination between the low tone and the high 
tone more obvious. Also, the presentation rate of the digits / letters was set at 1 digit/letter 
per second instead of 2, because the test involved older individuals who found the 2 
digit/letter  per  second  rate  to  be  too  fast  to  grasp.  This  was  determined  after  a  pilot 
sample of younger and older individuals was tested at various presentation rates.     101 
 
The Dichotic Listening Tests performed by Gopher & Kahneman (1971), Kahneman et 
al. (1973), and Gopher (1982) comprised of 48 Tests. However, to reduce the duration of 
testing time, we used 24 tests as per the factorial design outlined earlier. Boer et al. 
(1997)  gave  48    Dichotic  Listening  Test  to  Royal  Netherlands  Air  Force  aviator 
applicants and  Royal Netherlands Navy air traffic control applicants and reported higher 
validity  for  the  24  test  protocol  as  compared  to  the  48  test  protocol  and  finally 
recommended the shorter version of the Test i.e. 24 Dichotic Tests. They also reported 
the adoption of the shorter protocol by the Royal Netherlands Air Force for their pilot 
selection  program.  Avolio  et  al.  (1985)  in  their  study  of  individual  differences  in 
information-processing  ability  as  a  predictor  of  motor  vehicle  accidents  also  used  24 
Dichotic Listening Tests instead of 48 Tests. 
 
3.5.2 Dichotic Listening: Recording & Equipment 
 
In  the  Dichotic  listening  test,  one  of  the  critical  issues  is  the  synchronization  of  the 
stimulus  (digits/letters)  onset  between  the  channels  (ears)  so  that  a  precise  temporal 
alignment is achieved between the two ears. According to Berlin (Berlin, 1977 cited in 
Davey, 1987) even if there is a difference as small as 10 milliseconds between the ears in 
the start of a stimulus it will affect the advantage accorded to a particular ear. Therefore 
to fabricate the Dichotic Listening test it was necessary to use a computer to generate 
tapes wherein there is exact control of temporal parameters relevant to the technique. For 
this purpose we used a sound editing software called AUDACITY® . This software is a 
digital audio editor and is used for: (1) recording live audio (2) convert tapes and records 
into digital recordings or CDs (3) edit MP3/WAV sound files (4) cut, copy, splice, and 
mix sounds together (5) change the speed or pitch of a recording and other tasks.  
For recording purposes, a researcher with a clear voice, good pronunciation and whose 
first language was English was employed. Using  AUDACITY®, we recorded: (a) “Test 
1”, “Test 2” till “Test  24” (b)  “0”,  “1”,  “2” till “9” (c) “A”,  “B” till “Z”. To  avoid 
confounding a “zero” with a “O” (i.e., pronounced as OOOO), we avoided recording a 
“O”. In the second step, we examined the wave forms of each of these spoken elements, 
listened to them and truncated them so as to get rid of the excess audio signature at the 102 
 
two ends and then labelled them. As a final product, these elements had to sound just 
about right. If there was an ambiguity in the pronunciation of an element, we requested 
the researcher to rerecord that element again. Finally we made sure that the time duration 
of each element (except “Test 1”, “Test 2” etc) did not exceed 0.5 seconds to prevent an 
overlap  with  the  following  element.  Although  this  software  is  not  user  friendly  for 
recording the Dichotic listening test (but then there is no other software to do so), we had 
to painstakingly assemble each of the elements along with silences, keeping in view the 
temporal duration of each element to the millionth of a second to get a presentation rate 
of  1  digits/letters  per  second  and  to  achieve  synchronization  of  stimulus  (digit/letter) 
onset  between  channels  so  that  the  temporal  alignment  between  the  ears  was  to  a 
millionth of a second. The individual tests were then appended to each other in series 
using the software. Test 1 to Test 12 were combined to form one series, while as Test 13 
to  Test  24  were  combined  to  form  another  series.  We  also  recorded  instructions  and 
sound samples of “low tone” and “high tone” so that the examinees become familiar with 
the tones. All these digital files were in a format that is specifically used / recognized by 
AUDACITY® ; therefore, to make these files  compatible with Microsoft Windows®  
Media Player,  these files were  converted into  WAV format using the  software. The 
Dichotic Listening test prepared for this research is placed on the accompanying CD in 
WAV format. A good quality stereo headphone set is also required to take the test. 
 
3.5.3 Dichotic Listening Test: Scoring 
 
Score on the test is the total number of errors. Essentially the errors can be categorized 
into three categories:  
•  Omission errors: Number of errors committed in reporting the digits from the 
relevant ear (relevant channel). This measure indicates the extent to which there 
was inability to focus attention on the relevant channel.  
•  Intrusion errors: The number of digits reported from the irrelevant channel. This 
measure indicates a person’s vulnerability to distraction. 
•  Switching errors: Since 50 percent of the second parts of the tests (i.e., 12 tests 
out of 24) involved switching to the other channel (the other ear), thus the number 103 
 
of Omission and Intrusion errors (as explained above) following the switch in 
relevant channel in the second part of those 12 tests are coded as switching errors. 
This  measure  indicates  failure  of  the  attention  mechanism  responsible  for 
switching. 
To  facilitate  scoring  of  the  Dichotic  Listening  Test,  a  score  sheet  was  prepared  (see 
Appendix-A). In this score sheet all the relevant digits for part one and part two of each 
test were written in bold font in one line. The irrelevant digits were noted in a line above 
the line of relevant digits. Tests wherein the switching of the relevant channel (from left 
to right or right to left) took place were given a shade to distinguish them from the rest, as 
switching errors are only noted in these tests (these tests were twelve in number). The 
examinee-dictated  digits  were  noted  on  this  sheet  of  paper  in  front  of  each  test.  To 
facilitate  ambiguity-free  scoring,  we  bifurcated  the  examinee-dictated  digits  into  two 
groups  (i.e.,  part  one  and  part  two  of  the  test)  by  examining  the  actual  relevant  and 
irrelevant digits. For Omission errors, we noted the number of relevant digits in part one 
that were omitted by the examinees in each test and then added them up for all the tests; 
these were the Omission errors. We divided this by 72 and multiplied it by 100 to get 
percentage Omitted errors. We divided by 72 because in the 24 tests, 12 tests had 2 
relevant digits and 12 had 4 relevant digits in part one.       
For  Intrusion errors, we inspected the examinee-dictated digits/letters in part one and 
compared  them  with  the  irrelevant  digits/letters  in  part  one.  The  number  of  common 
digits/letters between these comparisons was the intrusions. These were added for all 24 
tests to obtain Intrusion errors. We divided this by 144 and multiplied it by 100 to get 
percentage Intrusion errors. We divided by 144 because in the 24 tests, each test had six 
irrelevant digits in part one, so the maximum number of intrusions that one could make 
was six in each test. For the switching errors category, since 50 percent of the second 
parts of the tests (i.e., 12 tests out of 24) involved switching to the other channel (the 
other  ear),  thus  the  number  of  Omission  and  Intrusion  errors  (as  explained  above) 
following the switch in relevant channel in the second part of these 12 tests were coded as 
switching  errors.  For  these  errors  we  had  to  consider  only  the  12  tests  where  the 
switching in the channel took place (i.e., Test number 2,3,5,10,13,14,17,19,20,22,23 and 
24). The switching errors for these tests were added to get switching errors. We divided 104 
 
these by 72 and multiplied it by 100 to get percentage Switching errors. We divided by 72 
because in the 12 tests under consideration, in each test there were 3 relevant digits in 
part two that could be missed and there were also three irrelevant digits that could have 
intruded. 
To get the total number of errors, the number of Omission, Intrusion and Switching errors 
were  added  for  all  24  tests.  Percentage  Total  errors  were  calculated  by  dividing  this 
number by 288 (i.e., 72+144+72 = 288).  
 
3.6 Paper Folding Test 
 
In the Paper Folding Test, subjects are mentally required to fold a piece of paper, imagine 
that a hole is punched through the folded paper and  then visualize as to what the paper 
would look like when it is unfolded. In the test, successive displays of figures show a 
square piece of paper that undergoes from one to four overlapping folds sequentially. 
Then a figure shows one or two holes punched through (such that it passes through the 
whole thickness of the paper) the folded paper at a particular location. There are five 
figures on the right hand side; one of these figures shows the correct position of the holes 
when the paper is completely unfolded. The examinee has to select the correct figure 
from  the  five  alternatives  (i.e.,  A,B,C,D,E).  The  figure  below  shows  a  very  simple 
example  of  a  Paper  Folding  Test  (single  fold)  (Figure  3.2).  Figure  3.3  illustrates  the 
rationale for selecting C as the correct answer, as the paper is unfolded. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 A simple example of Paper Folding Test (Ekstrom et al., 1976) 
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Figure 3.3 Showing unfolding of paper after punching of hole (Ekstrom et al., 1976). 
 
According to Ekstrom et al. (1976), the Paper Folding Test measures spatial visualization 
ability. Spatial visualization  refers to the mental manipulation of spatial information to 
determine  how  a  given  spatial  configuration  would  appear  if  portions  of  that 
configuration  were  to  be  rotated,  folded,  repositioned,  or  otherwise  transformed 
(Salthouse et al., 1990). De Raedt & Ponjaert-Kristoffersen (2000) classify the test as a 
visuo-spatial test with a working memory component because visuo-spatial information 
has to be stored in working memory while at the same time another mental operation is 
being  performed.  The  test  involves  a  mental  reversal  process  that  relies  on  working 
memory  (De  Raedt  &  Ponjaert-Kristofferson,  2001).  The  simultaneous  storage  and 
processing of information is a critical aspect of working memory. For a task that assesses 
working  memory,  a  necessary  and  important  feature  is  the  maintenance  of  some 
information while that information or some other information is being processed upon 
(Baddeley,  1986  cited  in  Salthouse  et  al.,  1989).  Impairment  of  working  memory  is 
associated with ageing according to many reports (Craik & Rabinowitz, 1984 cited in 
Salthouse  et  al.,  1989).  The  paper  folding  test  also  puts  considerable  demand  on  the 
central executive, because in order to solve the problem, a sequence of internal spatial 
transformations have to be exercised on the figure; therefore, there is a requirement that 
the  examinee  manages  task  specific  goals  and  subgoals  and  also  different  cognitive 
processes have to be scheduled and coordinated (Hegarty et al., 2000). 106 
 
Ekstrom et al. (Ekstrom et al., 1976 cited in Blajenkova et al., 2006) report a test-retest 
reliability of 0.84 for the paper folding test and Salthouse et al. (1990) report a reliability 
of  greater  than  0.82.  In  another  study,  Salthouse  et  al.(1989)  report  a  reliability  of 
0.86.The  test  also  shows  important  age  effects  (Craik  &  Salthouse,  1992).  Craik  & 
Salthouse (1992) tested 383 adults between the ages of 18 and 80 years. The scores on the 
test were converted into z scores (standardized scores) based on the scores of the young 
adults (18-29 years old). The distributions of the scores were plotted for each age cohort 
in 10 year increments (i.e., 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s, 70s). The distribution plots showed a 
clear tendency for the entire distribution of scores in each cohort to shift to lower levels 
as the age increased. A correlation coefficient of 0.42 was obtained between the paper 
folding test and age.  
De Raedt & Ponjaert-Kristofferson (2000,2001) made a study of 84 car drivers between 
the ages of 65 and 96 years who were referred for a fitness-to-drive  evaluation. The 
relationship between their self-reported accidents and seven neuropsychological tests was 
investigated. Their driving performance was also evaluated on a road test. Among the 
neuropsychological tests, the Paper Folding Test was the best predictor of accidents at 
cross roads. The authors explained that in order to make predictions about the time-to-
arrival of upcoming vehicles, information on initial position of vehicles must be retained 
in working memory. Therefore, visuo-spatial function with working memory plays an 
important  role  in  left-turn  (right  turn  in  Britain)  performance,  primarily  because  the 
judgement  of  speed  and  distance  of  oncoming  vehicles  is  involved.  The  situation  is 
further exacerbated because multiple oncoming and crossing vehicles require that drivers 
coordinate their turn movements into gaps that are multiply constrained because of the 
directional split of traffic and that some times more than one lane is in each direction 
Also, according to Guerrier et al. (1999), the importance of working memory in driving 
cannot be overemphasized because, for example, while making a left turn (Right turn in 
Britain), based on the dynamic changing situation of oncoming traffic and driver’s own 
vehicle  capabilities  (e.g.  acceleration),  information  has  to  be  processed  /operated  on, 
stored, retrieved and decision made (Guerrier et al., 1999). 
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3.6.1 Paper Folding Test: Test Procedure & Scoring 
 
Detailed Testing procedure and problem items are at Appendix-A. Ponjaert-Kristoffersen 
(2000) used the paper folding test with only one fold and the examinees had to choose 
between only two alternatives. However, we designed the test ourselves and included a 
total of 16 test items with 4 items each of one, two, three and four overlapping folds. 
Also, we gave the examinees 5 alternatives (i.e., A,B,C,D,E) to choose from on each test 
item.  As  the  number  of  folds  increase,  choosing  the  correct  answer  becomes  more 
difficult.  Salthouse  et  al.(1989)  found  that  as  the  number  of  folds  increased  mean 
accuracy  decreased  for  all  trials.  They  concluded  that  this  decrease  in  accuracy  with 
increase  in  folds  showed  an  inability  on  part  of  the  examinees  to  preserve  relevant 
information when other information was being processed and thus appeared to represent a 
failure of the working memory. Based on these finding it was intuitive that the 16 test 
items should not be scored equally as they varied in the number of folds. Therefore, we 
devised a scoring system wherein the score of each test item (if correct) was proportional 
to the number of folds in that item. Therefore, the one fold item was allocated 2.5 marks 
(if correct), the two folds 5 marks, the 3 folds 7.5 marks and the 4 folds 10 marks. Since 
there are 4 items each of the one, two, three and four folds, if an examinee answers all of 
them correctly he gets 100 marks (i.e., 2.5 × 4 + 5 × 4 + 7.5 × 4 + 10 × 4 = 100). To 
discourage  guessing,  some  marks  are  subtracted  from  the  total  score,  for  incorrect 
answers;  this  is  in  accordance  with  the  recommendation  of  Ekstrom  et  al.  (1976). 
Therefore, guessing is not to the advantage of candidates unless they eliminate one or 
more  of  the  answer  alternatives  as  wrong.  Since  each  item  has  5  alternatives,  the 
probability that a guess will be correct is one fifth; therefore if an item is incorrect, one 
fifth of the marks of that item will be subtracted from the total score. For example, if an 
examinee answers all items correctly except one 3 fold item and one four fold item his 
net score will be 79 (i.e., correct marks – incorrect marks = (2.5 × 4 + 5 × 4 + 7.5 × 3 + 
10  ×  3)  –  (  7.5  ×  1/5    +  10  ×  1/5  )  =  82.5  –  3.5  =  79).  This  protocol  adopted  for 
determining  the  number  of  marks  to  be  subtracted  for  incorrect  answers  is  quite  in 
conformance with the procedure adopted by Blajenkova et al. (2006) and Hegarty et al. 
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According to Hegarty et al. (Carroll, 1993 cited in Hegarty et al., 2000), in the Paper 
Folding Test the difficulty of the items to be solved primarily constrains an individual’s 
performance  and  hence  the  time  limit  is  relatively  liberal.  In  accordance  with  these 
recommendations, we set a time limit of 10 minutes for the 16 items of the test.  
 
3.7 Useful Field of View (UFOV) Test 
 
Sanders (Sanders, 1970 cited in  Edwards et al., 2005) was the first researcher to put 
forward the concept of useful field of view. The visual field area over which information 
can be acquired in a brief glance without eye or head movement was termed “functional 
visual field” by the author. This concept was introduced by researchers because they 
found out that although standard acuity and perimetric tests relevant to the visual field 
were  able  to  diagnose  eye  diseases,  they  failed  to  predict/explain  the  difficulties 
encountered by older individuals in performing everyday tasks that required the use of 
peripheral vision. The term Useful Field of View was first used by Ball et al. (1990) and 
is  ultimately  now  associated  with  a  specific  test  that  is  administered  by  a  personal 
computer and is developed by Visual Awareness, Inc., Birmingham, AL, USA. 
Scientists  and  clinicians  from  a  wide  spectrum  of  disciplines  agree  that  information 
processing speed slows with age and is due to the fact that neural transmission speed 
declines and the nervous system of older individuals shows signs of slow recovery from 
the effects of stimulation. Worsening of the cognitive function with advancing age is 
primarily  attributed  to  this  slowing  which  also  manifests  itself  prominently  in  the 
performance  of  older  people  on  complex  activities  (Visual  Awareness  Inc.,  2002). 
Research in the areas of visual information processing and cognitive ageing conducted 
during the 1980s and 1990s refined the concept of UFOV and its measurement. Research 
showed (Scialfa et al., 1987; Bergen & Julesz, 1983 cited in Edwards et al., 2005) that to 
search an area having a particular size for a target, either a serial search strategy or a 
parallel search strategy is adopted which is related to the duration of the stimulus (the 
exposure  of  the  area)  as  well  as  the  target/distractor  similarity  or  dissimilarity 
(corresponds  to  conspicuity  of  the  target)  i.e.,  given  a  constant  duration,  the  more 
conspicuous  the  target  the  greater  are  the  eccentricities  at  which  it  can  be  detected 109 
 
compared with a less conspicuous target and  given a constant conspicuity, the longer the 
stimulus duration, the further are the eccentricities at which the target can be detected 
compared with shorter durations of the stimulus. By varying the stimulus duration and the 
conspicuity  of  the  peripheral  target  and  the  identification  of  a  central  object,  an 
individual’s useful field of view can be manipulated. These guiding principles were used 
in the development of the UFOV which included 3 subtests (subtest 1, 2 and 3) that 
measured an individual’s processing speed across increasingly complex visual displays.   
 The  original  version  (Standard  version)  was  administered  via  the  Visual  Attention 
Analyzer which had a 20 inch touch screen and included a chin rest that was situated 23.5 
cm from the screen (Clay et al., 2005). This test required 20 to 30 minutes to administer. 
In  the  Standard  version,  in  the  divided  (subtest  2)  and  selective  attention  (subtest  3) 
subtests,  the  peripheral  targets  appeared  randomly  at  eccentricities  of  10,  20  and  30 
degrees along eight radial spokes (Clay et al., 2005). The duration of displays varied 
between 40 and 240 milliseconds (Owsley et al., 1998a). For each subtest, the scores in 
the Standard version are expressed in terms of the percentage reduction of a maximum 
30-degree  radius  field  (Owsley  et  al.,  1998a)  and  range  between  0  and  30  percent 
reduction. Since the factors known to impact the size of the useful filed of view are 
independently assessed by each of the subtests, thus the three subtest scores are added to 
obtain an overall measure of reduction in UFOV (Edwards et al., 2005). Thus in the 
Standard version, this measure ranges between 0 and 90. Higher scores indicate poorer 
performance. A score of 0 percent reduction on a subset means that the individual was 
able to correctly radially localize targets at all eccentricities at the minimum stimulus (i.e. 
40 milliseconds) duration and a score of 30 percent reduction on a subset means that the 
individual  cannot  reliably  localize  the  peripheral  targets  presented  at  the  10  degrees 
eccentricity and the maximum stimulus duration (240 milliseconds). Ball et al. (1993) in 
a study showed that a UFOV (relative to a 30 degree radius) reduction of greater than 40  
percent provided the best single cutpoint for separating high risk and low risk drivers.     
To  expand  UFOV’s  application,  two  new  and  briefer  versions  of  the  UFOV  were 
developed that are administered via a personal desktop computer. Beginning in 1998 the 
test is now administered using the PC versions (Clay et al., 2005). One version uses a 
touch screen monitor and the other uses a mouse to register responses. Scores on the two 110 
 
PC  versions  correlate  very  highly  with  each  other  (Edwards  et  al.,  2005).  The  test 
conducted under both versions takes about 15 minutes. Peripheral target eccentricity and 
display duration are the most critical factors affecting the size of UFOV. In the original 
test (Standard version),  the peripheral target  eccentricity was manipulated for a fixed 
display duration. The size of UFOV was measured at that duration and then the process 
was repeated at a faster duration. In the PC versions, the eccentricity of the peripheral 
target is fixed and the display duration is manipulated. In the PC (personal computer) 
versions, the peripheral target appears at approximately 11 cm from the center of the 
fixation box (center of the screen) and the duration of displays varies between 16.67 (say 
17) and 500 milliseconds (Edwards et al., 2005). The PC versions do not have a chin rest 
but examiners are instructed to seat examinees at about 18 to 24 inches from the screen 
(Visual Awareness Inc., 2002). The monitor size used is 17 inches (Visual Awareness 
Inc., 2002) for the PC versions. The examinees may be given a short guided-practice 
program for using the mouse. Also, prior computer experience is not required to use 
either version (i.e., Standard version or PC versions) and also prior computer experience 
does not enhance performance in any systematic way (Edwards et al., 2005). In the PC 
versions, scores  for each subtest represent the  duration of displays in  milliseconds at 
which  examinees  could  correctly  perform  each  subtest  75  percent  of  the  time.  The 
software  automatically  adjusts  the  length  of  stimulus  presentation  in  milliseconds  as 
needed  for  each  of  the  three  subtests.  The  stimulus  presentation  time  for  an  item  is 
shortened if the previous two responses are  correct and is lengthened if the previous 
response is incorrect. This process of tracking the perceptual threshold is continued until 
a stable estimate of 75 percent correct is calculated (Visual Awareness Inc., 2002). The 
length of time that the stimulus is displayed will get shorter and shorter (provided correct 
responses are made). The software will measure the point at which the examinee fails to 
accurately  see  the  information  displayed  on  the  screen  and  therefore  there  will  be  a 
particular time when the test becomes impossible for everyone (Visual Awareness Inc., 
2002). 
In the PC versions, the scores represent the display duration in milliseconds at which the 
examinee  correctly  performs  each  subtest  75  percent  of  the  time.  A  metric  for  inter 
conversion has been prepared (see Edwards et al., 2005) for converting percent reduction 111 
 
in UFOV score (used in the Standard version) to subtest threshold in milliseconds (used 
in the PC versions) and vice versa. Visual Awareness Inc. (2002) provides tables for 
detailed  interpretation  of  either  scoring  system.  The  three  subtests  measure  visual 
processing speed, ability to divide attention and selective attention abilities (Myers et al., 
2000). However, performance on the three constituent subtests is non-independent as the 
speed of visual processing is relevant to all three subtests and in subtest 2 and 3, attention 
abilities are relevant (Owsley et al., 1998a). The UFOV test is a quantitative index of 
visual processing speed and divided and spatial attention (St.Louis et al., 2005).     
In the UFOV test, in the first subtest the examinee is to identify a target (silhouette of a 
car  or  truck)  that  is  presented  in  a  central  fixation  box  and  is  presented  for  varying 
lengths  of  time.  In  the  second  subtest  the  examinee  has  to  identify  a  central  target 
(silhouette of a car or truck presented in the central fixation box) and also to radially 
localize a simultaneously presented target (silhouette of a car) displayed in any one of 
eight  radial  positions  on  the  periphery  of  the  computer  monitor.  The  third  subtest  is 
identical to the second subtest except that the peripheral target (Silhouette of a car) is 
embedded in distractors (47 triangles of the same size and luminance as the peripheral 
target). When unsure of the correct answer, examinees are encouraged to guess as the test 
would not go forward unless a response is made.  
UFOV  is  not  a  measure  of  visual  field  sensitivity  and  UFOV  results  should  not  be 
translated  to  percentage  visual  field  loss  (traditionally  assessed  by  standard  vision 
perimetry tests).  A reduction in the useful field of view may be due to visual field loss or 
due to impairments in attention or both of the factors (Visual Awareness Inc., 2002). 
Visual sensory and cognitive deficits can occur in older people together or separately. In 
a  study  (Ball  et  al.,  1990  cited  in  Ball  et  al.,  1993),  it  has  been  shown  that  UFOV 
shrinkage can occur even in older subjects with excellent visual field sensitivity. Most 
driving license issuing agencies have put a lot of emphasis on the assessment of visual 
acuity. However, as reported by Ball et al. (2006), although, several large scale sample 
studies have attempted but have failed to show a link between visual deficits (including 
several  indices  of  visual  function)  and  crash  involvement,  thus  showing  that  visual 
function  alone  is  a  poor  predictor  of  driving  performance.  Conventional  measures  of 
visual field assess visual-sensory sensitivity, whereas UFOV is linked to higher order 112 
 
processing skills, such as rapid visual-processing speed, selective and divided attention. 
Owsley et al. (1995) also demonstrated that performance on the UFOV relies on higher-
order cognitive abilities as well as visual sensory function. Sekuler et al. (2000) describes 
the  deterioration  in  the  useful  field  of  view  as  a  decrease  in  efficiency  of  extracting 
information from a cluttered scene. They also found out that the deterioration of UFOV 
starts early in life (by 20 years or younger).  
In a study by Ball et al. (1993), to identify visual factors associated with increased vehicle 
crashes in elderly drivers, useful field of view test had high sensitivity (89 percent) and 
specificity (81 percent) in predicting the crash history of elderly drivers. It was observed 
that older drivers with significant deficits in useful field of view were six times more 
likely to be involved in accidents during the past 5 years. Significant correlation was 
obtained between crashes and eye health status, visual sensory function and chronological 
age, but these parameters were poor at distinguishing crash-involved drivers from crash-
free drivers. In fact, According to the author, these tests (sensory tests, such as visual 
acuity and peripheral field sensitivity) do not reflect the visual complexity of the driving 
task, and are more relevant to clinical diagnoses and assessment of ocular disease/vision 
loss.  The  driving  environment  is  quite  complex,  where  vehicle  control  has  to  be 
negotiated in a cluttered environment through the simultaneous use of both central and 
peripheral vision  to process both primary (high priority) and secondary (low priority) 
visual  tasks  and  where  the  prediction  of  important  events  in  time  and  space  is 
unpredictable. Therefore, simple visual sensory tests fail to capture the visual demands of 
driving. In the Ball et al. (1993) study, the subjects whose visual acuity was better than 
20/20, 43 percent had a useful field of view (UFOV) reduction of greater than 40 percent 
(the threshold amount) and 41 percent of the subjects who had a useful field of view 
(UFOV) reduction of greater than 40 percent (the threshold amount), showed an average 
loss of visual field sensitivity of less than 2.5 dB. 
The UFOV is not a test that assesses reaction time. If performance on subset 1 is poor, it 
may  signify  poor  central  vision,  processing  speed,  attention,  working  memory,  or  a 
combination of these factors (Visual Awareness Inc., 2002). Generally if performance on 
subset 1 is poor, performance on subset 2 will also be poor as all the features of subtest 1 113 
 
are present in subset 2 and subset 2 has an additional target in the periphery. Subtest 1 is 
sensitive in identifying individuals that are severely impaired (Edwards et al., 2005). 
 Edwards et al. (2005) in their study found out that the UFOV test was significantly 
correlated with age. Visual Awareness Inc. (Visual Awareness Inc., 2002) also cites three 
relatively early studies that indicated that in general the useful field of view appears to 
shrink  with  age.  In  a  population  based  study,  approximately  one  third  of  the  older 
subjects had a 40 percent or greater reduction in useful field of view (Rubin et al., 1997 
cited in Owsley, et al., 1998a).  However, there is considerable variability and many older 
subjects’ performance is at par with that of young college students. Therefore, not all 
older individuals are affected in the same manner. Reger et al. (Reger et al., 2004 cited in 
Clay et al., 2005) found subtest 2 to have the highest correlation with at-fault crashes. 
Subjects  having  diseases  such  as  Alzheimer’s  and  Parkinson’s  and  traumatic-brain 
injured subjects have shown abnormal performance on the UFOV test (Fisk et al., 2002; 
Rizzo et al., 2000; Uc et al., 2003 cited in St.Louis et al., 2005). Duchek et al. (1998) 
carried out a study using three groups: (a) healthy control group (58 subjects) (b) very 
mild DAT (dementia of the Alzheimer’s type) group (49 subjects) (c) mild DAT group 
(29 subjects). All participants were administered the 45 minute Washington University 
Road Test (WURT). A correlation coefficient of  - 0.56 was obtained between the UFOV 
scores  and  the  driving  scores  such  that  poorer  driving  performance  was  significantly 
related to greater reduction in UFOV. Also, UFOV scores increased (became worse) as 
the severity of dementia increased. The average reduction in UFOV of healthy controls, 
very mild DAT subjects and mild DAT subjects was 29, 34 and 75 percent respectively. 
These averages were based on administering the UFOV test to 28 control subjects, 21 
very mild DAT subjects and only 6 mild DAT subjects. The authors concluded that mild 
DAT subjects appeared to exhibit a deficit in their ability to “process peripheral target 
information amidst visual distractors, while simultaneously monitoring a central task”.       
Owsley, et al.(1998a) carried out a prospective cohort study of 294 drivers aged 55 to 87 
years with three  years of follow up from 1990-1993 to identify whether measures of 
visual processing ability, including the Useful Field of View test, are related with crash 
involvement in older drivers. In their study, visual attention and visual processing speed 
was assessed using the Useful Field of View test. They found out that older drivers with a 114 
 
reduction of useful field of view of 40 percent or greater were more than twice as likely 
to have experienced an accident during the three years of follow-up. In another study of 
older  drivers  performed  at  the  University  of  Alabama  at  Birmingham,  Owsley  et  al. 
(1991) found that deficits in information processing ability as measured by the useful 
field of view test and deficits in cognitive abilities were related to crash involvement as 
recorded by the state. By incorporating their parameters in a model they were able to 
explain 20 percent of variance in crash involvement (as recorded by the state). Further, it 
was  reckoned  that  older  drivers  with  poor  scores  on  the  UFOV  or  exhibiting  poor 
cognitive  status  had  3-4  times  more  accidents  (of  any  type)  and  15  times  more 
intersection crashes than subjects without those problems. Goode et al. (1998) conducted 
a study of 239 older drivers ranging from age 55 to 85 and above and found that the 
UFOV  test  was  most  strongly  related  to  crash  involvement  (state  recorded  at-fault 
accidents over the previous five years) among all cognitive tests. At a cut-off value of 40 
percent reduction in UFOV score, they obtained a sensitivity and specificity of 86.3 and 
84.3 percent respectively. Studies made by other authors have also found the UFOV test 
to be predictive of accidents in older drivers (Ball & Owsley, 1993; Rizzo et al., 1997; 
Sims et al, 1998). Owsley et al. (1998b) made an exploratory  study (from 1985 to 1990 
in the state of Alabama) of 78 drivers involved in injurious crashes, 101 drivers involved 
in  non-injurious  crashes  and  115  drivers  not  involved  in  any  crash  during  the  same 
period. The drivers’ age ranged from 55 to 87 years. They reported that elderly drivers 
having reduction of UFOV greater than 40 percent were at least 20 times more likely to 
be  involved  in  an  injurious  crash  compared  with  subjects  with  no  or  more  minor 
reductions  in  UFOV  and  concluded  that  visual  processing  impairments  and  eye 
conditions were more prevalent in older drivers involved in injurious vehicle crashes. The 
UFOV  task  depends  on  an  individual’s  speed  of  processing,  divided  attention  and 
selective attention performance and taps abilities that are vital to driving at the attentive 
(serial) and pre-attentive (parallel) levels. Stimulus and task features that are critical for 
driving are indeed incorporated in the useful field of view test. A driver with reduced 
UFOV may perform as if he or she has tunnel vision and yet he or she may not show any 
abnormality on standard vision perimetry tests, which place more emphasis on maximal 
estimates of sensory function vis-à-vis attention effects (Rizzo, 2004). The UFOV is quite 115 
 
relevant to situations where a person has to be aware of peripheral objects e.g., such as at 
intersections. Intersections can be particularly demanding for the driver as they require a 
series of complex visual perceptions and decision making processes. Visual attention at 
the  preattentive  level  plays  a  very  crucial  role  as  it  is  used  to  quickly  direct  one’s 
attention to highly salient visual events occurring in a cluttered scene (such as busy traffic 
intersections) e.g., when a vehicle approaches in peripheral vision (from the cross road).    
Visual  Awareness  Inc.(2002)  reports  a  test-retest  reliability  coefficient  of  0.88  after 
testing  70  participants  aged  65  years  and  older.  Edwards  et  al.  (2005)  in  their  study 
evaluated the test re-test reliability coefficients for the UFOV PC mouse version and the 
UFOV PC touch screen version as 0.884 and 0.735 respectively. Also, a high correlation 
coefficient (0.916) was obtained between the scores of both the PC versions. Correlation 
coefficients  of  0.658  and  0.746  were  obtained  between  the  Standard  version  and  the 
mouse  and  between  Standard  version  and  the  touch  screen  version  respectively.  The 
coefficients 0.916 is slightly larger than the coefficients 0.658 and 0.746 because both the 
PC versions use the same scoring scale, the same size monitor and the possibility of score 
values has a larger range. The authors finally concluded that practical use of both the PC 
versions (mouse and touch screen) in clinical practice / evaluation can be adopted due to 
the sufficient magnitude of their reliability and validity coefficients. 
 
3.7.1 UFOV Test: Scoring and Testing Procedure 
 
Presently, only the PC versions of the test are being marketed. We used the PC version 
that employs the mouse to make responses. For detailed testing procedure, the UFOV 
manual  may  be  consulted  (Visual  Awareness  Inc.,  2002).  However,  before  the  test 
begins, examinees are informed that the test would not go forward unless a response is 
made, therefore if they are unsure of the correct answer, they should guess. Also, during 
the  course  of  the  test,  there  will  be  a  point  when  the  test  becomes  impossible  and 
therefore, they should not be alarmed if they cannot recognize the displayed presentation 
at that time. Test scores for each subtset are generated by the computer. For interpretation 
of the scores, the UFOV manual may be consulted (Visual Awareness Inc., 2002). Also, 
Appendix-A contains a table for inter conversion (adopted from Edwards et al., 2005) of 116 
 
percent reduction in UFOV score (used in the Standard version) to subtest threshold in 
milliseconds (used in the PC versions) and vice versa. 
 
3.8 Summary 
 
This  chapter  has  described  the  cognitive  attributes  that  are  relevant  /  crucial  for  the 
driving task and has then come up with the selection and detailed description of a battery 
of cognitive tests that are appropriate in gauging decline in relevant cognitive constructs. 
Multiple cognitive domains are called upon when an individual is negotiating driving 
scenarios/situations and many of these cognitive constructs themselves are interrelated 
and interact with each other. The coordination of several ongoing processes including 
attention,  perception,  memory  (declarative,  procedural,  and  working),  and  executive 
functions (decision making and implementation) is required for safe driving. A meta-
analysis of 27 primary studies showed that visuospatial skills and attention were most 
helpful in screening at risk drivers. In case of head injury or generalized brain damage, 
tests  that  measure  visual  memory,  executive  abilities,  spatial  awareness  and  attention 
were  deemed  significant  predictors  of  driving  skills.  In  the  early  stages  of  DAT 
(Dementia of the Alzheimer’s type), subjects show impairments in the ability to switch or 
disengage attention, while as they retain the ability to focus attention to a spatial location. 
The  ability  to  switch  attention  is  also  correlated  with  driving  performance  in  normal 
individuals. 
During the course of normal ageing, some cognitive functions e.g. spatial orientation and 
perceptual speed have been found to decline. Also, in normal cognitive ageing, there is a 
general decrement in the speed with which information is processed, the efficiency with 
which new information is acquired also decreases, there is cognitive inflexibility and the 
working memory shows signs of reduction. The ability to control spatial attention lies on 
a  continuum  from  healthy  young  adults  to  the  young-old,  through  the  old-old  to 
individuals with mild DAT. 
Six  cognitive  tests  (Trail  Making-B  Test,  Clock-Drawing  Test,  Rey-Osterrieth  Test, 
Dichotic Listening Test, Paper Folding Test and the UFOV Test) were selected. This 
chapter also describes these tests in detail (including the cognitive domains tapped by 117 
 
each test) and their testing and scoring procedures. These tests were selected as they 
covered key cognitive domains (as highlighted above) necessary for safe driving, were 
diverse (e.g. paper-and pencil tests, computerized and listening tests), were reliable and 
were quite sensitive to the effects of ageing and to a range of diseases that are well known 
to impair driving performance. Tests that measured vocabulary and general information 
were not included. Each cognitive test did not reflect a pure measure of a single cognitive 
domain, but rather each test tapped more than one cognitive domain. Also, each test only 
partially tapped a specific domain. There was more than one test that tapped the same 
domain that was very critical relevant to the driving task e.g., there was more than one 
test  that  tapped  visuospatial  ability  and  attention  (because  these  were  highly  crucial 
domains relevant to driving). 118 
 
4 Driving Simulation 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The  objectives  of  this  chapter  were  to  describe  the  simulation  equipment,  design  of 
simulation drives, refinement/fine tuning of drives, sample of drivers, the experimental 
procedure and the various driving performance parameters and their processing. Usually, 
the criteria to assess driving ability are based on driving measured in on-road conditions.  
However,  researchers  (Christie,  1996;  Vagverket,  2001  cited  in  Patomella  &  Kottorp 
(2005)) have questioned the ability of on-road tests to highlight unsafe driving behavior. 
Usually, the normal on-road test is insufficiently challenging to identify risky driving 
behavior due to cognitive impairment (Vagverket, 2001 cited in Patomella & Kottorp 
(2005)). Also, due to the non-standardized nature of normal road tests, each driver is not 
subjected  to  the  same  opportunities  to  commit  errors  and  so  the  scoring  of  driving 
maneuvers may be of doubtful validity (Fox et al., 1998). According to Fox et al. (1998), 
unless on-road tests are developed on the basis of solid psychometric principles, they 
cannot be expected to be valid barometers of driving ability, be it to assess brain impaired 
drivers or for ordinary driver license testing. Ulfarsson et al. (2006) in a study of factors 
affecting common vehicle-to-vehicle collision types using the accident database compiled 
by  NHTSA  concluded  that  in-vogue  road  tests  are  not  practical  to  identify  impaired 
drivers.  Therefore,  it  was  decided  to  address  the  research  objectives  through  the 
application of Driving Simulation, and the process is described in the remaining sections 
of this chapter. 
 
4.2 Apparatus and Equipment 
 
A simulation drive was programmed using the STISIM
® software developed by Systems 
Technology Incorporated, 13766 South Hawthorne Blvd. Hawthorne, CA 90250-7083. 119 
 
The version of the software was Build 2.08.01 copyright © 1985-2009. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 
show views of the STISIM
® driving simulator.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 The STISIM driving simulator. The systems monitor to control the simulation 
is on the left. 
 
The steering wheel (force feedback steering) and pedal assembly had a USB interface and 
were  manufactured  by  Logitech
®  designated  as  G25  Racing  Wheel.  The  Central 
Processing Unit was a DELL
® computer with dual display video cards with 2 GB of 
virtual memory with an INTEL
® processor operating at 2.8 giga hertz. The operating 
system was Microsoft windows XP Professional. There were two monitors: (1) A 16 inch 
Samsung  SyncMaster  753DFX  and  (2)  A  32  inch  RELISYS  Liquid  Crystal  Display 
monitor with a refresher rate of 60 hertz.  The 32 inch monitor provided  a resolution of 
1024  ×  768  and  was  the  main  display  monitor  through  which  drivers  viewed  the 
simulated  road  environment.  The  16  inch  monitor  was  used  as  a  systems  monitor  to 
control the simulation. 120 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 The STISIM driving simulator with the pedal assembly and the steering wheel 
in view. 
 
The video card for the main monitor was Sync Master 753DF(T)/783DF(T) Magic Sync 
Master AQ17DF on NVIDIA and for the 16 inch monitor Plug and Play Monitor on 
NVIDIA  Geforce  FX5200.    A  Speaker  system  was  provided  to  impart  a  realistic 
impression of sound effects such as road noise, noises emanating from the engine and 
instructions  to  the  driver.  The  simulator  was  essentially  a  fixed  base  simulator  with 
vehicle feedback provided through three modalities; these were visual feedback, audio 
and steering force feedback.   
All the hardware was configured as per instructions in the STISIM 
® Manual. The pedals 
were configured in order to emulate an automatic transmission i.e. the clutch pedal was 
made un-functional. The steering force feedback resolution was adjusted using a number 
of parameters. The following levels of steering adjustment parameters were adopted after 
a  number  of  test  drivers  found  them  to  be  appropriate  enough  to  provide  a  realistic 
sensation of steering feel and reactive force : (1) Overall Effects Strength = 25% (2) 121 
 
Spring Effect Strength = 50% (3) Damper Effect Strength=15 %  (4) Centering Spring 
Strength=100 %. The ten parameters relevant to “vehicle dynamics” controlled how the 
vehicle would brake, accelerate and steer; these were adjusted after input from a couple 
of test drivers, and were: (1) Yaw Rate Scale Factor = 65000 rad/sec/deg (2) Oversteer 
coefficient  =  0  (3)  Acceleration  Limit  =  0.4  g  (4)  Deceleration  Limit  =  -0.8  g  (5) 
Coefficient  of  Drag    =  0.0001  (6)  Yaw  Instability  =  0  (7)  Speed  Instability  =  0  (8) 
Steering Deadband = 0 degrees (9) Yaw Instability Tag = 0 sec (10) Idle Throttle Setting 
= 0.05. 
 
4.3 Design of Drives 
 
4.3.1 Overview 
 
In order to discriminate between the driving skills of cognitively impaired drivers and 
normal drivers it is important that drivers be presented with driving scenarios that employ 
driving skills at the “controlled processing” (effortful processing) level rather than those 
which only require “automatic processing” (Lee et al., 2002a). Automatic processes (e.g., 
gear changing, lane keeping, steering etc.) are acquired through many years of practice 
and do not deteriorate with age (Lee et al., 2002a). Also, automatic processes are fast, 
involuntary  and  place  limited  demands  on  attention  capacity,  whereas  “effortful”  or 
“controlled” processes are slow and capacity-demanding and are used in coping with 
unpredictable  or  unfamiliar  stimulus  demands.  In  old  age,  automatic  routines  remain 
relatively  well  preserved  but  older  people  find  it  very  difficult  to  inhibit  automatic 
processes in suddenly changing (and unexpected) situations (Rogers and Fisk, 1991). As 
pointed  out  by  De  Raedt  &  Ponjaert-Kristoffersen  (2001),  such  situations  may  be 
encountered, for example,  in rear-end accidents when the leading vehicle suddenly stops;  
the ability to switch from automatic to controlled processes plays a critical role in such 
situations. Controlled processing comes into play when routine reactions do not suffice 
and the complexity of the situation necessitates the use of the attention controller, the 
central executive (Lundqvist, 2001). 122 
 
In other words, drivers should be put through complex situations / hazardous situations 
where specific/particular information processing stages are stressed and errors of one type 
or another are likely to be committed. These complex / hazardous situations should be 
diverse  and  sufficient  in  number  so  as  to  enable  an  adequate  sampling  of  driving 
behaviour. Routine diverse driving maneuvers (encountered in day-to-day driving) should 
form the bulk with the complex/hazardous events interspersed within them. Also, driving 
maneuvers that older drivers find problematic or face difficulty performing need to be 
included. Overall, the drive should be relatively difficult and long enough to provide 
variability and detailed information on specific type of errors committed by drivers.  
 
4.3.2 Design of Main Drive (Drive-I) 
 
Drive-I consisted of a 21 mile drive (duration approximately 40 minutes). In order to 
maintain safety, negotiating the elements in the drive required situation awareness, hazard 
perception and decision making skills; some of these elements were: 
•  Controlled  Hazards  (pedestrian/dog  intrusions,  intersection  intrusions,  sudden-
braking, intrusions with limited sight distance etc.). 
•  Right turns across oncoming traffic.  
•  Left turns (involving cyclist). 
•  Dangerous overtaking by opposing vehicle. 
•  Lane changing manoeuvres (in traffic) and lane drops. 
•  Stop controlled intersections (gap selection). 
•  Overtaking manoeuvres in the wake of a stream of oncoming vehicles. 
•  Transiting construction zones. 
•  Signalized intersections. 
•  Signalized intersections with dilemma zones. 
•  Gas station manoeuvres. 
•  Tracking task (boxes fallen from truck on the road, mountain S-curves). 
Situation awareness in cognitive context is the ability to judge and decide, when one has 
to  choose  between  alternative  actions    in  complex/critical  situations  involving  traffic 123 
 
control  devices  (signals,  signs  and  markings),  interacting  vehicles/pedestrians  and 
combinations of road geometry (Allen et al., 2004a).  The drive was programmed using 
the programming language “Scenario Definition Language” (SDL) pertinent to STISIM
®.
  
The breakdown of the lane configuration was as follows: 
From start to 34100 feet     =  2 lane road 
From 34100 to 95000 feet  =  4 lane road 
From 95000 to 99000 feet  =  6 lane road 
From 99000 to 103600 feet  =  residential road 
From 103600 to 110400feet  =  2 lane mountain road 
From 34600 feet to 99000 feet and from 103900 to 110400 feet, no centreline crossing 
was allowed. The drive was predominantly rural with an urban flavour in certain reaches. 
Liberal use of horizontal and vertical curves was instituted to avoid monotony in the 
driving process and also to limit sight distances at specific locations so as to elicit/assess 
certain driver behaviour. The radii of horizontal curves were generally generous; only one 
or two had relatively tight radii (i.e., curves intentionally made sharper) which made them 
marginally drivable at the posted speed limit. Posted speed limits of 25, 30, 45, 55 and 65 
mph were used in the drive. Due consideration was given to the location of critical events 
and measurement of performance measures in the roadway environment to ensure that 
such  locations  were  conducive  to  the  event  and  that  the  roadway  geometry  (i.e.  for 
example curves, intersections and hills etc) was or was not a factor. In STISIM
®, when 
designing dynamic events, a trigger is needed to commence a particular action from the 
event. A common trigger used is the headway time between the driver and the object. 
However, there is an option to select from a variety of triggers (e.g., distance, absolute 
distance, lateral distance, range, signal change etc.), and therefore quite diverse triggers 
were used in different events. The headway time is calculated using the driver’s speed 
and  trajectory  at  the  time  when  the  event  is  called.  In  setting  up  hazards,  due 
consideration was given to controlling perceptual and timing variables. Some iterations 
were necessary to develop critical timing in situations requiring limited sight distance.  
To complicate lane changing, vehicles in adjacent lanes approached from behind (could 
be spotted in rear view mirror); lane blockages were then programmed to force the driver 
to manoeuvre. Safe execution of the scenario required that the driver monitor traffic, 124 
 
pedestrians and traffic control devices through the rear view mirrors and the windscreen 
and  make  appropriate  manoeuvres  at  the  right  time.  Critical  events  were  not  packed 
tightly  together  but  were  rather  separated  by  quite  some  distance  to  ensure  that  one 
scenario did not spill into the other or an interaction did not take place between two 
adjacent  events  (e.g.,  dynamic  vehicles  from  an  upstream  event  carrying  over  into  a 
downstream  event).  A  significant  number  of  benign  events  were  introduced  into  the 
drive, but which were not a source of stimulus (e.g., a pedestrian standing by the road 
edge who did not attempt to cross the road as the driver approached). In the drive design, 
event  sequence  patterns  were  avoided  so  that  subjects  did  not  learn  from  repeated 
exposure.  
Infrastructure consisting of static objects such as buildings, parked cars, trees, and road 
signs etc. was added and was thoughtfully designed giving due regard to as to how they 
would  affect  a  driver’s  visual  search  pattern,  perception,    attention  and/or  driving 
behaviour in context of the critical event. Along the drive, several cars were also parked 
on the road-side shoulders with the intention that the driver should become accustomed to 
their presence and when these vehicles become part of a critical/hazardous event in a 
subsequent  scenario,  the  driver  should  not  be  predisposed  to  ascribe  any  emergency 
meaning to their placement. Telephone poles at a spacing of 200 feet were placed along 
the road alignment to give drivers cues as to their speed.   
The drive was programmed using “Scenario Definition Language” (SDL) pertinent to 
STISIM
®  .  The final programming code along with PDEs (Previously Defined Events) 
under the folder PDE1s is attached at Appendix-C. PDEs are programs called by the main 
code, which also transfers some parameters to them. The Main Drive (Drive-I) file is by 
the name of old.evt. The overall coding of this drive took 18 months of full time work. 
 
4.3.3 Design of DA (Divided Attention) and Car-Following Drive (Drive-
II) 
 
The DA and the Car-Following drive collectively designated as Drive-II, was a 14 mile 
drive with a total duration of 16 minutes, with about 8 minutes consumed by the DA 
portion. The first portion of the drive comprised of a  DA (Divided Attention) task while 125 
 
the second  portion was a Car-Following task. Both portions were in tandem with each 
other  and  there  was  no  break  in-between.  In  order  to  assess  continuous  measures  of 
driving ability (e.g., speed, steering control/ lane keeping), the driver or the vehicle can 
be stimulated in a controlled manner e.g., by the application of wind gust, lead vehicle 
with  a  controlled  velocity  profile  or  a  divided  attention  task  etc.  ,  and  the  driver’s 
response  to  the  stimulus  measured  (Allen  et  al.,  2005).    Due  to  the  workload  from 
competing sources, it is not possible for the driver to respond in an optimum manner to 
the primary task (driving) and secondary task (e.g., DA task) and one or both are bound 
to suffer. This trade-off can be measured and may show up as an increased reaction time, 
deterioration in lane positioning or speed adherence.     
The DA drive was based on a two-lane roadway. There were no horizontal curves, turns, 
pedestrians,  traffic  or  traffic  control  devices.  However,  fourteen  vertical  curves  were 
inserted (but not at locations where the driver was supposed to immediately brake in 
response to a STOP sign appearing on the screen) with the intent that the vertical curves 
would have an effect on the speed of the vehicle and extra effort would be needed in 
order to maintain a constant speed while at the same time attending to the DA task. The 
driver  had  to  maintain  a  constant  speed  of  55  mph.  After  commencement,  default 
diamond signs appeared in the upper left and upper right corners of the screen.  In a 
pseudo-random fashion, the diamond signs changed into one of the following signs: (1) 
Left triangle (2) Right triangle (3) Left down triangle (4) Left up triangle (5) Right down 
triangle (6) Right up triangle (7) Left horn (8) Right horn. The signs changed 58 times 
during the DA portion of the drive. In response to the left triangle and the down triangle, 
the driver was asked to press the “left divided attention” button and the “right divided 
attention” button was supposed to be pressed in response to the right triangle and the up 
triangle.  For the horn symbol, the “horn divided attention” button had to be pressed. 
Using the configuration’s input/output tab dialog box (in the software), specific buttons 
on  the  steering  console  were  assigned  to        “left  divided  attention”,    “right  divided 
attention”  and   “horn divided attention” . The symbols were displayed until the driver 
responded or the maximum time elapsed (which was 5 sec). At three pseudo-random 
locations in the DA portion of the drive, STOP sign appeared in the middle of the screen. 
The driver was asked to respond with immediate emergency braking to a stop. The brakes 126 
 
had to be pressed whilst the sign remained on the screen (i.e., 10 sec). The purpose of the 
test was to get a measure of the brake perception-reaction time. 
The Car-Following portion of the drive was also based on a two-lane roadway. There 
were no horizontal curves, vertical curves, turns, pedestrians, or traffic control devices. A 
lead car appeared that the driver had to follow. The speed of the lead car fluctuated based 
on a pre-specified sinusoidal profile. The driver had to match the lead vehicle’s speed in 
order  to  maintain  a  constant  following  distance  between  himself/herself  and  the  lead 
vehicle. If the distance by which the driver fell behind the lead vehicle exceeded 200 feet, 
a warning message was pronounced  approximately every 5 seconds instructing the driver 
that he/she was falling behind the lead vehicle and must catch up and match the lead 
vehicle’s speed. Changes in the speed of the lead vehicle were in sinusoidal wave form 
having an amplitude of 10 ft/sec. The length of each cycle was 15 sec (i.e. period of the 
wave). The initial speed (also the mean speed) of the lead vehicle was 80 ft/sec (aprox. 55 
mph). The lead vehicle speed climbed to 90 ft/sec in 3.75 sec then returned to 80 ft/sec in 
another 3.75 sec then plummeted to 70 ft/sec in another 3.75 sec and then climbed back 
to 80 ft/sec in another 3.75 sec; this pattern was repeated for the whole drive. There was 
no speed limit in the Car-Following portion of the drive. The final programming code for 
Drive-II is attached at Appendix-C by the name of DA1.evt. The overall coding of this 
drive took one month of full time work. 
 
4.3.4 Design of Practice Drives 
 
Two practice drives were designed, one for each drive. The practice drives were of about 
12 minutes duration each. While designing the practice drive for Drive-I and Drive-II, the 
same  principles  were  employed  as  those  used  in  the  design  of  Drive-I  and  Drive-II 
respectively. A flavour of all major categories of the scenarios of the actual drives was 
included in the practice drives. However, the trigger point parameters were altered so as 
to avoid a practice effect. Also, the spatial arrangement and visual appearance of scenes 
was  altered,  so  that  drivers  were  not  predisposed  to  associate  the  onset  of  a 
critical/hazardous event with a particular pattern of road infrastructure and/or event. The 
intent of the practice drives was to develop driver’s understanding of the logic used in 127 
 
negotiating the scenarios,  to gain expertise in the use of pedals/steering etc., and to sense 
the acceleration/braking potential and other operational capabilities of their vehicle in the 
simulated environment. The final programming code for practice drive for Drive-I and 
Drive-II  is  at  Appendix-C  under  the  file  names  old(PRAC).Evt  and  DA(Prac).evt 
respectively. The overall coding of the practice drives took one month of full time work. 
 
4.3.5 Refinement/Fine-Tuning of Drives 
 
Testing and final refinement of the drives was essential to ensure  that the drives would 
achieve their objectives. Two experienced middle aged drivers were given a chance to 
drive both drives and based on their input a number of alterations were incorporated. 
Some major changes are mentioned below: 
•  Three consecutive speed limit sign boards at a spacing of 200 feet were installed 
for emphasis. 
•  Due to an absence of cues to judge speed, the speed potential of the simulator was 
programmed at a maximum value of 65 mph and frequent verbal reminders were 
issued to drivers throughout the drive. 
•  Vehicles were positioned on the shoulder, in the opposing lane or adjacent same-
direction lane so as to prevent drivers from avoiding certain hazardous scenarios. 
•  When making right turns in the face of opposing traffic, gap sizes in the opposing 
stream of traffic were increased. 
•  The sight distance to certain hazards was increased. 
•  Examples of all ambiguous scenarios/events where deviant behaviour was bound 
to occur were included in the practice drive.  
•  More practice of steering use was included in the practice drive. 
•  Inter-vehicle distance to facilitate safe overtaking was increased. 
•  Recorded instructions for right turn were advanced some distance upstream to 
prevent conflict with vehicles in the blind spot in adjacent lanes. 
•  The entry point to a petrol station was made more prominent through pavement 
colouring. 128 
 
•  Lane closure was incorporated to force drivers to travel in a specific lane which 
was relevant to the trigger point/hazard encounter. 
•  The  importance  of  the  number  of  low-speed  warnings  was  emphasised  in  the 
instructions. 
•  A  number  of  trigger  point  parameters  relevant  to  scenarios/hazards  were 
incrementally  altered  so  as  to  make  them  more  discriminatory,  but  not  too 
difficult.  
 Refinement / fine-tuning of the code of Drive-I and Drive-II took about two months of 
full time work, as a number of trigger points/parameters relevant to events had to be 
manipulated / altered incrementally and then tested a number of times by the same two 
drivers.  The  whole  process  of  coding,  testing,  refinement  and  re-testing  of  all  drives 
(practice as well as actual drives) took about 22 months of full time work. 
 
4.4 The Experimental Procedure 
 
4.4.1 Overview and the Sample 
 
Since  drivers  crash  more  frequently  in  a  simulator  than  in  real  life  (Fiorentino  & 
Parseghian,  1997),  it  was  decided  to  use  a  comparative  approach  to  evaluate  driving 
performance (or decline in driving competence) by testing experienced younger drivers 
and  experienced  older  drivers.  This  would  enable  the  identification/quantification  of 
driving errors that are unique to decline in driving competences. For the younger age 
group,  the  statistically  safest  age  group  of  26  to  40  years  was  selected  (Hakamies-
Blomqvist, 1993) whereas for the older group the age limit was fixed as above 60 years. 
To minimize cross-sectional overlap in functionality, subjects between the ages of 41 to 
59 years were excluded. All drivers were to have a valid UK driving license and be 
current drivers with at least 5 years of driving experience.  
The  selection  of  a  random  sample  was  neither  feasible  nor  desired.  Therefore,  a 
convenient sample of volunteers (from both age groups) was sought. The selection bias 
introduced as a result of the non-random sample was not of much concern as it was not 
intended to generalize the estimated percentage of drivers (with impaired driving ability 129 
 
etc.)  to  the  entire  driving  population  i.e.,  we  were  not  interested  in  estimating  the 
proportion of drivers (with decrements in driving ability) in the population but rather 
were interested in the range of performance capabilities of drivers. Also, there were good 
prospects that the non-random sample may enable the testing of some “information rich” 
cases of older drivers which were really crucial and valuable. There have been some 
studies that have utilized smaller samples than the sample size in this research (Rizzo et 
al., 1997; Rizzo et al., 2001; Christie et al., 2001a; Radford et al., 2004 ; Nouri et al., 
1987; Lew et al., 2005; Cox et al., 1998).  
In total, fifty six drivers were successfully tested from both groups. Six drivers from the 
older  group  experienced  simulation  sickness  syndrome  and  their  testing  had  to  be 
aborted. The demographic detail of the successfully-tested subjects may be seen in Table 
4.1.  
  
Table 4.1 Demographic detail of the successfully-tested younger and older driver groups. 
Group 
No. 
of 
Males 
No.  of 
Females 
No.  of 
Total 
Subjects 
Minimum 
Age (yrs) 
Maximum 
Age (yrs) 
Mean 
Age 
(yrs) 
Median 
Age 
(yrs) 
Standard 
Deviation 
of  Age 
(yrs) 
Young  14  14  28  26.3  40  32.3  32.3  4.4 
Old  16  12  28  60.3  88.4  68.7  66.2  7.4 
 
Approval for the research was obtained from the School Research Ethics Committee. 
Advertisement  leaflets  were  distributed  in  the  Southampton  area  and  in  a  number  of 
bowling clubs. All subjects were tested in the morning so as to avoid systematic effects of 
fatigue. As the whole testing protocol lasted about 4 hours, three very old age drivers (age 
79.4, 82.9 and 88.4 yrs) were tested in two sessions as to avoid systematic effects of 
fatigue. The participants were first given a short (3 to 4 minutes) run on the practice drive 
(the  beginning  portion  had  S-curves,  which  can  expose  drivers  prone  to  simulation 
sickness)  to  ensure  that  the  driver  was  not  prone  to  simulation  sickness  syndrome. 
Nausea,  disorientation  and  ocular  problems  such  as  eyestrain,  blurred  vision  and  eye 
fatigue have been reported as some of the indicators of simulation sickness in fixed-base 
simulators (Mourant & Thattacherry, 2000). If a participant experienced the syndrome, 130 
 
the practice drive was immediately terminated and the participant was deemed unfit to 
take the simulation drive. If a participant did not feel any discomfort in the practice drive, 
then the rest of the protocol followed. The sample of drivers was tested over a period of 3 
months.  
Firstly, participants filled out a brief questionnaire (except part IV which related to post-
simulation  issues),  then  they  were  given  the  following  neuropsychological  tests  in 
random order: (1) Ufov Test (2) Dichotic Test (3) Trail-Making Test (4) Rey-Osterrieth 
Test (5) Paper Folding Test (6) Clock Drawing Test. This was followed by a practice 
drive for the Main Drive (Drive-I) and then the Main Drive. This procedure was repeated 
for the DA and Car-Following Drive (Drive-II). Finally part IV of the questionnaire was 
filled out.  Frequent breaks for refreshments were provided (but not in the middle of a 
simulation run or a cognitive test). 
 
4.4.2 Instructions 
 
Instructions for Drive-I and Drive-II are at Appendix-C. It may be highlighted that the 
drivers were specifically instructed to drive at the posted speed limit. If their speed fell 5 
mph or more below the speed limit, a “ding” sound would remind them (every 3 seconds) 
and if their speed exceeded the posted speed limit by more than about 6 ½ mph, they 
would be issued a speeding ticket by the software (registered as a speed exceedance); 
both would count negatively towards driver evaluation. The number of “ding” sounds 
would be recorded as the number of low-speed warnings.  
Since  the  driving  speed  can  be  used  to  regulate  the  difficulty  of  the  driving  task 
(Hakamies-Blomqvist,  1993),  it  was  deemed  necessary  to  impose  the  low-speed 
constraint; otherwise, a driver would technically complete the simulation drive at a very 
low speed and not experience even a single accident.  Since the timing of the triggers of 
critical events/hazards was closely related to the speed of the driver when the event was 
initiated,  slow speed tended to present the hazard at a lower level of intensity to the 
driver. Staplin (Staplin et al., 1999) has classified overcautiousness (e.g., driving slowly) 
as  a  discriminating  error.  Discriminating  errors  are  potentially  dangerous  errors  that 131 
 
signify degradation in driving skill. Verbal instructions were also given to avoid hazards 
either by braking vigorously, swerving or using a combination of both.  
 
4.4.3 Data Collection 
 
A number of driver performance measures that were generated by the simulation were 
collected at a frequency of 20 hertz i.e. every 0.05 seconds. The raw data were collected 
in  ASCII  code  and  were  later  converted  into  Microsoft  Excel
®  format  for  further 
processing in MATLAB
® . A number of driving performance parameters/statistics for 
relevant segments of each drive were then calculated using different algorithms. Since a 
very huge amount of data was generated by the simulator, it took four months of full time 
work to inspect and extract relevant parameters from the data files. 
 
4.5 Performance Measures 
 
4.5.1 Overview 
 
Before the data were analysed, each driver’s simulation file was played back and each 
and every off-road accident, collision, pedestrian hit, traffic light ticket, stop sign missed, 
centreline crossing, road edge excursion, and illegal turn was thoroughly examined to 
ensure that the driving error occurred as a result of driving performance decrement and 
not as a result of programming artefact; e.g., the vehicular traffic was “intelligent” but 
when it was programmed to undertake a certain manoeuvre, during the exact manoeuvre 
stage it lost its  “intelligent” status but reverted back to being an “intelligent” vehicle 
once the manoeuvre was complete. An “intelligent” vehicle stopped at traffic lights, stop 
signs and avoided colliding with vehicles in front of them (without breaking the laws of 
physics).  Also,  for  example,  in  some  instances  a  pedestrian  hit  was  registered  even 
though the driver’s vehicle bonnet had passed the pedestrian (but once the pedestrian 
started walking he could not stop). 
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4.5.2 Data Collection and Processing 
 
4.5.2.1 No. of Total Hazards 
 
This parameter was the sum of No. of Off-road Accidents, No. of Collisions, No. of 
Pedestrian Hits, No. of Traffic Light Tickets, No. of Stop Signs Missed, No. of Illegal 
Turns and No. of Stops in Middle of Traffic. All these parameters are discrete events that 
represent a substantial risk of crashes and traffic conflicts and have been included in this 
category as per recommendations of a number of authors (Staplin et al., 1999; Stern et al., 
2004; Allen et al., 2004b; Freund et al., 2005b; Freund et al., 2005a; Hunt et al., 1997a; 
Dobbs et al., 1998; Cox et al., 1998) and they signal declining driving skill. With regard 
to raw driving performance parameters, two of the most important parameters i.e. No. of 
Total Hazards and No. of Low-Speed warnings have been graphed against age and are 
shown in Figure 4.3. A lowess curve has been superimposed on the graphs. It may be 
highlighted that the Lowess curve follows the general trend in the data. Both graphs in 
general show an upwards trend with increasing age. 
 
4.5.2.2 No. of Low-Speed Warnings 
 
These were the number of “ding” sounds played every three seconds when the driver’s 
speed was more than 5 mph below the posted speed limit. 
 
4.5.2.3 Over Speed Limit (Percent of Time) 
 
This showed the percentage of the total driving time that the driver was more than 6 ½ 
mph above the posted speed limit. 
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Figure 4.3 Graphs of No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-Speed warnings against age 
of drivers with superimposed Lowess curves. 
 
4.5.2.4 Out of lane (Percent of Time) 
 
This showed the percentage of driving time that a vehicle wheel was outside the left road 
edge or the centreline of the road. Segments of the roadway where the centreline was 
crossed for overtaking purposes or while evading an accident were not counted. Also, a 
left roadway edge crossing while veering into a petrol station was not counted. 
 
4.5.2.5 Steering Reversal Rate (Mountain Drive) 
 
It  represented  the  number  of  times  per  minute  the  steering  wheel  was  reversed  by  a 
magnitude  larger  than  1.5  degrees.  Heading  errors  build  up  when  visual  attention  is 
diverted,  which  are  corrected  by  means  of  large  and  disruptive  steering  wheel 
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movements.  This  parameter  was  calculated  from  103900  feet  to  110300  feet  i.e.  the 
mountainous portion of Drive-I. 
 
4.5.2.6 Time-To-Line crossing (Mountain Drive) 
 
Assuming  constant  speed  and  fixed  steering  angle,  Time-To-Line  Crossing  (TLC)  is 
defined as the time required to reach the lane marking (Johansson et al., 2004); it is a 
time-based  safety  margin  adopted  by  the  driver.  TLC  values  less  than  1  second  and 
greater than 20 seconds were ignored and the median of the remaining TLC values was 
computed (Johansson et al., 2004). 
 
4.5.2.7 Absolute Difference in Modulus 
 
Modulus highlighted how closely the driver was able to match the lead vehicle’s speed in 
the Car-Following regime. A value of 1 was ideal, whereas a value less than 1 indicated 
that the following driver tended to drive slower than the lead vehicle. A value greater 
than 1 showed that the following driver was driving faster and had to slow down on 
catching  up.  The  absolute  difference  between  1  and  the  actual  Modulus  value  was 
calculated.  
 
4.5.2.8 Delay (Phase Shift) 
 
This parameter was a measure of the time it took for the following vehicle to respond to 
changes in the lead vehicle’s speed in the Car-Following regime. A value of zero was 
perfect.  Larger  values  signified  that  it  took  a  longer  time  for  the  following  driver  to 
recognize and react to the lead vehicle’s speed changes. 
 
4.5.2.9 Coherence 
 
Coherence  indicated how well the driver’s data followed the lead vehicle’s data in the 
Car-Following  regime.  It  is  a  measure  of  the  squared  correlation  between  the  speed 135 
 
signals  of  both  vehicles  (Brookhuis  &  Waard,  1994).  A  value  of  1  showed  perfect 
coherence.  
 
4.5.2.10 No. of Correct DA Responses 
 
This  indicated  the  number  of  times  the  driver  was  able  to  press  the  correct  divided 
attention button in response to one of the eight possible signs out of 58 instances. 
 
4.5.2.11 No. of DAs with No Response 
 
This indicated the number of times the driver did not respond at all within 5 sec to the 
sign change that occurred out of a total of 58. 
 
4.5.2.12 Reaction Time DA Task 
 
This indicated the average reaction time in seconds of the driver measured from the time 
when the sign first appeared to when the driver pressed the divided attention button. 
 
4.5.2.13 Standard Deviation of Reaction Time DA Task 
 
This  indicated  the  standard  deviation  of  the  reaction  time  of  the  driver  in  seconds 
measured  from the time when the sign first  appeared to when the driver pressed the 
divided attention button. 
 
4.5.2.14 Reaction Time to Stop Sign 
 
This indicated the average (of three readings) of the reaction time in seconds and was 
measured  from  the  time  the  STOP  sign  first  appeared  on  the  screen  to  the  time  the 
driver’s foot hit the brake pedal. 
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4.5.2.15 Absolute Difference in Speed DA Task 
 
This indicated the absolute difference in mph between 55 mph and the average speed 
taken in four segments in the DA portion of the drive where there was no interference 
from the appearance of the STOP signs on the screen. 
 
4.5.2.16 Standard Deviation in Speed DA Task 
 
This indicated the standard deviation of speed in mph taken in four segments in the DA 
portion of the drive where there was no interference from the appearance of the STOP 
signs on the screen. 
 
4.5.2.17 Absolute Difference Lane Position DA Task 
 
This indicated the average of the absolute difference in feet between the center of the 
vehicle and the centre of the lane in the Divided Attention portion of the drive. 
 
4.5.2.18 Standard Deviation Lane Position DA Task 
 
This indicated the standard deviation in feet of the absolute difference between the center 
of the vehicle and the centre of the lane in the Divided Attention portion of the drive. 
 
4.5.2.19 Absolute Difference Lane Position Car-Following Task 
 
This indicated the average of the absolute difference in feet between the center of the 
vehicle and the centre of the lane in the Car-Following task. 
 
4.5.2.20 Standard Deviation Lane Position Car-Following Task 
 
This indicated the standard deviation in feet of the absolute difference between the center 
of the vehicle and the centre of the lane in the Car-Following portion of the drive. 137 
 
 
4.5.2.21 Steering Reversal Rate DA Task 
 
It  represented  the  number  of  times  per  minute  the  steering  wheel  was  reversed  by  a 
magnitude larger than 1.5 degrees in the Divided Attention portion of the drive. 
 
4.5.2.22 Steering Reversal Rate Car-Following 
 
It  represented  the  number  of  times  per  minute  the  steering  wheel  was  reversed  by  a 
magnitude larger than 1.5 degrees in the Car-Following portion of the drive. 
 
4.5.2.23 Time-To-Line Crossing DA Task 
 
It indicated the Time-To-Line Crossing (TLC) value in seconds for the DA portion of the 
drive. TLC values less than less than 1 second and greater than 20 seconds were ignored 
and the median of the remaining TLC values was computed (Johansson et al., 2004). 
 
4.5.2.24 Time-To-Line Crossing Car-Following 
 
It indicated the Time-To-Line Crossing (TLC) value in seconds for the Car-Following 
portion of the drive. TLC values less than less than 1 second and greater than 20 seconds 
were ignored and the median of the remaining TLC values was computed (Johansson et 
al., 2004). 
 
4.6 Questionnaire 
 
A  simple  questionnaire  was  devised  to  gauge  driver  behaviour  in  particular 
circumstances,  self  assessment  of  their  driving  ability.    It  consisted  of  five  parts:  (I) 
Driving  Skills  (II)  Driving  Behaviour  (III)  About  Computing  (IV)  Simulation  (V) 
Personal  Information.    Part-I  gauged  driver’s  self  assessment of  their various  driving 
skills. Part-II focused on their driving behaviour in various circumstances. Part-III was 138 
 
about their commuting practices and accidents/penalty points. Part-IV focused on their 
assessment of the driving simulation runs. Part-V was for soliciting personal information 
i.e.  age,  sex,  contact,  etc.  As  the  research  developed,  it  became  clear  that whilst  the 
questionnaire could provide insights into the attitudes of drivers, it was not relevant to the 
main thrust of the research and was not therefore considered further. However, a copy of 
the questionnaire is at Appendix-B (on a CD). 
 
4.7 Summary 
 
This  chapter  has  described  the  driving  simulation  process  involved  in  this  research. 
Justification has been given as to why it was decided to meet the research objectives 
through driving simulation rather than on-road tests. The Simulation apparatus has been 
described in detail along with certain values of vital parameters that were adopted. The 
psychometric  principles  employed  in  the  design  of  the  simulation  drives  have  been 
outlined and the design elements of both drives (Drive-I Drive-II) along with the practice 
drives have been described in detail.  Drive-I is the main drive while as Drive-II is the 
Divided Attention and Car Following Drive. The drive testing and refinement process has 
been described. 
The criterion used in the selection of sample has been ascertained. Two groups of drivers 
were tested in this research. Group-I was the experienced younger driver group (age 26-
40 years), whereas group-II was the experienced older driver group (age > 60 years) with 
at  least  5  years  driving  experience  and  a  current  valid  UK  driving  license.  The 
experimental procedure consisting of the six major neuropsychological tests (i.e., Ufov, 
Dichotic, Trail-Making, Rey-Osterrieth, Paper Folding, Clock Drawing) and the driving 
simulation protocol has been described. 
Data collection consisted of collecting 24 driving performance parameters at every 0.05 
seconds interval. The 24 driving performance parameters relevant to Drive-I and Drive-II 
have been described in  detail. The Computation of driving performance indices from 
these 24 parameters has been described in the next chapter.   139 
 
5 Driving Performance Indices 
 
5.1 Introduction/Overview 
 
The objectives of this chapter were to develop three different driving performance indices 
using the concepts of Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Coefficient using Item Analysis and 
then  to  derive  their  corresponding  weighted  versions  through  the  use  of  Principal 
Components Analysis. Driving performance was objectively quantified through driving 
performance indices that were based on the driving performance parameters collected in 
Drive-I and Drive-II of the simulated drive cycles. Since there was no external criterion 
(e.g.,  driving  instructor’s  assessment)  against  which  to  judge  driving  performance, 
therefore  the  concept  of  “Scale  Development”  had  to  be  employed.  The  underlying 
phenomenon or construct that we were interested in was “driving performance”. Since the 
construct  is  not  directly  observable,  a  collection  of  items  (i.e.  driving  performance 
parameters) were combined into a composite score, because the items (i.e. values of the 
driving performance parameters) were caused by the construct (i.e. driving performance) 
(DeVellis, 2003). However, the scale should be homogeneous i.e., the items should tap 
different aspects of the same construct (driving performance) and the homogeneity also 
ensures that the scale is internally consistent (a set of items are internally consistent if 
they share common variance and tap the same underlying construct (Spector, 1992)).  It 
would not be logical to add items to form a total /composite score if they measured 
different  attributes.  The  homogeneity  condition  has  two  implications  (Streiner  & 
Norman, 2003): (1) There should be moderate correlation between the items (2) Each 
item should correlate with total score formed from the composite of the items. If one item 
is  correlated  highly  with  another,  then  the  second  item  would  add  little  additional 
information to the construct and be redundant. This can result in a possible loss of content 
validity as different/diverse aspects of the construct would fail to be represented and the 
scale  would  be  narrow  in  scope.  The  methodology  for  the  development  of  different 
driving performance indices and their rationale is described in the remaining sections of 
this chapter.  140 
 
 
5.2 Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
A scale should measure a construct in a reproducible fashion. Reliability in a general 
sense is a measure of the reproducibility of a set of scores under differing conditions and 
shows the consistency or stability of a measuring instrument (Lyman, 1998). There are 
different forms of reliability (Allen &Yen, 1979). The most general method of finding 
estimates of reliability through internal consistency is the Cronbach’s Alpha (Kaplan & 
Saccuzzo, 2001). Cronbach’s Alpha is a measure of internal-consistency reliability that 
provides a lower-bound estimate of a test’s reliability based on a single administration 
(Allen  &Yen,  1979;  Streiner  &  Norman,  2008).  The  formula  for  Cronbach’s  Alpha 
(Bland & Altman, 1997) is: 
 
 
i
T
S k
k S
2
2 1
1
 
α = −     −  
∑   (5.1) 
α = Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficient 
k   = No. of items (i.e. no. of driving performance parameters) 
i S
2= Variance of i
th item 
T S
2=   Variance of total score formed by summing all the items. 
Before  calculating  Cronbach’s  Alpha,  the  items  (driving  performance  parameters)  are 
first multiplied by their respective weighting  coefficients before calculating    i S
2 and  
T S
2. The coefficient Alpha partitions the total variance among the items into signal and 
noise components (DeVellis, 2003) i.e., alpha is the proportion of total variation that is 
signal. Equation 5.1 can be interpreted as: 
   
 
k Sum of item variances
k Sum of variances and covariances
1
1
 
α = −   −  
  (5.2) 
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Where the Sum of item variances is the sum of the variances of the items and the Sum of 
variances  and  covariances  is  the  sum  of  all  the  variances  and  covariances  of  the 
variance-covariance  matrix.  Cronbach’s  Alpha  equals  the  proportion  of  total  variance 
among  the  items  that  is  due  to  the  underlying  construct  and  is  therefore  communal 
(common) (DeVellis, 2003). The term on the right hand side in the brackets of Equation 
5.2 is the proportion of total variance of the items that is unique; this is subtracted from 1 
to get the proportion of variance that is communal (i.e. common). The term (k/k-1) is 
included as a correction factor in Equation 5.1 and 5.2 to ensure that an Alpha of 1 is 
obtained if perfect correlation is present between the items. If the items are uncorrelated, 
the variance of the total score (i.e., composite of the items) will be equal to the sum of the 
variances of individual items making the scale and so Alpha would be zero; the variance of 
the total score will increase as items become more and more correlated. An alternate form of 
Cronbach’s Alpha is:  
 
( )
kr
k r 1 1
α =
+ −
  (5.3) 
Where,  k is number of items (i.e., driving performance parameters) and  r is the average 
correlation between the items. Equation 5.3 shows that if Alpha is very low, the test has 
few  items  (i.e.  is  short)  or  the  items  have  very  little  in  common  (i.e.,  the  average 
correlation between items is low). According to Nunnally (1978),  Alpha should be above 
0.70 to demonstrate  internal consistency. Streiner and Norman (2003) suggest a value 
greater than 0.8.  
 
5.3 The Concept of Weights 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha was first estimated using unit nominal weights i.e. weighting all items 
equally. However, before estimating Alpha, the 24 driving performance parameters were 
standardized i.e., the mean of each driving performance parameter was subtracted from 
its respective value and then divided by the sample standard deviation of the parameter, 
resulting  in  each  parameter  having  a  mean  of  zero  and  a  standard  deviation  of  1 
(Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Values larger than the mean appear as positive and smaller 
as  negative.  Since  standardization  is  a  linear  transformation,  the  distribution  of  each 142 
 
driving performance parameter was preserved (because the proportionality of inter-score 
distance was preserved, therefore there was no distortion in shape of distribution and 
correlations  were  not  affected).  Standardization  does  not  “normalizes”  (normal 
distribution)  a  variable.  Standardization  was  necessary  because  the  variances  of  the 
driving  performance  parameters  were  different;  adding  the  raw  scores  (without 
standardization)  would  have  resulted  in  heavier  weighting  of  the  parameters  having 
greater variance in an apparently equally-weighed composite. It was also necessary to 
standardize due to the “incomparable / incompatible” nature of the parameters and/or 
their  units  of  measurement  (e.g.,  one  parameter  measures  the  no.  of  accidents  while 
another measures the deviation of the vehicle from the center of the lane).  
It may be noted that there is a real difference between the apparent (nominal) weight 
assigned to an item and the effective contribution that this weight makes to the composite 
or the total score, because in addition to the apparent weights, the contribution from the 
different  items  to  the  total  score  is  a  function  of  the  variances  of  the  items  and  the 
intercorrelations  between  the  items  (Helmstadter,  1964).  Therefore,  use  of 
standardization (making variances equal) and then using unit nominal weights with the 
items comes closest to achieving equal effective weighting, particularly if the correlation 
of each item with the other is nearly the same (Wang & Stanley, 1970). Also in assigning 
nominal (apparent) weights, it is the relative magnitude of the apparent (nominal) weights 
of  items  to  one  another  that  is  important  rather  than  the  absolute  magnitude  of  such 
apparent weights.  
 
5.4 Item Analysis and Estimating Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
5.4.1 Overview 
 
The number of observations (drivers) used in the estimation of Cronbach’s Alpha was 56, 
with each observation having 24 different driving performance parameters (items). First, 
all  driving  performance  parameters  were  standardized.    Before  carrying  out  further 
estimation, it was necessary to orient (i.e., change polarity) 19 of the 24 standardized 
driving  performance  parameters  so  that  higher  scores  corresponded  to  better  driving 143 
 
performance (i.e., high level of the score on the item should represent high level of the 
construct  and  vice  versa)  (Acock,  2006;  Spector,  1992;  Wainer,  1976).  This  was 
accomplished  by  multiplying  the  standardized  values  of  all  24  parameters  except  the 
following  five  by  -1:  Time-To-Line  Crossing  (Mountain  Drive),  Coherence,  No.  of 
Correct DA Responses, Time-To-Line Crossing DA Task, Time-To-Line Crossing Car-
Following.  
The  standardized  (and  polarity  corrected)  driving  performance  parameters  were 
multiplied with unit nominal (apparent) weights and then added up to obtain a total score 
(composite score). Equation 5.1 and the Pearson Moment Correlation coefficient were 
employed to carry out Item Analysis and estimate Alpha. Item Analysis was carried out 
to eliminate those items that do not contribute towards the formation of an internally 
consistent scale and thus lower reliability. First, the variances of the driving performance 
parameters and the total score (composite score) were calculated and then Equation 5.1 
was  used  to  estimate  Cronbach’s  Alpha.  Next,  the  Pearson  Moment  Correlation 
coefficients were found between each driving performance parameter and the total score 
(composite score) and also between each driving performance parameter and the total 
score on all the other items. This information formed the basis for the decision making 
process  whereby  certain  parameters  were  dropped  and  their  impact  on  the  value  of 
Cronbach’s Alpha reliability coefficient assessed (Acock, 2006; Spector, 1992; Wainer, 
1976;  Kline,  1993).  There  is  no  constraint  on  the  size  of  the  sample  relevant  to  the 
number  of  items  (parameters)  being  used  in  Item  Analysis  but  that  it  should  be 
representative (Kline, 1993). 
 
5.4.2 Three different Kind of Indices. 
 
Three different kinds of unit nominal weight indices were computed. These were: 
1.  Index obtained by considering all 24 driving performance parameters. 
2. Index obtained by considering all 24 driving performance parameters except 
No. of Total Hazards.  
3. Index obtained by considering all 24 driving performance parameters except 
No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-Speed Warnings. 144 
 
The  rationale  for  considering  the  three  driving  performance  indices  was  that 
categorization of drivers with regard to driving performance was to be based on driving 
performance  indices.  To  maintain  the  psychometric  principles  (described  in  Section 
4.3.1) used in the design of the drive and the driving behaviour exhibited by drivers in 
this context, it was necessary to isolate the effects of No. of Total Hazards  and No. of 
Low-Speed Warnings from the rest of the parameters. They were considered separately 
along with their respective indices (indices in which these parameters were not present). 
This was important because, as pointed out earlier, driving speed can be used to regulate 
the  difficulty  of  the  driving  task  (Hakamies-Blomqvist,  1993).  Slower driving  speeds 
have been exhibited by Alzheimer patients (compared to age matched controls) in driving 
simulators  (Cox  et  al.,  1998  cited  in  Brown  &  Ott,  2004)  and  by  mildly  demented 
subjects in on-road tests (Hunt et al., 1993 cited in Brown & Ott, 2004). Slow driving as a 
compensatory measure is also reported by Hakamies-Blomqvist (Hakamies-Blomqvist, 
1994) and the significant difference between the speeds of older and younger drivers has 
been  identified  by  McGwin  &  Brown  (1999)  as  a  cause  of  dangerous  accidents. 
McKnight  and  Urquijo  (1993)  highlighted  slow  driving  for identification  of  deficient 
drivers based on a sample of 1000 referral forms used by police. In simulator studies, 
slow speed driving by older drivers has been reported by Quillian et al. (1999), Park et al. 
(2007) and Chaparro and Alton (2000). Using a driving simulator, Cox et al. (1998) and 
Szlyk et al. (2002) report slow speed driving by Alzheimer disease subjects (out patients) 
and suspected-dementia subjects respectively, compared to control groups. According to 
Hunt et al. (1997a), results from their road test were consistent with those of other studies 
using road tests and showed that DAT (dementia of the Alzheimer type) subjects adopted 
slower speeds compared to healthy elderly controls. Staplin (Staplin et al., 1999) has 
classified overcautiousness (e.g., driving slowly) as a discriminating error. Discriminating 
errors are potentially dangerous errors that signify reduced driving skill. 
 
5.4.3 Methodology 
 
The  estimation  of  driving  performance  index  by  consideration  of  all  24  driving 
performance parameters (Index named = DPI1) was undertaken as follows:  145 
 
Firstly,  all  24  parameters  were  standardized  and  oriented  in  the  proper  direction  (by 
changing signs of the 19 parameters as explained in Section 5.4.1) and were added to 
obtain a total score. Variances of the driving performance parameters and the total score 
(composite score) were calculated and then Equation 5.1 was used to estimate Cronbach’s 
Alpha. The Item Analysis and Cronbach’s Alpha estimations may be seen in Table 5.1. 
The Bottom of Column 5 and 6 shows the average of the correlation between the 24 items 
and Cronbach’s Alpha (based on 24 parameters) (i.e. 0.2807 and 0.9035 respectively). 
Column 3 gives the correlation coefficients of the driving performance parameters with 
the total score and column 4 gives the correlation coefficient of the parameter with the 
total score excluding the parameter itself.  Column 5 and 6 give the average correlation 
coefficients between the parameters and coefficient Alpha respectively, if this particular 
parameter was to be removed from the analysis. Since the objective of Item Analysis is to 
identify weak items (weak driving performance parameters) and eliminate them so as to 
increase  the  homogeneity  of  the  scale  and  thereby  increase  Alpha,  the  Item-rest 
correlation (column 4) was used as the criterion to make this decision (Spector, 1992; 
Kline, 1993) along with the value of Alpha. Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) and Kline 
(1993)  suggest  using  values  of  Item-rest  correlation  (Colum  4)  rather  than  Item-test 
correlation (Column 3) in order to avoid bias, as the total score includes the contribution 
of the item when calculating Item-test correlation (column 3). The parameter to drop first 
was the one whose omission had the least negative or most positive effect on Alpha; the 
Item-rest  correlation  was  used  as  a  guide  in  identifying  the  parameters  which  were 
expendable. As the lowest value of Item-rest correlation was that of parameter V31 (i.e.,-
0.0387), it was dropped and the whole analysis was repeated. It may be seen from Table 
5.1 that dropping V31 increases the Average inter-item correlation from 0.2807 to 0.3083 
and  Alpha  from  0.9035  to  0.9111.  For  well-fitting  items,  Alpha  will  decrease  if  we 
remove the item as is evident from column 6 of Table 5.1. The table showing the rest of 
the analysis after dropping V31 is given in Appendix-D. The next lowest value of Item-
rest correlation was for parameter V29  (i.e., 0.0061). Therefore, parameter V29 was 
dropped and the whole analysis repeated. This procedure was continued until the lowest 
value of Item-rest correlation was not less than 0.3 (Kline, 1993), at which stage the 146 
 
process of elimination of parameters was stopped. Tables showing details of calculations 
are at Appendix-D.  
 
Table 5.1 Item Analysis and estimation of Cronbach’s Alpha 
Col.1  Col.2  Col.3  Col.4  Col.5  Col.6 
No. 
Item (Driving Performance 
Parameters) 
Item-test 
correlation 
Item-rest 
correlation 
Average 
inter-item 
correlation 
Alpha 
1  V25=t-hazards  0.7659  0.7322  0.2697  0.8947 
2  V26=no-low-speedwarnings  0.4556  0.3933  0.2861  0.9021 
3  V27=over-speed-time  0.7090  0.6687  0.2727  0.8961 
4  V28=out-lane-time  0.6534  0.6073  0.2757  0.8975 
5  V29=sr-mount  0.0841  0.0094  0.3058  0.9102 
6  V30=tlc-mount  0.2720  0.2008  0.2958  0.9062 
7  V31=abs-diff-modulus  0.0361  -0.0387  0.3083  0.9111 
8  V32=delay-phase-shift  0.4266  0.3625  0.2877  0.9028 
9  V33=coherence  0.6357  0.5879  0.2766  0.8979 
10  V34=no-correct-da  0.5873  0.5350  0.2792  0.8991 
11  V35=no-da-noresponse  0.6118  0.5617  0.2779  0.8985 
12  V36=rt-da  0.8215  0.7948  0.2668  0.8933 
13  V37=sd-rt-da  0.7941  0.7638  0.2682  0.8940 
14  V38=rt-stop  0.7077  0.6672  0.2728  0.8961 
15  V39=abs-diff-speed-da  0.5530  0.4978  0.2810  0.8999 
16  V40=sd-speed-da  0.7643  0.7304  0.2698  0.8947 
17  V41=abs-diff-lane-pos-da  0.3244  0.2551  0.2931  0.9051 
18  V42=sd-lane-pos-da  0.7315  0.6938  0.2715  0.8955 
19  V43=abs-diff-lane-pos-car  0.3079  0.2380  0.2939  0.9054 
20  V44=sd-lane-pos-car  0.6899  0.6475  0.2737  0.8966 
21  V45=sr-da  0.5348  0.4781  0.2819  0.9003 
22  V46=sr-car  0.3961  0.3303  0.2893  0.9035 
23  V47=tlc-da  0.8327  0.8075  0.2662  0.8930 
24  V48=tlc-car  0.6831  0.6400  0.2741  0.8967 
           
  Test scale      0.2807  0.9035 
 
Where, 
V25 = No. of Total Hazards 
V26 = No. of Low-Speed Warnings 
V27 = Over Speed Limit (Percent of Time) 
 147 
 
V28 = Out of Lane (Percent of Time) 
V29 = Steering Reversal rate (Mountain Drive) 
V30 = Time-To-Line Crossing (Mountain Drive)  
V31 = Absolute Difference in Modulus 
V32 = Delay (Phase Shift) 
V33 = Coherence 
V34 = No. of Correct DA Responses 
V35 = No. of DAs with No Response 
V36 = Reaction Time DA Task 
V37 = Standard Deviation of Reaction Time 
V38 = Reaction Time to Stop Sign 
V39 = Absolute Difference in Speed DA Task 
V40 = Standard Deviation in Speed DA Task 
V41 = Absolute Difference Lane Position DA Task 
V42 = Standard Deviation Lane Position DA Task  
V43= Absolute Difference Lane position Car-Following Task 
V44 = Standard Deviation Lane position Car-Following Task 
V45 = Steering Reversal Rate DA Task 
V46 = Steering Reversal Rate Car-Following 
V47 = Time-To-Line Crossing DA Task 
V48 = Time-To-Line Crossing Car-Following 
The  following  five  driving  performance  parameters  were  sequentially  dropped  which 
improved Alpha from 0.9035 to 0.9280:  V31, V29, V30, V43 and V41.   
The  same  procedure  was  followed  for  the  case  where  the  index  was  obtained  by 
considering all 24 driving performance parameters except No. of Total Hazard (Index 
named= DPI2). The initial Item Analysis was started with 23 parameters (details of the 
analysis are in Appendix-D). The following five driving performance parameters were 
sequentially dropped which improved Alpha from 0.8947 to 0.9214:  V31, V29, V41, V43 
and V30. 
A  similar  procedure  was  followed  for  the  case  where  the  index  was  obtained  by 
considering all 24 driving performance parameters except No. of Total Hazards and No. 148 
 
of Low-Speed Warnings (Index named= DPI3). The initial Item Analysis was started with 
22  parameters  (see  Appendix-D).  The  following  five  driving  performance  parameters 
were sequentially dropped which improved Alpha from 0.8929 to 0.9213:  V31, V29, 
V41, V43 and V30. Table 5.2 summarizes the particular driving performance parameters 
used in forming different driving performance indices using Item Analysis and Alfa. In 
all three cases, high values of the reliability coefficients were obtained.  
 
Table 5.2 Summary of driving performance parameters included in the three driving 
performance indices. 
Index  Parameters Included in Index 
Parameters 
Dropped (due 
to weak 
correlations) 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
 
DPI1 
V25,V26,V27,V28,V32,V33,V34,V35,V36, 
V37,V38,V39,V40,V42,V44,V45,V46,V47,V48 
V31,V29,V41, 
V43,V30 
0.9280 
DPI2 
V26,V27,V28,V32,V33,V34,V35,V36,V37, 
V38,V39,V40,V42,V44,V45,V46,V47,V48 
V31,V29,V41, 
V43,V30 
0.9214 
DPI3 
V27,V28,V32,V33,V34,V35,V36,V37,V38, 
V39,V40,,V42,V44,V45,V46,V47,V48 
V31,V29,V41, 
V43,V30 
0.9213 
    
 Where, 
DPI1 = Index obtained by consideration of all 24 driving performance parameters. 
DPI2 = Index obtained by considering all 24 driving performance parameters except No. 
of Total Hazard. 
DPI3 = Index obtained by considering all 24 driving performance parameters except No. 
of Total Hazards and No. of Low-Speed Warnings. 
The  driving  performance  indices  shown  in  Table  5.2  were  formed  by  adding  their 
respective parameters (i.e., equivalent to using unit nominal weights) under “Parameters 
Included  in  Index”  after  these  parameters  had  been  standardized  and  oriented  in  the 149 
 
proper direction (by changing signs of the 19 parameters as explained in Section 5.4.1, if 
any of these 19 parameters was present). 
 
5.5 Weighting 
 
5.5.1 Overview 
 
The indices DPI1, DPI2 and DPI3 were computed using unit nominal weights. However, 
it was decided also to estimate another set of indices using differential weights based on 
the  parameters  selected  in  Table  5.2  for  each  of  the  three  indices.  These  weighted 
versions of DPI1, DPI2 and DPI3 were called DPI1-weighted, DPI2-weighted and DPI3-
weighted respectively. The predictive ability of an index can be increased by the use of 
differential weights (Perloff & Persons, 1988). According to Streiner and Norman (2003), 
if the items (parameters) in a scale are less than 40, differential weighting may have some 
effect.  It  is  best  to  employ  multiple  regression  in  order  to  maximize  the  correlation 
between  the  composite  score  and  external  criterion  in  order  to  arrive  at  differential 
weights (the weights being the beta coefficients), if a reliable external criterion is present. 
However, in the absence of an external criterion (as in our case), a reasonable strategy 
would  be  to  use  differential  weights  to  maximize  the  reliability  of  the  composite 
(Helmstadter, 1964).  For congeneric items, it is sensible to us differential weighting to 
maximize reliability (i.e.., Alpha) (Li et al., 1996). A scale is called congeneric when all 
the items are measuring the same construct i.e., when all the items are correlated with 
each  other  (Streiner  &  Norman,  2008).  The  use  of  differential  weights  to  maximize 
reliability (Alpha) has been advocated by other authors as well (Berge & Hofstee, 1999; 
Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; Wang & Stanley, 1970). More reliability translates to more 
variance of the composite score (i.e., more dispersion of composite score) and therefore 
yields more discrimination among individuals (Kline, 1993; Horst, 1966). 
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5.5.2 Weighting by Principal Component Analysis 
 
Principal Component Analysis was used to find differential weights so as to maximize 
Alpha.  The  first  Principal  Component  of  the  standardized  variables  (parameters) 
maximizes the explained variance and therefore, its eigenvector furnishes the weights that 
maximize  Cronbach’s  Alpha  (Lord,  1958;  Berge  &  Hofstee,  1999).  The  resulting 
maximized Alpha is given by: 
  max
1
1
1
k
k
α
λ
  = −   −  
  (5.4) 
max α   =   Maximized Cronbach’s Alpha. 
k   =   No. of terms (i.e. no. of parameters). 
λ   =   Largest Eigenvalue of the Variance-Covariance Matrix of the  
    Standardized items (standardized parameters). 
Principal  Component  Analysis  is  a  multivariate  statistical  method.  Details  of  the 
technique can be found in Rencher (2002) and Manly (2005). In Principal Component 
analysis, the variance of a linear combination of the variables (parameters) is maximized. 
The p variables (parameters) X1 , X2, …., Xp are taken and combinations of these are 
found to produce indices Z1, Z2, ….., Zp  in order of their importance that are uncorrelated 
with  each  other  and  describe  the  variation  in  the  data.  The  Var(Z1)  ≥Var(Z2)≥ 
…≥Var(Zp), where Var(Zi) is the variance of Zi. Since the indices are uncorrelated, that 
means  that  they  are  tapping  different  “dimensions”  and  are  called  the  Principal 
Components. Data on the p variables (parameters) and the n observations (i.e., n drivers) 
are formed into a variance-covariance matrix and p Eigenvalues ( 1 2 , ,...., p λ λ λ ) and their 
corresponding  p  Eigenvectors  (  a1,  a2,  …,  ap)  are  estimated.  The  first  Principal 
Component is the linear combination of variables (parameters) X1 , X2, …., Xp and is: 
 
  Z1 = a11 X1+ a12 X2 + …… + a1p Xp  (5.5) 
 
Where a11, a12, …., a1p are the elements of the eigenvector a1 corresponding to the first 
Eigenvalue  1 λ   (which  is  the  largest  )  and  so  on.  The  Eigenvalues  of  the  variance-151 
 
covariance matrix are the variances of their corresponding Principal Components i.e. for 
example, variance of Z1 is equal to  1 λ . Also,  
  1 2 11 22 .... .... p pp c c c λ λ λ + + + = + + +   (5.6) 
Where,  1 2 , ,...., p λ λ λ are the Eigenvalues and  11 c ,  22 c  and  pp c are the respective variances 
of  the  variables  (parameters)  i.e.,  the  diagonal  elements  of  the  variance-covariance 
matrix. Since the variables (parameters) were standardized (mean=0 and variance =1), 
therefore the sum on the right hand side of Equation 5.6 is equal to p i.e. the number of 
variables  (parameters).  The  First  Principal  component  is  the  linear  combination  that 
possesses the maximum variance, hence the elements of the Eigenvector corresponding to 
1 λ  (i.e., the largest Eigenvalue) form the weights which when used with the standardized 
parameters  (polarity  corrected)  result  in  maximum  variance  (maximally  separated  or 
spread out) of the composite and hence maximum Alpha. 
First, the parameters identified in Table 5.2 were standardized and oriented in the proper 
direction (by changing signs of the 19 parameters as explained in Section 5.4.1, if any of 
these  19  parameters  was  present).  Principal  component  analysis  was  then  carried  out 
relevant  to  the  three  indices  in  Table  5.2  and  corresponding  Eigenvalues  and 
Eigenvectors  determined.  Elements  of  the  Eigenvector  corresponding  to  the  largest 
Eigenvalue ( 1 λ ) constituted the weights that maximized Alpha. The maximum value of 
Alpha was computed using Equation 5.4 and was then verified against manual calculation 
using  Equation  5.1.  The  elements  of  the  Eigenvector  corresponding  to  the  largest 
Eigenvalue ( 1 λ ) were added and each element then divided by this total to obtain relative 
nominal weights. The standardized parameters (polarity corrected) were then multiplied 
with these relative weights and added up to obtain the weighted versions of the indices 
DPI1-weighted,  DPI2-weighted,  DPI3-weighted  corresponding  to  the  unit  nominal 
weight  indices  DPI1,  DPI2  and  DPI3  respectively.  Table  5.3  shows  the  optimized 
weights  that  were  obtained  using  Principal  Component  Analysis  in  order  to  estimate  
DPI1-weighted; the table also shows unit weights (relative) for comparison which were 
calculated as 1/19 as there were 19 parameters used in DPI1. The largest Eigenvalue ( 1 λ ) 
was 8.60031, which was used in Equation 5.4 to estimate maximized Alpha of 0.9328 
(using  k =19).  Optimized  weights  obtained  using  Principal  Component  Analysis  for 152 
 
estimation of  DPI2-weighted and  DPI3-weighted  are in Appendix-D along with values 
of Largest Eigenvalues and maximized Alpha. Table 5.4 summarizes Cronbach’s Alpha 
(using unit nominal weights) for DPI1, DPI2 and DPI3 and maximized Alpha (using 
Principal Component weights) for DPI1-weighted, DPI2-weighted and DPI3-weighted. 
Table 5.5 shows the correlation coefficients between the six driving performance indices. 
It may be noted from Table 5.4 that, there was a slight increase in Alpha in all three 
indices  when  Principal  Components  weights  were  used  and  a  very  high  degree  of 
correlation  between  the  indices.  However,  since  differential  weights  change  the 
distribution of an index and can make a difference with regard to the groupings of drivers 
obtained through cluster analysis, it was considered worthwhile to explore this strategy. 
 
Table 5.3 Optimized weights obtained using Principal Component Analysis for 
estimation of DPI1-weighted (Unit relative weights relevant to DPI1 shown for 
comparison). 
No.  Driving Performance Parameters  Unit Weights (relative)  Optimized Weights (relative) 
1  V25=t-hazards  0.0526  0.0637 
2  V26=no-low-speedwarnings  0.0526  0.0377 
3  V27=over-speed-time  0.0526  0.0559 
4  V28=out-lane-time  0.0526  0.0534 
5  V32=delay-phase-shift  0.0526  0.0394 
6  V33=coherence  0.0526  0.053 
7  V34=no-correct-da  0.0526  0.0509 
8  V35=no-da-noresponse  0.0526  0.0499 
9  V36=rt-da  0.0526  0.0656 
10  V37=sd-rt-da  0.0526  0.0645 
11  V38=rt-stop  0.0526  0.0577 
12  V39=abs-diff-speed-da  0.0526  0.0438 
13  V40=sd-speed-da  0.0526  0.0603 
14  V42=sd-lane-pos-da  0.0526  0.0637 
15  V44=sd-lane-pos-car  0.0526  0.0586 
16  V45=sr-da  0.0526  0.0379 
17  V46=sr-car  0.0526  0.0256 
18  V47=tlc-da  0.0526  0.0673 
19  V48=tlc-car  0.0526  0.0511 
       
  Total  1  1 
       
  Cronbach’s Alpha  0.9280  0.9328 153 
 
 
Table 5.4 Summary of Cronbach’s Alpha using nominal unit weights for DPI1, DPI2 and 
DPI3 and Maximized Alpha using Principal Component weights for DPI1-weighted, 
DPI2-weighted and DPI3-weighted. 
Index  Cronbach’s Alpha  Index 
Maximized 
Cronbach’s Alpha 
DPI1  0.9280  DPI1-weighted  0.9328 
DPI2  0.9214  DPI2-weighted  0.9264 
DPI3  0.9213  DPI3-weighted  0.9261 
 
Table 5.5 Correlation coefficients between the six driving performance indices. 
  DPI1  DPI2  DPI3 
DPI1-
weighted 
DPI2-
weighted 
DPI3-
weighted 
DPI1  1           
DPI2  0.9986  1         
DPI3  0.9960  0.9971  1       
DPI1-weighted  0.9975  0.9944  0.9937  1     
DPI2-weighted  0.9973  0.9977  0.9965  0.9980  1   
DPI3-weighted  0.9945  0.9944  0.9976  0.9968  0.9984  1 
 
5.5.3 Weighting by Utilizing an Optimization Tool 
 
Besides the optimized weights obtained through Principal Component analysis, it was 
also  decided  to  use  an  optimization  tool  to  find  differential  weights  that  maximized 
Cronbach’s Alpha to see if a different set of weights were feasible. First, the parameters 
identified  in  Table  5.2  were  standardized  and  oriented  in  the  proper  direction  (by 
changing signs of the 19 parameters as explained in Section 5.4.1, if any of these 19 
parameters was present). A program was devised in Microsoft Excel
® in which nominal 
unit weights were used as starting values before being multiplied with their respective 
parameters, with Cronbach’s Alpha being computed using Equation 5.1. The optimization 
tool Solver in Microsoft Excel
® was then used to carry out a number of iterations by 154 
 
changing the unit nominal weights so as to maximize Alpha, with the constraints that the 
sum of the differential weights should add up to 1 and all differential weights should be 
positive.    Solver  uses  the  “Generalized  Reduced  Gradient  (GRG2)  Algorithm  for 
optimizing nonlinear problems”. This algorithm was developed by Leon Lasdon, of the 
University of Texas at Austin, and Allan Waren, of Cleveland State University. Linear 
and  integer  problems  use  the  simplex  method  with  bounds  on  the  variables,  and  the 
branch-and-bound  method,  implemented  by  John  Watson  and  Dan  Fylstra,  Frontline 
Systems, Inc (http://www.solver.com/) (Microsoft Excel® Help). The optimized weights 
using this optimization tool were exactly the same as those obtained by using Principal 
Component Analysis in Section 5.5.2 and there was no change in the maximized Alpha 
coefficient. 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has described the development of six different driving performance indices 
to be used in assessment of driving performance and the rationale for their development. 
The  estimation  of  single  administration  reliability  using  Cronbach’s  Alpha  has  been 
emphasized  along  with  computation  formulae.  The  concept  of  weights  and 
standardization of items (parameters) has been discussed and highlighted that the use of 
standardization (making variances equal) along with utilization of unit nominal weights 
comes closest to achieving equal effective weighting , particularly if the correlation of 
each  item  with  the  other  is  nearly  the  same.  The  procedure  of  Item  Analysis  and 
estimation of Cronbach’s Alpha has been described. The rationale for consideration of the 
three different driving performance nominal-unit-weight indices (DPI1, DPI2 and DPI3) 
has been elaborated upon. 
The methodology used in estimating Cronbach’s Alpha through Item Analysis for the 
three  indices  has  been  described  which  resulted  in  high  values  of  Alpha  reliability 
coefficients (0.9280, 0.9214 and 0.9213). Calculation of the three unit nominal weight 
indices  has  been  described.  The  case  of  differential  weighting  has  been  justified  and 
Principal  Component  analysis  employed  to  find  optimum  weights  for  the  weighted 
versions  (i.e.,  DPI1-weighted,  DPI2-weighted    and  DPI3-weighted)  of  the  indices. 155 
 
Calculation of the three weighted versions of the indices has been outlined. Based on 
certain  driving  performance  parameters  and  driving  performance  indices,  the 
performance-based categorization of drivers using a clustering technique is described in 
the next chapter. 
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6 Cluster Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The objectives of this chapter were to come up with a categorizations of drivers (based on 
driving performance) using the technique of normal-mixture-model cluster analysis using 
six  different  alternatives  of  driving  performance  parameter  combinations/single 
parameters  and  finally  the  identification  of  the  most  clinically  relevant  grouping  of 
drivers  based  on  relevant  driving  performance  parameters.  After  the  six  driving 
performance  indices  had  been  estimated,  the  next  step  was  to  make  a  driver-
categorization based on the measures of driving performance i.e., driving performance 
indices and two of driving performance parameters (No. of Total Hazards and No. of 
Low-speed Warnings). For example, DPI2 and No. of Total Hazards were considered as 
two  separate  variables  because  they  were  to  be  used  in  cluster  analysis  to 
categorize/group  the  56  drivers  so  that  drivers  within  each  group  were  similar  with 
respect to these two variables and the groups were dissimilar to each other with respect to 
these two variables. If we did not separate No. of Total Hazards from DPI2 and still used 
cluster analysis using these two variables then the results would have been biased as the 
effect of  No. of Total Hazards would be present in both variables and they would not be 
providing “mutually exclusive” measures of driving performance. A similar analogy goes 
for DPI3, No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-Speed warnings except that now these 
three separate variables were to be used in cluster analysis to categorize/group the 56 
drivers so that drivers within each group were similar with respect to these three variables 
and the groups were dissimilar to each other with respect to these three variables. The 
rationale  for  inclusion  of  these  two  driving  performance  parameters  (No.  of  Total 
Hazards and No. of Low-Speed warnings) separately in cluster analysis has already been 
explained in Sections 4.4.2, 4.5.2.1 and 5.4.2. Since it is generally impossible a priori to 
perceive what combination of variables is likely to result in interesting and informative 
classifications  (Everitt  &  Hothorn,  2006)  of  drivers,  the  following  six  possible 
alternatives were explored for driver-classification: 157 
 
1.  DPI1 
2.  DPI1-weighted 
3.  DPI2 and  No. of Total Hazards 
4.  DPI2-weighted and  No. of Total Hazards  
5.  DPI3,  No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed Warnings 
6.  DPI3-weighted,  No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed Warnings 
The inclusion of the number of parameters/variables in each of these six scenarios also 
ensured that only a small number of variables relevant to the classification were being 
used and that these variables described the objects/observations (Gordon, 1999; Everitt et 
al., 2001). It may be highlighted that DPI1 included the effect of 19 parameters, DPI2 
and DPI3 included the effect of the 19 parameters except “No. of Total Hazards” and 
“No. of Total Hazards and Low-speed Warnings” respectively. The “-weighted” suffix 
depicted  their  corresponding  weighted  versions  (i.e.  Principal  Component  weights). 
Previous studies (e.g., Lew et al., 2005; Schultheis et al., 2003) have categorized drivers 
as having “failed” when  their driving performance score (as gauged by some kind of an 
index/score) fell more than 2 standard deviations below the mean of the control group 
(normal group). Assuming that a higher score on an index corresponds to better driving 
performance,  this  criterion  ensures  that,  in  a  normally  distributed  population, 
approximately 2.3 percent (probability Z ≤ -2 is 0.023) of the normal drivers will always 
be considered as abnormal even if their performance does not qualify for a “failed” status. 
Besides, this criterion cannot be used for categorization if more than one measure is used 
simultaneously to assess driver performance. In four of the six alternative assessment 
strategies  highlighted  above,  more  than  one  measure  was  considered  for  driving-
performance  assessment.  Therefore,  it  was  decided  to  use  the  statistical  technique  of 
Cluster Analysis for the categorization of drivers. 
 
6.2 Clustering Methods 
 
Details  of  Cluster  Analysis  can  be  found  in  Rencher  (2002),  Manly  (2005),  Gordon 
(1999), Romesburg (1984), Everitt et al. (2001), Everitt & Dunn (2001) and Everitt & 
Hothorn (2006). In cluster analysis, there is no a priori information about the underlying 158 
 
groupings in the data. The intent is to find out patterns in the data so as to group the 
multivariate observations. The  groupings should be such that the objects/observations 
within each cluster/group are similar and the clusters/groups are dissimilar to each other. 
The  number  of  groups/clusters  is  not  usually  known  before  hand,  and  the  groupings 
should  make  sense  in  the  context  of  the  objectives/research.  In  many  techniques  of 
Cluster Analysis, the groupings are based on some measure of similarity/dissimilarity 
between all pairs of observations and/or on the maximization of some objective function.  
A  commonly  used  measure  of  dissimilarity  is  the  “Euclidean”  distance,  which  is  the 
distance between two observation vectors. Other measures of similarity/dissimilarity used 
are  for  example,  “Minkowski”  distance,  “City  Block”  distance,  “Canberra”  distance, 
“Pearson Correlation”, “Taxonomic” distance and “Angular Separation” etc. The use of a 
particular similarity / dissimilarity measure partly depends upon the type of variables 
involved (e.g., quantitative, qualitative, nominal, dichotomous, categorical, ordinal) and 
the clustering method.  
Hierarchical  and  Partition  clustering  are  two  common  approaches  used  to  cluster 
observation vectors. In Hierarchical clustering, each observation is initially considered as 
a cluster, the two groups that are closest are combined (n-1 groups, one of size two and 
the  rest  of  size1),  and  this  process  continues  till  a  single  cluster  containing  all  n 
observations  is  obtained.    A  hierarchy  of  clusters  is  generated  by  this  process.  This 
process can also be applied in reverse manner i.e. initially a single cluster containing all n 
observations is considered and finally n clusters having one observation each is obtained. 
For  example, the Single  Linkage, Complete  Linkage, Average  Linkage, Centroid and 
Ward’s Method fall under the rubric of Hierarchical clustering. In Partition clustering, 
initial partitioning is used to divide the observations into g clusters or g cluster centers are 
initially  demarcated;  then  some  optimality  criterion  forms  the  basis  of  reallocating 
observations between / to these g clusters. K-means clustering comes under the rubric of 
Partition clustering. There are Model-based clustering methods that employ finite mixture 
densities  as  models  for  cluster  analysis;  this  entails  estimation  of  parameters  of  the 
assumed mixture and then the posterior probabilities of cluster membership. 
In  the  Hierarchical  methods,  the  process  is  irreversible  i.e.,  once  two  observations  / 
clusters are merged/separated into clusters, they cannot be separated / merged later in the 159 
 
procedure so mistakes cannot be corrected (Rencher, 2002). Also, consideration needs to 
be given to whether the hierarchical structure that is imposed on the data is acceptable or 
it  introduces  unacceptable  distortion  of  the  original  relationships  amongst  the 
observations  relevant  to  their  similarity/dissimilarity  measures  (Everitt  et  al.,  2001).  
Even the results from an optimization method such as the K-means can be substantially 
affected by the choice of the initial partition (Everitt et al., 2001); with data that is not 
well  structured,  different  initial  partitions  may  lead  to  different  local  optima  of  the 
clustering criteria rather than a global optimum. Also, there is the controversial issue of 
standardization  (i.e.  subtracting  the  mean  of  each  variable  from  its  value  and  then 
dividing by the Standard deviation of the variable so that the means of all variables are 
zero  and  their  variances  are  all  one),  which  is  essentially  equalizing  their  variances. 
Standardization  can  greatly  affect  the  groupings  that  are  discovered  (Stata,  2007); 
standardization  is  sometimes  necessary  in  order  to  prevent  a  variable  having  high 
variability from dominating a cluster analysis, while as in other cases it can hide the true 
grouping inherent in the data because if a particular variable separates the groups well, 
then the variance of this variable will be large but standardization will tend to equalize it. 
Therefore, the question of whether to standardize or not is not an easy one (Rencher, 
2002).  
The commonly used Hierarchical and Partition clustering methods, although based on 
intuitively reasonable procedures (Everitt, 2005) are heuristic in nature, as the allocation 
of  objects  to  clusters  is  not  based  on  rules  that  have  an  underlying  statistical  model 
(probabilistic or deterministic) but rather clustering is brought about through optimization 
of an objective function which is based on bringing about cohesion within clusters and 
isolation between clusters (Leese & Landau, 2006). The hieuristic methods treat variables 
as  independent  within  clusters.  Also,  different  similarity  /  dissimilarity  measures  and 
clustering algorithms give widely different cluster groupings and there is no solid ground 
on which to prefer one method over the other. Generally the statistical properties of the 
heuristic  methods  are  not  known  which  excludes  the  possibility  of  formal  inference 
(Fraley  &  Raftery,  2002;  Everitt  &  Hothorn,  2006).    Furthermore,  there  is  scant 
systematic guidance for addressing the fundamental and vital issue of ascertainment / 
determination of the number of clusters (Fraley & Raftery, 2002; Everitt & Hothorn, 160 
 
2006). Model based clustering is preferred in this respect (Leese & Landau, 2006) and is 
increasing  superseding  the  older  heuristic  methods  (Everitt,  2005).  The  issue  of 
standardization  in  model-based  (which  is  based  on  distributions)  clustering  is  not  an 
impediment as clustering using standardized (which is a linear transformation and does 
not distorts the distribution of a variable) and un-standardized variables gives identical 
clusters. Variables that are highly correlated within groups/clusters lead to clusters that 
are  ellipsoidal  in  p-dimensional  space;  however,  the  heuristic  clustering  methods 
typically fail to recognize this true structure and impose spherical structure on the data 
(Papageorgiou & Baxter, 2001). Physically separate clusters (i.e. mutually exclusive) are 
easy to distinguish with most clustering criteria / methods, however, the Hierarchical and 
Partition  clustering  methods  perform  poorly  (compared  to  model-based  methods)    in 
separating true groups when there is overlap between the groups or when they intersect 
(Banfield & Raftery, 1993; Fraley & Raftery, 1998). The need for deciding which inter-
individual similarity / dissimilarity measure to use is completely dispensed with when a 
model-based clustering approach is adopted (Everitt & Dunn, 1991). The model-based 
approach is essentially based on the idea that the data consists of independent samples 
from  a  series  of  group/cluster  populations,  but  the  group/cluster  labels  of  each 
independent sample have been lost, so the data can be considered as  coming from  a 
mixture distribution (usually a mixture of multivariate normal distributions). The next 
step is to estimate the parameters of each multivariate distribution in the mixture and then 
the  posterior  probabilities  of  group/cluster  membership  of  each  observation/object 
(Venables & Ripley, 2002). 
 
6.3 Model-Based Clustering / Normal Mixture Models 
 
As  highlighted  by  Everitt  and  Hothorn  (2006),  in  model  based  clustering,  the  most 
successful  approach  was  first  proposed  by  Scott  and  Symons  (1971),  extended  by 
Banfield and Raftery (1993), and then further extended by Fraley and Raftery (1999, 
2002). The following description of the method has been primarily taken from Fraley and 
Raftery (1999, 2002). It is assumed that the sample of observations /objects comes from a 
population that consists of G subpopulations each depicting a cluster/group. The data is 161 
 
given by y which has independent multivariate observations given by y1, y2, …. , yn , the 
likelihood function for a mixture model is  given by 
  ( ) ( )
= =
θ θ τ τ = τ θ ∑ ∏ 1 1
1 1
,..., ; ,..., | y |
n G
MIX G G k k k
k i
L   f i i i i y y y y   (6.1) 
 
Where k f  and  k θ are the density and parameters respectively of the kth component in the 
mixture and  k τ is the probability that an observation/object belongs to the kth component 
( k τ ≥0; 
G
k k 1 1
= τ = ∑ ). The multivariate normal (Gaussian) density (  k φ ) is commonly 
used  because  of  its  computational  tractability  (McLachlan  &  Chang,  2004).    The 
parameters  of  this  multivariate  normal  density  are  k µ   which  is  the  mean  and  the 
covariance matrix,  k Σ . The multivariate density is  
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The multivariate normal mixture densities generate data that is characterized by clusters 
that are centered at the means  k µ . The density of points that are nearer to the mean is 
greater.  The  surfaces  of  constant  density  have  an  ellipsoidal  shape.  Other  geometric 
properties of the clusters are determined by the variance-covariance matrix  k Σ . Usually, 
it  is  impractical  to  maximize  the  function  in  Equation  6.1  without  imposing  some 
constraints on the parameters. Characteristics (shape, volume and orientation) are usually 
estimated from the data and can be constrained to be the same for all clusters or allowed 
to vary between clusters. This is brought about through the eigenvalue decomposition of 
the  variance-covariance  matrix  k Σ of  the  multivariate  normal  distribution  for  the    k
th 
component given by 
  
 
T
k k k k k D A D Σ =λ   (6.3) 
Where, 
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k Σ = Variance-covariance matrix  
k D = Orthogonal  d × d matrix of eigenvectors  
k A =  d × d diagonal matrix whose elements are proportional to the eigenvalues of  k Σ  
k λ = An associated constant of proportionality (it is a scalar) 
T
k D = Transpose of the orthogonal matrix of eigenvectors 
k λ ,  k A ,  and 
T
k D are  considered  as  independent  sets  of  parameters  relevant  to  each 
cluster and either they  are constrained to be the same for each cluster or are allowed to 
vary among clusters. When these parameters are fixed, clusters share certain geometric 
properties. The orientation of the k
th component of the mixture is governed by  k D ;  k A  
determines  the  shape  of  density  contours  and  k λ   specifies  the  volume  (size)  of  the 
relevant ellipsoid. The parameterization of the covariance matrix also includes (but is not 
restricted to) the well known models: (1) where all clusters are spherical and of the same 
size  ( k Σ =  I λ )    which  gives  the  sum  of  squares  criteria  (Ward,  1963)  (2)  When  the 
covariance matrix is equal across all components/clusters ( k Σ =  Σ ) where the geometry 
of all clusters is the same but not necessarily spherical (Friedman & Rubin, 1967) (3) 
Unrestrained  k Σ , where each cluster has a different geometry (Scott and Symons, 1971). 
To characterize the covariance structure of the mixture, in case when  k Σ =  I λ ,  k Σ =  Σ  
and  k Σ is  unrestricted,  one,  d(d+1)/2  and  G(d(d+1)/2)    parameters  are  required 
respectively,  where  d  is  the  dimensionality  of  the  data  and  G  is  the  number  of 
clusters/components. 
The  geometric  interpretation  of  various  parameterizations  and  the  multivariate  model 
options  that  have  been  provided  in  the  software  package  MCLUST  for  hierarchical 
clustering (HC) (here model-based) and EM (Expectation Maximization) that runs in the 
statistical package R
® which is based on the S programming language are shown in Table 
6.1 from Fraley and Raftery (2006). MCLUST was downloadable for free for academic 
research  purposes  from  the  University  of  Washington  website  at 
http://www.stat.washington.edu/mclust.  Documentation  for  the  MCLUST  package  has 
been provided by Fraley and Raftery (2006), with minor revisions incorporated in 2007. 163 
 
From Table 6.1 it may be seen that when the dimensionality of the data is one (i.e., when 
clustering is based on only one variable i.e. univariate case), there are only two models: 
(1) Equal variance (designated by E in the model identifier column), and (2) varying 
variance (designated by V in the model identifier column). In table 6.1, for example, EVI 
stands for a model in which the volumes of all clusters are equal (E), the shapes may vary 
(V) and the orientation is the identity (I). The covariances of clusters in this model are 
diagonal with orientation parallel to the coordinate axes. Sample data is used to determine 
the parameters that are associated with characteristics signified by E or V. 
 
Table 6.1 Parameterization of the covariance matrix  k Σ currently available in MCLUST 
for hierarchical clustering (HC) (model-based) and/or EM for multidimensional data.  
Identifier  Model  HC  EM  Distribution  Volume  Shape  Orientation 
E    ￿  ￿  (univariate)  equal     
V    ￿  ￿  (univariate)  variable     
EII  I λ   ￿  ￿  Spherical  equal  equal  NA 
VII  I k λ   ￿  ￿  Spherical  variable  equal  NA 
EEI  A λ     ￿  Diagonal  equal  equal  coordinate axes 
VEI  A k λ     ￿  Diagonal  variable  equal  coordinate axes 
EVI  k A λ     ￿  Diagonal  equal  variable  coordinate axes 
VVI  k k A λ     ￿  Diagonal  variable  variable  coordinate axes 
EEE 
T DAD λ   ￿  ￿  Ellipsoidal  equal  equal  equal 
EEV 
T
k kAD D λ     ￿  Ellipsoidal  equal  equal  variable 
VEV 
T
k k k AD D λ     ￿  Ellipsoidal  variable  equal  variable 
VVV 
T
k k k k D A D λ   ￿  ￿  Ellipsoidal  variable  variable  variable 
Note: The ￿ in the appropriate column indicates availability. (Source: Fraley and Raftery, 2006). 
             
The  methods  for  maximum  likelihood  clustering  are  based  on  the  EM  (Expectation-
Maximization) algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977; McLachlan & Krishnan, 1997). This 
procedure  is  in  fact  a  particular  example  of  the EM  algorithm  relevant  to  Maximum 
Likelihood estimation of missing data (i.e. here the label of the component density to 
which  an  observation  belongs  is  missing)  (Everitt,  1996).  In  EM  relevant  to  mixture 164 
 
model  clustering,  ( ) , i = x y z i i   are  considered  the  “complete”  data  ,  where  
( ) 1,....., i iG z z = zi is the unobserved portion of the data with  
  ik
1   if   belongs to group k
z =
0 otherwise.

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i x
 
 
Assuming that each  z i i i i is independent and identically distributed and has a multinomial 
distribution with probability of one draw from G categories as  1,...., G τ τ , the resulting 
density function of  i y given  i z  is given by  ( )
1 |
ik G z
k k k f θ
= ∏ i y    and the complete-data 
log-likelihood is 
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 An iteration of EM comprises of an “E”-step and an “M”-step. The “E”-step for mixture 
models is given by  
  ( )
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  (6.5) 
In the “E”-step, a matrix z is computed such that each element  ik z is an estimate of the 
conditional probability (posterior probabilities of  belonging to a particular cluster) that 
observation i belongs to cluster k given the current estimates of the parameters. The “M”-
step then computes the maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters based on these z 
values i.e., the “M”-step consists of maximizing Equation 6.4 in terms of the parameters 
k τ and  k θ   with  ik z fixed  at  values  obtained  from  the  previous  “E”-step,  ˆik z .    The 
procedure  alternates  between  these  two  steps  until  convergence  takes  place.  Each 
iteration results in improved estimates of posterior probabilities of cluster membership. 
The  parameters  usually  converge  to  the  maximum  likelihood  values  for  the  normal 
mixture model given by Equation 6.1 and the column means of the matrix z converge to 
the mixing proportions  τk , where G is the number of groups/clusters which is fixed 
before  implementing  the  EM  algorithm.  An  initial  estimate  of  z  (for  starting  the 165 
 
iterations) is obtained from a discrete classification which results in matrix z having zero 
and  one  entries  with  exactly  one  1  per  row.  This  discrete  classification  is  achieved 
through  model-based  hierarchical  clustering  (HC)  which  uses  classification  maximum 
likelihood approach to determine which two groups to merge at each stage (Banfield & 
Raftery, 1993; Celeux & Govaert, 1993; Fraley, 1998). 
The  value  ik z
∗     of  ˆik z at  convergence  is  the  estimated  conditional  probability  that  of 
observation i belonging to group k. The maximum likelihood classification of observation 
i  is { } | max ij k ik j z z
∗ ∗ = i.e. the maximum value in the row of matrix z for a particular 
observation. The uncertainty associated with the classification of an observation is given 
by  ( ) 1 maxk ik z
∗ − . For multivariate normal mixtures,  k f in Equation 6.5 (which is the  
“E”-step) is replaced by  k φ defined in Equation 6.2, regardless of the parameterization.          
One significant benefit of using a mixture-model approach to cluster analysis is that it 
enables the comparison of models through the use of reliable approximate Bayes factors. 
Thus, the selection of  parameterization of the model (i.e. the clustering method)  and the 
number of clusters/groups are brought about systematically. The Bayes factor used is 
given by BIC (Schwarz, 1978), which is:  
  ( ) BIC 2 log M M e l m n = −   (6.6) 
 
      Where, 
M l   = Maximized mixture loglikelihood for the model 
M m   = No. of independent parameters to be estimated in the model 
n  = No. of observations 
In general, larger values of BIC correspond to stronger evidence for a model and the 
number of clusters. There is a concomitant increase in the loglikelihood as the number of 
clusters/components increase (and hence  M m ) (McLachlan & Chang, 2004).  As more 
terms are added to a model, the fit of the mixture model to a given data set improves (i.e., 
the  loglikelihood  increases);  therefore,  model  assessment  through  the  sole  use  of 
loglikelihood can not be used for model assessment in mixture-model cluster analysis. 166 
 
The second term in Equation 6.6 (i.e.   ( ) log M e m n ) is subtracted  from the loglikelihood, 
thus  penalizing  the  complexity  of  the  model,  so  that  it  may  be  maximized  for  more 
parsimonious parameterizations and smaller number of clusters/groups (Fraley & Raftery, 
1998).         
The  assumption  that  the  data  set  have  a  multivariate  normal  distribution  is  not  an 
essential requirement for mixture-model cluster analysis (Papageorgiou & Baxter, 2001; 
Fraley  and Raftery, 2002).  In mixture-models, if the EM (Expectation Maximization) 
algorithm for a model having a certain number of components (clusters/groups) is applied 
to a mixture in which in reality there are fewer  number of groups/clusters, then it may 
fail  due  to  ill-conditioning.  Ill-conditioning  occurs  due  to  the  singularity  or  near 
singularity of the covariance matrix associated with one or more components. Therefore, 
it  is  important  to  avoid  using  the  procedure  to  find  a  larger  number  of  components 
(clusters/groups) than is necessary (Fraley & Raftery, 1998). 
 
6.4 Clustering Scenarios 
 
Since  our  sample  of  drivers  was  from  the  general  driver  population  (and  not  from  a 
dementia clinic etc), the only a priori information that would assist in the identification of 
drivers with poor driving skills (labeled the deficient-driver group below) was: 
•  The deficient-driver group will be a relatively smaller group (in size). 
•  On average, the deficient-driver group will have unfavourable scores (compared  
with the other group/groups) on the variables/parameters used in the classification 
of drivers. 
•  The  cluster  analysis  scenario  in  which  the  classification  of  drivers  takes  into 
account the No. of Total Hazards and/or the No. of Low-speed Warnings (along 
with  the  relevant  driving  performance  index)  will  hold  more  promise  due  to 
reasons explained in Sections 4.3.1, 4.4.2 and 5.4.2. 
•  Based  on  subject  knowledge,  the  meaningful/relevant  total  number  of 
categories/groups identified by cluster analysis based on driving performance will 
be 2 or 3.  167 
 
Whilst noting the above points, it was necessary to explore all six scenarios outlined in 
Section 6.1 and select the one that is the most appropriate for identification of deficient 
drivers. Normal-Mixture model based cluster analysis was performed using the statistical 
software R
® and the add-on package MCLUST. Except for the univariate case in Sections 
6.4.1 and 6.4.2, all ten candidate parameterizations in Table 6.1 were run, i.e. EII, VII, 
EEI, VEI, EVI, VVI, EEE, EEV, VEV and VVV with each number of clusters from 2 to 
9. Although it was considered that outcomes for higher number of clusters (say greater 
than 3) would not be likely to add value to the understandings, the default setting in the 
software (of up to 9 clusters), was retained as the BIC was to be used as a guide in 
identifying the appropriate parameterization (model) and the number of clusters. For the 
univariate case, the parameterization E and V (in Table 6.1) were used with each number 
of clusters from 2 to 9. A matrix of BIC values corresponding to each combination of the 
number  of  clusters  and  parameterization  (model)  was  obtained  along  with  cluster 
membership  and  uncertainty  of  classification.  It  may  be  noted  that  in  certain 
combinations of the number of clusters and parameterization, ill-conditioning occurred 
(denoted by NA, i.e. BIC value was not returned). This especially occurred where the 
number of clusters were more than in reality, and was irrelevant. The detail of the cluster 
analysis using the six scenarios is described in the following sections and in Appendix-E. 
It  may  be  highlighted  that  the  group  numbers  are  arbitrary  and  that  when  groups 
intersect/overlap, drivers having relatively higher values of uncertainty of classification 
would be expected to fall in the overlapping region (Fraley and Raftery, 2006). 
 
6.4.1 Cluster Analysis using DPI1 
 
In this scenario, only one variable (univariate case i.e. dimensionality of the data was 
one) i.e. DPI1 was used in cluster analysis, because it was the composite of all 19 driving 
performance  parameters  shown  in  Table  5.2.  The  maximum  value  of  this  index  was 
21.912  and  the  minimum  -36.495.  Appendix-E  contains  all  detailed  output  of  the 
analysis. The three models with the highest BIC values are shown in Table 6.2. Model E 
with 2 groups/clusters has the highest BIC value. The number of drivers in each group 
and  their  group-mean  value  on  the  index  DPI1  are  shown  in  table  6.3.  Clearly,  on 168 
 
average, group no. 2 has higher scores on the index than group no. 1, which is smaller 
with  14  drivers.  Therefore  group  no.  1  may  be classified  as  having  deficient  driving 
skills. Although group no.1 is small, its size is relatively large compared with the total 
size of the sample. Other ancillary plots can be found in Appendix-E.  
 
Table 6.2 Best three models along with BIC values and number of groups/clusters for 
cluster analysis using DPI1. 
Best BIC Values 
E,2  V,2  V,1 
-445.382  -448.071  -449.197 
 
Table 6.3 Mean values of DPI1 for groups/clusters using model E with BIC of -445.382  
Groups for model E with 2 clusters/groups having BIC of -445.382 
Group No.  No. of Drivers  Mean DPI1 
1  14  -18.211467 
2  42  6.070489 
 
6.4.2 Cluster Analysis using DPI1-weighted 
 
In this scenario, only one variable (univariate case i.e. dimensionality of the data was 
one)  i.e.  DPI1-weighted  was  used  in  cluster  analysis  because  it  was  the  weighted 
composite of all 19 driving performance parameters identified in Table 5.2; the weights 
being the Principal Component weights derived in Section 5.5.2. The maximum value of 
this index was 1.155 and the minimum -2.129.   
The three models with the highest BIC values are shown in Table 6.4. Model E with 2 
groups/clusters has the highest BIC value. The number of drivers in each group and their 
group-mean  value  on  the  index  DPI1-weighted  are  shown  in  Table  6.5.  Clearly,  on 
average, group no. 2 has higher scores on the index compared to group no. 1, which is a 
smaller group with 13 drivers. Therefore drivers in group no. 1 may be considered as 
possessing poor driving skills. Although group no.1 is small, its size is still relatively 
large compared with the total size of the sample. Other ancillary plots can be found in 
Appendix-E.  
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Table 6.4 Best three models along with BIC values and number of groups/clusters for 
cluster analysis using DPI1-weighted. 
Best BIC Values 
E,2  V,2  V,1 
-120.441  -122.430  -124.013 
 
Table 6.5 Mean values of DPI1-weighted for groups/clusters using model E with BIC 
of -120.441 
Groups for model E with 2 clusters/groups having BIC of -120.441 
Group No.  No. of Drivers  Mean DPI1-weighted 
1  13  -1.0413267 
2  43  0.3148197 
 
6.4.3 Cluster Analysis using DPI2 and No. of Total Hazards 
 
In this scenario, two variables (dimensionality of the data was two) i.e. DPI2 and No. of 
Total  Hazards  were  used  in  cluster  analysis.  The  variable  No.  of  Total  Hazards  was 
included because DPI2 did not include the effect of this variable. The maximum value of 
DPI2 was 20.915 and the minimum -32.211. The variable No. of Total Hazards had a 
maximum value of 30 and a minimum of 2.  
The results of the three models with the highest BIC values are shown in Table 6.6. 
Model EEV with 2 groups/clusters has the highest BIC value. The number of drivers in 
each group and their group-mean values on the index DPI2 and No. of Total Hazards are 
shown in Table 6.7. On average, group no. 1 has higher scores on the index DPI2 and 
lower No. of Total Hazards compared with group no. 2, which is a smaller group with 14 
drivers.  Drivers  in  group  no.  2  may  be  considered  as  possessing  poor  driving  skills. 
Although group no.2 is small, its size is still relatively large compared with the total size 
of the sample. Other ancillary plots can be found in Appendix-E. 
 
Table 6.6 Best three models along with BIC values and number of groups/clusters for 
cluster analysis using DPI2 and No. of Total Hazards. 
Best BIC Values 
EEV,2  VEV,2  VVV,2 
-736.709  -739.345  -743.235 170 
 
 
Table 6.7 Mean values of DPI2 and No. of Total Hazards for groups/clusters using 
model EEV with BIC of -736.709. 
Groups for model EEV with 2 clusters/groups having BIC of -736.709 
Group No.  No. of Drivers  Mean No of Total Hazards  Mean DPI2 
1  42  6.97619  5.677471 
2  14  14.71429  -17.032412 
 
6.4.4 Cluster Analysis using DPI2-weighted and No. of Total Hazards 
 
In this scenario, two variables (dimensionality of the data was two) i.e. DPI2-weighted 
and  No.  of  Total  Hazards  were  used  in  cluster  analysis.  The  variable  No.  of  Total 
Hazards was included because DPI2-weighted did not include the effect of this variable. 
The maximum value of DPI2-weighted was 1.170 and the minimum -1.959. The variable 
No. of Total Hazards had a maximum value of 30 and a minimum of 2. 
The three models with the highest BIC values are given in Table 6.8. Model VEV with 2 
groups/clusters has the highest BIC value. The number of drivers in each group and their 
group-mean values on the index DPI2-weighted and No. of Total Hazards are shown in 
Table 6.9. On average, group no. 1 has higher scores on the index DPI2-weighted and 
lower No. of Total Hazards compared with group no. 2, which is a smaller group with 16 
drivers.  Drivers  in  group  no.  2  may  be  considered  as  possessing  poor  driving  skills. 
Although group no.2 is small, its size is still relatively large compared with the total size 
of the sample. Other ancillary plots can be found in Appendix-E. 
 
 
Table 6.8 Best three models along with BIC values and number of groups/clusters for 
cluster analysis using DPI2-weighted and No. of Total Hazards. 
Best BIC Values 
VEV,2  EEV,2  VVV,2 
-420.308  -420.553  -420.813 
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Table 6.9 Mean values of DPI2-weighted and No. of Total Hazards for groups/clusters 
using model VEV with BIC of -420.308. 
Groups for model VEV with 2 clusters/groups having BIC of -420.308 
Group No.  No. of Drivers  Mean No of Total Hazards  Mean DPI2-weighted 
1  40  6.55  0.3124784 
2  16  14.8125  -0.7811958 
 
6.4.5 Cluster Analysis using DPI3, No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-
speed Warnings 
 
In this scenario, three variables (dimensionality of the data was three) i.e. DPI3, No. of 
Total  Hazards  and  No.  of  Low-speed  Warnings  were  used  in  cluster  analysis.  The 
variables No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed Warnings were included because 
DPI3 did not include the effects of these variables. The maximum value of this index was 
19.554 and the minimum -32.845. The variable No. of Total Hazards had a maximum 
value of 30 and a minimum of 2 and No. of Low-speed Warnings had a maximum value 
of 656 and a minimum of 286. 
The three models with the highest BIC values are shown in table 6.10. Model VEI with 2 
groups/clusters has the highest BIC value. The number of drivers in each group and their 
group-mean values on the index DPI3,  No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed 
Warnings are shown in Table 6.11. On average, group no. 2 has higher scores on the 
index  DPI3,    lower  No.  of  Total  Hazards  and  lower  No.  of  Low-speed  Warnings 
compared to group no. 1, which is a smaller group with 18 drivers. Drivers in group no. 1 
may be considered as possessing poor driving skills. Although group no.1 is small, its 
size is still relatively large compared to the total size of the sample. Other ancillary plots 
can be found in Appendix-E. 
 
Table 6.10 Best three models along with BIC values and number of groups/clusters for 
cluster analysis using DPI3,  No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed 
Warnings. 
Best BIC Values 
VEI,2  VVI,2  VEV,2 
-1386.271  -1390.824  -1391.108 172 
 
 
Table 6.11 Mean values of DPI3, No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed 
Warnings for groups/clusters using model VEI with BIC of -1386.271. 
Groups for model VEI with 2 clusters/groups having BIC of -1386.271 
Group 
No. 
No. of 
Drivers 
Mean No. of Total 
Hazards 
Mean No. of Low Speed 
warnings 
Mean 
DPI3 
1  18  13.8333  500.8333  -13.0564 
2  38  6.5789  392.3421  6.1846 
 
6.4.6 Cluster Analysis using DPI3-weighted, No. of Total Hazards and 
No. of Low-speed Warnings 
 
In  this  scenario,  three  variables  (dimensionality  of  the  data  was  three),  i.e.  DPI3-
weighted, No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed Warnings, were used in the cluster 
analysis.  The  variables  No.  of  Total  Hazards  and  No.  of  Low-speed  Warnings  were 
included  because  DPI3-weighted  did  not  include  the  effects  of  these  variables.  The 
maximum  value  of  DPI3-weighted  index  was  1.159  and  the  minimum  -2.084.  The 
variable No. of Total Hazards had a maximum value of 30 and a minimum of 2 and No. 
of Low-speed Warnings had a maximum value of 656 and a minimum value of 286. 
 The three models with the highest BIC values are shown in table 6.12. Model VEI with 2 
groups/clusters has the highest BIC value. The number of drivers in each group and their 
group-mean values on the index DPI3-weighted,  No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-
speed Warnings are shown in Table 6.13. On average, group no. 2 has higher scores on 
the  index  DPI3-weighted,    lower  No.  of  Total  Hazards  and  lower  No.  of  Low-speed 
Warnings compared to group no. 1, a smaller group with 18 drivers. Drivers in group no. 
1 may be considered to possess poor driving skills. Although group no.1 is small, its size 
is still relatively large compared with the total size of the sample. Other ancillary plots 
can be found in Appendix-E. It may be noted that the grouping of drivers obtained in this 
scenario is exactly the same as that described in Section 6.4.5 (i.e., the same drivers were 
included in both groups in both scenarios). One interesting observation in this scenario 
was that a 3 cluster grouping was also among the best three, as evident from Table 6.12 
with a small difference in BIC from the one with the highest value. Therefore, it was 
decided to use the three variables i.e. DPI3-weighted, No. of Total Hazards and No. of 173 
 
Low-speed Warnings in cluster analysis by considering all ten models with the number of 
clusters being 3, which is described in the next section.  
 
Table 6.12 Best three models along with BIC values and number of groups/clusters for 
cluster analysis using DPI3-weighted,  No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-
speed Warnings. 
Best BIC Values 
VEI,2  EEV,3  VEV,2 
-1070.690  -1075.632  -1076.110 
 
Table 6.13 Mean values of DPI3-weighted, No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed 
Warnings for groups/clusters using model VEI with BIC of -1070.690. 
Groups for model VEI with 2 clusters/groups having BIC of -1070.690 
Group 
No. 
No. of 
Drivers  
Mean No. of Total 
Hazards 
 Mean No. of Low Speed 
warnings 
Mean DPI3-
weighted 
1  18  13.833333  500.8333  -0.797444 
2  38  6.578947  392.3421  0.3777367 
 
6.4.7 Cluster Analysis using DPI3-weighted, No. of Total Hazards and 
No. of Low-speed Warnings considering only 3 clusters 
 
In this scenario, three variables i.e. DPI3-weighted, No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-
speed Warnings were used in cluster analysis by considering all ten models with the 
number of clusters being 3.   
The three models with the highest BIC values for 3 clusters are shown in Table 6.14. 
Model EEV has the highest BIC value. The number of drivers in each group and their 
group-mean values on the index DPI3-weighted,  No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-
speed Warnings are shown in Table 6.15. On average, group no. 3 has the highest scores 
on the index DPI3-weighted, the lowest No. of Total Hazards and the lowest No. of Low-
speed Warnings compared with group no. 1 and 2. Also, group no.1 has higher score on 
the  index  DPI3-weighted,  lower  No.  of  Total  Hazards  and  lower  No.  of  Low-speed 
Warnings compared to group no.2. Therefore, driving performance in decreasing order of 
skill by group number is: group no.3, no.1 and no. 2 (see Table 6.15 and Figure 6.1). 174 
 
Group no.2 is the smallest group (comprising of 8 drivers) and may be considered as 
possessing poor driving skills. Other ancillary plots can be found in Appendix-E.  
 
 
Table 6.14 Best three models along with BIC values for 3 clusters/groups using DPI3-
weighted, No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed Warnings. 
 
Best BIC Values 
EEV,3  VEI,3  EEI,3 
-1075.632  -1079.265  -1083.289 
 
 
 
Table 6.15 Mean values of DPI3-weighted, No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-
speed Warnings for model EEV with BIC of -1075.632. 
 
Groups for model EEV with 3 clusters/groups having BIC of -1075.632 
Group 
No. 
No. of 
Drivers 
Mean No. of 
Total 
Hazards 
Mean No. of Low-
Speed warnings 
Mean DPI3-
weighted 
1  20  8.1  441.55  -0.2607223 
2  8  16.5  553  -0.8960832 
3  28  7.321429  381.0357  0.4422541 
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Figure 6.1 Scatter-matrix plot of DPI3-weighted, No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-
speed Warnings showing driver classification using the model EEV with 3 
groups/clusters having BIC of -1075.632. The square symbols represent group No.2, the 
triangular symbols represent group No.1 and the other symbols (i.e. circular symbols) 
represent group No.3. 
 
6.4.8 K-Means Cluster Analysis using DPI3-weighted, No. of Total 
Hazards and No. of Low-speed Warnings. 
 
Since the K-means clustering method is gaining more use than the hierarchical methods 
(Afifi et al., 2003), it was also decided to apply K-means clustering to DPI3-weighted, 
No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed Warnings for assessment of clusters. The 
statistical package R
® with the built-in function kmeans was used for the purpose.  
In the K-means clustering technique, a set of data is partitioned into a specific number of 
groups/clusters  which  minimizes  the  within-group  sum  of  squares  (sum  of  squared 
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deviations of each point from its cluster centroid on every dimension) over all variables 
(Hartigan & Wong, 1979). Apparently, the problems seems relatively simple in that every 
possible  partition  of  the  n  individuals/objects/observations  into  k  groups  should  be 
considered and the one with the lowest within-group sum of squares selected. However, 
in actual practice, the numbers involved are so vast that it is impossible to completely 
enumerate every possible partition even with the fastest computer (Everitt & Hothorn, 
2006).  This  has  led  to  the  development  of  algorithms  designed  to  search  for 
configurations  with  the  minimum  within-group  sum  of  squares  by  reallocating 
observations/objects  between  groups  and  keeping  the  new  one  only  if  it  provides  an 
improvement (Everitt & Hothorn, 2006). Although, such algorithms do not guarantee that 
the global minimum will be found.  The essential steps of these algorithms are: 
1.  An initial partition of individuals/objects/observations is made into k groups either 
by  using  one  of  the  hierarchical  clustering  techniques  (e.g.  average  linkage 
method) or by selecting k items at random to serve as seeds for clusters (which are 
later replaced by centroids (mean vectors) of clusters). 
2.  If seeds are chosen, the remaining points in the data set are allocated to the cluster 
with the nearest seed (based on Euclidean distance); and as soon as a cluster has 
more  than  one  member,  the  seed  is  replaced  by  its  cluster  centroid  (Rencher, 
2002). The mean or centroid of the k clusters is computed. The change in the 
clustering  criteria  (within-group  sum  of  squares)  produced  is  calculated  when 
each object is moved from its cluster to another. 
3.  The  change  that  leads  to  the  greatest  improvement  in  the  clustering  criteria 
(within-group sum of squares) is made. 
4.    Steps 2 and 3 are repeated until no more improvement in the clustering criteria 
(within-group  sum  of  squares)  occurs  as  a  result  of  moving  an 
object/individual/observation between clusters. 
It  is  often  difficult  to  decide  on  the  number  of  groups  and  no  method  qualifies  for 
recommendation in all circumstances (Everitt et al., 2001) and most methods are informal 
(Everitt & Dunn, 2001). The within-group sum of squares decreases as new clusters are 
added and ultimately takes a value of zero if every point is made into a cluster; therefore, 
a sharp change may be indicative of the best solution. One way of noting this reduction is 177 
 
to plot a graph between the number of clusters and Within-group sum of squares and look 
for an “elbow” in the curve (Everitt & Hothorn, 2006), which would be suggestive of a 
particular  number  of  clusters  (Everitt  &  Dunn,  2001).  In  K-Means  clustering,  when 
variables are on measured on different scales, some form of standardization of variables 
is necessary before applying the method (Everitt et al., 2001). 
Before apply K-Means clustering, the variables DPI3-weighted, No. of Total Hazards and 
No. of Low-speed Warnings were standardized by dividing each variable by its respective 
range  (Everitt  &  Hothorn,  2006).  Figure  6.2  shows  a  graph  between  the  number  of 
clusters and Within-group sum of squares. As “little elbows” were noticed corresponding 
to 2 and 4 number of clusters, detailed K-means clustering was applied using 2 and 4 as 
the number of clusters to the data to ascertain groupings in each case. For the 2 cluster 
solution, Table 6.16 shows the number of drivers in each group and their group-mean 
values  on  the  index  DPI3-weighted,    No.  of  Total  Hazards  and  No.  of  Low-speed 
Warnings. On average, group no. 1 has higher scores on the index DPI3-weighted,  lower 
No. of Total Hazards and lower No. of Low-speed Warnings compared with group no. 2, 
which is a smaller group with 16 drivers. Drivers in group no. 2 may be considered as 
possessing poor driving skills. Although group no.2 is small, its size is still relatively 
large compared with the total size of the sample. Other ancillary data can be found in 
Appendix-E. 
For the 4 cluster solution, Table 6.17 shows the number of drivers in each group and their 
group-mean values on the index DPI3-weighted,  No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-
speed Warnings. Inspection of table 6.17 indicates that there is no consistent pattern with 
regard to the driving performance skill of groups and their scores on the three variables 
e.g., group no.1 has the worst score on the No. of Total Hazards, whereas its score on the 
No. of Low-speed Warnings is not the worst. This inconsistent behavior was expected (as 
pointed out in Section 6.4), as subject knowledge indicated that more than 2 or 3 groups 
would not provide meaningful/relevant classifications.  
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Figure 6.2 Within groups sum of squares plotted against number of clusters using K-
Means Clustering. 
 
Table 6.16 Mean values of DPI3-weighted, No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed 
Warnings considering 2 groups in K-means Clustering. 
2 Cluster/Group solution using K-means Clustering 
Group 
No. 
No. of 
Drivers 
Mean No. of 
Total 
Hazards 
Mean No. of Low-
Speed warnings 
Mean DPI3-
weighted 
1  40  6.975  393.525  0.3595664 
2  16  13.75  511.4375  -0.898916 
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Table 6.17 Mean values of DPI3-weighted, No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed 
Warnings considering 4 groups in K-means Clustering. 
4 Cluster/Group solution using K-means Clustering 
Group 
No. 
No. of 
Drivers 
Mean No. of 
Total 
Hazards 
Mean No. of Low-
Speed warnings 
Mean DPI3-
weighted 
1  7  17.42857  429.7143  -1.231837 
2  8  11.25  588.125  -0.6370448 
3  23  8.043478  431.6087  0.1744398 
4  18  5.666667  349.1111  0.5392833 
 
6.5 Results 
 
The driver groups possessing poor driving performance skills identified in Sections 6.4.1, 
6.4.2, 6.4.3, 6.4.4, 6.4.5, 6.4.6 and 6.4.8 (two cluster case, k-means) were not relatively 
small compared with the total number of drivers, and hence the classifications obtained as 
a  result  of  these  scenarios  were  not  viable  as  pointed  in  Section  6.4.  The  groupings 
obtained in Section 6.4.8 (four cluster case, k-means) were inconsistent with regard to the 
variables and therefore were not meaningful. The clustering results obtained using K-
Means clustering (both 2 cluster case and 4 cluster case) were not promising. It may also 
be highlighted that scenarios in section 6.4.1, 6.4.2, 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 did not take into 
account the most intuitively appropriate 3 variables simultaneously (i.e. DPI3-weighted 
or  DPI3,  No.  of  Total  Hazards  and  No.  of  Low-speed  Warnings)  that  were  relevant, 
keeping in view the psychometric principles used in the design of the drive in context of 
driving behavior exhibited by cognitively deficient drivers (see Sections 4.3.1, 4.4.2 and 
5.4.2). The viability of the simultaneous use of these three variables is also supported by 
the fact that mixture-model based scenarios that used these variables simultaneously gave 
exactly the same driver groups and classification. The most intuitively appropriate and 
clinically relevant classification of drivers was provided by considering DPI3-weighted, 
No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed Warnings with a 3 cluster solution (scenario 
of Section 6.4.7) using normal-mixture model EEV. It may be pointed out that age was 
not used as a factor in the decision making/model selection process. The following points 
support use of this model: 180 
 
1.  The poor-performance driver group (group no.2) was a relatively smaller group (8 
drivers) compared with the total sample. 
2.  Despite the fact that drivers in Group no.2 were driving on average at the lowest 
speeds, they had the greatest number of accidents etc (i.e. no. of total hazards) and 
had low rating on all other driving performance measures (i.e. DPI3-weighted). 
This substantiates their classification as “poor drivers”.     
3.  The total number of groups/clusters (i.e. three) was within the limits (2 or 3) of 
the total number of groups. 
4.  There was a consistent pattern with regard to the driving performance skill of 
groups and their scores on the three variables i.e., on average, group no.3 had the 
highest score on DPI3-weighted, the lowest No. of Total Hazards and the lowest 
No. of Low-speed Warnings. Similarly, group no.1 had favourable scores on all 
these variables compared with group no. 2.  
5.  The  Maximum  BIC  occurred  for  the  2  cluster  model  (model  VEI,  BIC=  -
1070.690); the difference in BIC between the 2 cluster model (model VEI, BIC= -
1070.690) and the three cluster model (model EEV, BIC= -1075.632) was small 
enough to conclude that there were either two or three groups in the data. The 
three  group/cluster  model  (model  EEV,  BIC=  -1075.632)  provided  the  most 
clinically  relevant  classification.  Adoption  of  this  practice  is  as  per 
recommendation of  Fraley and Raftery (2002). 
6.   In  order  to  evaluate  the  clusters  obtained  from  our  model,  scores  on  other 
variables  of  interest  (i.e.  cognitive  tests)  were  compared  (Cohen  et  al.,  1977) 
using  driver  classification  groupings.  Scores  on  the  nine  cognitive  tests  (trail, 
clock, rey-copy, rey-recall, dichotic, paper, ufov1, ufov2, ufov3) on average were 
the highest by group no.3, then group no. 1 and then group no. 2. This same order 
was also observed in decreasing order of driving-performance-skill among the 
three groups. 
7.  Five “ideal objects” (i.e., 2 older group drivers and 3 younger group drivers) were 
also part of the sample. These five drivers were “ideal” in the sense that their 
driving performance/skill was obvious (and well known) on account of their long 
association with the university/department. After cluster  analysis, it was noted 181 
 
that these five drivers ended up in the most appropriate groups and fitted in the 
classification  very  well.  This  procedure  is  as  per  recommendation  of  Gordon 
(Gordon, 1999). 
It may be noted that despite the fact that drivers in Group no.2 were driving on average at 
the lowest speeds, they had the greatest number of accidents etc (i.e. no. of total hazards) 
and had low rating on all other driving performance measures (i.e. DPI3-weighted). This 
is contrary to a speed accuracy trade-off effect, which in a different context involving 
older drivers on a driving simulator was reported (Park et al., 2007; Quillian et al., 1999), 
in DAT subjects in road tests by Hunt et al. (1997a), in out-patients with Alzheimer’s 
disease in a driving simulator by Cox et al. (1998), and in suspected dementia subjects in 
a driving simulator by Szlyk et al. (2002). 
 
6.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has described the process of categorization of drivers based on driving skill. 
The  rationale  for  the  use  of  the  statistical  technique  of  cluster  analysis  rather  than  a 
categorization that is based on the control group (and its associated 2 standard deviations 
method) has been explained. Since in cluster analysis, it is generally impossible a priori 
to perceive what combination of variables is likely to result in interesting/informative 
classifications,  six  different  scenarios  having  different  combination  of  driving 
performance  indices  and/or  variables/parameters  were  considered  for  clustering.  The 
different methods that are used to classify observations/objects into clusters/groups have 
been explained along with their pros and cons. The relatively recently developed normal-
mixture model clustering technique has been described along with its favourable aspects 
compared with the other methods and especially its ability to discern between members 
of overlapping / intersecting clusters. 
Cluster  analysis  considering  six  scenarios  using  normal-mixture  models  has  been 
illustrated along with the use of K-means clustering on one particular scenario. The most 
appropriate,  well-fitting  and  clinically  relevant/meaningful  clustering  scheme  was 
provided by the normal-mixture model EEV with 3 clusters by considering the index 
DPI3-weighted and the variables No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed Warnings. 182 
 
This clustering scheme identified 8 drivers as possessing poor driving skills that belonged 
to the older driver group. Despite the fact that these drivers were on average driving at the 
lowest speeds, they had the greatest number of accidents etc (i.e. no. of total hazards) and 
had lowest rating on all other driving performance measures (i.e. DPI3-weighted), on 
average.  The  next  chapter  describes  multiple  regression  analysis  in  modeling  driving 
performance using cognitive tests (independent variables). 
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7 Development of Linear Models 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The objectives of this chapter were to develop parsimonious multiple linear regression 
models using nine neuropsychological tests (trail, clock, rey-copy, rey-recall, dichotic, 
paper, ufov1, ufov2, ufov3) as predictors in order to predict general driving ability. In 
Chapter 5, six different driving performance indices were developed through the concept 
of  Scale  Development.  These  were  DPI1,  DPI2  and  DPI3  and  their  corresponding 
weighted versions DPI1-weighted, DPI2-weighted, and  DPI3-weighted. To model (linear 
regression model) the driving performance indices through the different cognitive tests it 
was  necessary  that  the  indices  included  the  effects  of  all  viable  driving  performance 
parameters i.e. the indices that were derived by considering all 24 driving performance 
parameters,  which  were  DPI1  and    DPI1-weighted.  Since  the  Pearson  Moment 
Correlation coefficient between  DPI1 and  DPI1-weighted was very high (0.9975), it was 
decided  to  model    DPI1-weighted  (dependent  variable)  through 
cognitive/neuropsychological tests (independent variables), as this index was geared to 
provide  maximum  discrimination  between  drivers  because  of  Principal  Component 
weights.  The  following  sections  describe  the  details  of  the  development  of  linear 
regression models. 
 
7.2 Screening of Variables 
 
There  were  nine  neuropsychological  tests  (trail,  clock,  rey-copy,  rey-recall,  dichotic, 
paper,  ufov1,  ufov2,  ufov3)  i.e.,  nine  independent  variables  and  56  observations. 
According to Kutner et al. (2005), as a general rule of thumb, there should be at least 6 to 
10 cases (observations) per variable, whereas, Harrell et al. (1996) recommend that if the 
number of predictors is > n/10 (where n is the number of observations/cases), a data 
reduction  technique  should  be  used  to  reduce  the  number  of  candidate  predictors  to 184 
 
enhance  the  accuracy/reliability  of  the  model.  For  small  ratios  of  the  number  of 
observations  to  the  number  of  predictors,  it  is  risky  to  generalize  regression  results 
beyond the sample because the regression coefficients are unstable due to their large 
standard  errors.  Therefore,  screening  of  candidate  predictors  was  necessary  for  early 
removal of predictors that had little chance of being predictive. In screening predictors, 
the  outcome  variable  (i.e.,  DPI1-weighted)  was  not  utilized  (Harrell  et  al.,  1996)  but 
rather subject matter knowledge was used as a guide in screening predictors. The UFOV 
test consisted of three subtests (ufov1, ufov2 and ufov3). In the first subtest the examinee is 
to identify a target (silhouette of a car or truck) that is presented in a central fixation box for 
varying lengths of time. In the second subtest, the examinee has to identify a central target 
(silhouette of a car or truck presented in the central fixation box) and also to radially localize 
a simultaneously presented target (silhouette of a car) displayed in any one of eight radial 
positions on the periphery of the computer monitor. The third subtest is identical to the 
second  subtest  except  that  the  peripheral  target  (Silhouette  of  a  car)  is  embedded  in 
distractors (47 triangles of the same size and luminance as the peripheral target). Therefore, 
all features of subtest 1 (i.e. ufov1) are present in subtest2 (i.e. ufov2) and all features of 
subtest2 are present in subtest3 (i.e. ufov3). Hence, ufov3 has all the features of ufov1 and 
ufov2. This is also evident from the correlations coefficients (Table 7.1) between ufov1, 
ufov2 and ufov3 which progressively increase between these three subtests as there is 
more in “common” between ufov2 and ufov3 than between ufov1 and ufov2. Also, the 
difficulty of the subtests progressively increases from ufov1 to ufov3. Therefore, in view of 
the above the predictors ufov1 and ufov2 were dropped. 
 
Table 7.1 Correlation coefficients between the three subtests of UFOV test 
  ufov1  ufov2  ufov3 
ufov1  1.0000     
ufov2  0.4225  1.000   
ufov3  0.3204  0.7471  1.000 
 
The scores on the clock drawing test could range from 0 to 15. Out of the 56 clock 
drawing scores, 1 driver achieved a score of 10, 9 drivers achieved a score of 14 and 46 185 
 
drivers  achieved  a  score  of  15.  Due  to  the  lack  of  variability  this  test  was  not 
discriminatory, as a variable which cannot vary will not co-vary (with the dependent 
variable) as well. Since the clock scores varied over a small range, they were bound to 
show no effect and were deemed non-significant (Draper & Smith, 1998; Montgomery et 
al.,  2006).  Therefore,  it  was  also  decided  to  drop  the  predictor  clock,  thus,  finally 
resulting in the following six candidate predictors: trail, rey-copy, rey-recall, dichotic, 
paper  and  ufov3.  Graphs  of  the  nine  cognitive  tests  against  age  with  superimposed 
Lowess curves are are shown in Figure 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. The lack of variability of the 
Clock-drawing test is obvious from Figure 7.1, where most of the participants had a score 
of 14 or 15 with one individual having a score of 10. In general, the cognitive tests show 
decrements in performance with respect to age. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Graphs of scores on the Trail Making-B Test, the Clock-drawing Test and the 
Rey-copy Test against Age, with superimposed Lowess curves. 
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Figure 7.2 Graphs of scores on the  Rey-recall Test, the Paper-Folding Test and the 
Dichotic Listening Test against Age, with superimposed Lowess curves. 
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Figure 7.3 Graphs of scores on the three subtests of the UFOV Test against Age, with 
superimposed Lowess curves. 
 
7.3 Missing Value Problem 
 
Driver bearing identification code “O56” (age 88.4 yrs) attempted the dichotic listening 
test but due to his inability to discern between the signals of the left and right channels 
(ears), ended up with a missing value score on this test. Since the case was very crucial 
because he was the oldest driver and had the highest No. of Total Hazards (i.e., thirty) 
and was the only individual with relatively substantially low score on the clock drawing 
test (score of 10),which is frequently used in dementia evaluations, it was decided to employ 
an appropriate methodology for addressing the missing value problem. In such cases, Altman 
(1991) suggests the following approach:  
•  Assign the most optimistic outcome to the missing value and analyze the data. 
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•  Repeat the analysis using the most pessimistic outcome for the missing value. 
•  Reanalyze the data by dropping the missing value case.  
The most pessimistic value was arrived at by assigning a score of 100 percent total error 
to driver “O56” on the dichotic listening test, since the driver had exhibited complete 
inability to take the test. The most optimistic value was arrived at by considering the 
estimation of the missing value by one of the missing-value-estimation-methods. The ad 
hoc method of mean substitution, where the mean of the variable (dichotic) is substituted 
for  the  missing  value  was  not  favoured  as  it  artificially  reduces  the  variance  of  the 
relevant variable and also diminishes relationships with other variables i.e. it distorts the 
covariance structure (Wayman, 2003). Another  ad hoc method, regression predictions 
tends to artificially inflate correlations (Schafer, 1997) and was therefore ruled out. The 
procedure  outlined  by  Schafer  (1997)  and  Schafer  &  Olsen  (1998)  that  utilizes  the 
Expectation and Maximization algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977 cited in Schafer & Olsen, 
1998)    and  multiple  imputation  (Rubin,  1987  cited  in  Schafer  &  Olsen,  1998)  was 
employed. The procedure is based on the multivariate normal distribution model. Details 
of  the  method  can  be  found  in  Schafer  (1997)  and  Schafer  &  Olsen  (1998).  A  free 
downloadable software program by the name of NORM which is Windows
® based is 
available  at  the  Pennsylvania  State  University  website  at 
http://www.stat.psu.edu/~jls/misoftwa.html.  In  multiple  imputation  (MI),  each  missing 
value  is  replaced  by  a  set  of  m  >  1  plausible  values,  which  are  drawn  from  their 
predictive distribution; typically 3 to 5 imputations (i.e., m is from 3 to 5) are sufficient 
for good results. After Multiple Imputation, the  m apparently complete data sets are 
analyzed  by  complete-data  methods.    After  each  of  the  m  data  sets  is  subjected  to 
identical  analysis,  the  results  (i.e.,  estimates  and  standard  errors)  are  combined  using 
rules provided by Rubin (Rubin, 1987 cited in Schafer & Olsen, 1998) and others, to 
finally present overall estimates and standard errors that reflect missing-data uncertainty. 
However, it was not worth the computational effort/precision  in our case to carry out m 
imputations  as  assigning  the  most  optimistic  outcome  to  the  missing  value  based  on 
missing-value-estimation-methods was indeed rather very optimistic as driver “O56” had 
failed  to  take  the  test  due  to  cognitive  deficits  /  lack  of  divided  attention  abilities. 
Therefore, instead of m imputations, the NORM software was used to make only one 189 
 
imputation (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), which tended to provide a better estimate of the 
missing value than the ad hoc methods (Little & Rubin, 1987; Graham et al., 1994 cited 
in Schafer & Olsen, 1998). 
Variables possessing heavily skewed distributions were first transformed to approximate 
normality and then transformed back to their original scale after the imputation. Table 7.2 
shows the different transformations used to bring about approximate normality. Since the 
lowest value of dichotic was zero, a small increment (i.e. 1) was added to the dichotic test 
result before applying the transformation as it is necessary that a variable should not be 
negative or zero before the power transformation is applied. 
 
Table 7.2 Different transformations used before imputation 
Variable  Transformation 
trail  
1
trail
 
rey-copy  ( )
3 rey copy −  
rey-recall  ( )
3 rey recall −  
dichotic  ( )
1
1 dichotic+
 
paper  none 
ufov3  ( ) log 3 e ufov  
 
The particular transformations were arrived at by using the ladder of power function in 
the statistical software Stata
® and by inspection of histograms after transformation of the 
variables. This function searches for a subset of powers for a transformation that converts 
a variable into a normally distributed variable by comparing it with the quantiles of a 
normal  distribution.  The  Expectation  Maximization  (EM)  algorithm  is  a  general 
technique that is used to fit models in incomplete data. It uses the relationship between 
missing data and the unknown parameters of a model. Using an iterative approach, first 
values of the parameters of the model are assumed and the missing values are predicted, 
then these predictions are used to update the parameter estimates and so on. This process 190 
 
ultimately converges to maximum-likelihood estimates that implicitly average over the 
distribution of the missing values (Schafer & Olsen, 1998). Using the NORM software 
the  Expectation  and  Maximization  (EM)  algorithm  converged  after  8  iterations.  The 
number of iterations input was 10000 (using a seed no. 99086 for reproducibility) and the 
software was instructed to impute at every 10000
th iteration, which resulted in a single 
imputed value of 17.11. Therefore, the most optimistic value assigned to the missing 
value for the dichotic variable was a total error rate of 17.11 percent on the dichotic 
listening test. 
 
7.4 Scenarios for Regression modelling 
 
Owing to the missing value encountered for the dichotic listening test with driver “O56”, 
linear regression models were developed for the following three scenarios: 
1.  Pessimistic Case (dichotic score = 100 for driver “O56”). 
2.  Optimistic Case (dichotic score = 17.11 for driver “O56”). 
3.  Deletion of Case of Driver “O56”. 
The dependent variable was DPI1-weighted and the independent variables (predictors) 
were the cognitive/neuropsychological tests: trail, rey-copy, rey-recall, dichotic, paper 
and ufov3. First full models incorporating all six predictors for all three scenarios were 
developed and its diagnostics performed. Then the computationally intensive technique of 
all regression models was used on each scenario for the selection of the best model. 
Finally, these best models were subjected to diagnostic checks and confirmed. 
 
7.4.1 Full Model Development 
 
Details of multiple linear regression modeling can be found in Weisberg (2005), Draper 
& Smith (1998), Montgomery et al. (2006), Kutner et al. (2005), Cohen et al. (2003), 
Berk  (2004),  Christensen  (2001)  and  Faraway(2005).  Full  models  employing  all  six 
cognitive tests as predictor were first developed for each of the three scenarios of Section 
7.4. The first step was to explore non linear transformations on the predictors and/or the 
dependent variable. The main purpose of the non linear transformation is to make the 191 
 
mean function linear in the transformed scale. The scatter matrix plot between the six 
predictors  and  DPI1-weighted  showed  no  evidence  of  straight  line  mean  function, 
therefore  non  linear  transformation  of  the  predictors  and/or  dependent  variable  was 
deemed  necessary.  With  one  predictor  and  one  response  variable,  a  suitable 
transformation can be selected by visualizing the mean function in a scatter plot and 
ensuring that the resulting scatter plot has an approximate straight line mean function. 
With  many  predictors,  this  visualization  technique  is  not  effective.  According  to 
Weisberg  (2005),  the  overall  objective  of  transformation  is  that  the  multiple  linear 
regression matches the data to a good approximation. Also, in a large number of cases, 
linearity  and  variance  stabilization  can  be  achieved  by  employing  the  same 
transformation (Cook & Weisberg, 1999). When there is more than one predictor, all 
transformations for the predictors are chosen at the same time so as to make the joint 
distribution of the predictors as normal (i.e. multinormality) as possible and then the Box 
and Cox procedure (Box & Cox 1964 cited in Weisberg, 2005) is used on the transformed 
predictors to find a transformation for the response variable (Cook & Weisberg, 1999; 
Weisberg,  2005).  To  find  the  transformations  that  do  the  best  job  at  achieving  joint 
normality of the predictors, the method of maximum likelihood is used. The power family 
of transformations are most often used in this context, which is given by:  
  ( ) , U U
λ ψ λ =   (7.1) 
Where U is the variable of interest and λ is the power parameter which is varied in order 
to  get  members  of  this  family.  For  example,  the  square  root  and  the  cube  root 
transformation corresponds to  1
2 λ = and  1
3 λ =  respectively.  0 λ = is interpreted as a log 
transformation  and  1 λ = corresponds  to  no  transformation.  Values  of  λ that  are 
considered, vary from -2 to 2 (Draper & Smith, 1998). For these transformations to be 
used,  it  is  necessary  that  the  variable  U be  strictly  positive;  this  can  be  achieved  by 
adding a small increment such that the minimum value of the variable becomes positive. 
It essentially slightly translates the scale without changing its distribution. If the ratio of 
the maximum to the minimum value of a variable is less than 10, then any transformation 
of the variable is unlikely to be helpful (Draper & Smith, 1998; Weisberg, 2005; Cohen et 
al., 2003), because the relationship between the variable and its transformed from will 192 
 
essentially  be  linear.  Since  the  ratio  of  the  maximum  to  the  minimum  value  of  the 
predictors trail, rey-copy and  rey-recall was less than 10 for all three scenarios, it was 
decided not to consider them for transformation. The predictors dichotic and paper had a 
minimum  value  of  zero  (i.e.  non-positive)  for  all  three  scenarios,  therefore  a  small 
increment i.e. 1 was added to them to make them positive. The response variable DPI1-
weighted was non-positive as it ranged from -2.129 to 1.154 for the Pessimistic Case and 
Optimistic  Case  and  from-1.368  to  1.154  for  the  Deletion  of  Case  of  Driver  “O56” 
scenario, the following formula (Streiner and Norman,  2003) was used to convert it into 
positive values called T-score given by the equation: 
  ( ) Tscore_DPI1_weighted X + SD z ′ ′ =   (7.2) 
Where,  
X′= desired mean of the variable  i.e.=100 
SD′= desired standard deviation of the variable i.e.=15 
z = the original standardized score of DPI1-weighted (i.e. subtracting the mean from 
each DPI1-weighted value and then dividing by its standard deviation, so that mean 
of  DPI1-weighted is zero and its standard deviation is 1). 
Tscore_DPI1_weighted = DPI1-weighted converted to T-score such that its mean is now 
100 and its standard deviation is 15. 
A T-score is simply a z-score (i.e. standardized score) with a new mean (i.e. 100) and 
standard deviation (i.e. 15). The choice of the mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15 
was to make sure that we did not end up with negative values onTscore_DPI1_weighted , 
as before considering variables as candidates for power transformations, it is necessary 
that they be positive (Weisberg, 2005). Equation 7.2 is a linear transformation and does 
not affect the distribution of DPI1-weighted. The three predictors dichotic+1, paper+1 
and ufov3 were considered candidates for transformation in all three scenarios of Section 
7.4. The Statistical software R
® that is based on the S programming language with the 
add-on package alr3 containing the function bctrans was used to find the powers  λ  to 
bring about joint normality using the method of maximum likelihood. 
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Table 7.3 Summary table showing estimated λ and value adopted for use for the three 
scenarios. 
 
Variable 
Pessimistic Case  Optimistic Case 
Deletion of Case of 
Driver “O56” 
 
Estimated 
λ  
λ rounded 
for use 
Estimated 
λ  
λ rounded 
for use 
Estimated 
λ  
λ rounded 
for use 
(dichotic + 1)  -0.4851  -0.5  -0.3895  -0.5  -0.3965  -0.5 
(paper + 1)  0.6777  0.5  0.6830  0.5  0.6875  0.5 
ufov3  0.1640  0  0.1544  0  0.1797  0 
 
Table7.3  shows  the  detail  of  estimated  values  of  λ for  each  scenario  and  the  value 
adopted  after  rounding.  Rounding  is  done  because  as  practical  matter,  very  precise 
estimates ofλ are not needed and the rounded figure will be more likely to be meaningful 
in any real-life situation (Weisberg, 2005; Cook & Weisberg, 1999). After rounding, the 
adequacy of the rounded values of λ was tested through likelihood ratio tests which gave 
p-values  of  0.33,  0.29  and  0.36  for  the  three  scenarios.  0 λ = is  interpreted  as  a  log 
transformation.  Next  the  six  predictors  (including  three  transformed)    i.e., 
( )
0.5 1 dichotic
− +   , ( )
0.5 1 paper+ , log 3 e ufov , trail , rey copy − and rey recall − were used 
in  a  Box  and  Cox    procedure  (Box  &  Cox  1964  cited  in  Weisberg,  2005)  to  find 
transformation  of  the  response  variable    Tscore_DPI1_weighted using  the  statistical 
software Stata
®. Table 7.4 gives values for  λ  along with 95% confidence intervals for 
the three scenarios for the response variable Tscore_DPI1_weighted  . 
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Table7.4 Summary table showing estimated  λ along with 95% confidence intervals for 
λ  for the three scenarios for the response variable Tscore_DPI1_weighted  . 
Pessimistic Case  Optimistic Case 
Deletion of Case of Driver 
“O56” 
 
Estimated 
λ  
95% 
confidence 
interval 
Estimated 
λ  
95% 
confidence 
interval 
Estimated 
λ  
95% 
confidence 
interval 
2.218  0.75 to 3.67  2.289  0.83 to 3.74  2.557  1.06 to 4.05 
 
Since the confidence intervals for all three scenarios were wide that included two or more 
of the bench mark levels of  1 1
2 2 1, ,0, ,1 λ = − −  which indicated that  λ was not crisply 
estimated. It implied that it made little difference which of the wide range of values was 
used and since the wide confidence intervals included 1, it would not be worthwhile to 
transform  the  response  variable  (Draper  &  Smith,  1998).  According  to  Cook  and 
Weisberg  (1999),  estimates  of  λ outside  the  range  of  -2  and  +2  often  indicate  that 
transformation of the response will not be helpful. Therefore, it was decided to use no 
transformation for the response variable  Tscore_DPI1_weighted  for all three scenarios. 
The following six predictors were regressed againstTscore_DPI1_weighted  :  
Trail = trail  
Rey_copy = rey copy −  
Rey_recall = rey recall −  
T_dichotic_t_plus = ( )
0.5 1 dichotic
− +  
T_paper_plus = ( )
0.5 1 paper+  
Ln_ufov3 = log 3 e ufov  
Results of regression analysis for the Pessimistic Case are shown in Table 7.5 to Table 
7.7. 
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Table 7.5 Detail of Sum of Squares for the scenario Pessimistic Case. 
Source  Sum of Squares  Degrees of freedom  MS 
Model  7721.66822  6  1286.9447 
Residual  4653.33179  49  94.96 
Total  12375  55  225 
 
Table 7.6 Detail of F-test and R-squared for the scenario Pessimistic Case. 
Detail of F-Test and R-Square 
Number of observations  56 
F (6, 49)  13.55 
Prob>F  0.0000 
R-squared  0.6240 
Adj R-squared  0.5779 
Root MSE  9.745 
 
Table 7.7 Detail of estimated coefficients and their standard errors for the 
scenario Pessimistic Case. 
Predictors  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t  P>| t |  95% Conf. Interval 
Trail  -0.051291  0.069930  -0.73  0.467  -0.1918  0.08924 
rey_copy  0.438801  0.821197  0.53  0.596  -1.2114  2.08906 
rey_recall  0.402275  0.308616  1.30  0.199  -0.2179  1.02246 
T_dichotic_t_plus  17.09213  8.676566  1.97  0.055  -0.3440  34.5283 
T_paper_plus  1.538772  1.017106  1.51  0.137  -0.5051  3.58272 
Ln_ufov3  -5.026747  2.544358  -1.98  0.054  -10.139  0.08633 
constant  82.63642  30.96989  2.67  0.010  20.4001  144.8727 
 
The test for significance of regression is significant with F (6, 49) = 13.55, p < 0.00005 
showing that at least one of the predictor variable contributes significantly to the model. 
Results of regression analysis for the Optimistic Case and for the Deletion of Case of 
Driver “O56” are in Appendix-F. For the Optimistic Case, the test for significance of 196 
 
regression is significant with F (6, 49) = 13.42, p < 0.00005 showing that at least one of 
the predictor variable contributes significantly to the model. For the Deletion of Case of 
Driver “O56” scenario, the test for significance of regression is significant with F (6, 48) 
=  9.66,  p  <  0.00005  showing  that  at  least  one  of  the  predictor  variable  contributes 
significantly to the model. 
 
7.4.2 Full Model Diagnostics 
 
After full multiple linear regression models were developed for the three scenarios of 
Section 7.4, the next step was to subject them to a thorough analysis to ensure that the 
functional form of the models was correct, the assumptions were satisfied and to identify 
outliers/influential observations. The diagnostics were primarily related to the analysis of 
residuals so as to determine the adequacy of the model. Once the adequacy of the model 
had  been  ensured,  the  next  step  was  to  select  parsimonious  models.  The  following 
paragraphs describe the diagnostics for the Pessimistic Case (unless otherwise produced 
in this section, all graphs and tables are in Appendix-F). First, the residuals were plotted 
against  the  predicted  value  (yhat)  and  a  Lowess  smoother  was  superimposed  on  the 
graph. It may be highlighted that the Lowess curve follows the general trend in the data. 
The  residuals  were  distributed  symmetrically  around  the  zero-residual  line  with  no 
evidence  of  curvilinearity.  The  Lowess  curve  did  not  exhibit  any  large  or  systematic 
deviations (or curvature) from the zero-residual line showing that the functional form of 
the model was correct. It may be noted that the Lowess curve’s downturn at the ends 
should be disregarded as a Lowess artifact, because there are only a few cases in the 
extremes that determine its position/location; rather we should concentrate more on the 
central parts of the curve (Weisberg, 2005; Hamilton, 2005).  
Apart from the visual inspection of residuals for ensuring equal variance, two separate 
statistical tests for heteroskedasticity of residuals (i.e. residuals have different variances) 
were  performed  using  the  statistical  software  Stata
®:  (1)  Cameron  &  Trevedi’s 
decomposition  of  IM-test,  and  (2)  Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg  test  of 
heteroskedasticity.  Both  tests  test  the  hypothesis:  Ho=  Residuals  have  constant/equal 
variance (i.e. homoskedasticity of residuals is present). P-vales of 0.2276 and 0.6811 197 
 
were  obtained  as  evidence  of  homoskedasticity  of  residuals  (i.e.  heteroskedasticity  in 
residuals was  absent), and therefore this important assumption was satisfied. Plots of 
residuals against each of the six predictors with superimposed Lowess curve can also be 
helpful in indicating model inadequacies; such plots did not show any systematic pattern 
i.e., the Lowess fitted line did not show any large or systematic deviations from the zero-
residual  line,  thus  manifesting  the  adequacy  of  the  functional  form  of  the  model. 
Normality  of  residuals  was  checked  through  two  plots:  (1)  kernel  density  plot  (with 
superimposed  normal  curve),  and  (2)  Q-Q  plot.  The  kernel  density  plot  is  a  better 
alternative  to  the  histogram  and  approximates  the  probability  density  of  a  variable 
(residuals). The Q-Q plot is a plot of the quantiles of the residuals against the quantiles of 
the normal distribution and is sensitive to non-normality near the tails. The kernel density 
plot matched the normal curve quite satisfactorily and so did all the points (except one 
point) lie on a straight line in the Q-Q plot. Besides, the residuals were subjected to three 
statistical  tests  of  normality  in  Stata
®  (Shapiro-Wilks  test,  Shapiro-Francia  test  and 
Skewness/Kurtosis  test),  which  gave  p-values  of  0.19449,  0.12764  and  0.0636 
respectively  (Ho=  residuals  are  normally  distributed)  as  evidence  of  normality  of 
residuals.  
Augmented component plus residual plot of each of the six predictors was also plotted 
with Lowess and fitted lines. These plots are used to diagnose nonlinearities and suggest 
alternate  functional  form  (Hamilton,  2005).  The  Lowess  curves  did  not  show  any 
systematic  pattern  and  closely  followed  the  regression  model  thus  reinforcing  the 
conclusion that was reached from the residual versus predicted value (yhat) plot that the 
regression  model  adequately  accounted  for  all  nonlinearity  in  the  data.  It  may  be 
reiterated  that  the  Lowess  curve’s  downturn  at  the  ends  should  be  disregarded  as  a 
Lowess artifact, as they are less reliable at the edges of the plot.         
Outliers are identified with respect to their y-values and/or their x-values. Outliers with 
respect to their y-values will have large studentized residuals and with respect to their x-
values will have high leverages. A large value of hii (diagonal element of the hat matrix 
i.e. leverage) indicates that the i
th case is located further away from the center of all x 
observations. A large leverage can result from extreme x values or unusual combination 
of x values (i.e. although none of the individual x values is unusual by itself). Not all 198 
 
outlying cases are influential. An observation is influential if its exclusion causes major 
changes in the fitted model (estimated coefficients, fitted values, t-tests, etc). The three 
measures of influence that are widely used in practice are DFFITS, Cook’s distance and 
DFBETAS (Kutner et al.,2005) and all measure influence based on omission of a single 
case.  DFFITS  and  Cook’s  distance  are  closely  related  and  tend  to  flag  the  same 
observations as influential (Hamilton, 2005; Cohen et al., 2003). The numeric values of 
the studentized residuals are less important than their pattern (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006). 
A case having a large studentized residual may be a perfectly plausible observation and 
deleting  it  to  improve  the  fit  of  the  model  is  dangerous  as  it  gives  a  false  sense  of 
precision in estimation or prediction (Montgomery et al., 2006). According to Chatterjee 
(Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006), cases with high leverages that are not influential are not a 
source of problems but high leverages cases that are influential should be scrutinized as 
these cases are outlying in the x-space (i.e., predictor space) and also influence the fit of 
the  model.  Added-variable  plots  (see  Appendix-F)  have  slopes  that  are  equal  to  the 
respective partial regression coefficients. If the slope of the best fitting regression line in 
the Added-variable plot is zero, the predictor variable has no unique relationship to the 
dependent  variable;  if  the  slope  is  positive,  the  added  variable  will  have  a  positive 
relationship  to  the  dependent  variable  and  if  it  is  negative,  it  will  have  a  negative 
relationship  (Cohen  et  al.,  2003).    Added-variable  plots  also  help  visually  unveil 
observations  that  exert  a  disproportionate  influence  on  the  model  (Hamilton,  2005). 
Points/observations that have high leverage are horizontally distant/distant from the rest 
of the data in Added-variable plots (Hamilton, 2005).            
DFFITS measures the influence that case i has on the fitted value  ˆ
i Y  and is given by 
(Kutner et al.,2005): 
 
  ( )
( )
( )
ˆ ˆ
i i i
i
ii i
Y Y
DFFITS
MSE h
−
=   (7.3) 
Where, 
ˆ
i Y = Fitted value for the i
th case when all n cases are used in fitting the model. 199 
 
( )
ˆ
i i Y = Predicted value for the i
th case obtained when the i
th case is omitted in fitting the 
model. 
The  denominator  in  Equation  7.3  is  used  for  standardization,  so  that  the  value 
( )i DFFITS for the i
th case represents the number of estimated standard deviations of   ˆ
i Y  
that  the  fitted  value  ˆ
i Y either  increases  or  decreases  by  omitting  the  i
th  case  in  the 
regression model. As a guideline in identifying influential cases, if the absolute value of 
DFFITS exceeds 1 for small to medium data sets (Kutner et al.,2005) the case may be 
considered as influential.  
DFBETAS is a measure of influence that case i exerts on the regression coefficients bk (k 
= 0, 1, 2…, p-1) and is given by (Kutner et al.,2005):  
  ( ) ( )
( )
( )
k k i
k i
kk i
b b
DFBETAS
MSE c
−
=   (7.4) 
Where,  
k b = Regression coefficient based on all n cases. 
( ) k i b = Regression coefficient obtained when the i
th case is omitted. 
The  denominator  in  Equation  7.4  is  used  for  standardization,  so  that  the  value
( ) ( ) k i DFBETAS  for the i
th case represents the number of estimated standard deviations of  
k b  that the coefficient  k b either increases or decreases by omitting the i
th case in the 
regression model. As a guideline in identifying influential cases, if the absolute value of 
DFBETAS exceeds 1 for small to medium data sets (Kutner et al.,2005) the case may be 
considered as influential.  
The  leverage  versus  squared  residual  plot  is  used  to  identify  individual  outliers.  The 
square of the residuals enhances the effect of the residuals visually. A horizontal line 
depicting  the  mean  of  leverages  and  a  vertical  line  depicting  the  mean  of  squared 
residuals are embedded for reference. Based on its particular combination of x values, the 
leverage shows how much potential an observation has for influencing a regression and 
large  squared  residuals  point  out  observations  whose  observed  y  values  are  much 
different from that predicted by the model. Leverages greater than 
2k
n  (where, k is the no. 200 
 
of parameters in the model (including constant) and n is the number of observations) are 
considered high (Kutner et al.,2005; Hamilton, 2005). In the  Pessimistic Case, from the 
leverages versus squared residuals plot, drivers “O6”, “O10”, “O34”, “O39” and “O56” 
had high leverages (greater than 
2k
n
= 0.25)  and driver “O46” had a high studentized 
residual (-3.85) showing an ill-fit. Absolute values of Studentized residuals greater  than 
2 or 3 are considered high by Chatterjee and  Hadi (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006), while 
Montgomery et al. (2006) consider 3 or 4 to be the threshold. Based on the six cognitive 
tests, the value predicted by the model (i.e., y hat) for Driver “O46” was higher (and 
hence the negative studentized residual) than her observed value on the index, because 
her scores on the six cognitive tests were relatively favourable compared to the other 
older  drivers  while  in  actual  practice  her  performance  measured  via  the  index  was 
relatively poor. All drivers possessing high leverages were older drivers. Only one driver 
“O46” had an absolute DFFITS value (-1.43) greater than 1 and there was no absolute 
value of DFBETAS greater than 1, thus manifesting that driver “O46” was influential. 
This is also obvious from the Added-variable plot as driver “O46” is quite distant from 
the rest. However, as pointed out by Chatterjee & Hadi (2006) cases with high leverages 
that are not influential are not a source of problems but high leverages cases that are 
influential should be scrutinized as these cases are outlying in the x-space (i.e., predictor 
space) and also influence the fit of the model; since the high leverage cases were not 
influential therefore, there was nothing wrong with observation of driver “O46” and was 
left  intact  as  it  did  not  affect  the  coefficient  estimates  (i.e.  all  absolute  values  of 
DFBETAS less than 1). The outliers i.e. observations having high leverages and high 
residuals  and  also  the  influential  cases  were  scrutinized  to  ensure  that  there  was  no 
measurement, recording or calculation error. After thorough checking, no error of any 
sort  could  be  detected  manifesting  that  these  were  indeed  plausible  observations. 
Therefore, the model for the Pessimistic Case was considered to be representative of all 
of the observations in the sample and not an artifact of a few.                 
For the Optimistic Case scenario (Appendix-F), all assumptions were satisfied through 
plots and statistical tests as in the Pessimistic Case scenario. In the  Optimistic Case 
scenario, from the leverages versus squared residuals plot, drivers “O6”, “O34”, “O39”, 201 
 
and “O56” had high leverages (greater than 
2k
n = 0.25)  and driver “O46” had a high 
studentized residual (-3.84) showing an ill-fit. Based on the six cognitive tests, the value 
predicted by the model (i.e., y hat) for Driver “O46” was higher (and hence the negative 
studentized residual) than her observed value on the index, because her scores on the six 
cognitive tests were relatively favourable compared to the other older drivers while in 
actual practice her performance measured via the index was relatively poor. All drivers 
possessing high leverages were older drivers. Only one driver “O46” had an absolute 
DFFITS  value  (-1.43)  greater  than  1  and  there  was  no  absolute  value  of  DFBETAS 
greater than 1, thus manifesting that driver “O46” was influential. This is also obvious 
from the Added-variable plot as driver “O46” is quite distant from the rest. Since the high 
leverage cases were not influential therefore, there was nothing wrong with observation 
of driver “O46” and was left intact as it did not affect the coefficient estimates (i.e. all 
absolute values of DFBETAS less than 1) (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006). The outliers i.e. 
observations having high leverages and high residuals and also the influential cases were 
scrutinized to ensure that there was no measurement, recording or calculation error. After 
thorough checking, no error of any sort could be detected manifesting that these were 
indeed  plausible  observations.  Therefore,  the  model  for  the  Optimistic  Case  was 
considered to be representative of all of the observations in the sample and not an artifact 
of a few.                 
For the Deletion of Case of Driver “O56” scenario (Appendix-F), all assumptions were 
satisfied through plots and statistical tests as in the Pessimistic Case scenario.  In the 
Deletion of Case of Driver “O56”  scenario, from the leverages versus squared residuals 
plot, drivers “O6”, “O10”, “O34”, and “O39” had high leverages (greater than 
2k
n = 0.25)  
and driver “O46” had a high studentized residual (-3.79) showing an ill-fit. Based on the 
six cognitive tests, the value predicted by the model (i.e., y hat) for Driver “O46” was 
higher  (and  hence  the  negative  studentized  residual)  than  her  observed  value  on  the 
index, because her scores on the six cognitive tests were relatively favourable compared 
to the other older drivers while in actual practice her performance measured via the index 
was relatively poor. All drivers possessing high leverages were older drivers. Only one 
driver “O46” had an absolute DFFITS value (-1.42) greater than 1 and there was no 
absolute  value  of  DFBETAS  greater  than  1,  thus  manifesting  that  driver  “O46”  was 202 
 
influential. This is also obvious from the Added-variable plot as driver “O46” is quite 
distant from the rest. since the high leverage cases were not influential therefore, there 
was nothing wrong with observation of driver “O46” and was left intact as it did not 
affect  the  coefficient  estimates  (i.e.  all  absolute  values  of  DFBETAS  less  than  1) 
(Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006). The outliers i.e. observations having high leverages and high 
residuals  and  also  the  influential  cases  were  scrutinized  to  ensure  that  there  was  no 
measurement, recording or calculation error. After thorough checking, no error of any 
sort  could  be  detected  manifesting  that  these  were  indeed  plausible  observations. 
Therefore, the model for the Optimistic Case was considered to be representative of all of 
the observations in the sample and not an artifact of a few. 
 
7.4.3 Model Selection Using All Possible Regression Models 
 
The next step was to select a parsimonious model from the full models developed in 
Section 7.4.1 for each of the scenarios of Section 7.4. Building a model that includes a 
subset of the available predictors involves two conflicting objectives (Montgomery et al., 
2006): (1) The predictors should be as many as possible so that the information contained 
in them can influence the predicted  value (2) since the variance of the prediction  ˆ y and 
the cost of data collection increases as the number of predictors increase, therefore few 
predictors are favoured. Deleting predictors has the potential for introducing bias in the 
estimates  of  the  coefficients  and  the  response,  however,  if  the  effect  of  the  deleted-
predictors is small, the amount of bias introduced will be less than the reduction in the 
variance of the response. But if negligible predictors (predictors with zero coefficients or 
coefficients less than their respective standard errors from the full model) are retained, 
the  variances  of  the  coefficients/parameters  and  the  predicted  response  will  increase 
(Montgomery et al., 2006). Reduced models will have smaller collinearity if too many 
predictors are providing the same information (Faraway, 2005). 
There are two main types of variable selection procedures: (1) The Stepwise selection 
approach, which compares successive models, and (2) the Criterion approach that uses 
optimization  of  some measure  of  goodness.  Because  of  the  “one-at-a-time”  nature  of 
adding/dropping variables, it is possible to miss the “optimal” model in the Stepwise 203 
 
method. Also, because there is so much multiple testing taking place, that the validity of 
the p-values is dubious i.e., the removal of predictors that are less significant tends to 
increase  the  significance  of  the  remaining  predictors  and  in  effect  results  in  the 
overstatement of the importance of the predictors that remain. Whereas, the Criterion 
based approach typically involves a wider search and compares models in a preferable 
manner (Faraway, 2005).  
The  best  model  was  selected  via  the  computation  intensive  technique  of  all  possible 
regression models and using the criterion approach. In the  all possible regression models 
technique, if there are q predictors, then there are 2
q  models that can be constructed 
which is based on the fact that each predictor can either be included or excluded from the 
model. The various candidate models are compared using the criteria that is based on the 
lack of fit of a model and its complexity (Weisberg, 2005). For a candidate subset of 
predictors, the lack of fit is measured by its SSE (i.e., Error sum of Squares or Residual 
sum of squares), because as predictors are added to a model SSE decreases. Complexity 
in the context of multiple linear regression is measured by the number of parameters 
(including the intercept) included for the candidate subset of predictors in the model. The 
most  common  criteria  in  multiple  linear  regression  and  other  problems  for  model 
comparison is: (1) Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) given by Sakamoto et al. (1987) 
(2) Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) given by Schwarz (1978), and (3) Mallows’ Cp 
(Mallows,  1973).  Smaller  values  of  the  entire  three  criterions  are  desirable.  One 
important similarity between the three criteria is that if the complexity of the model is 
fixed (i.e., for example if we are considering all models with say the no. of parameters as 
four) then all three will agree and the smallest value of each will choose the same model 
(Weisberg,  2005;  Faraway,  2005).  AIC  and  BIC  criterion  can  even  be  used  for 
comparisons of non-nested models (Cohen et al., 2003; Kass & Raftery, 1995; Chatterjee 
& Hadi, 2006). Nested means that all the predictors in the smaller model are also present 
as  predictors  in  the  larger  model  and  both  models  are  based  on  identical 
observations/cases. BIC and AIC are given by: 
  log log log e p e e BIC n SSE n n p n = − +   (7.5) 
  log log 2 e p e AIC n SSE n n p = − +   (7.6) 
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n= No. of observations. 
p SSE = Error Sum of Squares (Residual Sum of Squares) for the subset regression model. 
p = No. of parameters in the model (including constant). 
Mallow’s Cp is given by: 
  ( ) 2
p
p
SSE
C n p
MSE
= − −   (7.7) 
Where, 
p SSE = Error Sum of Squares (Residual Sum of Squares) for the subset regression model. 
n= No. of observations. 
p = No. of parameters in the model (including constant). 
MSE= Mean Square Error (i.e., estimate of
2 σ i.e. variance of error) obtained from the 
full model. 
Cp  for  the  full  model  will  equal  p .  The  Cp  criterion  is  used  to  identify  subsets  of 
predictors for which (1) the Cp value is small and (2) Cp value is near p (Kutner et al., 
2005). Subsets that possess small values of Cp have small total mean squared error and Cp 
values  near  p  translates  to  small  bias  of  the  regression  model  (Kutner  et  al.,  2005). 
According  to  Faraway  (2005),  when  the  value  of  Cp  is  much  bigger  than  p  (i.e. 
considerably above p), the model will have a bad fit or a lack of fit (i.e. biased model). 
The three criteria (i.e. BIC, AIC and Cp) trade-off fit of the model in terms of SSE (i.e., 
Error  sum  of  Squares  or  Residual  sum  of  squares)  against  complexity  (by  providing 
penalties for adding predictors) (Faraway, 2005).                             
Using simulation studies, Lutkepohl (Lutkepohl, 1985 cited in Christensen, 2001) showed 
that the BIC out performed the AIC (and many other criteria) with regard to identification 
of the correct model and the minimization of prediction errors. Asymptotically, the AIC 
is  not  consistent;  the  BIC  has  been  developed  by  modifying  the  AIC  to  specifically 
achieve  consistency  and has  out  performed  the  AIC  (Christensen,  2001).  The  BIC  is 
generally considered to solve the model selection problem (Freedman, 2005). The models 
chosen by BIC tend to be simpler/parsimonious than those chosen by the AIC criterion 
(Kass & Raftery, 1995) because BIC penalizes larger models more heavily compared to 
AIC (Faraway, 2005; Kutner et al., 2005). According to Chatterjee and Hadi (2006), the 205 
 
difference  between  AIC  and  BIC  is  in  the  severity  of  the  penalty  for  p  (i.e.  no.  of 
parameters), which is more pronounced in BIC when n > 8, and thus tends to control the 
over-fitting tendency of AIC. To guard against over-fitting they recommend the use of 
BIC.  
The Coefficient of Multiple Determination ( R
2) is defined as a measure of the proportion 
of variation in the response variable explained by the predictors and is given by: 
 
2 SSR SSE
R 1
SST SST
= = −  
Where SSR is the regression sum of squares, SSE is the error sum of squares (residual 
sum  of  squares)  and  SST  is  the  total  sum  of  squares.  R
2  is  also  the  square  of  the 
correlation  between  the  observed  values  y  and  the  fitted  values  ˆ y (Weisberg,  2005). 
Adding more predictors to a model increases R
2, because SSE can never become larger 
with more predictors as SST is always the same for the given set of responses. Since R
2 
can be made larger by including more predictors, an Adjusted R
2 (Adjusted Coefficient of 
Multiple Determination) is sometimes used that adjusts for the number of predictors in 
the model. The Adjusted R
2 adjusts R
2 by dividing each sum of squares by its respective 
degrees of freedom and is given by (Kutner et al., 2005): 
 
2
SSE
1 SSE
Adj-R 1 1
SST SST
1
n n p
n p
n
  − − = − = −  −  
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Where, n is the number of observations and p is the number of parameters in the model 
(including constant). The adjusted R
2 may actually decrease when another predictor is 
added to the model, because any decrease in SSE may be more than offset by the loss of 
degrees of freedom in the denominator term (n-p) (Kutner et al., 2005).        
Since the number of predictors were six, using the technique of all possible regression 
models, 2
6 = 64 possible models were estimated for each of the three scenarios of Section 
7.4. AIC, BIC, Cp, R
2 and Adjusted R
2 were computed for each of the 64 models in each 
of the scenarios (64×3= 192 models in total) to aid in  the decision making process for 
selection of the best model in each scenario. In each scenario, the following four criteria 
were used to screen between the 64 models so as to get a smaller subset of models for 
further scrutiny: 206 
 
1.  The five models having the lowest AIC. 
2.  The five models having the lowest BIC. 
3.  The five models having the lowest Cp. 
4.  The one, two, three, four, five, and six predictor model with the lowest AIC, BIC, 
Cp (Note: all pointed towards the same model in each of the six cases). 
A  considerable  number  of  common  models  were  screened  by  the  above  screening 
mechanism.  In  the  Pessimistic  Case  scenario,  nine  models  shown  in  Table  7.8  were 
screened from the pool of 64 possible models, by using the above four criteria. 
 
Table 7.8 The nine models screened from the pool of 64 models of 
Pessimistic Case scenario. 
Pessimistic Case (dichotic score = 100 for driver “O56”) 
Model 
No. 
Predictors 
N
o
.
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2 R   Adj-
2 R   Cp  BIC  AIC 
1  2 x   2  0.4129  0.4020  24.51  280.52  276.47 
2  5 x 6 x   3  0.5337  0.5161  10.76  271.64  265.57 
3  3 x 1 x 2 x   4  0.5938  0.5703  4.94  267.95  259.85 
4  1 x 6 x 2 x   4  0.5922  0.5686  5.15  268.17  260.07 
5  5 x 6 x 2 x   4  0.5765  0.5521  7.19  270.28  262.18 
6  3 x 1 x 6 x 2 x   5  0.6124  0.5820  4.51  269.35  259.22 
7  5 x 1 x 6 x 2 x   5  0.6078  0.5770  5.11  270.01  259.88 
8  4 x 3 x 1 x 6 x 2 x   6  0.6218  0.5840  5.28  272.00  259.84 
9  4 x 3 x 1 x 6 x 2 x 5 x   7  0.6240  0.5779  7  275.70  261.52 
 
Where, 
1 x = ( )
0.5 1 dichotic
− +  207 
 
2 x =  e log ufov3 
3 x = rey recall −  
4 x = trail  
5 x = rey copy −  
6 x = ( )
0.5 1 paper+  
Model No.3 of Table 7.8 had the lowest BIC value (267.95) and a lower value of AIC as 
well. Its Cp value of 4.94 was small and was near p (No. of parameters). Besides the R
2 of 
model No.3 was 0.5938 as compared to the full model R
2 of 0.6240, which shows that by 
getting  rid  of  half  of  the  predictors,  there  was  a  reduction  of  only  3  percent  in  the 
explained variance of driving performance index. The lack of multicollinearity of Model 
No. 3 was evident from the values of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), which were 1.35, 
1.30 and 1.21. Therefore, Model No.3 was selected as the best and parsimonious model, 
which was based on the dichotic, ufov3 and rey-recall cognitive tests.        
In a similar manner, for the Optimistic Case scenario and Deletion of Case of Driver 
“O56” scenario, tables showing the screened models from the pool of 64 possible models 
(in each scenario) are in Appendix-F.  
In the Optimistic Case scenario, nine models were screened from the pool of 64 possible 
models. Model No.3 and Model No. 4 of the Table for Optimistic Case in Appendix-F 
had essentially the same and the lowest BIC values (268.81 and 268.86 respectively) and 
a lower value of AIC as well. The Cp value of both these models was small (5.43 and 5.48 
respectively) was small and was near p (No. of parameters). Their R
2 values were also 
essentially  the  same.  Therefore,  it  did  not  make  much  difference  which  model  was 
selected. It was decided to select model No.4 as this model involved the same predictors 
as  those  selected  in  the  Pessimistic  Case,  thereby  facilitating  comparison.  The  R
2  of 
Model No.4 was 0.5871 as compared to the full model R
2 of 0.6217, which shows that by 
getting  rid  of  half  of  the  predictors,  there  was  a  reduction  of  only  3  percent  in  the 
explained variance of driving performance index. The lack of multicollinearity of Model 
No. 4 was evident from the values of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), which were 1.34, 
1.30 and 1.19. Therefore, Model No.4 was selected as the best and parsimonious model, 
which was based on the dichotic, ufov3 and rey-recall cognitive tests.        208 
 
In the Deletion of Case of Driver “O56” scenario, ten models were screened from the 
pool of 64 possible models. Model No.3 of the table for Deletion of Case of Driver 
“O56” in Appendix-F had the lowest BIC value (272.23) and the lowest value of AIC as 
well. The Cp value of model No.3 was also the lowest (3.57) and was near p (No. of 
parameters). The R
2 of Model No.3 was 0.5227 as compared to the full model R
2 of 
0.5469, which shows that by getting rid of half of the predictors, there was a reduction of 
only  2  percent  in  the  explained  variance  of  driving  performance  index.  The  lack  of 
multicollinearity of Model No.3 was evident from the values of Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF), which were 1.25, 1.23 and 1.12. Therefore, Model No.3 was selected as the best 
and parsimonious model, which was based on the dichotic, ufov3 and rey-recall cognitive 
tests. 
 
7.4.4 Best/Parsimonious Model Development 
 
Since in all three scenarios of section 7.4, the predictors dichotic, ufov3 and rey-recall 
were identified as contributory to best model, it was necessary to determine the correct 
functional form of model and transformation of predictors for each of the three scenarios 
when these predictors alone are used in models, as underlined by Montgomery et al. 
(2006). In developing the best/parsimonious models, all the steps described in Section 
7.4.1 relevant to full model development were followed with the exception that there 
were now three predictors (dichotic, ufov3 and rey-recall). The response variable was
Tscore_DPI1_weighted . The predictor dichotic had a minimum value of zero (i.e. non-
positive) for all three scenarios, therefore, a small increment i.e. 1 was added to make it 
positive. Since the ratio of the maximum to the minimum value of rey-recall was less 
than 10 for all three scenarios, it was decided not to consider it for transformation. Hence, 
the two variables dichotic+1 and ufov3 were considered candidates for transformation in 
all three scenarios of Section 7.4. The Statistical software R
® that is based on the S 
programming language with the add-on package alr3 containing the function bctrans was 
used to find the powers λ  to bring about joint normality using the method of maximum 
likelihood.  
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Table 7.9 Summary table showing estimated λ and value adopted for use for the three 
scenarios for development of the best models. 
Variable 
Pessimistic Case  Optimistic Case 
Deletion of Case of 
Driver “O56” 
 
Estimated 
λ  
λ rounded 
for use 
Estimated 
λ  
λ rounded 
for use 
Estimated 
λ  
λ rounded 
for use 
(dichotic + 1)  -0.4918  -0.5  -0.3944  -0.5  -0.3954  -0.5 
ufov3  0.1957  0  0.1829  0  0.2505  0 
 
Table7.9  shows  the  detail  of  estimated  values  of  λ for  each  scenario  and  the  value 
adopted after rounding. After rounding, the adequacy of the rounded values of  λ was 
tested through likelihood ratio tests which gave p-values of 0.44, 0.43 and 0.29 for the 
three scenarios.  0 λ = is interpreted as a log transformation. Next the three  predictors 
(including two transformed)  i.e.,  ( )
0.5 1 dichotic
− +   ,  log 3 e ufov  and   rey recall − were 
used in a Box and Cox  procedure (Box & Cox 1964 cited in Weisberg, 2005) to find 
transformation  of  the  response  variable    Tscore_DPI1_weighted using  the  statistical 
software Stata
®. Table 7.10 gives values for  λ  along with 95% confidence intervals for 
the three scenarios for the response variable Tscore_DPI1_weighted  . 
 
Table7.10 Summary table showing estimated λ along with 95% confidence intervals for 
λ  for the three scenarios for the response variable Tscore_DPI1_weighted  
for development of best models. 
Pessimistic Case  Optimistic Case 
Deletion of Case of Driver 
“O56” 
 
Estimated 
λ  
95% confidence 
interval 
Estimated 
λ  
95% confidence 
interval 
Estimated 
λ  
95% confidence 
interval 
2.437  0.99 to 3.87  2.531  1.10 to 3.95  2.579  1.06 to 4.09 
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Since the confidence intervals for all three scenarios were wide that included two or more 
of the bench mark levels of  1 1
2 2 1, ,0, ,1 λ = − −  which indicated that  λ was not crisply 
estimated.  According to Cook and Weisberg (1999), estimates of λ outside the range of -
2 and +2 often indicate that transformation of the response will not be helpful. Therefore, 
it was decided to use no transformation for the response variable Tscore_DPI1_weighted  
for all three scenarios. It may be noted that the same transformations (for the predictors) 
were  arrived  at  as  were  used  in  the  Full  model  development.  The  following  three 
predictors were regressed againstTscore_DPI1_weighted  :  
Rey_recall = rey recall −  
T_dichotic_t_plus = ( )
0.5 1 dichotic
− +  
Ln_ufov3 = log 3 e ufov  
Results of regression analysis for the Pessimistic Case are shown in Table 7.11 to Table 
7.13. 
 
Table 7.11 Detail of Sum of Squares for the scenario Pessimistic Case for best model. 
Source  Sum of Squares  Degrees of freedom  MS 
Model  7347.71  3  2449.237 
Residual  5027.28  52  96.678 
Total  12375  55  225 
 
Table 7.12 Detail of F-test and R-squared for the scenario Pessimistic Case 
for best model. 
Detail of F-Test and R-Square 
Number of observations  56 
F (3, 52)  25.33 
Prob>F  0.0000 
R-squared  0.5938 
Adj R-squared  0.5703 
Root MSE  9.8325 
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Table 7.13 Detail of estimated coefficients and their standard errors for the 
scenario Pessimistic Case for best model. 
Predictors  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t  P>| t |  95% Conf. Interval 
T_dichotic_t_plus  23.40597  7.193504  3.25  0.002  8.971147  37.84079 
Ln_ufov3  -7.826133  2.042769  -3.83  0.000  -11.9252  -3.72701 
Rey_recall  0.7197843  0.2512916  2.86  0.006  0.2155308  1.224038 
constant  104.3111  13.60166  7.67  0.000  77.01737  131.6048 
 
The test for significance of regression is significant with F (3, 52) = 25.33, p < 0.00005 
showing that at least one of the three predictor variable contributes significantly to the 
model.  The  individual  t-tests  of  the  regression  coefficients  show  all  predictors  to  be 
highly significant (i.e. all p values way less than 0.05). Results of regression analysis for 
the Optimistic Case and for the Deletion of Case of Driver “O56” are in Appendix-F. For 
the Optimistic Case, the test for significance of regression is significant with F (3,52) = 
24.65,  p  <  0.00005  showing  that  at  least  one  of  the  predictor  variable  contributes 
significantly to the model. The individual t-tests of the regression coefficients show all 
predictors to be highly significant (i.e. all p values way less than 0.05). For the Deletion 
of Case of Driver “O56”, the test for significance of regression is significant with F 
(3,51) = 18.61, p < 0.00005 showing that at least one of the predictor variable contributes 
significantly to the model. The individual t-tests of the regression coefficients show all 
predictors to be highly significant (i.e. all p values way less than 0.05). The following 
three best/parsimonious models pertinent to each of the three scenarios were obtained: 
•  Pessimistic Case   
( ) ( ) ( )
-0.5
e =104.31+23.40 +1 -7.83 log +0.72 DPI dichotic ufov3 rey-recall  
 
•  Optimistic Case 
( ) ( ) ( )
-0.5
e =105.09+22.93 +1 -8 log +0.73 DPI dichotic ufov3 rey-recall    
•  Deletion of Case of Driver “O56” scenario 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
-0.5
e =104.43+22.63 +1 -8.06 log +0.76 DPI dichotic ufov3 rey-recall  
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7.4.5 Best/Parsimonious Model Diagnostics 
 
After the best/parsimonious models were developed in Section 7.4.4, the next obvious 
step was to subject them to thorough analysis to ensure that the functional form of the 
models was correct, the assumptions were satisfied and to identify outliers/influential 
observations. The diagnostics were performed in a manner similar to that of Full Model 
Diagnostics of Section 7.4.2, therefore the detailed explanations will not be repeated. All 
graphs and tables relevant to best/parsimonious model diagnostics for each of the three 
scenarios are at Appendix-F, which can be interpreted as per description of Section 7.4.2. 
Suffice to say that for all three scenarios, residuals were normally distributed with no 
evidence of heteroskedasticity or systematic patterns. As a final check, the residuals were 
also plotted against the square and interaction terms of each of the three predictors to 
ensure that no systematic pattern was evident (and hence no missing term in the model). 
Once  the  functional  form  of  the  model  was  deemed  adequate,  the  next  step  was  to 
identify and assess outliers and influential observations. 
In the Pessimistic Case, from the leverages versus squared residuals plot, drivers “Y52”, 
“O6” and “O56” had high leverages (greater than 
2k
n
= 0.14)  and driver “Y5”’ and 
“O46” had high studentized residuals (2.03 and -3.34 respectively) showing an ill-fit. 
Based on the three cognitive tests, the value predicted by the model (i.e., y hat) for Driver 
“Y5” was lower (and hence the positive studentized residual) than her observed value on 
the index, because her scores on the three cognitive tests were relatively unfavourable 
compared to the other younger drivers while in actual practice her performance measured 
via the index was relatively  good. The value predicted by the model (i.e.,  y hat) for 
Driver “O46” was higher (and hence the negative studentized residual) than her observed 
value  on  the  index,  because  her  scores  on  the  three  cognitive  tests  were  relatively 
favourable compared to the other older drivers while in actual practice her performance 
measured  via  the  index  was  relatively  poor.  Only  one  driver  “O46”  had  an  absolute 
DFFITS  value  (-1.01)  greater  than  1  and  there  was  no  absolute  value  of  DFBETAS 
greater than 1, thus manifesting that driver “O46” was influential. This is also obvious 
from the Added-variable plot as driver “O46” is quite distant from the rest. Since the high 213 
 
leverage cases were not influential therefore, there was nothing wrong with observation 
of driver “O46” and was left intact as it did not affect the coefficient estimates (i.e. all 
absolute values of DFBETAS less than 1) (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006). The outliers i.e. 
observations having high leverages and high residuals and also the influential cases were 
scrutinized to ensure that there was no measurement, recording or calculation error. After 
thorough checking, no error of any sort could be detected manifesting that these were 
indeed  plausible  observations.  Therefore,  the  model  for  the  Pessimistic  Case  was 
considered to be representative of all of the observations in the sample and not an artifact 
of a few. 
In the Optimistic Case, observations having high leverages and high studentized residuals 
were identical to that of the Pessimistic Case (with slightly different values) and hence 
the  same  interpretation.  No  observation  was  influential  (i.e.  all  absolute  values  of 
DFFITS and DFBETAS less than 1). Therefore, the model for the Optimistic Case was 
considered to be representative of all of the observations in the sample and not an artifact 
of a few. 
In the Deletion of Case of Driver “O56” scenario, from the leverages versus squared 
residuals plot, drivers “Y52” and “O6” had high leverages (greater than 
2k
n = 0.14) and 
driver “O46” had a high studentized residual (-3.4) showing an ill-fit. Based on the three 
cognitive tests, the value predicted by the model (i.e., y hat) for Driver “O46” was higher 
(and  hence  the  negative  studentized  residual)  than  her  observed  value  on  the  index, 
because her scores on the three cognitive tests were relatively favourable compared to the 
other older drivers while in actual practice her performance measured via the index was 
relatively poor. Only one driver “O46” had an absolute DFFITS value (-1.03) greater than 
1 and there was no absolute value of DFBETAS greater than 1, thus manifesting that 
driver “O46” was influential. This is also obvious from the Added-variable plot as driver 
“O46” is quite distant from the rest. Since the high leverage cases were not influential 
therefore, there was nothing wrong with observation of driver “O46” and was left intact 
as it did not affect the coefficient estimates (i.e. all absolute values of DFBETAS less 
than 1) (Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006). The outliers i.e. observations having high leverages 
and high residuals and also the influential cases were scrutinized to ensure that there was 
no measurement, recording or calculation error. After thorough checking, no error of any 214 
 
sort  could  be  detected  manifesting  that  these  were  indeed  plausible  observations. 
Therefore, the model for the Deletion of Case of Driver “O56” scenario was considered 
to be representative of all of the observations in the sample and not an artifact of a few. 
 
7.4.6 Model Development Using Cognitive Tests trail and rey-recall 
 
Since the cognitive tests trail and rey-recall are relatively quick and easy to administer 
paper-and-pencil  tests,  and  as  they  were  not  together  selected  as  predictors  in  the 
best/parsimonious models, it was worthwhile to assess the viability of a multiple linear 
regression model (for the Pessimistic Case) that was based on these two cognitive tests 
alone. Since the ratio of the maximum to the minimum value of the predictors trail and 
rey-recall  was  less  than  10,  it  was  decided  not  to  consider  them  for  transformation 
(Draper & Smith, 1998; Weisberg, 2005). The response variable DPI1-weighted was non-
positive and therefore converted into positive values called T-score using Equation 7.2 
(as explained in Section 7.4.1) thus obtainingTscore_DPI1_weighted . Next trail and rey-
recall were used in a Box and Cox procedure (Box & Cox 1964 cited in Weisberg, 2005) 
to  find  transformation  of  the  response  variableTscore_DPI1_weighted using  the 
statistical software Stata
®. A  λ value of 2.348 with a 95% confidence intervals of 0.814 
to  3.881was  obtained.  Because  of  the  wide  confidence  interval  and  other  factors 
explained in Section 7.4.1, it was decided not to use any transformation on the response 
Tscore_DPI1_weighted   .    The  predictors  trail  and  rey-recall  were  regressed  against
Tscore_DPI1_weighted  . Results of regression analysis are shown in Table 7.14 to Table 
7.16.  
 
 Table 7.14 Detail of Sum of Squares when trail and rey-recall are in the model. 
Source  Sum of Squares  Degrees of freedom  MS 
Model  6349.96  2  3174.97 
Residual  6025.04  53  113.68 
Total  12375  55  225 
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Table 7.15 Detail of F-test and R-squared when trail and rey-recall are in the 
model. 
Detail of F-Test and R-Square 
Number of observations  56 
F (2, 53)  27.93 
Prob>F  0.0000 
R-squared  0.5131 
Adjusted R-squared  0.4948 
Root MSE  10.662 
 
Table 7.16 Detail of estimated coefficients and their standard errors when 
trail and rey-recall are in the model. 
Predictors  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t  P>| t |  95% Conf. Interval 
trail  -0.2224002  0.0489786  -4.54  0.000  -0.320638  -0.12416 
rey-recall  0.8813328  0.266606  3.31  0.002  0.346588  1.416077 
constant  98.72119  8.214036  12.02  0.000  82.24592  115.1965 
 
The diagnostics were performed in a manner similar to that of Full Model Diagnostics of 
Section 7.4.2, therefore the detailed explanations will not be repeated. Suffice to say that 
residuals were normally distributed with no evidence of heteroskedasticity or systematic 
patterns.  As  a  final  check,  the  residuals  were  also  plotted  against  the  square  and 
interaction terms of each of the two predictors to ensure that no systematic pattern was 
evident (and hence no missing term in the model). Once the functional form of the model 
was deemed adequate, the next step was to identify and assess outliers and influential 
observations. 
From  the  leverages  versus  squared  residuals  plot,  drivers  “O56”,  “O39”,  “O12”  and 
“Y32” had high leverages (greater than 
2k
n = 0.11)  and driver “O46”, “O7”  and “O35” 
had high studentized residuals (-3.371, -2.090 and 2.025 respectively) showing an ill-fit. 
Based on the two cognitive tests, the value predicted by the model (i.e., y hat) for Driver 
“O35” was lower (and hence the positive studentized residual) than her observed value on 216 
 
the index, because her scores on the two cognitive tests were relatively unfavourable 
compared to the other older drivers while in actual practice her performance measured via 
the index was relatively good. The value predicted by the model (i.e., y hat) for Driver 
“O46”  and  “O7”  was  higher  (and  hence  the  negative  studentized  residuals)  than  her 
observed  value  on  the  index,  because  their  scores  on  the  two  cognitive  tests  were 
relatively favourable compared to the other older drivers while in actual practice their 
performance measured via the index was relatively poor. No observation was influential 
(i.e. all absolute values of DFFITS and DFBETAS less than 1). Lack of multicollinearity 
was evident from the values of Variance Inflation Factors (VIF), which were 1.25 and 
1.25.  The  outliers  i.e.  observations  having  high  leverages  and  high  residuals  were 
scrutinized to ensure that there was no measurement, recording or calculation error. After 
thorough checking, no error of any sort could be detected manifesting that these were 
indeed plausible observations. Therefore, the model with the predictors trail and rey-
recall was considered to be representative of all of the observations in the sample and not 
an artifact of a few. 
 
7.4.7 Validation of Models 
 
The best/parsimonious models developed in Section 7.4.4 and the model based on the two 
predictors (trail and rey-recall) of Section 7.4.6 needed to be validated. Validation of 
regression models manifests the reasonableness and stability of regression coefficients, 
the  utility  and  plausibility  of  the  regression  function  and  the  ability  to  generalize 
inferences that are drawn from the model (Kutner et al., 2005). The basis for many of the 
techniques  that  are  employed  in  model  development  is  the  fit  of  the  model  to  the 
available data, and therefore it apparently may seem that a well fitting model will also be 
a  successful  predictor;  however,  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case.  Therefore,  formal 
techniques of model validation have to be employed. The three fundamental techniques 
of validating a regression model are (Montgomery et al., 2006): 
•  Investigate the model’s predictive ability by collecting new (or fresh) data. 217 
 
•  Use a holdout sample to check the model and its predictive performance (data 
splitting i.e., setting aside some of the original data sample). Some times, data 
splitting is called cross validation. 
•  Comparison of results with prior experience, theoretical expectations, empirical 
results and simulation results etc. 
The best validation technique is through the collection of new data (Kutner et al., 2005), 
and  then  to  compare  the  predictions  made  by  the  model  against  them.  Accurate 
predictions of new data by the model will instill confidence in the model and the model-
building process. However, collection of new  data is not always practical or  feasible 
because of limited resources, dismantled experimental plant etc. In such situations, the 
holdout technique (data-splitting) holds more promise, when the data set is large. In the 
data-splitting technique, the data set is split into two sets, the first set is called the model-
building set or the training sample and is used to develop the model, while the second set 
is called the validation or prediction set and is used to evaluate the reasonableness and 
predictive  ability  of  the  model.  The  regression  model  is  developed  from  the  model-
building set and the validation set is then used to evaluate the predictive ability of the 
model. One potential drawback of the data splitting method is that it reduces the precision 
with which the regression coefficients are estimated (Kutner et al., 2005). That is, the 
standard errors of the regression coefficients that are estimated from the model-building 
set will be larger than they would have been if all the data (i.e., without splitting) had 
been used up in estimating the regression coefficients (Kutner et al., 2005; Montgomery 
et al., 2006; Snee, 1977). However, if the model-building set is reasonably large, then the 
standard errors will in general not be much larger than they would have been if all the 
data (i.e., without splitting) had been used in estimating the regression coefficients.  
Since  our  sample  was  relatively  small,  using  the  data-splitting  technique  of  model 
validation would have resulted in imprecise regression estimates from the model-building 
set thereby resulting in an unreliable model (to be validated) which would have negated 
the whole exercise/essence of model validation.   
Harrell et al. (1996) recommend the use of the entire sample in model development as 
according to the authors, data are too precious to waste. However, refinements of data-
splitting exist. For smaller data sets, the K-fold cross-validation procedure is employed 218 
 
(Kutner et al., 2005). In the K-fold cross-validation procedure, the data are split into K 
roughly equal parts. Out of the k = 1, 2, ….., K parts, the k
th part is used as the validation 
set and the remaining K-1 parts are used as the model-building set and a measure of 
prediction error is obtained; the K estimates of prediction errors are then combined to 
produce  a K-fold cross-validation estimate. When the data split is such that K= n, it 
becomes  the  PRESS  statistic  variant  of  data-splitting  (Montgomery  et  al.,  2006; 
Weisberg, 2005; Snee, 1977). In the PRESS Statistic variant of data-splitting, almost all 
the data (except one observation) is used to estimate the regression coefficients/model. A 
model is estimated from all observations except observation i . Then this model is used to 
predict the fitted value  ( ) ˆ
i y of observation i. Thus a model is used to predict a response 
variable for an observation whose data was not used in the development of the model. 
The prediction error of observation i is given by: 
  ( ) ( ) ˆ i i i e y y = −   (7.8) 
Where, 
( ) i e = prediction error for observation i. 
i y = Observed value of observation i. 
( ) ˆ
i y = Fitted value from model estimated from all observations except i. 
This prediction error calculation is repeated for all observations i = 1, 2,…, n.  These 
prediction  errors  are  called  PRESS  residuals.  It  is  possible  to  calculate  n  PRESS 
residuals without fitting n different regressions. The i
th PRESS residual is given by: 
  ( ) 1
i
i
ii
e
e
h
=
−
  (7.9) 
Where, 
( ) i e = prediction error for observation i (i
th PRESS residual). 
i e =  Ordinary residual of observation i. 
ii h =  i th diagonal element of the hat matrix. 
Large PRESS residuals have the potential to identify observations where the model does 
not fit the data well or observations where the model is likely to provide poor future 
predictions (Montgomery et al., 2006). The  prediction error sum of squares (i.e., the sum 219 
 
of squared PRESS residuals) called the PRESS statistic is used as measure of model 
quality. The PRESS statistic is: 
  ( )
2
1
ˆ PRESS
n
i i
i
y y
=
  = −   ∑   (7.10) 
 
2
1 1
n
i
i ii
e
h =
 
=   −   ∑  
A model with a small value of PRESS is favoured. PRESS is considered as a measure of 
how well a model performs in predicting new data (Montgomery et al., 2006). It is used 
to calculate an R
2-like statistic (R
2
prediction) for prediction, which gives an indication of the 
predictive capability of the model: 
 
2
prediction
PRESS
R 1
T SS
= −   (7.11) 
Where,  T SS is the total sum of squares. The equation for 
2
prediction R  is analogous to that of 
the Coefficient of Multiple Determination R
2 given by: 
 
2 R 1
T
SSE
SS
= −   (7.12) 
SSEis the error sum of squares given by  ( )
2
1
ˆ
n
i i
i
y y
=
− ∑ , where  i y is the observed value of 
observation i and  ˆi y  is the fitted value of observation i. Table 7.17 shows the PRESS 
statistic,  R
2  and  R
2
prediction  for  the  best/parsimonious  models  of  the  three  scenarios 
developed in Section 7.4.4 and the model developed for the two predictors (trail and rey-
recall) in Section 7.4.6. 
 
Table 7.17 PRESS statistic, R
2, and R
2
prediction for the four models developed in Sections 
7.4.4 and 7.4.6. 
Regression Model  PRESS statistic  R
2  R
2
prediction 
Pessimistic Case  5831.133  0.59  0.53 
Optimistic Case  5933.261  0.59  0.52 
Deletion of Case of Driver “O56”  6701.847  0.52  0.45 
Two predictor model (trail and rey-recall)  6744.327  0.51  0.46 220 
 
 
Table 7.17 shows for example that for the Pessimistic Case model, R
2
prediction was 0.53 
and R
2 was 0.59 thus it is expected of this model to explain 53 percent of the variability 
of driving performance index in new data as compared to 59 percent of the variability 
explained by the least-squares fit to the model-building data set. The loss/degradation in 
R
2 with regard to the four models of Table 7.17 for the Pessimistic Case, Optimistic 
Case, Deletion of Case of Driver “O56” and the Two predictor model was 0.06, 0.07, 
0.07 and 0.05 respectively. The loss/degradation  in R
2 is small keeping in view that 
Montgomery et al. (2006) have termed a loss/degradation of 0.0632 (i.e. 6.32 percent) as 
slight  and  Ratrout  et  al.  (2004)  have  made  the  following  comment  relevnt  to  a 
degradation in R
2 of 0.128 (i.e. 12.8 percent) when validating their model: “Nevertheless, 
the  degradation  in  R
2  is  not  severe  enough  to  suspect  a  serious  inconsistency  in  the 
behavior of Model 1”. Therefore, there is reasonably strong evidence that the models will 
be satisfactory predictors. It would have been useful to have an accepted statistical test to 
judge the acceptable degradation in R
2; however, such a test is not available. 
The  signs  of  the  coefficients  of  all  four  models of  table  7.17  were  correct  and  their 
magnitudes reasonable. The variance inflation factors (VIF), which is a multicollinearity 
diagnostic also serves as an important guides to the validity of a model. If a VIF of a 
predictor exceeds 5 or 10 (Montgomery et al., 2006; Snee, 1977), it indicates that its 
coefficient is poorly estimated or unstable due to the near-linear dependencies that exist 
among  the  predictors  /  regressors.  Variance  Inflation  Factors(VIFs)  relevant  to  all 
predictors in all  four models were way down below 5 thereby manifesting stability of 
regression coefficients. 
 
7.4.8 Results and Discussion 
 
The best/parsimonious models developed for the three scenarios of Section 7.4 are given 
below in Equations 7.13, 7.14 and 7.15: 
•   Pessimistic Case   
( ) ( ) ( )
-0.5
e =104.31+23.40 +1 -7.83 log +0.72 DPI dichotic ufov3 rey-recall  
 
  (7.13) 221 
 
•  Optimistic Case 
( ) ( ) ( )
-0.5
e =105.09+22.93 +1 -8 log +0.73 DPI dichotic ufov3 rey-recall    
  (7.14) 
•  Deletion of Case of Driver “O56” scenario 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
-0.5
e =104.43+22.63 +1 -8.06 log +0.76 DPI dichotic ufov3 rey-recall  
 
  (7.15) 
 
The model based on the two predictors (trail and rey-recall) of Section 7.4.6 is given 
below by Equation 7.16: 
  ( ) ( ) 98.72 0.22 0.88 DPI trail rey recall = − + −   (7.16) 
The regression models for the three scenarios (i.e. Equations 7.13, 7.14 and 7.15) are 
essentially  the  same  as  they  have  the  same  functional  form,  the  same  predictors, 
essentially  the  same  coefficients  and  essentially  the  same  predictive  performance. 
Therefore, in practice it will make little difference which of these is adopted. This shows 
that the single missing value of driver “O56” for the dichotic listening test did not have 
much bearing on the development of the models. However, it was decided to adopt the 
model relevant to the Pessimistic Case (Equation 7.13) as it had the lowest BIC value 
(267.95) and a higher R
2 value (0.59). The Coefficient of Multiple Determination (R
2) is 
a global statistic used to assess the fit of a model. The relatively high value of 0.59 
showed that 59 percent of the variation in the Driving Performance Index (DPI) was 
explained  by  the  three  cognitive  tests.  The  interpretation  for  the  partial  regression 
coefficient of rey-recall is that a unit increase in rey-recall would result in an increase of 
0.73 in the Driving Performance Index (DPI) when all other predictors (i.e. dichotic and 
ufov3) are held constant. Partial regression coefficients relevant to ufov3 and dichotic can 
not be interpreted as these predictors are in transformed form. The mismatch (as evident 
from  the  not-too-high  R
2)  between  the  three  neuropsychological  tests  and  Driving 
Performance Index (DPI) is because besides cognitive functions, the role of experience, 
adaptability and motivation can not be downplayed in driving (Ranney, 1994; Lundqvist, 
2001; Lundqvist & Ronnberg, 2001 cited in Radford et al., 2004). The model based on 
trail and rey-recall could not compete with the Pessimistic Case model (Equation 7.13) 222 
 
as it had a lower R
2 value (0.51) and a higher BIC value (274.06). Although these two 
tests (trail and rey-recall) are paper-and-pencil tests that are easy to administer, together 
they failed to account for a higher percentage of variability in Driving Performance Index 
(DPI) than the other three tests (dichotic, ufov3 and rey-recall) as a group. One potential 
draw-back of especially using the trail test for such predictive purposes could be that a 
candidate could get hold of a standard testing sheet and through practice acquaint himself 
with the spatial configurations of letters and alphabets which would allow him to get a 
higher but biased score. The Driving Performance Index (DPI) in these models may be 
regarded as a general driving performance index that was obtained by considering all 24 
driving performance parameters. This index gives an idea of the general driving skill of a 
driver  with  essentially  the  same  emphasis  being  placed  on  each  driving  performance 
parameter, be it for example the No. of Total Hazards, Over Speed Limit (Percent of 
Time) or Standard Deviation in Speed DA Task and therefore, cannot be used in the 
identification of drivers exhibiting risky driving behavior due to cognitive impairment. In 
order to identify drivers exhibiting risky driving behavior due to cognitive impairment, it 
is necessary that the effects of parameters that assess driving skills at the “controlled 
processing level” (“effortful” processing) be isolated from the rest of the parameters, 
before undertaking evaluation of risky-driving behavior based on these broader categories 
of parameters. Since these effects were not isolated in the Driving Performance Index 
(DPI) in the model, therefore this index is not capable of discriminating between risky 
driving behavior due to cognitive impairment and normal driving behaviour.          
Although,  the  model  involving  the  trail  test  did  not  stand  out  higher  with  regard  to 
explaining the variation in the Driving performance Index (DPI), however, the trail test 
has correlated strongly with a wide range of driving performance measures in participants 
with Parkinson’s Disease (Stolwyk et al., 2006); McKenna (McKenna, 1998) had some 
success  in  using  it  to  screen  drivers;  has  high  sensitivity  to  the  progressive  cognitive 
declines that take place during the course of Dementia (Storandt et al., 1984 cited in Stutts et. 
al., 1998); is recommended by the AMA (The American Medical Association) due to its 
correlation with driving performance (in simulators and on-road tests) in older adults with 
dementia (Carr et al., 2006). As obvious from the cited studies, the trail test is sensitive 
when a state of neurologic disease exists (or the population is a clinical population), in 223 
 
these situations it is bound to show some good correlation with driving performance / 
screening  because  of  covariability.  Our  sample  consisted  of  active  drivers  from  the 
general driving population (not a clinical population), who apparently had good mental 
and physical constitution. Therefore, the trail test was bound to perform less favourably 
in gauging driving skill. According to Carr et al. (2006), a score of 180 seconds or longer 
on the trail test (i.e. Trail Making-B test) indicates an increased risk of unsafe driving. 
Based on normal mixture cluster analysis, out of 56 drivers, 8 drivers were identified as 
possessing poor driving skills, whereas out of these 8 drivers, only one driver (“O56”) 
had a trail score of 180 seconds or greater (his score was 191 seconds). This clearly 
shows the tendency of the trail test to identify only the most severe cases (which are 
relatively easy to identify) and its failure to demarcate the drivers/cases having doubtful 
skills (which are the most challenging to identify for further on-road tests). The cognitive 
tests  dichotic,  ufov3  and  rey-recall  which  were  identified  as  predictors  in  the 
best/parsimonious  model  were  also  intuitively  the  most  appropriate  tests  bearing 
relevance for driving skill. Reger et al.(2004) conducted meta-analysis of 27 primary studies 
to examine the relationship between neuropsychological functioning and driving ability for 
adults with dementia and concluded that visuospatial skills and attention were most helpful in 
screening  at  risk  drivers.  Christie  et  al.  (2001a)  identified  visual  memory,  executive 
abilities, spatial awareness and attention as predictors of driving skill. The three cognitive 
tests  (dichotic,  ufov3  and  rey-recall)  as  a  whole  measure  visual-spatial  construction 
ability, visual memory, organizational, planning and problem solving skills (executive 
functioning), motor functioning, ability to switch attention, vulnerability to distraction, 
selective attention, visual processing speed, divided and spatial attention. Impairments in 
visual memory (which  are primarily measured  by rey-recall) also contributes to poor 
decision  making  (based  on  incorrect  input)  thereby  increasing  drivers’  risk  of  errors, 
crashes  and  injuries  (Rizzo  &  Kellison,  2004).  Kahneman  et  al.  (1973)  reported 
correlation coefficients ranging from 0.29 to 0.37 between errors on the dichotic listening 
test and crashes over a one year period in young professional bus drivers aged 22 to 32. 
Parasuraman & Nestor (1991) give a list of other studies (along with relevant data in tabular 
format) that show significant correlation starting from 0.3 to 0.4 between measures of driving 
performance (using accident rate or closed-course driving performance index) and at least 224 
 
one  measure  of  selective  attention  (which  is  measured  by  the  dichotic  listening  test). 
Parasuraman & Nestor (1993) also report that the ability to switch attention (such as in the 
dichotic listening test) is also correlated with driving performance in normal individuals.  
Numerous  studies  have  been  cited  in  Section  3.7  which  show  a  significant  relationship 
between the UFOV test and driving performance/accidents. 
 
7.5 Summary 
 
This  chapter  has  described  the  development  of  linear  models,  their  diagnostics  and 
validation.  The  driving  performance  index  DPI-weighted  was  regressed  against 
neuropsychological tests. The rationale and procedure for the initial screening of the nine 
candidate  predictors  (cognitive  tests)  to  six  predictors  (trail,  rey-copy,  rey-recall, 
dichotic, paper and ufov3) has been highlighted. The methodology adopted to resolve the 
issue of the missing value of driver “O56” (a vital case) on the dichotic listening test has 
been described considering three scenarios: 
•  Assigning the most optimistic outcome to the missing value (Optimistic case). 
•  Assigning the most pessimistic outcome to the missing value (Pessimistic case). 
•  Dropping the missing value observation/case (Deletion of Case of Driver “O56” 
scenario).    
The process of development of full models for the three scenarios has been explained in 
detail along with diagnostics through the aid of statistical tests and graphical displays 
including  the  identification  of  outlier  and  influential  points.  Best/parsimonious  model 
selection using the computation intensive technique of all regression models along with 
the AIC, BIC and Cp criterion as measure of goodness, has been demonstrated for all 
three  scenarios.  The  process  of  best/parsimonious  model  development  and  their 
diagnostics  through  the  aid  of  statistical  tests  and  graphical  displays  including  the 
identification of outlier and influential points has been elaborated upon. A separate model 
has been developed for two of the easy to administer paper-and-pencil tests (trail and rey-
recall).  Validation  methodology  has  been  outlined  and  all  models  validated  with 
reasonably  strong  evidence  that  they  will  be  satisfactory  predictors.  The 
best/parsimonious regression models for the three scenarios are essentially the same as 225 
 
they have the same functional form, the same predictors, essentially the same coefficients 
and the same predictive performance. Therefore, in practice it will make little difference 
which  of  these  is  adopted.  In  the  model,  59  percent  of  the  variation  in  the  Driving 
Performance Index (DPI), which can be regarded as an index of general driving ability, is 
explained by the dichotic, ufov3 and rey-recall cognitive tests. The model based on trail 
and rey-recall can not compete with this model, on account of its relatively low R
2 value 
and relatively higher  BIC value.  Logistic  regression modeling using the dichotomous 
categorization of drivers as the dependent variable and cognitive tests as predictors is 
described in the next chapter.  
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8 Logistic Regression Model 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The  objectives  of  this  chapter  were  to  develop  logistic  regression  models  that  would 
discriminate “poor-drivers” from “not-poor-drivers” by using: (1) A single cognitive test 
that brings about the best discrimination (2) Age as predictor (3) A composite measure of 
all nine cognitive tests as a predictor. And the identification of the model that brings 
about the best discrimination amongst the three models. To model the “poor-drivers” 
through  logistic  regression  using  different  cognitive  tests,  it  was  necessary  that  the 
dependent variable (driver grouping) be dichotomized into “poor drivers” and “not-poor-
drivers”  from  the  three-group  classification  obtained  in  Sections  6.4.7  and  6.5.  In 
Sections 6.4.7 and 6.5, a clustering regime based on the variables DPI3-weighted, No. of 
Total Hazards and No. of Low-speed Warnings and three clusters was found to provide 
the  best  solution.  The  three  groupings  of  drivers  and  their  mean  values  on  the  three 
variables are reproduced in Table 8.1. 
 
Table 8.1 Mean values of DPI3-weighted, No. of Total Hazards and No. of Low-
speed Warnings for model EEV with BIC of -1075.632. 
Groups for model EEV with 3 clusters/groups having BIC of -1075.632 
Group 
No. 
Number of 
Drivers 
Mean No. of 
Total 
Hazards 
Mean No. of Low-
Speed warnings 
Mean DPI3-
weighted 
1  20  8.1  441.55  -0.2607223 
2  8  16.5  553  -0.8960832 
3  28  7.321429  381.0357  0.4422541 
Maximum & Minimum value of No. of Total Hazards = 30, 2 
Maximum & Minimum value of No. of Low-Speed warnings = 656, 286 
Maximum & Minimum value of DPI3-weighted = 1.158719, - 2.083781 
 
On average, group No.3 had the highest score on DPI3-weighted (a driving index), the 
lowest No. of Total Hazards and the lowest No. of Low-speed Warnings. Similarly, group 
No.1 had favourable scores on all these variables compared with group no. 2. Despite the 
fact that drivers in Group no.2 were on average driving at the lowest speeds, they had the 227 
 
greatest number of accidents etc (i.e. no. of total hazards) and had low rating on all other 
driving performance measures (i.e. DPI3-weighted). This substantiates their classification 
as “poor drivers”. Figure 8.1 shows a driver-classification graph of No. of Low-speed 
Warnings against No. of Total Hazards for the driver groupings of Table 8.1. The square 
symbols  represent  group  No.2,  the  triangular  symbols  group  No.1,  and  the  circular 
symbols  represent  group  No.3  (the  ellipses  superimposed  on  the  classification  plot 
correspond  to  the  multivariate  analogs  of  the  standard  deviations  for  each  mixture 
component (i.e. they correspond to the covariances of the components) with centers at the 
means  k k k k μ μ μ μ ). Table 8.1 and Figure 8.1 indicate that the attributes of group No. 2 are quite 
deviant from the other two groups (i.e. group No. 1 & 3), which are relatively quite close. 
Since in logistic regression the dependent variable must be dichotomous, it was logical to 
merge group No. 1 and 3 to form a “not-poor-drivers” group and designate group No. 2 
as the “poor-drivers” group.  
Thus the “poor drivers” group consisted of 8 drivers and the “not-poor-drivers” group of 
48. Following the conventions of logistic regression and our objective, the 8 drivers were 
coded as 1 (i.e. the event of interest occurred) and the remaining 48 as zero (i.e. the event 
of interest did not occur) under the dependent variable category. To predict the binary 
response (i.e.  “poor drivers” and  “not-poor-drivers”) through different cognitive tests, 
logistical  modeling  was  chosen  instead  of  the  alternative  technique  of  discriminant 
analysis because in discriminant analysis the assumption that the predictors follow a joint 
multivariate normal distribution is rarely if ever satisfied (Kutner et al., 2005; Hosmer 
and Lemeshow, 2000). Besides, logistic regression modeling is remarkably flexible and 
unless the data set has most of the probabilities as very small or very large, or where the 
fit is extremely poor (which can be identified systematically), it is unlikely for any other 
modeling technique to provide a better fit (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). There are no 
assumptions  required  regarding  the  distributions  of  predictors  in  logistic  regression 
(Tabachnick  &  Fidell,  2007).  The  following  sections  describe  the  details  of  the 
development of logistic regression models. 
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Figure 8.1 Driver-classification graph of No. of Low-speed Warnings against No. of Total 
Hazards for model EEV with 3 groups/clusters having BIC of -1075.632. 
 
8.2 Sample size considerations 
 
In logistic regression, the quite general approach of ML (Maximum Likelihood) is used 
in estimation primarily because of two reasons (Allison, 1995). The estimators produced 
by ML have good large-sample properties. ML estimators are consistent, asymptotically 
efficient, and asymptotically normal provided that certain regularity conditions are met. 
To clarify further, Allison (1995) elaborates that Consistency means that as the sample 
becomes larger, the estimates converge in probability to the true values (i.e. the estimates 
Group No. 2 
Group No. 3 
Group No. 1 229 
 
will be approximately unbiased in large samples). Asymptotically efficient means that the 
estimates will have standard errors that are (approximately) at least as small as that for 
any other estimation method, in large samples. And  Asymptotically normal means that in 
large samples, the sampling distribution of the estimates will be approximately normal, 
and therefore the normal and chi-square distributions can be used to compute confidence 
intervals and p-values. All these approximations get better as sample size gets larger. 
According to Allison (1995), both for large samples and small, researchers routinely use 
ML estimation, but he urges caution in interpreting p-values and confidence intervals 
when  the  samples  are  small  and  considers  the  use  of  smaller  p-values  to  be  more 
reasonable in order to compensate for the poor approximation to the normal and chi-
square distributions (for the likelihood ratio and Wald tests), in small samples.    
The  indications  of  problems  of  small  number  of  observations/cases  relevant  to  the 
number of predictors are that extremely high parameter estimates and standard errors 
result (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007); the natural course of action then would be to either 
increase the number of observations or eliminate one or more predictors.    
The number of parameters (of logistic regression) that can be reasonably estimated with 
maximum likelihood depends not only on the overall sample size but on factors such as 
the marginal balance on the “1’s” and “zeros” of the dependent variable (i.e. the degree of 
lop sidedness of the dependent variable; in other words when there are few 1’s and lots of 
“zeros”, or vice versa) and the distribution of the predictors (Jewell, 2004). In logistic 
regression, there should be about 10 events (the number of events being the smaller of the 
number of “1’s” and “zeros” of the dependent variable) per predictor variable in order to 
obtain reasonably stable estimates of regression coefficients (Belle, 2002; Jewell, 2004) 
and  parameters  no  more  than  10  percent  of  the  sample  size  (Jewell,  2004).  This  is 
because,  in  order  to  detect  partial  effects,  multiple  logistic  regression  requires  larger 
sample sizes (Agresti, 2007).   
Keeping in view the overall sample size, the number of candidate  predictors , and the lop 
sidedness of the dependent variable (i.e. 8 versus 48), the decision to begin a multivariate 
logistic model based on all possible predictors (trail, clock, rey-copy, rey-recall, dichotic, 
paper, ufov1, ufov2, ufov3) or a smaller subset of them was not appropriate as it would 
have resulted in a numerically unstable model (thereby making use of the likelihood ratio 230 
 
tests unreliable). Instead, as per recommendation of Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) it was 
decided to fit nine univariate models, one for each predictor (i.e. each cognitive test) and 
use a variety of criterion to aid decision making in selecting the best model. 
 
8.3 Selecting the Best Univariate Model 
 
Because  of  the  missing  value  encountered  for  the  dichotic  listening  test  with  driver 
“O56”,  univariate  logistic  regression  models  were  developed  for  the  following  three 
scenarios using the statistical software Stata
®:         
1.   Pessimistic Case (dichotic score = 100 for driver “O56”). 
2.  Optimistic Case (dichotic score = 17.11 for driver “O56”). 
3.  Deletion of Case of Driver “O56”. 
The dependent variable  y  was  coded  as 1  for  “poor-drivers” and as 0  for “not-poor-
drivers”  and  the  nine  cognitive  tests  were  considered  one  at  a  time  for  each  of  the 
aforementioned three scenarios. Details of the technique of logistic regression can be 
found  in  Hosmer  and  Lemeshow  (2000),  Agresti  (2007),  Kutner  et  al.  (2005),  Long 
(1997) and Long and Freese (2006). A number of Goodness-of-fit statistics relevant to 
each model were computed and are shown in Table 8.2 for the Pessimistic Case scenario. 
 
Table 8.2 Goodness-of-fit statistics for univariate logistic regression models for the 
Pessimistic Case scenario. 
Univariate Logistic Regression for  Pessimistic case (dichotic score=100) 
Univariate Model with Predictor  P-value  Deviance  BIC  AIC  Pseudo-R
2 
Ufov3  0.0001  29.68  37.73  33.68  0.3539 
Dichotic  0.0002  32.07  40.12  36.07  0.3017 
Trail   0.0015  35.85  43.9  39.85  0.2195 
Rey-copy  0.0032  37.27  45.32  41.27  0.1886 231 
 
Univariate Logistic Regression for  Pessimistic case (dichotic score=100) 
Univariate Model with Predictor  P-value  Deviance  BIC  AIC  Pseudo-R
2 
Paper  0.0048  37.98  46.03  41.98  0.1731 
Clock  0.0069  38.64  46.69  42.64  0.1587 
Rey-recall  0.0089  39.08  47.13  43.08  0.1492 
Ufov2  0.0091  39.14  47.19  43.14  0.148 
Ufov1  0.2147  44.39  52.44  48.39  0.0335 
 
The  P-value  in  Table  8.2  is  relevant  to  the  likelihood  ratio  test  and  is  based  on  the 
comparison of the Full and Reduced models, where the Full model is the current model 
and  in  the  present  context  includes  the  constant  0 β and  1 β   and  the  Reduced  Model 
consists of the null model i.e. a model based on only the constant  0 β . In other words, H0:
1 0 β =   against  Ha:  1 0 β ≠ .  It  is  an  omnibus  test  to  see  if  the  model  as  a  whole  is 
statistically significant. The test statistic is given by: 
  ( ) ( )
2 2 log log e e G L R F = − −      (8.1) 
Where,  ( ) loge L R is the log likelihood of the Reduced Model (null model in this case) 
and  ( ) loge F is the log likelihood of the Full Model (model with intercept and predictor). 
When H0 holds, G
2  has a 
2 χ distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference 
in the degrees of freedom of the Full and Reduced model (i.e. difference in the number of 
parameters of the two models). To illustrate the case when only the predictor ufov3 is in 
the model (see Table 8.2) we get (log likelihoods in Appendix-G):  
  ( )
2 2 22.966514 14.839488 16.25 G = − − − − =       (8.2) 
Since G
2 = 16.25 with  1 degree of freedom (D.F) has a P-value of 0.0001, we conclude 
Ha that ufov3 is highly significant and should not be dropped from the model.  232 
 
 The Deviance compares a given model with a saturated model. A saturated model has as 
many  parameters  as  there  are  data  points,  so  the  data  is  reproduced  by  the  model 
perfectly. The Deviance statistic does not have a chi-squared distribution and is given by: 
  ( ) ( ) 2 log fitted model log saturated model e e D L L = − −      (8.3) 
The Deviance in context of logistic regression plays the same role as the error sum of 
squares (residual sum of squares) plays in linear regression and has a prominent role in 
some approaches in assessing goodness-of-fit (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). Loge L 
(fitted  model)  is  the  log  Likelihood  of  the  current  model.  In  logistic  regression,  the 
Likelihood  of  the  saturated  model  is  1  (and  therefore  Log  Likelihood  is  zero).  To 
illustrate the case when only the predictor ufov3 is in the model (see Table 8.2) we get 
(log likelihoods in Appendix-G): 
  ( ) 2 14.839488 29.68 D=− − =   (8.4) 
BIC (Bayesian information criterion) and AIC (Akaike’s information criterion) is given 
by (Kutner et al., 2005):  
  ( ) ( ) 2log log e e BIC L b p n =− +   (8.5) 
  ( ) 2log 2 e AIC L b p =− +   (8.6) 
Where loge L(b) is the log Likelihood of the fitted model,  p is the number of parameters 
in the model (including constant) and n is the number of observations. Promising models 
will have relatively small values of BIC and AIC. The criterion is used to assess the 
overall fit of a model and can be used to compare both nested and non-nested models, 
however, the BIC is gaining more popularity (Long, 1997). To illustrate the case when 
only  the  predictor  ufov3  is  in  the  model  (see  Table  8.2)  we  get  (log  likelihoods  in 
Appendix-G): 
  ( ) 2 14.839488 2 log 56 37.73 e BIC =− − + =   (8.7) 
  ( ) ( ) 2 14.839488 2 2 33.68 AIC =− − + =   (8.8) 
The Pseudo-R
2 (also called McFadden’s R
2) compares a model with just the intercept (i.e. 
null model) to a model with other parameters besides the intercept (Long and Freese, 
2006). It is the proportion of change in terms of the Log Likelihood and is given by: 233 
 
  ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
2
McF
log Intercept log Full log Full
1
log Intercept log Intercept
e e e
e e R
−
= = −   (8.9) 
Where  loge  (Full)  is  the  Log  likelihood  of  the  full  model  (i.e.  model  with  other 
parameters  besides  the  intercept)  and  loge  (intercept)  is  the  Log  Likelihood  of  the 
intercept only model (i.e. the null model). Analogous to R
2 in linear regression, loge 
(Intercept) is thought of as the total sum of squares and loge (Full) as residual sum of 
squares (i.e. error sum of squares) (Long, 1997). Pseudo-R
2 always increases as variables 
are added to the model. Pseudo-R
2 values are low compared to typical R
2 values that are 
encountered in good linear regression models, because low Pseudo-R
2 values in logistic 
regression are the norm. However, as a statistic in evaluating competing models, they 
may be helpful in the model building stage (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). To illustrate 
the  case  when  only  the  predictor  ufov3  is  in  the  model  (see  Table  8.2)  we  get  (log 
likelihoods in Appendix-G): 
 
2
McF
14.839488
1 0.3539
22.966514 R
−
= − =
−
  (8.10) 
Both the AIC and BIC involve penalties that are based on the number of parameters in 
the model. Therefore, both criteria trade-off fit of the model in terms of Log Likelihood 
against complexity (by providing the penalties p loge (n) and 2 p for adding predictors in 
the BIC and AIC expressions respectively). A major draw-back of using deviance as a 
model selection criterion is that the Deviance (which essentially is -2 loge L(b)) will never 
increase  as  terms  are  added  to  the  model  because  there  is  no  penalty  for  adding 
predictors.    
The best model for the Pessimistic Case scenario evident from Table 8.2 is a univariate 
model  based  on  the  ufov3  cognitive  test  because  of  the  lowest  BIC,  AIC  and  even 
Deviance. The Pseudo-R
2 of this model is also the highest and the P-value (0.0001) for 
the likelihood ratio test indicates that the model is statistically highly significant. The 
next best univariate models in decreasing order of over all fit are the models based on 
dichotic, trail, rey-copy and paper cognitive tests (ancillary detail at Appendix-G). This 
procedure was repeated for the Optimistic Case scenario and the Deletion of Case of 
Driver “O56” scenario and the same results were obtained (detail at Appendix-G). The 
best model was based on the ufov3 test, and since there was no missing value present on 234 
 
this test, it was decided to develop a single univariate model based on all 56 observations 
of the ufov3 test. 
 
8.4 Development, Diagnostics and Validation of univariate 
logistic regression model (ufov3 based) 
 
Having determined the cognitive test (ufov3) that constitutes the best fitting model to the 
data, the next step was to determine the correct functional form of ufov3 in which it 
should enter the model (i.e. whether the model is linear in the logit for ufov3), assess 
goodness-of-fit of the model (overall measures of fit) and perform diagnostics analysis. 
Before these analyses are carried out it is necessary to elaborate the concept of covariate 
pattern. Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) recommends calculating diagnostic statistics by 
covariate pattern. All subjects/observations having the same covariate values (the same 
values on the predictors) constitute a particular covariate pattern. For example, in the 56 
observations (relevant to drivers) there were 38 covariate patterns (i.e. there were 38 
distinct/unique  values  of  ufov3).  The  model  is  developed/fitted  based  on  individual 
subject/observation data, however, the covariate pattern is taken into account when the fit 
of the model is assessed (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). The covariate values (predictor 
values), fitted values and diagnostic statistics are the same for all subjects/observations 
with  a  particular  covariate  pattern,  but  each  subject/observation  has  an  individual 
outcome. The covariate pattern approach to assessing goodness-of-fit and diagnostics is 
necessary because if the number of covariate patterns is much smaller than n (the total 
number of observations), identification of influential and/or poorly fit covariate patterns 
may be missed (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). 
To determine the correct functional form of ufov3 in which it should enter the model, the 
scatterplot smooth approach was used (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). In this approach, 
first  a  Lowess  curve  is  fitted  to  a  graph  between  observed  response  (i.e.  for  “poor-
drivers” y=1 and for “not-poor-drivers” y=0) on the y-axis and ufov3 on the x-axis. It 
may be highlighted that the Lowess curve follows the general trend in the data. Ordinates 
corresponding to each ufov3 value are read from this graph which are in fact probabilities 235 
 
of being a “poor-driver” and these probabilities are converted into logits using Equation 
8.16, which are called smoothed logits. Finally a graph is drawn between the smoothed 
logits and ufov3 which is called a scatterplot smooth, shown in Figure 8.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Graph of Smoothed Logit against ufov3. 
 
Figure 8.2 supports treating ufov3 as linear in the logit (i.e., no transformation of ufov3). 
The results of logistic regression for the predictor ufov3 are shown in Tables 8.3 to 8.5. 
 
Table 8.3 Goodness-of-fit statistics for univariate logistic regression using ufov3 
Logistic Regression Model with ufov3 as predictor  
Number of observations  56 
Log Likelihood of Null Model  -22.966514 
Log Likelihood of Full Model  -14.839488 
Likelihood ratio Chi-square (1)  16.25 
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
S
m
o
o
t
h
e
d
 
L
o
g
i
t
0 100 200 300 400 500
UFOV3
Graph of Smoothed Logit against ufov3236 
 
Logistic Regression Model with ufov3 as predictor  
Prob > Chi-square  0.0001 
Pseudo-R
2  0.3539 
AIC  33.67898 
BIC  37.72968 
Deviance  29.679 
 
Table 8.4 Coefficients for univariate logistic regression using ufov3 
Predictor  Coefficient  Standard Error  z  P>| z |  95% Conf. Interval 
ufov3  0.019135  0.0064765  2.95  0.003  0.0064412  0.0318288 
constant  -4.591905  1.161746  -3.95  0  -6.868885  -2.314925 
 
Table 8.5 Odd Ratio for univariate logistic regression using ufov3 
Predictor  Odds Ratio  Standard Error  z  P>| z |  95% Conf. Interval 
ufov3  1.019319  0.0066017  2.95  0.003  1.006462  1.032341 
 
To  see  whether  the  logistic  regression  model  fits  the  data  well  overall,  the  Pearson 
goodness-of-fit  test  was  carried  out,  which  uses  the  covariate  patterns  in  the  data  as 
groups. The test is based on the idea of comparing an observed number of individuals to 
the number expected calculated from the fitted model. These observed  (O) and expected 
(E) numbers are then combined to form a goodness-of-fit 
2 χ  statistic. Large values of the 
statistic indicate a poor fit (with its concomitant small p-values). The Pearson goodness-
of-fit test gave a chi-square (36 degrees of freedom) value of 40.71 translating to a p-
value of 0.2707, which indicated that overall the model fitted the data well. Another way 
of  graphically  assessing  the  fit  of  the  model  is  to  plot  a  Lowess    graph  comparing 
predicted probabilities to a moving average of the proportion of cases that are 1 (i.e., 
“poor-drivers”). In other words a Lowess (smoother curve) graph between the observed 
outcome i.e. coded 1 for “poor-driver” and 0 for “not-poor-driver” on the y-axis and 
predicted probability of being a “poor-driver” on the x-axis. Such a graph is shown at 
Appendix-G, where a diagonal straight line (having equal x-axis and y-axis values) has 
also been embedded for reference. The graph shows the Lowess (smoother curve) curve 237 
 
closely  following the diagonal line, indicating that the fraction of observed cases are 
about equal to the predicted probabilities, which manifests a good fit of the model. 
In  diagnostics,  the  influence  of  individual  patterns  is  considered  i.e.  the  individual 
components of the summary statistics are graphically examined. The Delta Chi-square 
statistic and the Delta-D (i.e Delta-Deviance) statistic allow the identification of those 
covariate patterns that are poorly fit (large values of Delta Chi-square and/or Delta-D). 
Large values of Pregibon’s dbeta allow the identification of those covariate patterns that 
have a great deal of influence on the values of the estimated parameters of the model. The  
Delta Chi-square is defined as:       
  ( )
2 2 2
j j X X X ∆ = −   (8.11) 
Where 
2
j X ∆  is the change in the Pearson chi-square goodness of fit statistic as a result of 
deleting  covariate  pattern  j, 
2 X is  the  Pearson  chi-square  goodness  of  fit  statistic 
computed from the full data set and  ( )
2
j X  is Pearson chi-square goodness of fit statistic 
computed when covarite pattern j is deleted. The Delta-D statistic is defined as:  
  ( ) j j D DEV DEV ∆ = −   (8.12) 
     Where  j D ∆ the  change  in  the  Deviance  statistic  as  a  result  of  deleting  covariate 
pattern j, DEV is the Deviance statistic computed from the full data set and  ( ) j DEV  is the 
Deviance  statistic  computed  when  covarite  pattern  j  is  deleted.  Thus  the    Delta  Chi-
square and Delta-D statistic provide measures of the influence of the jth covariate pattern 
on these summary statistics. In order to determine n (i.e. the number of observations) 
Delta Chi-square and Delta-D statistics, n models have to be fitted in each case which is 
computation  intensive  and  time  consuming.  Therefore,  for  faster  computation,  linear 
approximations are used (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). The Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ ) 
statistic  is  used to  assess  the  influence  that  individual  covariate  patterns  have  on  the 
estimated model parameters and is the difference between the estimated parameters from 
the  full  data  set  and  the  estimated  parameters  when  a  specific  covariate  pattern  (i.e. 
pattern j) is excluded from the analysis. Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ ) represents the influence 
of covariate pattern j on all the estimated  's β simultaneously. To save computation effort 238 
 
and time (and avoid fitting the model n times), approximations of the measure have been 
developed (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). The diagnostic statistics are usually plotted 
against predicted probabilities of the outcome of interest (i.e. predicted probability of 
being  a  “poor-driver”)  obtained  from  the  model.  In  logistic  regression,  since  the 
distribution of the diagnostic statistics under the hypothesis that the models fits is not 
known with certainty, therefore, reliance on visual assessment of the plots is the mainstay 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). In assessing diagnostic statistics, the relative magnitude 
of the statistic of an observation is compared to others i.e. observations that are farther 
away  from most of the data points warrant attention. However, values of Delta Chi-
square and Delta-D statistic that not much greater than 4 are considered not high and the 
Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ ) should be larger than 1.0 for an individual covariate pattern to 
have an effect on the estimated coefficients (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000).    
Since the summary statistic (Pearson goodness-of-fit test) indicated that overall the model 
fitted  well,  therefore  it  was  not  expected  of  diagnostics  to  find  a  large  number  of 
covariate patterns being poorly fit. The graph between Delta Chi-square statistic and Pr 
(y) (i.e. predicted probability of being a “poor-driver”) and between Delta-D statistic and 
Pr (y) (i.e. predicted probability of being a “poor-driver”) in Appendix-G, shows driver 
“O13” as some distance from the balance of plotted-data and has values of both these 
statistics much greater than 4 (i.e. partly based on visual impression from the graphs and 
partly based on numeric values of these two statistics). Clearly driver “O13” is poorly fit 
by the model, as she was classified as “poor-driver” whereas her score on ufov3 was 
favourable (i.e. 67). Aside from the observation of driver “O13”, the plots show that the 
model fits reasonably well. 
The graph between Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ ) statistic and Pr (y) (i.e. predicted probability 
of being a “poor-driver”) in Appendix-G, shows driver “O13” and “O14” to be some 
distance from the balance of plotted-data, although both had values of Pregibon’s dbeta (
j β ∆ )    less  than  1.0,  still  it  was  decided  to  investigate  these  points  further.  This 
information can  also be interpreted from the  graph between Delta Chi-square (
2
j X ∆ ) 
statistic and Pr (y) (i.e. predicted probability of being a “poor-driver”) (see Appendix-G), 
where the size of the symbols is proportional to Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ ) statistic. This 239 
 
graph shows that not all influential points (large Pregibon’s dbeta) are outliers (large 
Delta Chi-square or Delta-D). 
 
Table 8.6 Estimated coefficients from all data, the percent change when the covariate 
pattern is deleted, values of Goodness-of-Fit statistic, and Odds ratio for each Model. 
Variable  All Data 
Deleting 
driver  “O13” 
Deleting 
driver  “O14” 
Deleting driver  
“O13”&“O14” 
ufov3  0.019135  29 %  21 %  68 % 
constant  -4.59190  -26  %  -11 %  -50% 
Goodness-of-fit 
Deviance  29.679  22.266  27.160  19.076 
Chi-square 
goodness  of  fit 
statistic 
40.71  16.69  44.52  15.35 
Odds Ratio (based on a unit change in ufov3) 
ufov3  1.019319  1.02498  1.023524  1.032687 
 
Table 8.7 Predicted probability of being a “poor-driver” and Observed outcome along 
with ufov3 scores for the two influential observations. 
Driver 
Code 
Age  ufov3 
Observed outcome (1=“poor-
driver”,  0 =“not-poor-driver”) 
Predicted probability of 
being “poor-driver” 
“O13”  64.2  67  1  0.0352345 
“O14”  76.9  273  0  0.652932 
 
A down side of the diagnostic statistic Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ ) is that it is a summay 
measure of change that occurs in all coefficients in the model simultaneously (and is a 
linear approximation as well), therefore it was necessary to rerun the model after deleting 
certain covariate patterns to gauge the exact change in the coefficients. Therefore, after 
identification  of  drivers  “O13”  and  “O14”  as  influential,  the  model  was  re-run  with 
observation  of  driver  “O13”  and  “O14”  individually  deleted  one  at  a  time  and  then 
simultaneously  deleted  and  the  actual  impact  on  the  coefficients  assessed  along  with 240 
 
calculation  of  goodness-of-fit  statistics  (i.e.  Deviance  and  Chi-square  goodness  of  fit 
statistic) shown in Table 8.6. By deleting observation of driver “O13” and “O14” one at a 
time,  the coefficient of ufov3 increases by 29 and 21 percent respectively compared to 
the model fitted to all data (the combined effect is even greater i.e. increase of 68 percent 
in the value of the coefficient and substantial decrease in the fit measures Deviance and 
Chi-square goodness of fit statistic). If we examine the Observed outcome and Predicted 
probability of being “poor-driver” of these drivers from Table 8.7, it becomes clear why 
these individuals have a relatively large impact on the estimated coefficients. In general 
the model predicts that the odds of being a “poor-driver” increase with increasing score 
on ufov3, but driver “O13” is a “poor-driver” (from observed outcome from Table 8.7) 
despite her relatively low score on ufov3 (and consequent low Predicted probability of 
being “poor-driver” from Table 8.7). On the other hand, driver “O14” is a “not-poor-
driver”  (from  observed  outcome  from  Table  8.7)  despite  his  relatively  high  score  on 
ufov3 (and  consequent  high Predicted probability of being “poor-driver” from Table 
8.7).  Table  8.6  also  corroborates  the  findings  from  the  diagnostic  graphs  that  driver 
“O13” is poorly fit by the model, whereas driver “O14” is not a relatively poor fit, which 
can be seen by comparing the Deviance and Chi-square goodness of fit statistic of the 
models relevant to all data and those from deleting drivers “O13” and “O14” i.e. the 
difference (decrease in values) between  the Deviance and Chi-square goodness of fit 
statistic  of  the  all-data  model  and  the  model  obtained  by  deleting  driver  “O13”  is 
substantial compared to the difference  of the all-data model and the model obtained by 
deleting driver “O14”.       
It was expected of some drivers to exhibit outcomes that were contrary to the general 
findings of the model, so this could not be formed as a sufficient basis for excluding these 
observations  in  fitting  the  model.  By  deleting  these  two  observations,  there  was  no 
substantial change in the conclusions and the estimated odds ratio for ufov3 changed in 
the direction of making the estimated effects stronger as evident from Table 8.6. The 
estimated degree of association changed but our conclusions did not change substantially. 
Also, since no data-entry errors were found relevant to these two observations and were 
considered plausible as well, therefore, it was decided to keep these observations in the 
model.     241 
 
Univariate logistic regression model is given by: 
  ( )
0 1
0 1 0 1
1
1 1
x
x x
e
e e
β β
β β β β π
+
+ − + = =
+ +
  (8.13) 
Where π is the probability of the outcome of interest (i.e. probability of being a “poor-
driver”),  0 β is the constant, and  1 β is the coefficient of the predictor x (i.e. ufov3). The 
logistic regression model developed using ufov3 as a predictor was: 
  ( ) 4.591905 0.019135 
1 ˆ
1
ufov3 e
π
− − + =
+
  (8.14) 
The  odds  of  an  outcome  of  interest  happening  is  defined  as  the  probability  that  the 
outcome of interest occurs divided by the probability that outcome of interest does not 
occur. Therefore the odds that a driver is a “poor-driver” is: 
 
0 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ 1
x Odds e
β β π
π
+ = =
−
  (8.15) 
The loge of the Odds is called the logit and is given by: 
  0 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ log
ˆ 1
e x
π
β β
π
  = +   −  
  (8.16) 
A useful inference in logistic regression is through the use of Odds ratio. The Odds ratio 
is formulated to determine how the odds of the event of interest (i.e. the odds of being a 
“poor-driver”)  increases  as  certain  changes  in  predictor  variable  values  occur  (for 
example an increase in ufov3 of say η ). The Odds ratio is the ratio of the odds of the 
event of interest (i.e. the odds of being a “poor-driver”) at condition 2 to that of condition 
1 in the predictors and is given by: 
     
 
2 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ 1 1
Odds ratio
π π
π π
    =     − −    
  (8.17) 
Therefore, the ratio reflecting the increase in odds of being a “poor-driver” when scores 
on the ufov3 increase by η  is given by (using Equations 8.15 and 8.17): 
 
( )
( )
4.591905 0.019135 3
0.019135
4.591905 0.019135 
ufov
ufov3
e
e
e
η
η
− + +
− + = =   (8.18) 
When  η is  1,  an  Odds  ratio  of  1.019319  (same  as  in  Table  8.6)  is  obtained  (using 
Equation 8.18) and a η of 40 gives an Odds ratio of 2.15. An increase in ufov3 of 1 (i.e. 242 
 
η = 1) is not meaningful keeping in view the range of variation of ufov3. This means that 
the odds of being a “poor-driver” increase over 2.15 fold for drivers having an increased  
(i.e. difference on the higher side) ufov3 score of 40 compared with the ufov3 scores of 
other drivers or in other words, the odds of being a “poor-driver” increase 115 percent for 
drivers  having  an  increased    (i.e.  difference  on  the  higher  side)  ufov3  score  of  40 
compared with the ufov3 scores of other drivers.        
 The logistic regression model of Equation 8.14, which is based on the cognitive test 
ufov3  gives  an  estimate  of  ˆ π ,  which  is  the  estimated  probability  of  the  outcome  of 
interest  (i.e.  probability  of  being  a  “poor-driver”)  and  is  a  continuous  measure.  To 
convert this continuous measure into a dichotomous scale (i.e. “poor-driver” and “not-
poor-driver”), a cut-off point on the continuous probability scale ˆ π , has to be determined 
as a prediction rule. If the value of the probability is greater than or equal to this cutoff-
point, the prediction is that of a “poor-driver” and if it is less, it translates to a “not-poor-
driver”.  As driver status is being predicted/judged through the ufov3 test, in using a 
particular cut-off value of the probability, four kinds of results are possible as shown in 
Figure 8.3. Two of these results are correct (true) and two wrong (false). From Figure 8.3, 
the test (cognitive test i.e. ufov3) gives correct results when it is positive in the “poor-
driver” status (True positive) or negative in the “not-poor-driver” status (true negative). 
On the other hand, the test is misleading if it is positive in the “not-poor-driver” status 
(false  positive)  or  negative  in  the  “poor-driver”  status  (false  negative).  Certain 
characteristics are defined relevant to the diagnostic test (cognitive test ufov3), these are 
(with reference to Figure 8.3): 
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+
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  1 1
d b
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b d b d
− = − =
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  (8.23) 
 
    Driver Status 
    “poor-driver” 
(positive) 
“not-poor-driver” 
(negative) 
Test (cognitive test 
i.e. ufov3) 
Value  of  predicted 
Probability ≥ cut-off 
(the test is positive) 
True positive 
(a) 
False positive 
(b) 
Value  of  predicted 
Probability < cut-off 
(the test is negative) 
False negative 
(c) 
True negative 
(d) 
 
Figure 8.3 The relationship between a diagnostic test (cognitive test i.e. ufov3) result and 
driver status (a, b, c and d are the number of drivers falling under the relevant category).  
 
Sensitivity is the fraction of “poor-drivers” that are correctly classified by the test (i.e. 
positive on the cognitive test ufov3). Sensitivity is also known as the True-positive rate. 
Specificity is the fraction of “not-poor-drivers” that are correctly classified by the test 
(i.e. negative on the cognitive test ufov3). The quantity (1-Specificity) given by Equation 
8.23 is known as the False-positive rate. Positive predictive value is the probability of 
being  a  “poor-driver”  with  a  positive  test  result  and  negative  predictive  value  is  the 
probability of being a “not-poor-driver” with a negative test result. In other words, for 
example, the positive predictive value answers the question, “If a driver’s test (cognitive 
test ufov3) result is positive, what are the chances that the driver will be a “poor driver?” 
It is desirable to have a test (cognitive test i.e. ufov3) that is highly sensitive and highly 
specific, but usually this is not possible. There is a trade-off between  sensitivity  and 
specificity of a diagnostic test (cognitive test i.e. ufov3), and both are affected by the 
decision of where the cut-off point is placed on the continuum of predicted probabilities. 
Consequently, sensitivity  can be increased only at the expense of specificity (or vice 
versa).  244 
 
To illustrate, as an extreme case, if the cut-point (on the predicted probability continuum) 
is set too low, sensitivity of the test will be very high resulting in the classification of 
almost everyone as a “poor-driver” with a lot of “not-poor-drivers” being erroneously 
classified as “poor drivers” thus resulting in low specificity for the test (i.e. cognitive test 
ufov3). Whereas if the cut-point is set too high, specificity of the test will be very high 
resulting in the classification of almost everyone as a “not-poor-driver” with a lot of 
“poor-drivers” being erroneously classified as “not-poor drivers”, thus resulting in low 
sensitivity for the test. In both these extreme cases, the predictive tool has no value at all. 
The goal should be to choose a cut-point so as to produce the fewest errors of either type. 
Often,  there  is  no  ideal cut-pint  that  will  result  in  perfect  classification.  Therefore,  a 
conscious effort should be made to minimize error of one type rather than the other.  
Table in Appendix-G shows the Sensitivity, Specificity and (1- Specificity) for different 
cut-points (predicted probabilities used as cut-points). To classify a test result as positive 
(or negative), Sensitivity and Specificity rely on a single cut-point. The area under ROC 
(Receiver  Operating  Characteristic)  curve  gives  a  more  complete  description  of 
classification accuracy. It plots the True-positive rate (Sensitivity) against False-positive 
rate (1-Specificity) for an entire range of different cut-points (Figure 8.4). The area under 
ROC  curve  varies  from  0  to  1  and  is  a  measure  of  the  test’s  ability  to  discriminate 
between “poor-drivers” and “not-poor-drivers”. An area under ROC curve of 0.5 or less 
means  that  the  predictions  are  no  better  than  random  guessing  (Kutner  et  al.,  2005; 
Streiner & Norman, 2003). Well discriminating tests crowd towards the upper left corner 
of  the  ROC  curve  (obviously  increasing  the  area  under  curve)  because  as  sensitivity 
progressively  increases  (by  lowering  the  cut-point),  there  is  a  small  or  no  loss  in 
specificity until the sensitivity reaches a very high level.  
The best cut-point is generally at the shoulder of the ROC curve, unless there are specific 
reasons for minimizing either false negatives or false positives (Fletcher and Fletcher, 
2005). According to Streiner & Norman (2003), the cut-point at the shoulder of the ROC 
results  in  the  smallest  overall  error  rate,  but  under  certain  circumstances,  it  may  be 
preferable  to  move  this  point  (shoulder  point),  either  up  or  down  ,  even  though  the 
number of false positive cases may increase faster than the number of true positive cases. 245 
 
An  area  under  RC  curve  of  0.8659  was  obtained  (Figure  8.4)  which  is  considered 
excellent discrimination (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for different cut-pints 
(predicted probabilities used as cut-points). Area under ROC curve is 0.8659. 
 
Incrementally, different values of predicted proabability (of being a “poor driver”) that 
served as cut-off points were used. If the predicted probability was greater than or equal 
to a particular cut-off point, the driver was classified as a “poor-driver” by the model and 
if less he/she was classified as a “not-poor-driver”. This classification from the model 
was compared with the actual status of the driver (whether a “poor-driver” or a “not-
poor-driver”) and the correct classification rate determined for that particular cut-point. 
The  value  of  the  cut-point  that  resulted  in  the  highest  correct  classification  rate  was 
selected as the appropriate cut-off point. In the logistic regression model based on ufov3, 
a cut-point of 0.4 provided the highest correct classification rate of drivers. 
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In  Appendix-G,  the  table  relevant  to  Sensitivity,  Specificity  and  (1-Specificity)  for 
different  cut-points  (predicted  probabilities  used  as  cut  points),  graph  between 
Sensitivity/Specificity  versus  cut-points  and  the  ROC  curve  can  also  guide  in  the 
selection of an appropriate cut-point. Figure 8.5 shows the driver classification obtained 
as a result of using a cut-point value of 0.4. 
 
    Driver Status   
   
“poor-driver” 
(positive) 
“not-poor-
driver” 
(negative) 
Total 
Test (cognitive 
test i.e. ufov3) 
Value  of  predicted 
Probability  ≥  0.4  (cut-
point) 
(the test is positive) 
5  1  6 
Value  of  predicted 
Probability  <  0.4  (cut-
point) 
(the test is negative) 
3  47  50 
Total  8  48  56 
 
Figure 8.5 The relationship between cognitive test (i.e. ufov3) result and driver status 
classification showing the number of drivers in each category using a cut-point value of 
predicted probability of 0.4. 
 
 Other parameters relevant to the table are calculated as follows: 
 
5
100 62.5%
5 3
Sensitivity = × =
+
  (8.24) 
 
47
100 97.92%
1 47
Specificity = × =
+
  (8.25) 
 
5
 = 100 83.33%
5 1
Positive predictive value (+PV) × =
+
  (8.26) 247 
 
 
47
 =  100 94%
3 47
Negative predictive value (-PV) × =
+
  (8.27) 
 
5 47
 = 100 92.86%
56
Correct Classification
+
× =   (8.28) 
92.89 percent of the drivers were correctly classified as either being “poor-drivers” or 
“not-poor-drivers” by the diagnostic test (cognitive test i.e. ufov3). Only one “not-poor-
driver” out of 48 was classified as a “poor-driver” by the test and three “poor-drivers” out 
of 8 as “not-poor-drivers”. In total, out of the 56 drivers only 4 drivers were misclassified 
by the test (cognitive test i.e. ufov3). Positive and negative predictive values of the test 
were high.    
Validation of a model is crucial especially if the model is to be employed to predict the 
outcome (whether a “poor-driver” or “not-poor-driver”) of future subjects (drivers). The 
aim of validation procedures in logistic regression is typically to assess discrimination 
performance, which is the ability of a test to bifurcate a population into those who will 
experience the outcome of interest (i.e. “poor-drivers”) and those who will not (“not-
poor-drivers”). A review of validation techniques has been provided in Section 7.4.7. 
Owing to the small sample size and as suggested by Harrell et al. (1996), the K-fold 
cross-validation was adopted. In the K-fold cross-validation technique, the data are split 
into K roughly equal parts. Out of the k = 1, 2, ….., K parts, the k
th part is used as the 
validation set and the remaining K-1 parts are used as the model-building set. When the 
data  split  is  such  that  K=  n,  it  becomes  the  PRESS  statistic  variant  of  data-splitting 
(Montgomery et al., 2006; Weisberg, 2005; Snee, 1977) in multiple linear regression, 
explained in Section 7.4.7. In logistic regression, K= J , where J ( J ≤ n) is the number of 
covariate patterns present in the data, because predicted values (fitted values) are the 
same for the same covariate pattern. Therefore, almost all the data (except one covariate 
pattern) is used to estimate the coefficients of the model. A model is estimated from all 
covariate patterns except covariate pattern j. Then this model is used to predict the fitted 
values (predicted probability)  ( ) ˆ
j π of covariate pattern j. Thus a model is used to predict 
the fitted values of a covariate pattern whose data was not used in the development of the 
model. This technique is also called LOO (leave-one-out) (Bautista et al., 1999). The use 
of the covariate patterns in validation has been advocated by Houwelingen and Cessie 248 
 
(1990)  and  of  the  technique  in  general  by  Steyerberg  et  al.    (2001)  and  Altman  and 
Royston  (2000).  Unlike  multiple  linear  regression,  there  are  no  computationally-
economic formulas available and so the model has to be fitted a J number of times (i.e. 
equal to the number of covariate patterns).  In model validation, the discrimination ability 
obtained  from  a  model  using  the  training  sample  usually  decreases  in  the  validation 
sample because the discrimination estimates (of the training sample) are derived from the 
same  data  that  was  used  to  fit  the  model  (Efron,  1986).  The  LOO  (leave-one-out) 
technique was used jointly with the area under ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) 
curve for validating the logistic regression model (Bautista et al., 1999), because typically 
ROC curves are used to evaluate model discrimination. First, the area under ROC was 
calculated from the model based on all data and then it was compared with the area under 
ROC curve obtained from the predicted probabilities using the LOO technique (leave-
one-out). The number of covariate patterns in the data was 38 (because there were 38 
unique  values  of  ufov3  among  the  56  drivers),  therefore  for  the  LOO  technique,  the 
model was fitted 38 times, each time leaving a particular covariate pattern out. The area 
under ROC curve obtained using all the data was 0.8659 (see Figure 8.4) and the area 
under  ROC  curve  obtained  using  the  LOO  technique  was  0.7904  (ROC  curve  and 
predicted probabilities obtained using LOO are at Appendix-G). 
The  statistical  software  Stata
®  was  used  to  test  the  equality  of  both  areas  using  a 
procedure suggested by DeLong et al. (DeLong et al., 1988 cited in Stata
® 10
 manual), in 
which the null hypothesis is H0: both areas are equal. Although the area 0.8659 is larger 
than 0.7904, the chi-squared test yielded a p-value of 0.0785, suggesting that there is no 
significant difference between the two areas, showing that the discriminatory ability of 
the logistic regression model did not decrease significantly using the LOO technique and 
therefore there was reasonably strong evidence that the model would be a satisfactory 
predictor  for  determining  the  status  (whether  “poor-driver”  or  “not-poor-driver”)  of 
future drivers, based on scores of ufov3 test. 
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8.5 Development, Diagnostics and Validation of Univariate 
Logistic Model (Age Based) 
 
In order to determine the extent to which age alone can discriminate between “poor-
drivers” and “not-poor-drivers”, it was decided to use age as a predictor in a logistic 
regression  model.  To  develop  the  model,  it  was  necessary  to  determine  the  correct 
functional form of age in which it should enter the model (i.e. whether the model is linear 
in the logit for age), assess goodness-of-fit of the model (overall measures of fit) and 
perform  diagnostics  analysis.  There  were  52  covariate  patterns  (i.e.  there  were  52 
distinct/unique values of age) in this model. To determine the correct functional form of 
age  in  which  it  should  enter  the  model,  the  scatterplot  smooth  approach  was  used 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). The scatterplot smooth, where the results are plotted on 
the logit scale is shown in Appendix-G. The graph essentially supports linearity of the 
logit in age (i.e., no transformation of age). The results of logistic regression for the 
predictor age are shown in Tables 8.8 to 8.10. 
 
Table 8.8 Goodness-of-fit statistics for univariate logistic regression using age. 
 
Logistic Regression Model with age as predictor  
Number of observations  56 
Log Likelihood of Null Model  -22.966514 
Log Likelihood of Full Model  -13.385772 
Likelihood ratio Chi-square (1)  19.16 
Prob > Chi-square  0.0000 
Pseudo-R
2  0.4172 
AIC  30.77154 
BIC  34.82225 
Deviance  26.772 
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Table 8.9 Coefficients for univariate logistic regression using age. 
Predictor  Coefficient  Standard Error  z  P>| z |  95% Conf. Interval 
age  0.1654765  0.0659499  2.51  0.012  0.0362171  0.2947359 
constant  -12.49311  4.666546  -2.68  0.007  -21.63937  -3.346847 
 
Table 8.10 Odd Ratio for univariate logistic regression using age 
Predictor  Odds Ratio  Standard Error  z  P>| z |  95% Conf. Interval 
age  1.179955  0.0778179  2.51  0.012  1.036881  1.342772 
 
The overall fit of the model to see whether the logistic regression model overall fits the 
data well was carried out using the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test.  In this 
test,  the  probability  of  being  a  “poor-driver”  is  calculated  from  the  model  for  each 
observation  and  the  resulting  values  are  arranged  in  increasing  order.  The  range  of 
probability values is then divided into subgroups (for example, deciles). For each sub-
group the observed number (O) of “poor-drivers” and “not-poor-driver” is noted and the 
corresponding  expected  (E)  number  of  “poor-drivers”  are  calculated  by  adding  the 
probabilities  (of  being  a  “poor-driver”)  for  each  individual  in  each  subgroup  and  the 
expected number of “not-poor-drivers” is the complement of this summation (i.e.,  1- 
(sum of probabilities)). The goodness-of-fit statistic is calculated from the Pearson Chi-
square statistic as: 
  ( )
2
2 Goodness-of-fit 
O E
E
χ
−
=∑   (8.29) 
The degrees of freedom for this statistic is the number of sub-groups minus two. Large 
values  of  the  statistic  indicate  a  poor  fit  (with  its  concomitant  small  p-values).  The 
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test gave a chi-square (5 degrees of freedom) 
value of 2.15 translating to a p-value of 0.8285, which indicated that overall the model 
fitted the data well. Another way of graphically assessing the fit of the model is to plot a 
Lowess  graph comparing predicted probabilities to a moving average of the proportion 
of cases that are 1 (i.e., “poor-drivers”). In other words a Lowess (smoother curve) graph 
between the observed outcome i.e. coded 1 for “poor-driver” and 0 for “not-poor-driver” 
on the y-axis and predicted probability of being a “poor-driver” on the x-axis. Such a 251 
 
graph is shown at Appendix-G, where a diagonal straight line (having equal x-axis and y-
axis  values)  has  also  been  embedded  for  reference.  The  graph  shows  the  Lowess 
(smoother curve) curve following the diagonal line quite in proximity, indicating that the 
fraction of observed cases are about equal to the predicted probabilities, which manifests 
a good fit of the model. 
In  diagnostics,  the  influence  of  individual  patterns  is  considered  i.e.  the  individual 
components  of  the  summary  statistics  are  graphically  examined.  Since  the  summary 
statistic (Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test) indicated that overall the model 
fitted  well,  therefore  it  was  not  expected  of  diagnostics  to  find  a  large  number  of 
covariate patterns being poorly fit. The graph between Delta Chi-square statistic and Pr 
(y) (i.e. predicted probability of being a “poor-driver”) and between Delta-D statistic and 
Pr (y) (i.e. predicted probability of being a “poor-driver”) in Appendix-G, shows driver 
“O13” and “O44” some distance from the balance of plotted-data and have values of both 
these statistics slightly greater than 4 (i.e. partly based on visual impression from the 
graphs and partly based on numeric values of these two statistics). Driver “O13” and 
“O44” are poorly fit by the model, as they were “poor-drivers” whereas their ages were 
relatively  not  too  much  (i.e.  64.2  and  64.7  years  respectively).  Aside  from  the 
observations of driver “O13” and “O44”, the plots show that the model fits reasonably 
well. 
The graph between Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ ) statistic and Pr (y) (i.e. predicted probability 
of being a “poor-driver”) in Appendix-G, shows driver “O13”, “O44” and “O21” to be 
some  distance  from  the  balance  of  plotted-data,  although  all  three  had  values  of 
Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ )  less than 1.0, still it was decided to investigate these points 
further.  This  information  can  also  be  interpreted  from  the  graph  between  Delta  Chi-
square (
2
j X ∆ ) statistic and Pr (y) (i.e. predicted probability of being a “poor-driver”) (see 
Appendix-G), where the size of the symbols is proportional to Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ ) 
statistic. This graph shows that not all influential points (large Pregibon’s dbeta) are 
outliers (large Delta Chi-square or Delta-D). 
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Table 8.11 Estimated coefficients from all data, the percent change when the covariate 
pattern is deleted, values of Goodness-of-Fit statistic, and Odds ratio for each Model. 
Variable  All Data 
Deleting 
driver  
“O13” 
Deleting 
driver  
“O44” 
Deleting 
driver  
“O21” 
Deleting drivers 
“O13”,“O44” & 
“O21” 
age  0.1654765  +19 %  +17 %  +21 %  + 96 % 
constant  -12.49311  -20 %  - 18 %  -18 %  -93 % 
Goodness-of-fit 
Deviance  26.772  22.388  22.565  24.319  14.333 
Chi-square 
goodness  of  fit 
statistic  (Hosmer 
& Lemeshow) 
2.15  0.65  0.62  2.29  1.69 
Odds Ratio (based on a unit change in age i.e. 1 year) 
age  1.179955  1.217456  1.213627  1.222437  1.383792 
 
Table 8.12 Predicted probability of being a “poor-driver” and Observed outcome along 
with age for the three influential observations. 
Driver 
Code 
Age 
Observed outcome (1=“poor-driver”,  
0 =“not-poor-driver”) 
Predicted probability of being 
“poor-driver” 
“O13”  64.2  1  0.1335977 
“O44”  64.7  1  0.1434682 
“O21”  79.4  0  0.656047 
 
A down side of the diagnostic statistic Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ ) is that it is a summary 
measure of change that occurs in all coefficients in the model simultaneously (and is a 
linear approximation as well), therefore it was necessary to rerun the model after deleting 
certain covariate patterns to gauge the exact change in the coefficients. Therefore, after 
identification of drivers “O13”, “O44” and “O21” as influential, the model was re-run 
with observation of driver “O13”, “O44” and “O21” individually deleted one at a time 
and then simultaneously deleted and the actual impact on the coefficients assessed along 253 
 
with calculation of goodness-of-fit statistics (i.e. Deviance and Hosmer and Lemeshow 
chi-square  goodness  of  fit  statistic)  shown  in  Table  8.11.  By  deleting  observation  of 
driver “O13”, “O44” and “O21” one at a time, the coefficient of age increases by 19, 17 
and 21 percent respectively compared to the model fitted to all data (the combined effect 
is even greater i.e. increase of 96 percent in the value of the coefficient and substantial 
decrease in the fit measures Deviance and Hosmer and Lemeshow chi-square goodness of 
fit statistic). If we examine the Observed outcome and Predicted probability of being 
“poor-driver” of these drivers from Table 8.12, it becomes clear why these individuals 
have a relatively large impact on the estimated coefficients. In general the model predicts 
that the odds of being a “poor-driver” increase with increasing age, but driver “O13” and 
“O44”  are  “poor-drivers”  (from  observed  outcome  from  Table  8.12)  despite  their 
relatively  low  age  (and  consequent  low  Predicted  probability  of  being “poor-driver” 
from Table 8.12). On the other hand, driver “O21” is a “not-poor-driver” (from observed 
outcome from Table 8.12) despite her relatively high age (and consequent high Predicted 
probability of being “poor-driver” from Table 8.12). Table 8.11 also corroborates the 
findings from the diagnostic graphs that driver “O13” and “O44” are poorly fit by the 
model, whereas driver “O21” is not a relatively poor fit, which can be seen by comparing 
the  Deviance  and  Hosmer  and  Lemeshow  chi-square  goodness  of  fit  statistic  of  the 
models relevant to all data and those from deleting drivers “O13”, “O44” and “O21” i.e. 
the difference (decrease in values) between  the Deviance and Hosmer and Lemeshow 
chi-square  goodness  of  fit  statistic  of  the  all-data  model  and  the  model  obtained  by 
deleting driver “O13” and “O44”  is substantial compared to the difference  of the all-data 
model and the model obtained by deleting driver “O21”.       
It was expected of some drivers to exhibit outcomes that were contrary to the general 
findings of the model, so this could not be formed as a sufficient basis for excluding these 
observations  in  fitting  the  model.  By  deleting  these  three  observations,  there  was  no 
substantial change in the conclusions and the estimated odds ratio for age changed in the 
direction  of  making  the  estimated  effects  stronger  as  evident  from  Table  8.11.  The 
estimated degree of association changed but our conclusions did not change substantially. 
Also, since no data-entry errors were found relevant to these two observations and were 254 
 
considered plausible as well, therefore, it was decided to keep these observations in the 
model.     
The ratio reflecting the increase in odds of being a “poor-driver” when age increases by 
η  is given by (using Equations 8.15 and 8.17): 
 
( )
( )
( )
12.49311 0.1654765
0.1654765
12.49311 0.1654765
age
age
e
e
e
η
η
− + +
− + = =   (8.30) 
When  η is  1,  an  Odds  ratio  of  1.179955  (same  as  in  Table  8.11)  is  obtained  (using 
Equation 8.30) and a η of 10 gives an Odds ratio of 5.23. An increase in age of 1 year 
(i.e. η = 1) is not meaningful keeping in view the range of variation of age. This means 
that  the  odds  of  being  a  “poor-driver”  increase  over  5.23  fold  for  drivers  having  an 
increased  (i.e. difference on the higher side) age of 10 years compared to the age of 
other drivers or in other words, the odds of being a “poor-driver” increase 423 percent for 
drivers having an increased  (i.e. difference on the higher side) age of 10 compared to the 
age of other drivers.        
An  area  under  ROC  curve  of  0.9062  was  obtained  which  is  considered  excellent 
discrimination  (Hosmer  and  Lemeshow,  2000).  A  cut-point  of  0.56  was  selected  (as 
explained in Section 8.4) as it gave the highest overall correct classification of drivers. 
Figure 8.6 shows the driver classification obtained as a result of using a cut-point value of 
0.56. 
Using cut-pint of 0.56 on the predicted probability scale, a sensitivity of 50 percent, a 
specificity  of  97.92  percent,  a  positive  predictive  value  of  80  percent,  a  negative 
predictive value of 92.16 percent and a correct classification rate of 91.07 percent was 
obtained. That is, 91.07 percent of the drivers were correctly classified as either being 
“poor-drivers” or “not-poor-drivers” by the diagnostic test (age). Only one “not-poor-
driver” out of 48 was classified as a “poor-driver” by the test and four “poor-drivers” out 
of 8 as “not-poor-drivers”. In total, out of the 56 drivers only 5 drivers were misclassified 
by the test (i.e. age). Positive and negative predictive values of the test were high.    
For  validating the model, the methodology of Section 8.4 was used. The LOO (leave-
one-out)  technique  was  used  jointly  with  the  area  under  ROC  (Receiver  Operating 
Characteristic) curve for validating the logistic regression model (Bautista et al., 1999), 
because typically ROC curves are used to evaluate model discrimination. 255 
 
 
    Driver Status   
    “poor-driver” 
(positive) 
“not-poor-driver” 
(negative) 
Total 
Test ( i.e. 
age) 
Value  of  predicted 
Probability ≥ 0.56 (cut-point) 
(the test is positive) 
4  1  5 
Value  of  predicted 
Probability < 0.56 (cut-point) 
(the test is negative) 
4  47  51 
Total  8  48  56 
 
Figure 8.6 The relationship between Test (i.e. age) and driver status classification 
showing the number of drivers in each category using a cut-point value of predicted 
probability of 0.56. 
 
First, the area under ROC was calculated from the model based on all data and then it 
was compared with the area under ROC curve obtained from the predicted probabilities 
using the LOO technique (leave-one-out). The number of covariate patterns in the data 
were  52,  therefore  for  the  LOO  technique,  the  model  was  fitted  52 times,  each  time 
leaving a particular covariate pattern out. The area under ROC curve obtained using all 
the data was 0.9062 and the area under ROC curve obtained using the LOO technique 
was 0.8724 (ROC curve and predicted probabilities obtained using LOO are at Appendix-
G).  The statistical software Stata
® was used to test the equality of both areas using a 
procedure suggested by DeLong et al. (DeLong et al., 1988 cited in Stata
® 10
 manual), in 
which the null hypothesis is H0: both areas are equal. Although the area 0.9062 is larger 
than 0.8724, the chi-squared test yielded a p-value of 0.1026, suggesting that there is no 
significant difference between the two areas, showing that the discriminatory ability of 
the logistic regression model did not decrease significantly using the LOO technique and 
therefore there was reasonably strong evidence that the model would be a satisfactory 256 
 
predictor  for  determining  the  status  (whether  “poor-driver”  or  “not-poor-driver”)  of 
future drivers, based on age. 
 
8.6 Development, Diagnostics and Validation of Univariate 
Logistic Model (based on Composite Cognitive Measure) 
 
To  explore  if  a  cognitive  measure  that  is  based  on  a  composite  score  of  all  nine 
neuropsychological tests was a better discriminator than the ufov3 test alone, a univariate 
logistic  regression  model  based  on  such  a  cognitive  measure  was  developed.  To 
formulate a composite score of the nine cognitive tests (trail, clock, rey-copy, rey-recall, 
dichotic, paper, ufov1, ufov2, ufov3), first they were standardized (i.e., the mean of each 
cognitive test was subtracted from its respective value and then divided by the sample 
standard deviation of the test, resulting in each test having a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of 1. Values larger than the mean appeared as positive and smaller as negative. 
Since standardization is a linear transformation, the distribution of each cognitive test was 
preserved (because the proportionality of inter-score distance was preserved, therefore 
there was no distortion in shape of distribution). The polarity of clock, rey-copy, rey-
recall and paper was changed (i.e., their standardized scores were multiplied by -1) so 
that  greater  scores  on  these  tests  also  translates  to  unfavourable  performance.  The 
standardized scores were added to form a composite score and this composite score was 
converted into a T-score by means of the formula:  
  ( ) X SD Tscore_cognitive z ′ ′ = +   (8.31) 
Where, 
X′= desired mean of the variable i.e. 100. 
SD′= desired standard deviation of the variable i.e. = 15. 
 z = the standardized form of the composite score.  
Tscore_cognitive = A measure of the composite cognitive score such that its mean is now 
100 and standard deviation 15. 
The choice of the mean (i.e. 100) and standard deviation (i.e. 15) ensured that we do not 
end  up  with  negative  values  on  Tscore_cognitive .  Equation  8.31  is  a  linear 257 
 
transformation  and  does  not  affect  the  distribution  of  the  composite  cognitive  score. 
Higher  scores  onTscore_cognitive translated  to  unfavourable  performance  (this 
orientation was necessary to make it compatible with the other models for comparison 
purposes).     
In order to determine the extent to which this composite cognitive measure of nine tests 
(i.e.  Tscore_cognitive )  could  discriminate  between  “poor-drivers”  and  “not-poor-
drivers”, it was decided to use  Tscore_cognitive  as a predictor in a logistic regression 
model  (using  the  pessimistic  scenario).  To  develop  the  model,  it  was  necessary  to 
determine the  correct functional form ofTscore_cognitive in which it should enter the 
model  (i.e.  whether  the  model  is  linear  in  the  logit  for  Tscore_cognitive ),  assess 
goodness-of-fit of the model (overall measures of fit) and perform diagnostics analysis. 
There  were  56  covariate  patterns  (i.e.  there  were  56  distinct/unique  values  of 
Tscore_cognitive )  in  this  model.  To  determine  the  correct  functional  form  of 
Tscore_cognitive  in which it should enter the model, the scatterplot smooth approach 
was used (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). The scatterplot smooth, where the results are 
plotted  on  the  logit  scale  is  shown  in  Appendix-G.  The  graph  essentially  supports 
linearity of the logit in  Tscore_cognitive  (i.e., no transformation of  Tscore_cognitive ). 
The results of logistic regression for the predictor  Tscore_cognitive are shown in Tables 
8.13 to 8.15. 
 
Table 8.13 Goodness-of-fit statistics for univariate logistic regression using
Tscore_cognitive . 
Logistic Regression Model with Tscore_cognitive as predictor  
Number of observations  56 
Log Likelihood of Null Model  -22.966514 
Log Likelihood of Full Model  -16.148665 
Likelihood ratio Chi-square (1)  13.64 
Prob > Chi-square  0.0002 
Pseudo-R
2  0.2969 258 
 
Logistic Regression Model with Tscore_cognitive as predictor  
AIC  36.29733 
BIC  40.34803 
Deviance  32.297 
 
Table 8.14 Coefficients for univariate logistic regression usingTscore_cognitive . 
Predictor  Coefficient  Standard Error  z  P>| z |  95% Conf. Interval 
Tscore_cognitive   0.1067349  0.0366649  2.91  0.004  0.034873  0.1785968 
constant  -12.91376  3.928084  -3.29  0.001  -20.61266  -5.214853 
 
Table 8.15 Odd Ratio for univariate logistic regression using Tscore_cognitive . 
Predictor  Odds Ratio  Standard Error  z  P>| z |  95% Conf. Interval 
Tscore_cognitive   1.112639  0.0407948  2.91  0.004  1.035488  1.195539 
 
The overall fit of the model to see whether the logistic regression model overall fits the 
data well was carried out using the Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test. Large 
values  of  the  statistic  indicate  a  poor  fit  (with  its  concomitant  small  p-values).  The 
Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test gave a chi-square (5 degrees of freedom) 
value of 5.19 translating to a p-value of 0.3928, which indicated that overall the model 
fitted the data well. Another way of graphically assessing the fit of the model is to plot a 
Lowess  graph comparing predicted probabilities to a moving average of the proportion 
of cases that are 1 (i.e., “poor-drivers”). In other words a Lowess (smoother curve) graph 
between the observed outcome i.e. coded 1 for “poor-driver” and 0 for “not-poor-driver” 
on the y-axis and predicted probability of being a “poor-driver” on the x-axis. Such a 
graph is shown at Appendix-G, where a diagonal straight line (having equal x-axis and y-
axis  values)  has  also  been  embedded  for  reference.  The  graph  shows  the  Lowess 
(smoother curve) curve following more or less in proximity, indicating that the fraction of 
observed  cases  are  about  equal  to  the  predicted  probabilities,  which  manifests  a 
satisfactory fit of the model. 259 
 
In  diagnostics,  the  influence  of  individual  patterns  is  considered  i.e.  the  individual 
components  of  the  summary  statistics  are  graphically  examined.  Since  the  summary 
statistic (Hosmer and Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test) indicated that overall the model 
fitted  well,  therefore  it  was  not  expected  of  diagnostics  to  find  a  large  number  of 
covariate  patterns  being  poorly  fit.  Considering  all  the  data,  the  maximum  value  of 
Tscore_cognitive   was  177.8352  and  the  minimum  82.66582,  with  lower  scores 
considered  favourable.  The  graph  between  Delta  Chi-square  statistic  and  Pr  (y)  (i.e. 
predicted probability of being a “poor-driver”) and between Delta-D statistic and Pr (y) 
(i.e. predicted probability of being a “poor-driver”) in Appendix-G, shows driver “O13”, 
“O44”, “O6” and “O15” some distance from the balance of plotted-data and have values 
of both these statistics almost greater than 4  (i.e. partly based on visual impression from 
the graphs and partly based on numeric values of these two statistics). Drivers “O13”, 
“O44”, “O6” and “O15”  are poorly fit by the model, as they were classified as “poor-
drivers” whereas their scores on Tscore_cognitive  were relatively low (i.e. 106.9, 102.3, 
100.5 and 99.4 respectively). Aside from the observations of drivers “O13”, “O44”, “O6” 
and “O15”, the plots show that the model fits reasonably well. 
The graph between Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ ) statistic and Pr (y) (i.e. predicted probability 
of being a “poor-driver”) in Appendix-G, shows driver “O21” to be some distance from 
the balance of plotted-data, although her value of Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ )  was less than 
1.0, still it was decided to investigate this point further. This information can also be 
interpreted  from  the  graph  between  Delta  Chi-square  (
2
j X ∆ )  statistic  and  Pr  (y)  (i.e. 
predicted probability of being a “poor-driver”) (see Appendix-G), where the size of the 
symbols is proportional to Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ ) statistic. This graph shows that not all 
influential points (large Pregibon’s dbeta) are outliers (large Delta Chi-square or Delta-
D).  
A down side of the diagnostic statistic Pregibon’s dbeta ( j β ∆ ) is that it is a summary 
measure of change that occurs in all coefficients in the model simultaneously (and is a 
linear approximation as well), therefore it was necessary to rerun the model after deleting 
certain covariate patterns to gauge the exact change in the coefficients. 260 
 
 
Table 8.16 Estimated coefficients from all data, the percent change when the covariate 
pattern is deleted, values of Goodness-of-Fit statistic, and Odds ratio for each Model. 
Variable  All Data 
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Deleting 
all five  
drivers  
Tscore_cognitive   0.10673  0 %  +6%  +8%  +10%  +27%  +215% 
constant  -12.9137  -1%  -7%  -9%  -10%  -22%  -216% 
Goodness-of-fit 
Deviance  32.297  28.736  27.857  27.491  27.241  29.365  6.362 
Chi-square 
goodness  of  fit 
statistic  (Hosmer 
& Lemeshow) 
5.19  5.08  5.40  2.66  2.66  4.90  0.03 
Odds Ratio (based on a unit change in Tscore_cognitive  ) 
Tscore_cognitive   1.1126  1.1126  1.1194  1.1223  1.1243  1.1446  1.4004 
 
Table 8.17 Predicted probability of being a “poor-driver” and Observed outcome along 
with score on Tscore_cognitive for the five observations. 
Driver 
Code 
Age 
Observed outcome 
(1=“poor-driver”,  0 =“not-
poor-driver”) 
Tscore_cognitive  
Predicted probability 
of being “poor-driver” 
“O13”  64.2  1  106.9118  0.1820469 
“O44”  64.7  1  102.3312  0.1201039 
“O6”  82.9  1  100.5739  0.1016506 
“O15”  69.9  1  99.41039  0.0908582 
“O21”  79.4  0  128.7144  0.6952022 
 
Therefore, after identification of drivers “O13”, “O44”, “O6” and “O15”  as affecting fit 
of the model and “O21” as influential, the model was re-run with observation of driver 261 
 
“O13”, “O44”, “O6” and “O15” and “O21” individually deleted one at a time and then 
simultaneously  deleted  and  the  actual  impact  on  the  coefficients  assessed  along  with 
calculation of goodness-of-fit statistics (i.e. Deviance and Hosmer and Lemeshow chi-
square goodness of fit statistic) shown in Table 8.16. By deleting observation of driver 
“O13”,  “O44”,  “O6”  ,  “O15”  and  “O21”  one  at  a  time,  the  coefficient  of  
Tscore_cognitive  increases by 0, 6, 8, 10, and 27 percent respectively compared to the 
model fitted to all data (the combined effect is even greater i.e. increase of 215 percent in 
the value of the coefficient and substantial decrease in the fit measures Deviance and 
Hosmer  and  Lemeshow  chi-square  goodness  of  fit  statistic).  It  may  be  noted  that 
observations “O13”, “O44”, “O6” and “O15”  do not have a substantial effects on the 
estimated  coefficients  as  predicted  by  Pregibon’s  dbeta  ( j β ∆ ).  If  we  examine  the 
Observed  outcome  and  Predicted  probability  of  being  “poor-driver”  of  these  drivers 
from Table 8.17, it becomes clear why these individuals have a relatively large impact on 
the fit of the model and the estimated coefficients. In general the model predicts that the 
odds of being a “poor-driver” increase with increasing score on  Tscore_cognitive , but 
drivers “O13”, “O44”, “O6” and “O15” are “poor-drivers” (from observed outcome from 
Table 8.17) despite their relatively low score on Tscore_cognitive  (and consequent low 
Predicted probability of being “poor-driver” from Table 8.17). On the other hand, driver 
“O21”  is  a  “not-poor-driver”  (from  observed  outcome  from  Table  8.17)  despite  her 
relatively high score on Tscore_cognitive  (and consequent high Predicted probability of 
being “poor-driver” from Table 8.17). Table 8.16 also corroborates the findings from the 
diagnostic  graphs that drivers  “O13”, “O44”,  “O6” and “O15” are poorly fit by the 
model (to varying degrees), whereas driver “O21” is not a relatively poor fit, which can 
be seen by comparing the Deviance and Hosmer and Lemeshow chi-square goodness of 
fit statistic of the models relevant to all data and those from deleting drivers “O13”, 
“O44”, “O6” and “O15” i.e. the difference (decrease in values) between  the Deviance 
and Hosmer and Lemeshow chi-square goodness of fit statistic of the all-data model and 
the model obtained by deleting drivers “O13”, “O44”, “O6” and “O15” is substantial 
(Drivers “O6” and “O15” are contributing more to the misfit than drivers “O13” and 262 
 
“O44” ) compared to the difference  of the all-data model and the model obtained by 
deleting driver “O21”.       
It was expected of some drivers to exhibit outcomes that were contrary to the general 
findings of the model, so this could not be formed as a sufficient basis for excluding these 
observations  in  fitting  the  model.  By  deleting  these  five  observations,  there  was  no 
substantial change in the conclusions and the estimated odds ratio for Tscore_cognitive  
changed in the direction of making the estimated effects stronger for some of the deletion 
scenarios as evident from Table 8.16. The estimated degree of association changed to 
some extent but our conclusions did not change substantially. Also, since no data-entry 
errors were found relevant to these five observations and were considered plausible as 
well, therefore, it was decided to keep these observations in the model.     
The ratio reflecting the increase in odds of being a “poor-driver” when Tscore_cognitive   
increases by η  is given by (using Equations 8.15 and 8.17): 
 
( )
( )
( )
12.91376 0.1067349
0.1067349
12.91376 0.1067349
Tscore_cognitive
Tscore_cognitive
e
e
e
η
η
− + +
− + = =   (8.32) 
When  η is  1,  an  Odds  ratio  of  1.112639  (same  as  in  Table  8.15)  is  obtained  (using 
Equation 8.32) and a η of 10 gives an Odds ratio of 2.91. An increase inTscore_cognitive   
of  1  (i.e.  η =  1)  is  not  meaningful  keeping  in  view  the  range  of  variation  of  
Tscore_cognitive . This means that the odds of being a “poor-driver” increase over 2.91 
fold for drivers having an increased  (i.e. difference on the higher side) score of 10 on 
Tscore_cognitive  compared to the score of other drivers or in other words, the odds of 
being  a  “poor-driver”  increase  191  percent  for  drivers  having  an  increased    (i.e. 
difference on the higher side) score of 10 onTscore_cognitive  compared to the score of 
other drivers.        
An  area  under  ROC  curve  of  0.9010  was  obtained  which  is  considered  excellent 
discrimination  (Hosmer  and  Lemeshow,  2000).  A  cut-point  of  0.49  was  selected  (as 
explained in Section 8.4) as it gave the highest overall correct classification of drivers. 
Figure 8.7 shows the driver classification obtained as a result of using a cut-point value of 
0.49. 
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    Driver Status   
   
“poor-driver” 
(positive) 
“not-poor-
driver” 
(negative) 
Total 
Test ( i.e. 
Tscore_cognitive ) 
Value  of  predicted 
Probability ≥ 0.49 (cut-
point) 
(the test is positive) 
4  2  6 
Value  of  predicted 
Probability < 0.49 (cut-
point) 
(the test is negative) 
4  46  50 
Total  8  48  56 
 
Figure 8.7 The relationship between Test (i.e. Tscore_cognitive ) and driver status 
classification showing the number of drivers in each category using a cut-point value of 
predicted probability of 0.49. 
 
Using a cut-point of 0.49 on the predicted probability scale, a sensitivity of 50 percent, a 
specificity  of  95.83  percent,  a  positive  predictive  value  of  66.67  percent,  a  negative 
predictive  value  of  92  percent  and  a  correct  classification  rate  of  89.29  percent  was 
obtained. That is, 89.29 percent of the drivers were correctly classified as either being 
“poor-drivers” or “not-poor-drivers” by the diagnostic test (Tscore_cognitive ). Only two 
“not-poor-driver” out of 48 were classified as a “poor-driver” by the test and four “poor-
drivers” out of 8 as “not-poor-drivers”. In total, out of the 56 drivers 6 drivers were 
misclassified by the test (i.e. Tscore_cognitive  ). Positive predictive value was relatively 
not high but negative predictive values of the test was high.    
For validating the model, the methodology of Section 8.4 was used. The LOO (leave-one-
out)  technique  was  used  jointly  with  the  area  under  ROC  (Receiver  Operating 
Characteristic) curve for validating the logistic regression model (Bautista et al., 1999), 
because typically ROC curves are used to evaluate model discrimination. First, the area 264 
 
under ROC was calculated from the model based on all data and then it was compared 
with the area under ROC curve obtained from the predicted probabilities using the LOO 
technique  (leave-one-out).  The  number  of  covariate  patterns  in  the  data  were  56, 
therefore for the LOO technique, the model was fitted 56 times, each time leaving a 
particular covariate pattern out. The area under ROC curve obtained using all the data 
was 0.9010 and the area under ROC curve obtained using the LOO technique was 0.8438 
(ROC curve and predicted probabilities obtained using LOO are at Appendix-G).  The 
statistical software Stata
® was used to test the equality of both areas using a procedure 
suggested by DeLong et al. (DeLong et al., 1988 cited in Stata
® 10
 manual), in which the 
null  hypothesis  is  H0:  both  areas  are  equal.  Although  the  area  0.9010  is  larger  than 
0.8438,  the  chi-squared  test  yielded  a  p-value  of  0.0548,  suggesting  that  there  is  no 
significant difference between the two areas, showing that the discriminatory ability of 
the logistic regression model did not decrease significantly using the LOO technique and 
therefore there was reasonably strong evidence that the model would be a satisfactory 
predictor  for  determining  the  status  (whether  “poor-driver”  or  “not-poor-driver”)  of 
future drivers, based on Tscore_cognitive . 
 
8.7 Results and Discussion 
 
All three scenarios resulted in selection of the best fitting model as the one based on 
ufov3. Also, in all three scenarios, the next best univariate models in decreasing order of 
over all fit were the models based on dichotic, trail, rey-copy and paper cognitive tests. 
The logistic regression model based on ufov3 as predictor was: 
  ( ) 4.591905 0.019135 
1 ˆ
1
ufov3 e
π
− − + =
+
  (8.33) 
Where  ˆ π is the predicted probability of a driver being a “poor-driver”. Because of the 
positive sign of the coefficient for ufov3 in Equation 8.33, the model predicts that the 
odds  of  being  a  “poor-driver”  increase  with  increasing  score  on  ufov3.  This  model 
reflected that the odds of being a “poor-driver” increase over 2.15 fold for drivers having 
an increased ufov3 score of 40 compared with the ufov3 scores of other drivers or in 
other words, the odds of being a “poor-driver” increase 115 percent for drivers having an 265 
 
increased  ufov3  score  of  40  compared  with  the  ufov3  scores  of  other  drivers.  This 
consistency of the ufov3 test as being a significant predictor is also clear from the fact 
that it was also one of the predictors defining the best linear regression model selected in 
Section 7.4.4. The area under ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve of 0.8659 
reflects excellent discrimination (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). According to Kutner et 
al. (2005), selecting a cut-point value (of predicted probability) of 0.5 is only reasonable 
when  (a)  it  is  equally  likely  for  the  outcome  of  interest  (i.e.  “poor-drivers”)  and  the 
complementary outcome (i.e. “not-poor-drivers”) to occur in the population of interest; 
and (b) the cost of incorrectly predicting the outcome of interest (i.e. “poor-drivers”) and 
the complementary outcome (i.e. “not-poor-drivers”) are approximately the same. Since 
these two conditions were not satisfied therefore a cut-point of 0.5 was avoided. As an 
alternative, Kutner et al. (2005) suggest to use a cut-point value such that the proportion 
of incorrect predictions is lowest (or the proportion of correct predictions is highest). 
Therefore, different cut-points were evaluated and finally a value of 0.4 gave the highest 
correct classification. Using a cut-point of 0.4, a Sensitivity of 62.5 percent, a Specificity 
of 97.92 percent, a Positive Predictive Value of 83.33 percent, a Negative Predictive 
Value  of  94  percent  and  an  overall  correct  classification  rate  of  92.86  percent  was 
obtained. The relatively lower Sensitivity of the test is attributed to the fact that the mean 
of predicted probabilities of the “poor-driver” group was 0.4652, which was close to the 
cut-point of 0.4. Only three “poor-drivers” were misclassified as “not-poor-drivers” and 
one  “not-poor-driver”  misclassified  as  a  “poor-driver”  by  the  ufov3  test.  Only  for 
comparison purposes with other studies, if the cut point is lowered to 0.2, a Sensitivity 
and  Specificity  of  75  and  85.42  percent  is  obtained  respectively,  which  is  quite 
comparable  to  the  Sensitivity  and  Specificity  of  the  study  by  Ball  et  al.  (1993) 
(Sensitivity=  89%,  Specificity=  81%)  and  Goode  et  al.  (1998)  (Sensitivity=  86.3%, 
Specificity=84.3%)  in  predicting  actual  crash  history  (from  state  records)  of  elderly 
drivers using the UFOV test. Duchek et al. (1998) carried out a study using three groups: 
(a) healthy control group (58 subjects) (b) very mild DAT (dementia of the Alzheimer’s 
type)  group  (49  subjects)  (c)  mild  DAT  group  (29  subjects).  All  participants  were 
administered the 45 minute Washington University Road Test (WURT). A correlation 
coefficient of  - 0.56 was obtained between the UFOV scores and the driving scores such 266 
 
that poorer driving performance was significantly related to greater reduction in UFOV. 
In another study of older drivers performed at the University of Alabama at Birmingham, 
Owsley et al. (1991) found that deficits in information processing ability as measured by 
the  useful  field  of  view  test  and  deficits  in  cognitive  abilities  were  related  to  crash 
involvement as recorded by the state. Owsley et al. (1998b) made an exploratory  study 
(from 1985 to 1990 in the state of Alabama) of 78 drivers involved in injurious crashes, 101 
drivers involved in non-injurious crashes and 115 drivers not involved in any crash during the 
same period. The drivers’ age ranged from 55 to 87 years. They reported that elderly drivers 
having reduction of UFOV greater than 40 percent were at least 20 times more likely to be 
involved in an injurious crash compared with subjects with no or more minor reductions in 
UFOV. Studies made by other authors have also found the UFOV test to be predictive of 
accidents in older drivers (Ball & Owsley, 1993; Rizzo et al., 1997; Sims et al, 1998).  
The  logistic  regression  model  based  on  age  as  a  predictor  had  an  area  under  ROC 
(Receiver  Operating  Characteristic)  curve  of  0.9062  which  is  considered  excellent 
discrimination (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). The model was:   
  ( ) 12.49311 0.1654765 
1 ˆ
1
age e
π
− − + =
+
  (8.34) 
Where  ˆ π is the predicted probability of a driver being a “poor-driver”. Because of the 
positive sign of the coefficient for age in Equation 8.34, the model predicts that the odds 
of being a “poor-driver” increase with increasing age. This model reflected that the odds 
of being a “poor-driver” increase over 5.23 fold for drivers having an increased age of 10 
years compared with the age of other drivers or in other words, the odds of being a “poor-
driver” increase 423 percent for drivers having an increased age of 10 compared with the 
age  of  other  drivers.  The  cut-point  value  of  0.56  on  the  predicted  probability  scale 
provided an overall correct classification rate of 91.07 percent which was slightly less 
than that for the ufov3 model. Using a cut-point of 0.56, a Sensitivity of 50 percent, a 
Specificity of 97.92 percent, a Positive Predictive Value of 80 percent and a Negative 
Predictive Value of 92.16 percent was obtained. Four “poor-drivers” were misclassified 
as “not-poor-drivers” and one “not-poor-driver” misclassified as a “poor-driver” by age 
as a test. The finding that the model with age as a predictor had good discrimination was 
not surprising as Edwards et al. (2005) in their study found out that the UFOV test was 267 
 
significantly  correlated  with  age  (and  the  model  based  on  ufov3  is  an  excellent 
discriminator), which was also corroborated by our high correlation coefficient of 0.7231 
between  age  and  ufov3.  The  National  Highway  Traffic  Safety  Administration  report  on 
accident  statistics  shows  a  steep  rise  in  per  mile  automobile  accident  risk  beginning 
around age 65, with the fatality rate per million miles of travel being 17 times that of the 
25-65  age  group  for  those  over  the  age  of  65  (NHTSA,  1997  cited  in  McKnight  & 
McKnight, 1999).  Also, past the age of 75, the risk of intersection collisions increases 
substantially for older drivers in almost all intersection manoeuvres (Staplin & Lyles, 
1991; Preusser et al., 1998). It has been found that the time required to search for a target 
or visual search performance worsens with age (Scialfa et al., 1999 cited in Caird & 
Hancock, 2002) and spatial orientation declines with the course of normal ageing (Schaie, 
1996).  This  obviously  could  have  implications  for  intersections  and  other  traffic 
environments/scenarios,  where  the  traffic  is  not  self-paced  and  the  risk  of  cognitive 
overload is high. Older drivers are more sensitive to noise and hence in performing a task, 
they  require  stronger  signals  to  react  (i.e.  they  have  a  lower  signal-to-noise  ratio) 
(Lundberg, 2003), thus affecting their performance in cluttered traffic environments etc.  
Also,  the  onset  of  age-associated  diseases  affecting  cognitive  functions  even  further 
exacerbates the situation and thus increases the risk of motor vehicle crashes in elderly 
drivers, as these diseases are more prevalent in the older age group. Also, there is some 
overlap  between  the  extremities  between  normal  ageing  and  MCI  (Mild  Cognitive 
Impairment) and between MCI and between early dementia (Petersen, 2003).  
The logistic regression model based on Tscore_cognitive  as a predictor had an area under 
ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve of 0.9010 which is considered excellent 
discrimination (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). The model was:   
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Where  ˆ π is the predicted probability of a driver being a “poor-driver”. Because of the 
positive sign of the coefficient for Tscore_cognitive  in Equation 8.35, the model predicts 
that the odds of being a “poor-driver” increase with increasing score onTscore_cognitive . 
This model reflected that the odds of being a “poor-driver” increase over 2.91 fold for 
drivers having an increased score on Tscore_cognitive  of 10 compared with the score of 268 
 
Tscore_cognitive  of other drivers or in other words, the odds of being a “poor-driver” 
increase 191 percent for drivers having an increased score of 10 on  Tscore_cognitive
compared with the score of other drivers. The cut-point value of 0.49 on the predicted 
probability scale provided an overall correct classification rate of 89.29 percent which 
was slightly less than that for the age model. Using a cut-point of 0.49, a Sensitivity of 50 
percent, a Specificity of 95.83 percent, a Positive Predictive Value of 66.67 percent and a 
Negative  Predictive  Value  of  92  percent  was  obtained.  Four  “poor-drivers”  were 
misclassified as “not-poor-drivers” and two “not-poor-driver” misclassified as a “poor-
driver” by  Tscore_cognitive  as a test. Since age related neurodegenerative conditions 
such as Alzheimer’s disease and normal ageing affect multiple but interacting aspects of 
cognition, a composite index reflecting overall cognitive ability needs to be evaluated for 
the prediction of driving safety (Anderson et al., 2005). Therefore, the model consisting 
of a predictor based on the composite of all nine cognitive tests (Tscore_cognitive ) was 
explored as per recommendation of Anderson et al. (2005). However, it is apparent that 
the discriminatory power of this model is not better (but not too worse) than the logistic 
model based on the single ufov3 test, showing that identification of drivers exhibiting 
risky  driving  behavior  due  to  cognitive  impairment  can  be  brought  about  better  by 
employing ufov3 test than by using a composite of nine cognitive tests (trail, clock, rey-
copy, rey-recall, dichotic, paper, ufov1, ufov2, ufov3). The Anderson et al. (2005) study 
included a simulation drive with a sample of 202 older drivers (ages 55 and older) out of 
which 70 drivers had mild dementia. Their findings supported the concept of a composite 
cognitive index, however it may be noted that their battery of tests did not include the 
UFOV test (although rey-copy, rey-recall and trail were common to both batteries) and a 
significant proportion of their sample was in a state of mild dementia (which could have 
made effects appear stronger). 
 
8.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has described the development of univariate logistic regression models using 
“poor-drivers” and “not-poor-drivers” as the two categories of the dependent variable and 269 
 
each of the nine cognitive tests as a candidate for being a predictor. The categorization of 
the three driver groups into two driver groups (“poor-drivers” and “not-poor-drivers”), 
based on driving performance measures has been explained. The use of univariate logistic 
regression rather than multiple linear regression has been justified based on the sample 
size,  lopsidedness  of  the  dependent  variable  and  the  number  of  potential  candidate 
predictors. The process of development of univariate logistic regression models for each 
of the three scenarios (i.e. pessimistic, optimistic and deletion of driver “O56” scenarios) 
has  been  explained,  and  the  selection  of  the  best/parsimonious  model  has  been 
demonstrated. All three scenarios resulted in selection of the best model as the one based 
on ufov3 as a predictor. Also, in all three scenarios, the next best univariate models in 
decreasing order of over all fit were the models based on dichotic, trail, rey-copy and 
paper cognitive tests. Univariate regression model based on ufov3 was developed, its 
diagnostics performed and validated using the LOO technique. In order to determine the 
extent  to  which  age  alone  could  discriminate  between  “poor-drivers”  and  “not-poor-
drivers”,  a  logistic  regression  model  based  on  age  was  developed,  its  diagnostics 
performed and validated using the LOO (leave-one-out) technique. To further explore if a 
cognitive measure that is based on a composite score of all nine (trail, clock, rey-copy, 
rey-recall, dichotic, paper, ufov1, ufov2, ufov3) neuropsychological tests was a better 
discriminator than the ufov3 test alone, a univariate logistic regression model based on 
such  a  cognitive  measure  (  i.e.Tscore_cognitive   )  was  developed,  its  diagnostics 
performed and validated using the LOO technique. Based on the area under ROC curve, 
all three models were considered to have excellent discrimination. However, the logistic 
regression model based on ufov3 test had the best discrimination. 
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9 Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The proportion of licensed drivers is increasing in the general driving population and a 
substantial number within this population group are experiencing a cognitive decline in 
functions that are critical to the driving task. According to one estimate, about 40 percent 
of the driving population will be over the age of 60 by the year 2020 in the UK and 
currently, several hundred thousand drivers with dementia hold driving licenses (Groeger, 
2000). It is well known that the number of motor vehicle crashes per unit distance of 
automobile travel is “U”-shaped, with risk increasing slightly between the ages of 55 and 
60, but greater increases in risk with each successive five-year interval. The fatality rate 
of drivers over the age of 80 is even higher than that of drivers less than 24 years of age. 
With regard to issue of neuropsychological tests, there is little consensus on which tests 
can be used to predict driving safety; therefore, there is no standard testing protocol (that 
is  reliable)  for  assessing  a  person’s  fitness  to  drive  after  the  onset  of  neurological 
disease/trauma and/or natural ageing. In the absence of a reliable standard protocol, some 
clinicians  make  their  judgments  based  on  self-report  (of  drivers),  which  has  risks 
associated with it as lack of insight and judgment are potential common traits of the 
population experiencing cognitive decrements. Therefore the decisions regarding fitness 
to drive exude a low level of confidence on part of the clinicians/professionals. Seldom is 
recourse made by health professionals to on-road driving assessment as a first alternative 
as it requires a fee and such testing centres are not readily available everywhere. Thus 
there is a need for more information on assessment on fitness to drive (with regard to 
cognitive tests), since medical information alone is not sufficient to assist in decision 
making. This will also alleviate the need for the requirement of an on-road evaluation 
/assessment or can be a supplementary tool in addition to on-road assessment and will 
instill more confidence in decision making. 
The difference between the direct effects of normal ageing and that of abnormal ageing 
(dementing disease especially in the early stage) relevant to driving skills, is less than 271 
 
clear-cut. It is possible that subjects exhibiting subtle cognitive changes may in fact have 
transgressed into the early stage of Dementia. Some individuals who have mild dementia 
possess sufficient driving skills to be designated as fit drivers; however, a stage /time will 
come when their cognitive impairment will exacerbate and will ultimately render them 
unfit drivers. The most challenging assessment and decision for the physician / licensing 
authority as regards fitness to drive lies in drivers who are questionably demented or are 
in a state of very mild dementia. This research addresses this issue of the identification of 
cognitive (neuropsychological) tests that can be used to assess an individual’s ability to 
drive and especially of those individuals that are questionably demented and are the most 
difficult  to  identify.  Nine  cognitive  tests  (trail,  clock,  rey-copy,  rey-recall,  dichotic, 
paper, ufov1, ufov2, ufov3), where the rey-copy and  rey-recall were essentially parts of 
one test (Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test) and  ufov1, ufov2 and ufov3 were the three 
subsets of the UFOV test, were administered to a sample of 56 individuals comprising of 
two age groups (young and old). Driving performance was gauged through two simulated 
drives on the STISIM driving simulator as it provided the most appropriate means of 
assessing/identifying risky driving behavior due to cognitive impairment, because in a 
driving simulator, drives can be designed based on psychometric principles and  also,  
each driver is subjected to the same opportunities for committing errors. 
In this research, a series of cognitive tests have been identified suitable to be used to 
assess  an  individual’s  ability  to  drive  and  especially  of  those  individual’s  that  are 
questionably demented or are in a subtle state of cognitive decline (and therefore are the 
most difficult to identify). The detail of these cognitive tests is provided in Chapter 3 and 
the mechanisms describing their selection is laid out in Chapters 7 and 8. Out of the 56 
drivers, 8 drivers (all from the older age group) possessing “poor-driving” skills and/or 
exhibiting risky driving behavior were identified by the simultaneous use of more than 
one variable through the novel approach of normal-mixture-model cluster analysis. In 
addition to studying the relative ability of cognitive tests to discriminate between “poor-
driving” and “not-poor-driving”, the effect of other factors such as age and a composite 
cognitive measure (based on all nine cognitive tests) was also evaluated in discriminating 
“poor-drivers” and “not-poor-drivers”. 
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9.2 Conclusions 
 
•  A major contribution by this research has been the development and deployment 
of a methodology by which drivers can be categorized including a deficient/poor 
driver  group.  The  categorization  is  based  on  driving  performance  skills    by 
considering  more  than  one  (i.e.  three)  driving  performance  parameters 
simultaneously  using:  (1)  a  diverse  sample  of  subjects,  (2)  simulation  drive-
designs  based  on  specific  psychometric  principles,  (3)  calculation  of  driving 
performance indices by removing parameters contributing to “noise” and keeping 
the ones contributing to “signal” through the concept of Cronbach’s reliability 
coefficient and weighting, and (4) the technique of normal-mixture-model cluster 
analysis. This has led to the identification of a deficient/poor driver group with 
some  individuals  even  exhibiting  relatively  subtle  changes  in  their  driving 
performance. Various other studies suffer from methodological deficiencies due 
to  one  or  more  of  the  following:  (1)  employment  of  inappropriate  design  of 
simulated  drives,  (2)  selection  of  clinical  samples,  (3)  use  of  a  single  driving 
performance parameter/index for driver classification and using the normal group 
as a reference for decision making, (4) using relatively fewer driving performance 
parameters  for  gauging  driving  performance,  and  (5)  inappropriate  choice  of 
cognitive tests etc. 
•  A  straightforward  cognitive  test  has  been  identified  which  can  discriminate 
between “poor” and “not-poor” drivers. The main finding and contribution from 
this study with regard to the relative discriminating ability of different cognitive 
tests is that the ufov3 test fared the best and showed the highest discriminating 
ability in separating “poor drivers” from “not-poor-drivers”. The ufov3 test is the 
third  subset  of  the  UFOV  (Useful  Field  of  View)  test  and  takes  up  the  most 
cognitive effort compared to ufov1 and ufov2. This test cannot be administered in 
isolation, because the examinee has to get gradually accustomed to the difficulty 
of the task by  first familiarizing himself with ufov1 and ufov2. The next best 
discriminating ability in decreasing order of strength is that of dichotic, trail, rey-
copy and paper. This highlights the relevance of visuospatial skills and attention 273 
 
in gauging risky driving behavior, as the UFOV test primarily evaluates visual 
processing  speed  and  divided  and  spatial  attention.  The  cut-point  value  of 
predicted  probability  of  0.4  adopted  in  Section  8.4  when  used  in  logistic 
regression Equation 8.33 corresponds to a cut-point value of 219 (after rounding) 
of ufov3. At this threshold, three “poor-drivers” and one “not-poor-driver”’ were 
misclassified (i.e. false negatives=3, false positives=1). Lowering this threshold 
although  would  have  increased  Sensitivity  but  at  the  expense  of  lowering 
Specificity. The test had moderate Sensitivity when compared to its Specificity. 
Although high Sensitivity for a test is important, but an effective screening tool 
should not also incorrectly identify someone who is able to drive competently as a 
highly specific test is rarely positive in the absence of the outcome of interest (i.e. 
being  a  “poor-driver”)  i.e.  it  gives  few  false  positive  results  and  thus  a  large 
number of “not-poor-drivers” will not be referred to on-road tests, which is also 
quite  favourable  as  these  “not-poor-drivers”  will  be  saved  undue  emotional 
distress and expense. For clinicians who practice in areas where driver evaluation 
resources  (i.e.  on-road  test  facility)  are  not  available  and  who must  decide  to 
remove  driving  privileges  based  on  clinical  findings,  this  is  an  important 
consideration. It may be noted that our sample consisted of active drivers from the 
general driving population (not a clinical population), who apparently had good 
mental  and  physical  constitution  (and  therefore  the  differences  between  the 
younger group and older group were much subtler). Had the older group come 
from  a  clinical  population,  the  effects  would  have  appeared  stronger  with 
consequent higher Sensitivity for the test. Some misclassification by using the test 
is  bound  to  happen  no  matter  how  we  ascertain  the  cut-point  because  of  the 
overlap of the distributions of the “poor-drivers” and the “not-poor-drivers” i.e. 
some “poor-drivers” will tend to have ufov3 scores lower than “not-poor-drivers” 
while some “not-poor-drivers” will have ufov3 scores higher than “poor-drivers”. 
This compromise will happen because we are using a simpler test (i.e. the ufov3 
test) as a proxy for a more elaborate, time consuming, expensive and accurate test 
(i.e. the simulator test) for ascertaining “poor-drivers” with the understanding that 
some misclassification will result. This risk is justified due to the convenience and 274 
 
the low error rate of classification of the ufov3 test (or the high rate of correct 
classification of the ufov3 test, keeping in view that no cognitive measure was 
used  in  driver-categorization).  Also,  in  practice,  the  test  is  most  likely  to  be 
applied  to  a  population  /  individuals  exhibiting  not-so-subtle  cognitive 
decrements, which is bound to give much higher sensitivities. 
•  Age has excellent discrimination ability in separating “poor drivers” from “not-
poor-drivers”. This discriminating ability is slightly less than that of the ufov3 
test, which is evident from the relatively smaller Sensitivity of the age model, 
although in itself the discrimination achieved with age as a predictor is considered 
excellent, based on area under ROC curve. Using age as a discriminator, four 
“poor-drivers” and one “not-poor-driver”’ were misclassified. The cut-point value 
of predicted probability of 0.56 adopted in Section 8.5 when used in Equation 
8.34  corresponds  to  a  cut-point  value  of  77  years  (after  rounding)  of  age. 
However,  age  cannot  solely  be  made  as  a  criterion  for  the  discrimination  of 
drivers as its effects are confounded by neurological diseases. In this research, the 
factor age may have emerged as a significant discriminator because its effects 
were not confounded by  other diseases as the  sample was not from a clinical 
population or had individuals of diverse age afflicted with neurological ailments. 
The elderly are considered a very heterogeneous group. Even in older people of 
the same age, there  exists considerable variability in different attributes. After 
middle age, health deteriorates exponentially over a period of 1 to 3 decades. 
Some older people experience a quite rapid decline in health while others will 
have a slow decline and they will be afflicted with disabilities quite late in life. 
Hence,  a  global  ruling  cannot  be  made  in  this  regard.  Also,  certain  medical 
conditions / neurological diseases that have a tendency to bring about cognitive 
impairment to the extent that safe operation of motor vehicles is not possible and 
increasingly, such medical conditions have started to afflict people at relatively 
early ages. Even a small but significant number of younger people suffer from 
dementia who are likely to drive a motor car. This implies that the government 
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with  regard  to  the  mandatory  evaluation  of  older  driver  performance  and/or 
cognitive evaluation. 
•  A composite cognitive measure that is based on all nine neuropsychological tests 
(trail, clock, rey-copy, rey-recall, dichotic, paper, ufov1, ufov2, ufov3), is not a 
better discriminator than the single ufov3 test in separating “poor drivers” from 
“not-poor-drivers”.  This  composite  cognitive  measure  was  the  sum  of  nine 
cognitive  tests  after  they  had  been  standardized  and  four  of  them  oriented 
(standardized scores of clock, rey-copy, rey-recall and paper multiplied by -1) in 
the  proper  direction.  Although  in  itself  the  discrimination  achieved  with  this 
composite  cognitive  measure  based  on  area  under  ROC  curve  is  considered 
excellent. This finding is contrary to some studies. It is possible for this research 
to have come with this finding because of the particular methodology/approach 
and battery of cognitive tests adopted. Using this composite cognitive measure as 
a  discriminator,  four  “poor-drivers”  and  two  “not-poor-driver”’  were 
misclassified. Even age as a discriminator is slightly better in performance than 
this composite cognitive measure. It shows that the ufov3 test is tapping relevant 
cognitive  constructs  (with  regard  to  driver  discrimination)  than  the  “test  all” 
cognitive skills approach that is being exercised through the composite cognitive 
measure.  Also,  this  is  testament  to  the  much  needed  parsimony/economy  in 
cognitive testing for driving and implies that preliminary driving-status can be 
determined without extensive investment in time. 
•  An equation to predict General driving performance through an index has been 
derived. The cognitive tests ufov3, dichotic and rey-recall as a group emerged as 
the best predictors of a general driving skills index in this research. This index is a 
measure of the general driving skill of a driver with essentially the same emphasis 
being placed on each driving performance parameter and therefore cannot be used 
to assess risky driving behavior due to cognitive impairment. However, it is a 
useful general index that can be used to gauge driving proficiency. These three 
tests  as  a  whole  measure  visual-spatial  construction  ability,  visual  memory, 
organizational,  planning  and  problem  solving  skills  (executive  functioning), 
motor  functioning,  ability  to  switch  attention,  vulnerability  to  distraction, 276 
 
selective  attention,  visual  processing  speed,  divided  and  spatial  attention  —— 
traits that are crucial for driving proficiency. This index will enable to predict 
general driving skill without putting an individual to a road-test and will show the 
degree of aptitude in handling a vehicle in diverse maneuvers. 
•  The  clock  drawing  test  (clock)  and  the  trail  making  test  (trail)  often  used  to 
clinically assesss dementure did not emerge as significant predictors of driving 
ability. Both tests are quick and easy to administer (are paper-and-pencil tests) 
and are recommended by the American Medical Association (AMA) for screening 
unsafe drivers. However, studies (Powlishta et al., 2002; Lee et al., 1996; Storey 
et  al.,  2001)  have  shown  the  clock  drawing  test  not  to  be  a  good  screening 
instrument for detecting the very earliest signs of dementia. Similarly, a critique 
of the trail test in this regard has been highlighted in Section 7.4.8. 
 
9.3 Recommendations 
 
This research shows that relatively simple and inexpensive neuropsychological tests of 
specific cognitive abilities can be used to aid the evaluation of drivers’ risk of unsafe 
driving and measurement of general driving skill. Scores greater than the threshold scores 
on the ufov3 test (that follow) should not result in cessation of driving privileges, but 
rather indicate that the driver needs further assessment / evaluation. This evaluation could 
mean  the  assessment  of the  driver  by  a  qualified  and  experienced driving  evaluation 
specialist / instructor, before a final decision is taken. Also, this cognitive test (ufov3) is 
not  a  substitute  for  other  tests/examinations  that  ascertain  physical  and  sensory  (e.g. 
vision, hearing etc) soundness of drivers. Also, clinicians should expect driving skills to 
deteriorate over time. Therefore, planning for repeat testing  after an  appropriate time 
interval is necessary in the very old drivers / critical cases. As a whole, it is expected that 
if the following recommendations are followed, they can result in substantial safety for 
older drivers and drivers in general.  
•  A score on ufov3 test greater than 220 indicates that the driver should be further 
evaluated by a driving specialist to ascertain risky driving behaviour. 277 
 
•  Drivers above the age of 77 pose a potentially greater risk. If such drivers have 
ufov3  scores  greater  than  220  it  indicates  much  stronger  evidence  for  the 
necessity to ascertain risky driving behavior through a driving specialist. 
•  The UFOV test should be made mandatory for drivers above the age of 77. 
•  If the intent is to measure general driving skill, then the cognitive tests ufov3, 
dichotic and rey-recall can be used with the following equation (Equation 7.13) 
for prediction purposes:   
                 ( ) ( ) ( )
-0.5
e =104.31+23.40 +1 -7.83 log +0.72 DPI dichotic ufov3 rey-recall    
As a guide, predicted scores less 96 (i.e. 2 standard deviations below the mean of 
the younger group) would signify poor driving proficiency and greater than 110 
(median of the younger group) would signify good driving proficiency.   
It may be reiterated that the ufov3 test (involves the identification of a central target and 
simultaneously  the  radial  localization  of  a  peripheral  target  embedded  in  distracter 
triangles) is the third subtest of the UFOV (Useful Field of View) test. The UFOV test 
takes about 15 minutes to administer using an ordinary on-the-market personal computer 
with a 17 inch monitor (computer literacy is not a prerequisite for taking the test). 
 
9.4 Recommended Future Research 
 
There  is  considerable  scope  for  further  research  in  the  realm  of  neuropsychological 
testing (cognitive testing). One aspect that clearly emerges from this research is that in 
general, the paper-and-pencil tests did not emerge as significant predictors of driving skill 
and in discriminating “poor drivers” from “not-poor drivers”. The computerized/listening 
tests were more promising. In this context, it is perceived that the ufov3 test emerged as a 
significant predictor of driving skill and in discriminating “poor drivers” from “not-poor 
drivers”  because  in  the  ufov  test,    the  stimulus  presentation  time  is  shortened  if  the 
previous two responses are correct and is lengthened if the previous response is incorrect. 
This process of tracking the perceptual threshold is continued until a stable estimate of 75 
percent  correct  is  calculated.  Therefore,  new/future  neuropsychological  tests  should 
dynamically adapt to the performance of an individual in setting threshold values so that 278 
 
ceiling effects (too many individual achievieng the highest score) and floor effects (too 
many individuals achieving the lowest score) are avoided so that discrimination between 
the individuals is obvious and variability in scores is achieved with scores proportional to 
an individual’s performance/ability on the test; this is only possible though computerized 
tests. These test should tap different aspects of attention and diverse visuospatial abilities 
(as these are the most important cognitive attributes with regard to driving) and decision 
making  abilities  under  time  pressure.  Also,  much  larger  samples  of  drivers  could  be 
employed from the general driving population in future research. 
   279 
 
Glossary 
 
Automatic Processes : Driving performance also depends on whether individual skills of 
driving draw on “automatic” or “effortful” processes (controlled processes). “Automatic 
processes”  are  fast,  involuntary,  and  place  limited  demands  on  attentional  capacity. 
Automaticity  generally  develops  under  highly  predictable  stimulus  conditions.  In 
contrast, “effortful” or “controlled processes” are slow and capacity-demanding and are 
used  to  deal  with  unpredictable  or  unfamiliar  stimulus  demands.  Some  driving  tasks 
become automatic following extensive practice (e.g., shifting gears). Other may continue 
to require effortful processing even in highly skilled drivers (e.g., backing into a street 
from a driveway). (Parasuraman & Nestor, 1993).  
 
CDR (Clinical Dementia Rating): is a more global assessment tool that incorporates both 
cognitive and functional assessment. It is used by researchers as a mental status screen 
and is recommended in the consensus guidelines of many professional organisations. It is 
a five point scale and is use to rate function in six cognitive functional categories. A 
rating  of  0.5  indicates  questionable  impairment,  3  indicates  sever  impairment.  This 
paradigm is unlikely to be used outside the field of research or in specialized dementia 
centers because of the training and time required to administer the test. 
 
Effortful    Processes  (Controlled  Processes):  Driving  performance  also  depends  on 
whether  individual  skills  of  driving  draw  on  “automatic”  or  “effortful”  processes 
(controlled  processes).  “Automatic  processes”  are  fast,  involuntary,  and  place  limited 
demands  on  attentional  capacity.  Automaticity  generally  develops  under  highly 
predictable stimulus conditions. In contrast, “effortful” or “controlled processes” are slow 
and capacity-demanding and are used to deal with unpredictable or unfamiliar stimulus 
demands.  Some  driving  tasks  become  automatic  following  extensive  practice  (e.g., 
shifting gears). Other may continue to require effortful processing even in highly skilled 
drivers (e.g., backing into a street from a driveway). (Parasuraman & Nestor, 1993). 
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Executive function: Executive function is considered to be a product of the coordinated 
operation of various processes to accomplish a particular goal in a flexible manner. The 
mechanism or system responsible for the coordinated operation of various processes is 
called executive control. (Funahashi, 2001).  
  
Selective Attention: Selective attention refers to the preferential processing by the brain 
of particular stimulus events. It involves the focusing and shifting of attention between 
stimulus  locations,  features,  or  categories  and  is generally  evaluated  by  tests  such  as 
dichotic listening, visual search, cue-directed detection, and the Stroop test. (Parasuraman 
& Nestor, 1993). 
 
Sensitivity:  Is the ability of a screening test to identify those individuals who have a 
condition under consideration. It is calculated as the percentage of all cases having the 
condition  (e.g.  the  condition  could  be  passing  the  driving  test  or  having  a  particular 
disease) who are judged by the test to have the condition (e.g. the condition could be 
passing the driving test or having a particular disease). Few real cases are missed by tests 
that  have  a  high  sensitivity  and  so  will  generate  few  “false-negative”  judgements. 
Sensitivity = (True Positive)/ (True Positive + False Negative). Sensitivity alone does not 
tell us all about the test, because a 100 percent sensitivity can be trivially achieved by 
labelling all test cases positive; hence, we also need to know the Specificity of the test 
(McDowell, 2006). 
 
Specificity:  Is the ability of a screening test to correctly identify those individuals who 
do not have the condition under consideration. It is calculated as the percentage of all 
cases not having the condition (e.g. the condition could be passing the driving test or 
having a particular disease) who are judged by the test not to have the condition (e.g. the 
condition could be passing the driving test or having a particular disease). Specificity = 
(True Negative)/ (True Negative + False Positive). (McDowell, 2006).  
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Divided Attention: Divided Attention is involved when two or more stimulus sources 
must be monitored or when two or more tasks have to be performed simultaneously. 
(Parasuraman & Nestor, 1993). 
 
Sustained Attention: Sustained attention refers to the maintenance of an alert state for 
prolonged periods of time and is typically measured in vigilance tasks. (Parasuraman & 
Nestor, 1993). 
 
Working Memory: Working memory is the collection of structures and processes within 
the brain used for temporarily storing and manipulating information. In other words, the 
major function of working memory is to hold several interrelated bits of information in 
our mind, all at the same time , so that this information can be worked with and then 
used.  Working  memory  acts  like  a  work  bench,  where  material  undergoes  handling, 
combination and transformation. New material and old material, both are held by this 
workbench which has been retrieved from storage (long-term memory).The four main 
structures  of  the  working  memory  model  are  the  Central  Executive,  the  Visuospatial 
Sketchpad, the Phonological loop and the Episodic buffer, as shown below in Figure G.1. 
The  Central  Executive  integrates  information  from  the  Phonological  loop,  the 
Visuospatial  Sketchpad  and  the  episodic  buffer.  In  attention,  planning  strategies  and 
coordinating behaviour, the Central Executive plays a major role. It suppresses irrelevant 
information and distributes tasks into appropriate areas and assigns priority and mental 
capacity to whichever task is seen more important than the other. The central executive 
can be metaphorically thought of as an executive supervisor of a firm/organisation. Issues 
that  need  to  be  attended  to  and  issues  that  need  to  be  ignored  are  decided  by  the 
executive. Also, figuring out how to tackle a problem by the selection of strategies is the 
work  of  the  executive.  The  Central  Executive  has  a  limited  ability  to  perform 
simultaneous tasks. The Visuospatial Sketchpad holds images and visual data and from 
that manipulates and processes the stimuli in order to produce the desired outcome, e.g. in 
driving,  judging  distance  uses  this  function.  The  Phonological  loop  deals  with  the 
manipulation  and  retention  of  auditory  data,  such  as  a  particular  sounds  or  words,  a 
practical use for this is rehearsing a phone number while trying to find a piece of paper to 282 
 
write it on so you don’t forget. The episodic buffer acts as a temporary storehouse, where 
information  from  the  phonological  loop,  the  visuospatial  sketchpad  and  long-term 
memory is gathered and combined. In order to interpret an earlier experience, solve new 
problems and plan future activities, the episodic buffer actively manipulates information 
(Matlin, 2005; Baddeley, 2000). 
 
 
 
Figure G.1 Model of Working Memory showing the Phonological loop, the Visuospatial 
Sketchpad, the Central Executive and Episodic Buffer—as well as their interaction with 
Long-term Memory (Baddeley, 2000 cited in Matlin, 2005) 
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Appendix-A 
 
Instruction Sheet for Trail Making-B Test 
 
Sample Instructions 
 
Start with the sample side up of the Trail Making Test Part B. Provide the examinee with 
a pencil and the following instructions: 
•  On this page are some numbers and letters (point to them). Start at number 1 
(point to “1”) and draw a line to A (point to “A”), A to 2 (point to “2”), 2 to B 
(point to “B”), B to 3 (point to “3”), 3 to C (point to “C”), and so on until you 
reach the end (point to circle marked “END”). Remember first you have a number 
(point to “1”) and then a letter (point to “A”), then a number (point to “2”), then a 
letter (point to “B”), and so on. Draw the lines as fast as you can without lifting 
the pencil from the paper. Ready! Go! 
•  If the participant completes the sample completely, say: “That was good, now we 
will go to the next one.”  And then proceed to the formal Trail Making-B Test. 
•  If a mistake is made by the participant (in the sample test), it should be pointed 
out and explained. The following explanations of mistakes are to be accepted. 
•  You started with the wrong circle, this is where you start (point to “1”). 
•  You omitted this circle (i.e. missed it). You should go from point 1 to A (point), A 
to 2 (point), 2 to B (point), B to 3 (point), and so on until you reach the end point. 
After the mistake has been explained, the examiner should mark out the wrong 
part and say: “Go on from here (pointing to the last circle completed correctly in 
the sequence).” If it is obvious that the examinee intended to touch the circle but 
missed  it,  it  should  not  be  counted  as  an  omission,  but  he  or  she  should  be 
cautioned to touch the circle. 
•  If the examinee still cannot complete the sample test, then his hand should be held 
and the pencil guided (eraser side down) through the circles. Then say: “Now try 284 
 
it, remember that start at number 1 (point) and a line should be drawn from 1 to A 
(Point), from A to 2 (point), 2 to B (point), from B to 3 (point), and so on until 
you reach the END. I will time how fast you can do this. Ready? Start!” 
•  If the examinee succeeds this time, then go on to the formal Trail Making-B Test. 
If he doesn’t succeed then the procedure should be repeated until he succeeds or it 
becomes evident that he cannot. 
 
Formal Trail Making-B Test Instructions 
 
On this page are both numbers and letters. It should be done the same way as the sample 
was done. The examinee should be instructed to begin at number1 (point) and a line 
drawn from 1 to A (point), from A to 2 (point), 2 to B (point), B to 3 (point), 3 to C 
(point), and so on ,in order until the END is reached. It should be reiterated that first there 
is a number (point), and then a letter (point), then a number (point), then a letter (point), 
and so on. The examinee should be told not to skip around and should go from one circle 
to the next in appropriate order. And the lines should be drawn as fast as possible without 
lifting the pencil from the paper. Finally say: “Ready! Begin!” 
Start timing as soon as the examinee is told to begin. If the participant makes an error, it 
should  be  called  to  his  attention  and  have  him  proceed  from  the  point  the  mistake 
occurred. Do not stop timing. If part B is completed without errors, record the time to the 
nearest second and remove the test sheet. 
Again if it is obvious that the examinee will be unable to complete the task successfully 
in any amount of time, the activity should be discontinued. 
Figure A.1 shows the full version of the Trail Making-B Test consisting of 25 circles with 
numbers 1 to 13 and alphabets A to L and Figure A.2 the sample test version of the Trail 
Making-B Test consisting of 8 circles with numbers 1 to 4 and alphabets A to D. 
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Figure A.1 Full version of the Trail Making-B Test consisting of 25 circles with 
numbers 1 to 13 and alphabets A to L. 
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Figure A.2 Sample test version of the Trail Making-B Test consisting of 8 circles 
with numbers 1 to 4 and alphabets A to D. 
 
Instruction Sheet for Clock-Drawing Test 
 
Present the subjects with a blank sheet of paper measuring 8 ½-by-11 inches and the 
following  instructions  should  be  given:  “You  are  to  draw  a  clock  and  put  in  the 
numbers.” After the participant draws the clock, the following instructions should be 
passed: “Now set the time at 10 minutes past 11”. Figure A.3 shows the scoring sheet for 
the Clock Drawing Test (Freedman Method). 
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Clock Drawing Test Scoring Sheet (Freedman Method) 
Contour 
1. Acceptable contour drawn   
2. Contour is not too small nor overdrawn 
nor reproduced repeatedly  
 
Numbers 
3. Only numbers 1-12 (without adding extra 
numbers or omitting numbers) 
 
4. Arabic number representation    
5. Numbers written in the correct order   
6. Paper not rotated while drawing numbers   
7. Numbers in the correct position   
8. All numbers located inside contour   
Hands 
9. Clock has two hands / or marks   
10. Hour target number indicated in some 
manner 
 
11. Minute target number indicated in some 
manner 
 
12.  Hands  in  correct  proportion  (minute 
hand longer) 
 
13. No superfluous markings   
14. Hands are joined or within 12 mm (1/2 
in) of joining  
 
Center 
15. Clock has a center (drawn or inferred/ 
extrapolated  at  the  point  where  2  hands 
meet) 
 
Total   
 
Figure A.3 Scoring Sheet for Clock Drawing Test (Freedman Method) 288 
 
 
Notes:  In this scoring system of the free-drawn clock, the clock drawings are scored 
according to the broad categories of contour, numbers, hands, and center. The scoring 
system consists of 15 critical items that constitute a maximum score of 15 i.e  a score of  
1  for  each  item  if  it  is  in  the  affirmative.  With  regard  to  item  1,  the  definition  of 
“acceptable” is any closed contour and closure is considered adequate if the lines used to 
draw  the  contour  are  touching  or  overlapping.  If  all  numbers  and  hands  can  not  be 
included  in  the  contour,  the  size  of  the  contour  is  considered  unacceptable.  Roman 
numerals are also acceptable. If a number is placed in a position that is not normally 
occupied by another number, then it is considered to be placed correctly. With regard to 
item 12, if the hour hand is perceptibly or measurably shorter than the minute hand, the 
hands are considered to be proportioned correctly. If the hands do not physically touch or 
intersect, the subject’s hands (i.e clock hands) can be extended to a point of intersection 
so  as  to  give  an  approximate  extrapolated  center.  Superfluous  markings  are  those 
markings that are not necessary for the indication of contour, numbers, or time. Marks 
that distinctly represent either 1- or 5-minute intervals are not considered superfluous. 
 
Instruction Sheet for Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test 
 
These instructions for the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test have been adapted from 
Strauss et al. (2006) (Strauss et al., 2006). Give the candidate a sheet of plain 8 ½ ×11 
inches paper which should be placed vertically on the table. Then give the following 
instructions: I would like to give you a card on which there is a design and I would like 
you to copy the design on the blank sheet of paper. Please copy the figure with care. The 
timing should be begun as soon as the drawing is exposed. Erasing is allowed by Meyers 
and Meyers (Meyers & Meyers, 1995b cited in Strauss et al., 2006). The drawing should 
be  carefully  supervised,  especially  in  the  early  stages.  If  the  candidate  is  drawing 
carelessly, he (she) should be reminded that the copy has to be made as accurate as 
possible.  
The maximum and minimum exposure time for the card and the candidate’s copy is 5 
minutes and 2½ minutes respectively. If after a lapse of 2 ½ minutes it is felt that the 289 
 
candidate is drawing too slowly, he (she) should be made aware of this and told to speed 
up the drawing. If the drawing is finished before 2 ½ minutes, the candidate should be 
told  to  check  the  drawing  carefully  and  to  make  sure  that  it  is  complete.  At  the 
completion of the drawing, the subject’s copy as well as the stimulus card (card with the 
drawing of the Rey-Complex figure) is removed from the candidate’s sight.  
The drawing completion time should be recorded. It should not take more than 5 minutes 
to complete the drawing, unless the candidate has a considerable motor difficulty. More 
important is the fact that the candidate completes the drawing as well as he can, than to 
have it finished within 5 minutes; therefore, the candidate should be allowed as much 
time as needed to enable him to draw to the best of his ability. But the card has to be 
exposed for a maximum of 5 minutes and a minimum of 2 ½ minutes. 
After a delay of 3 minutes (after copying the figure), which should be filled with a verbal 
task such as talking (no visual memory task should be given in this gap), a clean sheet of 
paper should be provided to the candidate and the following instructions given: If you 
remember, I gave you a figure to copy a short time ago. I would like that you draw that 
figure again. There is no time constraint.  
The quantitative scoring criteria of the Rey-Osterrieth Test is shown in Figure A.4 below. 
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REY-OSTERRIETH COMPLEX FIGURE TEST 
FORM A (Rey Figure) 
Details  Copy  3-Minutes Recall 
1. Cross upper left corner, outside of rectangle     
2. Large rectangle     
3. Diagonal cross     
4. Horizontal midline of 2     
5. Vertical midline     
6. Small rectangle, within 2 to the left     
7. Small segment above 6     
8. Four parallel lines within 2, upper left     
9. Triangle above 2 upper right     
10.  Small vertical line within 2, below 9     
11. Circle with three dots within 2     
1 
2 
2  2 
2 
2  2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
5 
5 
6 
6 
7 
8 
8 
8 
8 
9 
9 
10 
11 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
13 
13 
14 
15 
15 
16 
17 
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REY-OSTERRIETH COMPLEX FIGURE TEST 
FORM A (Rey Figure) 
12. Five parallel lines with 2 crossing 3, lower right     
13. Sides of triangle attached to 2 on right     
14. Diamond attached to 13     
15.  Vertical  line  within  triangle  13  parallel  to  right 
vertical of 2  
   
16. Horizontal line within 13, continuing 4 to right     
17. Cross attached to low center     
18. Square attached to 2, lower left     
Total score     
Scoring:  
Consider each of the eighteen units separately, and appraise accuracy of each unit and 
relative position within the whole of the design. For each unit count as follows: 
 
Correct          placed properly    2 points 
            placed poorly      1 point 
 
Distorted or incomplete      placed properly    1 point 
but recognizable        placed poorly      ½ point 
 
Absent or not recognizable              0 points 
Maximum                  36 points 
 
Figure A.4 Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test: Form A and legend. Source: Osterrieth, 
P.A.  (1944).  Le  test  de  copie  d’une  figure  complex:  Contribution  a  l’etude  de  la 
perception et de la memoire. Archives de Psychologie;30: 286-356. 
 
Taylor Scoring Criteria / guidelines for the Rey-Osterieth Complex figure (reproduced 
from Spreen & Strauss, 1991). 
(Note: Detail 1 means Item 1, Detail 2 means Item 2, and so on) 292 
 
 
Detail 1: The cross at the upper left corner, outside of the rectangle. The cross must come 
down to the horizontal midline of the rectangle and must extend above the rectangle. The 
line that joins the cross to the rectangle must be approximately in the middle of the cross 
and must come between Detail 7 and the top of the rectangle.  
Detail 2: The large rectangle. The horizontal dimensions of the rectangle must not be 
greater  than  twice  the  vertical  dimensions  of  the  rectangle,  nor  must  the  rectangle 
resemble a square. Because there are so many possibilities of distorting the rectangle and 
it is not possible to score for position, a score of ½ point is given if the rectangle is 
incomplete or distorted in any way.  
Detail 3: The diagonal cross must touch each of the four corners of the rectangle and 
must intersect in the middle of the rectangle.  
Detail  4:  The  horizontal  midline  of  the  rectangle  must  go  clearly  across  from  the 
midpoint of the left side of the rectangle to the midpoint of the right side of the rectangle 
in one unbroken line. 
Detail 5: The vertical midline must start at the midpoint of the bottom of the rectangle 
and go through in one unbroken line to the midpoint at the top of the rectangle. In scoring 
for position of details 4, 5, and 6, they should intersect at the midpoint of the rectangle. 
Usually, if they do not, only one of them is scored as incorrect for position. Very seldom 
are all three scored as incorrect for not being in position.  
Detail 6: The small rectangle within the large rectangle and to the left side of it. The 
boundaries of Detail 6 are defined by the top of the rectangle falling between lines 2 and 
3 of the parallel lines that make up Detail 8, and the width of the small rectangle must be 
approximately one-quarter of the width of the large rectangle; that is, it should come to 
the midpoint between the left side of the large rectangle and the vertical midpoint of the 
rectangle. The cross within detail 6 must come from the four corners of the rectangle and 
should intersect at the mid-point of the rectangle (i.e.,  intersecting on Detail 4).  
Detail 7: The Straight line above Detail 6 must be shorter than the horizontal aspect of 
Detail 6 and must fall between the top of Detail 6 and the second line of Detail 8.  
Detail 8: The four parallel lines within the rectangle in the upper left corner should be 
parallel,  with  the  spaces  between  them  approximately  equal.  If  the  lines  are  unduly 293 
 
slanted or, of course, if there are more or less than four of them, then the scoring is 
penalized.  
Detail 9: The triangle above the rectangle on the upper right, with the height less than the 
base.  
Detail 10: The small vertical line within the rectangle just below detail 9. The line should 
be clearly shifted to the left within the upper right quadrangle in the rectangle.  
Detail 11: The circle with three dots must be in the lower right half of the upper right 
quadrangle. It must not touch any of the three sides of the triangular area in which it is 
placed, and the positioning of the dots should be such that there are two above and one 
below, so that it resembles a face. 
Detail 12: The five parallel lines that are crossing the lower right aspect of Detail 3 must 
all be within the lower right quadrangle. They must not touch any sides of the quadrangle, 
and they should be approximately equidistant from one another. 
Detail 13: The triangle on the right end of the large rectangle. The height of the triangle 
must not be greater than half of the horizontal midline of the rectangle and, as already 
mentioned, the slope of the sides of the triangle must not be a continuation of the slope of 
Detail 9. 
Detail 14: The diamond attached to the end of Detail 13 should be diamond-shaped and 
must be attached to the end of detail 13; it must not extend down below the bottom of the 
large rectangle, Detail 2.  
Detail 15: The vertical line within triangle 13 must be parallel to the right vertical of 
Detail 2, the large rectangle, and it must be shifted to the left within Detail 13. 
Detail 16: The horizontal line within Detail 13, which is a continuation of Detail 4 to the 
right, must come from the midpoint of the right side of the large rectangle and extend to 
the top of triangle 13. If triangle 13 is slightly askew, or if Detail 4 does not meet the 
midpoint of the right side of the rectangle, Detail 16 should still be scored as a full 2 
points if it went to the top of the triangle from the midpoint of the right side of the 
rectangle.  
Detail 17: The cross attached to the lower center area of the rectangle. The right side of 
the cross must be clearly longer than the left side of the cross but must not extend beyond 294 
 
the  right  end  of  the  large  rectangle.  It  should  also,  at  its  left  end,  commence  at  the 
midpoint of the right side of the square, which is Detail 18. 
Detail 18: The square on the lower left corner of Detail 2. It must clearly be a square, as 
opposed to the rectangular shape of Detail 6, and its sides should be the same size as the 
vertical aspect of Detail  6, extending halfway between the left side of the rectangle and 
the vertical midline of the rectangle. 
 
Instruction Sheet For Dichotic Listening Test 
 
The examinee is given a set of stereo headphones and showed the left ear headphone 
(marked with a “L”) and the right ear headphone. The volume for both ears is adjusted 
individually according to the subject’s preference so that the messages seem equally loud 
to the examinee. Verbal instructions are given about the contents of the test and what the 
examinee is supposed to do. Since a digit is most likely to be missed if it is presented 
when  the  examinee  is  speaking  in  response  to  the  just  preceding  relevant  digit,  the 
examinee is advised to speak the relevant digit quickly as soon as he hears it so that he is 
ready for the next one. The examinee is told that he has to repeat aloud the “Test number” 
of the test so that the examiner knows which test is being played. Also, the examinee has 
to speak aloud only the digits from the relevant ear in both parts of the test and the 
examiner has to write these digits/letters. The relevant ear is designated by the tones (low 
tone=left  ear  is  relevant;  high  tone=right  ear  is  relevant).  There  are  4  practice  tests. 
Before the practice tests, the examinee is played a “low” tone and a “high” tone so that he 
becomes  familiar  with  it  and  can  differentiate  between  them.  Also,  he  is  played  a 
recording of the actual pronunciation of the digits (0 to 9) and alphabet letters (A to Z) so 
that he becomes familiar with their pronunciation and knows their peculiarities. 
Out of these 4 practice tests, switching of the relevant channel is involved in two tests and 
in two tests the same ear is to be attended to in part one and part two. In the Dichotic 
Listening  Test,  it  is  standard  practice  to  repeat  the  practice  trials  until  the  examinee 
knows what to do and the task has been understood. After the examinee understands the 
task, the actual tests start. There are 24 tests divided in 2 groups. Group one consists of 
“Test 1” to “Test 12”, and group two consists of “Test 13” to “Test 24”. After 12 tests, 295 
 
there is a break of 30 seconds and then the other 12 tests are instituted. To facilitate 
ambiguous-free scoring, a scoring sheet was developed which is shown in Table A.1. 
 
Table A.1 Dichotic Listening Test scoring sheet 
Dichotic Listening Test Scoring Sheet 
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Date                    
Purpose                   
ID                   
Name                   
Date of birth                   
occupation                   
   4  7  6  0  2  8  -  5  9  3                
          5  1  9  3  -  4  7  6                  
* P Test 1 (LR)                   
   2  4  6  3  7  0  -  1  9  5                
              9  8  -  7  4  2                  
P Test 2 (LL)                   
   0  5  9  4  7  1  -  6  8  2                
         3  6  8  2  -  1  5  9                  
* P Test 3 (RL)                   
   7  9  3  1  2  5  -  6  4  8                
             8  0  -  1  3  9                   
P Test 4 (RR)                   
   3  4  6  8  2  0  -  9  7  1                
   1   9   7  5  -  3  8  4                
Test 1 (RR)                   296 
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   8  0  1  2  3  7  -  4  6  5                
   5  6  9  4  -  3  1  8                
*Test 2 (LR)                   
   0  4  1  9  3  5  -  6  2  8                
   8  7  -  3  0  5                
*Test 3 (RL)                   
   8  3  0  1  7  2  -  9  4  5                
   5  4  6  9  -  8  2  0                
Test 4 (LL)                   
   6  9  2  0  3  5  -  4  8  7                
   1  8  7  4  -  2  0  9                
*Test 5 (LR)                   
   6  2  7  0  9  8  -  5  3  4                
   3  5  1  4  -  2  8  7                
Test 6 (RR)                   
   5  3  9  0  1   6  -  2  4  8                
   7  4  2  8  -  1  9  6                
Test 7 (RR)                   
   6  5  7  2  4  1  -  9  0  3                
   3  8  -  2  5  6                
Test 8 (LL)                   
   7  9  6  1  5  3  -  2  0  8                
   4  0  2  8  -  3  1  9                
Test 9 (LL)                   
   8  5  9  6  3  0  -  7  4  2                297 
 
Dichotic Listening Test Scoring Sheet 
     
P
a
r
t
 
I
 
P
a
r
t
 
I
 
P
a
r
t
 
I
I
 
P
a
r
t
 
I
I
 
E
r
r
o
r
s
 
   7  1  -  9  8  3                
*Test 10 (RL)                   
   4  8  5  9  1  0  -  7  2  3                
   6  3  -  8  4  5                 
Test 11 (RR)                   
   6  9  7  2  3  0  -  1  5  8                
   5  1  4  8  -  0   7  2                
Test 12 (LL)                   
   4  2  0  5  1  8  -  3  6  7                
   6  9  -  1  0  2                
*Test 13 (LR)                   
   1  3  9  6  0  4  -  7  8  5                
   8  7  2  5  -  4  1  6                
*Test 14 (LR)                   
   4  3  1  6  8  5  -  2  0  9                
   9  7  -  5  4  1                
Test 15 (LL)                   
   9  4  2  5  6  8  -  0  7  3                
   3  1  -  9  5  8                
Test 16 (LL)                   
   5  0  8  3  1  9  -  4  6  7                
   4  2  -  1  5  9                
*Test 17 (RL)                   
   4  5  8  3  6  0  -  7  1  2                
   9  2  -  4  3  6                298 
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Test 18 (RR)                   
   4  2  8  3  0  9  -  1  5  6                
   7  6  -  3  8  4                
*Test 19 (LR)                   
   1  8  0  3  6  2  -  7  9  4                
   9  5  -  1  0  3                
*Test 20 (LR)                   
   2  6  7  1  4  0  -  9  8  5                
   8  3  -  1  2  4                
Test 21 (RR)                   
   7  1  4  8  3  9  -  6  2  0                
   0  6  5  2  -  3  9  7                
*Test 22 (RL)                   
   9  4  8  6  1  0  -  7  5  2                
   5  3  7  2  -  4  1  0                
*Test 23 (RL)                   
   3  4  0  2  6  7  -  8  9  5                
   8  1  9  5  -  0  4  7                
*Test 24 (RL)                   
Total                   
Note: The “P” before the Test No. stands for practice test. 
* switching from left to right ear or from right to left ear takes place (row shown 
in shading). 
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Scoring detail of the Dichotic Listening Test 
 
To facilitate scoring of the Dichotic Listening Test, a score sheet was prepared (Table 
A.1). In this score sheet all the relevant digits for part one and part two of each test were 
written in bold font in one line. The irrelevant digits were noted in a line above the line of 
relevant digits. Tests wherein the switching of the relevant channel (from left to right or 
right to left) took place were given a shade to distinguish them from the rest, as switching 
errors are only noted in these tests (these tests were twelve in number). The examinee-
dictated  digits  were  noted  on  this  sheet  of  paper  in  front  of  each  test.  To  facilitate 
ambiguity-free scoring, we bifurcated the examinee-dictated digits into two groups (i.e., 
part one and part two of the test) by examining the actual relevant and irrelevant digits. 
For Omission errors, we noted the number of relevant digits in part one that were omitted 
by the examinees in each test and then added them up for all the tests; these were the 
Omission  errors.  We  divided  this  by  72  and  multiplied  it  by  100  to  get  percentage 
Omitted errors. We divided by 72 because in the 24 tests, 12 tests had 2 relevant digits 
and 12 had 4 relevant digits in part one. 
For  Intrusion errors, we inspected the examinee-dictated digits/letters in part one and 
compared  them  with  the  irrelevant  digits/letters  in  part  one.  The  number  of  common 
digits/letters between these comparisons was the intrusions. These were added for all 24 
tests to obtain Intrusion errors. We divided this by 144 and multiplied it by 100 to get 
percentage Intrusion errors. We divided by 144 because in the 24 tests, each test had six 
irrelevant digits in part one, so the maximum number of intrusions that one could make 
was six in each test. For the switching errors category, since 50 percent of the second 
parts of the tests (i.e., 12 tests out of 24) involved switching to the other channel (the 
other  ear),  thus  the  number  of  Omission  and  Intrusion  errors  (as  explained  above) 
following the switch in relevant channel in the second part of these 12 tests were coded as 
switching  errors.  For  these  errors  we  had  to  consider  only  the  12  tests  where  the 
switching in the channel took place (i.e., Test number 2,3,5,10,13,14,17,19,20,22,23 and 
24). The switching errors for these tests were added to get switching errors. We divided 
these by 72 and multiplied it by 100 to get percentage Switching errors. We divided by 72 
because in the 12 tests under consideration, in each test there were 3 relevant digits in 300 
 
part two that could be missed and there were also three irrelevant digits that could have 
intruded. 
To  get  the  total  number  of  errors  we  added  the  number  of  Omission,  Intrusion  and 
Switching errors for all 24 tests. Percentage Total errors were calculated by dividing this 
number by 288 (i.e., 72+144+72 = 288). 
 
Paper Folding Test Instructions 
 
These  instructions  and  the  sample  problem  presented  below  have  been  adopted  from 
Ekstrom et al. (1976) (Ekstrom, R.B., French, J.W., Harman, H.H. (1976). Manual for Kit 
of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests 1976. Educational Testing Service, Princeton, New 
Jersey.)  In  this  test,  it  has  to  be  imagined  that  pieces  of  paper  are  folded  and  then 
unfolded.  Every  problem  in  this  test  consists  of  some  figures  drawn  to  the  left  of  a 
vertical line and some are drawn to the right of this vertical line. The figures on the left 
hand side of the vertical line show a square piece of paper being folded; the last of these 
figures has one or two holes drawn on it which shows the location where the paper has 
been punched. The hole is punched in such a manner that it passes through the whole of 
the thickness of the paper. There are five figures on the right hand side of the vertical 
line. One of these figures shows the position of the holes, when the paper is completely 
unfolded. You are to decide which of these five figures is the correct representation of the 
paper, when it is unfolded; the correct figure has to be marked with an X through it. The 
example in Figure A.5 and A.6 illustrates the problem. 
 
 
 
Figure A.5 A simple example of Paper Folding test. 
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C is the correct answer to the sample problem presented in Figure A.5. Figure A.6 show 
the folding and unfolding of the paper and justifies the answer C, which is the correct 
answer.  
 
 
Figure A.6 Showing unfolding of paper after punching of hole. 
 
In all paper folding problems that follow, all the folds that the paper under goes are 
shown in the figures to the left of the vertical line and the paper is not moved or turned in 
any other way except to illustrate the folds shown in the figures. The answer is the figure 
that shows the position of the holes when the paper is completely unfolded.  
Scoring on the test will be such that the marks for correctly answered problems will add 
to the total score, while a fraction of the marks of each problem will be subtracted from 
the  total  score  for  each  incorrect  problem.  Therefore,  guessing  will  not  be  to  the 
advantage of candidates unless they eliminate one or more of the answer alternatives as 
wrong. Also, paper folding problems that involve more folds carry more marks and vice 
versa .You will have 10 minutes to complete the test. 
 
Scoring of Paper Folding test 
 
The examinees  have 5 alternatives (i.e., A,B,C,D,E) to choose from on each test item. 
The  16  test  items  are  not  scored  equally.  The  score  of  each  test  item  (if  correct)  is 
proportional to the number of folds in that item. One fold item is allocated 2.5 marks (if 
correct), the two folds 5 marks, the 3 folds 7.5 marks and the 4 folds 10 marks. Since 302 
 
there are 4 items each of the one, two, three and four folds, if an examinee answers all of 
them correctly he gets 100 marks (i.e., 2.5 × 4 + 5 × 4 + 7.5 × 4 + 10 × 4 = 100). To 
discourage  guessing,  some  marks  are  subtracted  from  the  total  score,  for  incorrect 
answers. Since each item has 5 alternatives, the probability that a guess will be correct is 
one  fifth;  therefore  if  an  item  is  incorrect,  one  fifth  of  the  marks  of  that  item  are 
subtracted from the total score. For example, if an examinee answers all items correctly 
except one 3 fold item and one four fold item his net score is 79 (i.e., correct marks – 
incorrect marks = (2.5 × 4 + 5 × 4 + 7.5 × 3 + 10 × 3) – ( 7.5 × 1/5  + 10 × 1/5 ) = 82.5 – 
3.5 = 79).   303 
 
Paper Folding Test 
 
 
 
 
3 
E  C  D  B  A 
2 
B  C  E  A  D 
A  B  C  E  D 
1 304 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
E  C  A  B  D 
5 
A  B  C  D  E 
4 
D  B  C  A  E 305 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
C  A  B  D  E 
8 
B  C  D  A  E 
7 
B  A  C  E  D 306 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
E  A  B  C  D 
11 
B  A  C  D  E 
10
E  A  B  C  D 307 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
E  C  B  D  A 
14 
D  A  B  C  E 
13 
D  A  B  C  E 308 
 
 
 
UFOV Test Instructions 
 
Presently, only the PC versions of the test are being marketed. We used the PC version 
that employs the mouse to make responses. For detailed testing procedure, the UFOV 
manual  may  be  consulted  (Visual  Awareness  Inc.,  2002).  However,  before  the  test 
begins, examinees are informed that the test would not go forward unless a response is 
made, therefore if they are unsure of the correct answer, they should guess. UFOV is not 
a reaction time test. Therefore, an examinee should take his or her time in responding. 
Rather, it is the accuracy of his or her response that counts. Also, during the course of the 
test, there will be a point when the test becomes impossible and therefore, they should not 
be alarmed if they cannot recognize the displayed presentation at that time. Test scores 
for  each  subtset  are  generated  by  the  computer.  For  interpretation  of  the  scores,  the 
UFOV  manual  may  be  consulted  (Visual  Awareness  Inc.,  2002).  Table  A.2  shows 
conversion of percent reduction in UFOV score (used in the Standard version) to subtest 
threshold in milliseconds (used in the PC versions) and vice versa (source: Edwards et al., 
2005). 
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Table A.2 Table for conversion of percent reduction in UFOV score (used in the 
Standard version) to subtest threshold in milliseconds (used in the PC versions) and vice 
versa (source: Edwards et al., 2005). 
UFOV Task 
Standard Version 
(% reduction) 
Touch and Mouse Versions 
(ms) 
Subtest 1 
0  0- 30 
5  31- 40 
10  41- 50 
15  51- 60 
20  61- 70 
25  71- 80 
30  >   80 
Subtest 2 
0  <   20 
5  21- 40 
10  41- 80 
15  81-120 
20  121-160 
25  161-200 
27.5  201-240 
30  > 240 
Subtest 3 
0  <  40 
7.5  41- 80 
12.5  81-120 
17.5  121-160 
22.5  161-200 
25  201-240 
30  > 240 
Note:  Total loss is the sum of the percent reduction from each of the three 
subtests 
.   310 
 
Appendix-B 
 
Appendix-B pertains to the Questionnaire. Appendix-B is on Compact Disc 
Appendix-C 
 
Appendix-C pertains to Chapter 4 i.e. Driving Simulation. Appendix-C is on Compact Disc 
Appendix-D 
 
Appendix-D pertains to Chapter 5 i.e. Driving Performance Indices. Appendix-D is on 
Compact Disc 
Appendix-E 
 
Appendix-E pertains to Chapter 6 i.e. Cluster Analysis. Appendix-E is on Compact Disc 
Appendix-F 
 
Appendix-F pertains to Chapter 7 i.e. Development of Linear Models. Appendix-F is on 
Compact Disc 
Appendix-G 
 
Appendix-G  pertains  to  Chapter  8  i.e.  Logistic  Regression  Models.  Appendix-G  is  on 
Compact Disc 
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